

AJS

OK-15463-27-KP415

American
Journal
of Sociology
Volume 111 Number 1
July 2005

Social Capital Activation and Job-Finding Assistance—Smith

Race and the Accumulation of Human Capital—Tomaskovic-
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The Institutional Logic of Occupational Prestige Ranking—
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The Case for a New Class Map—Weeden and Grusky

A Theory of Scandal—Adut

Interlocking Corporate Directorates—Burris

Review Essay—Camic

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AJS

American Journal of Sociology

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Volume 111 No 1 July 2005

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“Don’t put my name on it”: Social Capital Activation and Job-Finding Assistance among the Black Urban Poor¹

Sandra Susan Smith
University of California, Berkeley

From a social capital theoretical perspective, deficiencies in access to mainstream ties and institutions explain persistent joblessness among the black urban poor. Little problematized, however, is the extent to which access leads to mobilization and the social context within which social capital activation occurs. Employing in-depth interviews of 105 low-income African-Americans, this work advances the literature in two ways. First, it suggests that what we have come to view as deficiencies in access among the black urban poor may have more to do with functional deficiencies of their job referral networks. Second, the findings from this study lay the groundwork for a single, multilevel conceptual framework within which to understand social capital activation, a framework that takes into consideration properties of the individuals, dyads, and communities of residence.

INTRODUCTION

Within the urban poverty literature, social isolation from mainstream ties and institutions is the basis upon which the black urban poor are presumed to lack social capital that facilitates job finding (Briggs 1998, Ran-

¹ This research was supported in part by a grant from the Ford Foundation to the Program on Poverty, the Underclass, and Public Policy at the University of Michigan, the Russell Sage Foundation’s Visiting Scholars Program, and New York University’s Research Challenge Fund. For helpful comments and suggestions, I would like to thank Michael Burawoy, Sheldon Danziger, Giselle Hendrie, Arlie Hochschild, Rosamond King, Mario Small, Stacey Sutton, William Julius Wilson, Alford Young, Jr., participants of the Summer Workshop of the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin—Madison, and Berkeley’s Department of Sociology Colloquium. For their research assistance, thanks as well to Meghan Falvey, Christine Hooker, and Hannah Pierce. Finally, I would like to express my greatest appreciation to the *AJS* reviewers, who provided amazing feedback that pushed me beyond what I perceived my limits to be. Direct correspondence to Sandra S. Smith, Department

kin and Quane 2000, Tigges, Brown, and Green 1998, Wacquant and Wilson 1989) As a result, it is argued that absent access to personal contacts who are able to provide job information and influence hires, even during strong economic times, members of this group still have great difficulty finding work (Wilson 1987) Recent evidence suggests, however, that their social isolation has been exaggerated These studies provide convincing evidence that the networks of the black urban poor are larger, more diverse and wide ranging, and much less detached from the mainstream than conventional wisdom indicates (Oliver 1988, Hurlbert, Beggs, and Haines 1998, Newman 1999), thus raising an interesting question If social isolation has been overestimated, what is the source of the black urban poor's social capital deficiency?

Qualitative research suggests that even when connected to ties who can provide job information and influence, the black urban poor often have difficulty *mobilizing* these ties for job-finding assistance (Jackson 2001, Newman 1999) In *No Shame in My Game*, for instance, Katherine Newman (1999) notes that among the low-wage workers she studied, personal contacts were vital to the job-matching process, but assistance was not always forthcoming Fearing that their referrals would prove unreliable and would compromise their reputations with employers, a few of her subjects denied help to their job-seeking ties Access, therefore, did not guarantee mobilization

While the work of Newman and others is noteworthy, it is only suggestive Without systematic investigations of job contacts' willingness to assist, we do not know why and to what extent those in possession of job information and influence are willing (or disinclined) to provide job-finding assistance, as well as what conditions have to be met for assistance to be forthcoming This study attempts to fill these gaps in the literature, both empirically and theoretically First, by exploring the process of making job referrals, I systematically document the concerns that the black urban poor have about providing assistance and investigate the effect that these concerns have on their general willingness to come to their job-seeking ties' aid Second, because prior research has not problematized the conditions that facilitate social capital activation during the job referral process, it is unclear what factors explain variations in job contacts' decisions to assist their job-seeking ties Drawing from a wide variety of earlier investigations, I show that the factors favorable to social capital activation operate at multiple levels, and I offer a single, multilevel conceptual framework within which to understand social capital activation

Employing in-depth interviews and survey data of 105 low-income

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African-Americans from one midwestern city, I find that those in possession of job information and influence overwhelmingly approached job-finding assistance with great skepticism and distrust. Over 80% of respondents in my sample expressed concern that job seekers in their networks were too unmotivated to accept assistance, required great expenditures of time and emotional energy, or acted too irresponsibly on the job, thereby jeopardizing contacts' own reputations in the eyes of employers and negatively affecting their already-tenuous labor market prospects. Consequently, they were generally reluctant to provide the type of assistance that best facilitates job acquisition in low-wage labor markets where employers rely heavily on informal referrals for recruitment and screening.

Social capital activation did occur, however, even in the context of pervasive distrust and perceived untrustworthiness. An examination of the job referral process revealed that assistance was contingent on several factors, including the SES of the neighborhoods in which contacts resided and the strength of their relationships with their job-seeking ties. However, decisions regarding the extent and nature of assistance were most profoundly affected by the interaction between job contacts' own reputations and job seekers' reputations. Overwhelmingly, job contacts were concerned about job seekers' prior behaviors and actions in the workplace and at home, as these indicated how they might behave once hired. Given little consideration were job seekers whose past indicated unreliability and those whose behaviors were characterized as "ghetto." Both types represented high risks. However, job contacts' decisions to assist also depended a great deal on their own reputations with employers. Those held in high regard were generally willing to assist even job seekers of ill repute. However, as their standing with employers declined, contacts became far more discriminating.

Thus, this study contributes to the literature on many levels. Findings indicate that social capital deficiencies of the black urban poor may have less to do with *deficiencies in access* to mainstream ties than previously thought. Instead, the inefficaciousness of job referral networks appears to have more to do with *functional deficiencies* (see Coleman and Hoffer 1987)—the disinclination of potential job contacts to assist when given the opportunity to do so, not because they lack information or the ability to influence hires, but because they perceive pervasive untrustworthiness among their job-seeking ties and choose not to assist. Furthermore, to the extent that social capital activation does occur, I show that decisions to assist are contingent on several factors, including the SES of contacts' community of residence, the strength of relationships with their job-seeking ties, and individuals' reputations and status. With these findings in mind, I propose a multilevel conceptual framework that understands

social capital activation as a function of properties at the community, the dyad, and the individual, thus laying the groundwork for future research designed to test rigorously the hypotheses implied herein

SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY IN THE STATUS-ATTAINMENT TRADITION

Access and Mobilized Models

In the process of status attainment, Nan Lin (2001) differentiates between two types of social capital—accessed and mobilized. This distinction represents a potentially valuable route for rethinking the relationship between social capital, job finding, and joblessness among the black urban poor. Accessed social capital models explain status attainment as a function of individuals' network structure and composition (Boxman, De Graaf, and Flap 1991, Burt 1992, 1997, Campbell, Marsden, and Hurlbert 1986, Granovetter 1985, Lin and Dumin 1986, Lin 1999). In contrast to accessed social capital models, mobilized social capital models are limited to studies in which personal contacts have been used for instrumental action, such as job finding. Here, status attainment is explained as a function of the status of the job contact who provided aid (Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn 1981, Marsden and Hurlbert 1988, De Graaf, Dirk, and Flap 1988).

Having distinguished between accessed and mobilized social capital, however, a crucial aspect of social capital theory remains underdeveloped. Access assumed, what explains variation in actors' ability to mobilize social resources for instrumental action? After all, individuals' social proximity to others does not guarantee that the resources attached to others will be forthcoming, as the work of Newman (1999) has shown and as Lin intimates: "Not all persons accessed with rich social capital are expected to take advantage of or be able to mobilize social capital for the purpose of obtaining better socioeconomic status. An element of action and choice should also be significant" (2001, p. 92). Observations such as these call for a thorough examination of the social contexts that affect the likelihood of social capital activation.

SOCIAL CAPITAL ACTIVATION TOWARD A SINGLE, MULTILEVEL FRAMEWORK

If we define social capital as the resources that actors have access to by dint of their connection to others in groups, networks, or organizations, social capital activation, at least within the status-attainment tradition, is the point at which these resources are shared—when one or more actors provides instrumental or expressive aid to others, beginning or continuing

a series of nonnegotiated or reciprocal exchanges. This treatment of social capital activation is consistent with social capital conceptualizations offered by Pierre Bourdieu (1985) and James Coleman (1988, 1990), both of whom highlight the importance of reciprocal exchanges for social capital development and the facilitation of its activation. However, it is clear from earlier work that the factors favorable to social capital activation operate at multiple levels. These include, but are not limited to, properties of the individual, the dyad, the network, and the community. Thus, an important next step is to assemble relevant work into a single, multilevel framework designed to inform future research endeavors and to help refine our theories of social capital and its mobilization. Consider the following an informal sketch of a baseline model.

Individual-Level Properties

Reputation—According to social exchange theory, social capital activation is at least in part facilitated by attributes of the individuals involved in the potential exchange. Specifically, given competing alternatives—whether or not to assist and with whom to do so—reputation is critical for determining action (see Granovetter 1985). According to Robert Wilson, “Reputation is a characteristic or attribute ascribed to one person by another” (1985, p. 27). In this sense, reputation is at least in part the product of one’s network of relations. It is through the network that knowledge about how an actor behaves in the context of one relationship spreads to others with whom the actor might deal. Furthermore, the quality of social judgments is itself conditioned on embeddedness, since the accuracy with which individuals are judged is only as good as allowed by the extent and nature of one’s network of relations.² Nonetheless, the

² Although Coleman (1988, 1990) has argued that social closure enhances the flow of information such that accurate assessments of others’ behavior exist for all, others point to the ways in which structural embeddedness characterized by network closure actually constrains information flow, making social judgments at best only rough estimates of actual quality. For instance, to explain the loose linkage between a producer’s status and the actual quality of the goods he or she produces, Podolny (1993) points to an actor’s network of relations as a mediating factor, arguing that embeddedness can inhibit access to others who are able to provide the latest information about the quality of products, creating a lag between the time the quality of the product has changed and perceptions that actors have of the product. Similarly, embeddedness in a network of relations can constrain access to up-to-date information about one’s reputation such that it may no longer correspond with one’s most recent behaviors and actions. Gould (2002), too, cautions against assuming that one’s status is an accurate reflection of his or her qualities. Instead, because actors use others’ judgments as a general guide for their own assessments of individuals of interest, socially influenced judgments are often amplified such that, as Gould explains, “actors who objectively rank above the mean on some abstract quality dimension are overvalued while

opinions and actions of those making social judgments are largely attributable to the observations they have of actors' past actions or behaviors. One's good name may be determined by others, but others' determinations originate from one's own actions, by and large. Thus, reputation largely inheres in the individual. It is up to individual actors either to cultivate or destroy their reputations (see Kreps 1996).

More important, however, is the role that reputation plays in facilitating social capital activation. Because of information asymmetries, quality is not often known before an exchange occurs (Shapiro 1982, Podolny 1993), contributing to the uncertainty of the situation. To reduce perceptions of risk associated with uncertainty, actors look to reputation on the assumption that past behavior is indicative of how individuals will act in the future. All else being equal, the greater one's reputation, the lower the perceived risk of loss and the greater others' willingness to partake in reciprocal exchanges. Reputation, then, acts as a signal, in the formal economic sense (Spence 1974). It leads to an expectation of quality from which calculations of risk can be made and decisions about whether and how to act can be determined (see Kollock [1994] for evidence of reputation's role in the formation of stable exchange relationships under conditions of uncertainty).

What I have laid out thus far assumes a two-party exchange in which the reputation of the potential beneficiary is the central focus. The effect of reputation on decisions to exchange is complicated further in three-party exchanges where one party, B, acts as an intermediary between two others, A and C. In such situations, B's decision to assist A by matching him or her with C is not only based on whether or not A is reputable, attention to short- and longer-run consequences requires that B consider the state of his or her own reputation with C as well. As Wilson states succinctly,

To be optimal, the player's strategy must take into consideration the following chain of reasoning. First, his current reputation affects others' predictions of his current behavior and thereby affects their current actions, so he must take account of his own current reputation to anticipate their

those ranking below the mean are undervalued—relative to the baseline scenario, in which social influence does not operate" (2002, p. 1146). Although Gould's objective was to theorize about the persistence of status hierarchies, the analogue to reputation, another socially influenced judgment, is evident. Burt's (2001) bandwidth and echo discussion is also of note here as he, too, takes to task the notion that embeddedness marked by closure enhances information flow, an argument consistent with a bandwidth hypothesis. Instead he argues that closure constrains access to new and different information by encouraging only the echoing of others' social judgments such that these judgments become amplifications of original dispositions, whether positive or negative. Because of etiquette, information contrary to others' observations becomes difficult to share, and thus the accuracy of social judgments is questionable.

current actions and therefore to determine his best response. Second, if he is likely to have choices to make in the future, then he must realize that whatever are the immediate consequences of his current decision, there will also be longer-term consequences due to the effect of his current decision to his future reputation, and others' anticipation that he will take these longer-term consequences into account affects their current actions as well (Wilson 1985, p. 28)

The context of providing job-finding assistance is consistent with such a three-party exchange. Here, job contacts act as intermediaries—as lobbyists for job seekers and advisors to employers (see Coleman [1990] for the distinction between intermediaries as advisors, guarantors, and entrepreneurs). Based on job contacts' reputation, employers will make predictions about whether or not job contacts' referrals will pay off, and so job contacts' decisions about whether or not to act as advisors to employers—or how to approach the advisory role—will hinge on their reputations with employers. Among those with sterling reputations, employers will likely look upon their referrals favorably, assuming contacts' judgments to be sound. Job contacts, perceiving this, are more likely to refer their personal contacts. Among those with subpar reputations, employers will likely think twice, correlating contacts' past behavior and actions with those of any referrals they make. Job contacts in this position are less likely to refer their personal contacts. These are the short-term considerations.

For those concerned with the long-term consequences of their behavior, they will also consider job seekers' reputations. This is because the outcome of matches will undoubtedly affect their reputations, and thus their future opportunities. Whether or not job contacts are allowed to assist again, receive promotions, or get raises may all hinge on the reputations they develop as a result of the matches they mediate. Thus, if job seekers are of known ill repute—say they are profoundly unreliable—then job contacts will not likely refer them to their employers for employment. However, if the word is that job seekers are reliable, job contacts' willingness to assist will increase.

But interaction effects must be considered as well. Job contacts with reputations built on a long history of positive behavior may very well suffer little from a botched referral, for instance, and thus may have a greater willingness to assist job seekers whose reputations are shaky, perceiving that their future reputations, and thus future opportunities, will be unharmed by one or two blemishes. Ill-reputed job contacts concerned with long-term consequences will have a narrower range of options from which to choose, however. Bad referrals will only weaken their standing in the firm, reducing the likelihood that they will be able to take advantage of opportunities that arise in the future. To optimize outcomes, then, those

held in low regard can only hope to improve their reputations, and thus their competitive edge, by aiding those job seekers who are themselves held in high regard

Status—Social capital activation is likely also contingent on the status of both job contacts and job seekers. According to Gould, status is “the prestige accorded to individuals because of the abstract positions they occupy rather than because of immediately observable behavior” (2002, p. 1147, cf. Podolny [1993] for an alternative, network-based conception of status). It is on this last point that reputation is distinguished from status. Whereas reputation is a signal of quality and an indication of future behavior that is based largely on prior actions and behaviors, status is a signal of quality and an indication of future behavior that is based largely on the positions that occupants hold. In practical terms, it is the difference between saying, “I know this applicant will do well because she has performed well” (reputation) and saying, “I know this applicant will do well because she graduated from an elite university” (status). With status, there is an assumption that prior actions or achievements at some point led to one’s position, but it is because of the positions themselves that occupants are accorded respect or not.

There are at least two ways in which social capital activation may be contingent on the status of the individuals involved in the job search process. First, job contacts may decide whether or not to assist based on the social prestige attached to the positions that *they* hold. In *No Shame in My Game*, for instance, Newman (1999) discusses the social costs of accepting low-wage work, especially those associated with the fast-food industry. Besides wages that dwell close to the bottom of the pay scale, this type of work is stigmatized for the high level of routinization involved, the lack of autonomy, the perception of limited opportunities for upward mobility, and the notion that, with fast-food employment, workers must suppress their feelings of anger and resentment in order to tolerate mistreatment occasioned by customers who in numerous ways remind them of their low social status (Leidner 1993). “Service with a smile” can be degrading work, affording its occupants little in the way of self-respect, worth, and social prestige—a serious dilemma, especially for those who reside in communities where respect is difficult to acquire and easy to lose (Anderson 1999). As a result, Newman found that it is not unusual for occupants of positions like these to be maligned, chastised, and ridiculed by their network of relations who deem such jobs and what they stand for to be too unworthy to hold, even in the context of persistent poverty. Thus, job contacts occupying positions held in such low regard may choose not to share the information that they have nor to influence hires, perceiving that others in their network will be loath to consider their offers and indeed may take the opportunity to remind job contacts

of their own unwise choice. Indeed, one of Newman's teenage subjects was so fearful that he would be the subject of mockery and derision by his friends that he withheld from them his place of employment.

Job seekers' status likely matters as well. Just as reputation signals to job contacts how job seekers might behave posthire, job seekers' current status also provides indications of likely future behavior if only because one's current status is perceived to be at least in part a function of the quality of one's character and past performance (Frank 1988, Gould 2002). Thus, job contacts' willingness to assist their job-seeking ties will likely depend on such factors as whether or not job seekers are currently employed, receive public assistance, have been convicted of a crime, have graduated high school, or are enrolled in college. In the minds of discriminating job contacts, each of these factors has relevance for determining the quality of character associated with their job-seeking ties, which will likely bear heavily on how they will behave in the future.

Dyadic Properties

Strength of tie —Drawing from the literature on social exchange, we might also conceptualize social capital activation in terms of properties of the dyad. This is because, independent of the status and reputations that individuals have developed outside of the context of the relationship, trust and trustworthiness can develop between potential exchange partners in such a way that facilitates instrumental aid (Burt 2001, Cook and Hardin 2001). According to Peter Blau (1964), trust and trustworthiness in dyadic relationships emerge from a history of successful reciprocal exchanges. The initiation of informal exchange relationships is typically characterized by relatively small-scale exchanges, such as borrowing or lending a book. As these smaller obligations are honored and riskier exchanges are undertaken with success, uncertainty about exchange partners' reliability declines, and trust between partners grows (Kollock 1994). Iterated exchanges also have a tendency to breed stronger, more cohesive and affective bonds (Lawler and Yoon 1996, 1998). For both of these reasons, the likelihood that future exchanges will occur increases (Molm, Takahashi, and Peterson 2000). Unpaid obligations, on the other hand, lead to distrust and erode the chances of long-term exchanges since actors whose credits go unpaid will likely withdraw from future exchanges or change the extent and nature of the exchanges to which they do commit. As Burt explains, "Where people have little history together, or an erratic history of cooperation mixed with exploitation, or a consistent history of failure to cooperate, people will distrust one another, avoiding collaborative endeavors without guarantees on the other's behavior" (2001, p. 33). Under these conditions, the likelihood of partaking in obligations of

exchange declines precipitously, and with it, too, does the likelihood of social capital activation

Properties of the Network Social Closure

In addition to properties of the individual and the dyad, social capital activation is also theorized to be affected by properties of the network³ Specifically, Coleman (1988, 1990) proposed that actors are not likely to activate social capital unless embedded in networks characterized by social closure Typically found in smaller communities, social closure describes network relations that are dense, overlapping, and close-knit According to Coleman, closed communities facilitate social capital activation by promoting trustworthiness, or what he called "trustworthiness in structures" Such a network structure allows for the emergence of effective social norms and sanctions that regulate behavior Because ties are dense, overlapping, and close, everyone is either directly or indirectly connected to all others through short chains The information channels that these connections create pass news and gossip throughout the network As a result, there is little that anyone can do without having others in the network discover their actions This monitoring capacity is key if sanctions are to be imposed for noncompliance, and if members are to be kept in line

While not necessarily trusting others in the encapsulated-interest sense of the term (see Hardin 2002, but also Cook and Hardin 2001), embeddedness in networks characterized by social closure provides actors with community-backed assurances that potential exchange partners will honor obligations or face appropriate sanctions, such as shunning or social exclusion These assurances reduce the risks associated with reciprocal exchanges, and they pave the way for extensive and long-term obligations, fertile ground for social capital activation (see also Granovetter 1985)⁴ A

³ This is not to say that properties of the dyad and network are unrelated, however Research by Lawler and Yoon (1996, 1998) has shown that network structures do affect the strength, cohesion, and affect of dyadic relations embedded in them Certain network structures facilitate repeated exchanges between members of similar power To the extent that these are successful, it leads to greater trust, cohesion, and emotional affect between them that promotes commitment to the dyad, even when superior options to exchange become available Thus, network structures are not inconsequential to dyad cohesion or closeness However, this relationship will not be considered in this work

⁴ Burt (2001) argues that although social closure may indicate when it may be safe to trust, it does not necessarily produce conditions that make trust advantageous This is because closure does not place individuals in the optimal space for taking advantage of new opportunities in the way that embeddedness in a network rich with structural holes might

wonderful empirical example is Edwina Uehara's (1990) examination of the effect network structures have on the ability and willingness of recently jobless, poor, black women to mobilize their ties for instrumental aid. She discovered that women embedded in high-density, high-intensity networks were more likely to engage in generalized exchanges than women embedded in networks of low density and low intensity, because they were better able to control each others' behavior through tracking, monitoring, and sanctioning, which created an environment of trustworthiness that promoted extensive exchanges. Gerald Suttles's (1968) rich ethnographic account of racial and ethnic differences in ethnic solidarity in one "slum" community also implicates loose network structures and relatively poor monitoring capacities with pervasive distrust and noncooperation among its black residents.

Properties of the Community Concentrated Disadvantage

Drawing from social disorganization theory, social capital activation is also conditioned upon structural properties of communities, specifically the community's SES, the extent of its ethnic heterogeneity, and the amount of residential mobility into and out of its borders (Shaw and McKay [1942] 1969, Sampson and Groves 1989, Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls 1999). All three structural factors are theorized to affect both the density of network relations—the extent to which networks can be characterized as closed—and the links between local institutions within communities. These then shape the development and maintenance of common values and effective social controls that facilitate cooperation and community problem-solving behaviors among residents.

For the purposes of this discussion, however, the SES of communities looms largest. In his seminal work, *The Truly Disadvantaged*, William Julius Wilson (1987) argues that as a result of deindustrialization and the exodus of the black middle and working classes from what were once vertically integrated communities, the past 30 years has seen a tremendous growth in the proportion of the black urban poor who reside in neighborhoods characterized by concentrated disadvantage. Not only are these communities marked by high to extreme poverty rates, but other "negative" social indicators, such as welfare receipt, unemployment, and female headship, are also at acute levels (Wacquant and Wilson 1989, Sampson et al. 1999, Sampson and Wilson 1995). In a context of concentrated disadvantage, Wilson contends, social capital activation is very unlikely because residents, lacking regular contact and sustained interaction with mainstream ties and institutions, have few social resources from which to draw. Their isolation has impeded the development of personal relationships that would otherwise serve as sources of expressive and instru-

mental aid. Thus, for instance, residents of neighborhoods characterized by concentrated disadvantage are less likely to have a current partner or a best friend (Wacquant and Wilson 1989). In addition to social resource deprivation, the general lack of material resources means that little or nothing is available to support the development or maintenance of community organizations in which residents can come together to achieve common goals, in the process of which they could forge common values and effective social controls that facilitate cooperation (Sampson et al 1999).

Social disorganization theory also advises that, controlling for access to resources, social capital activation is also less likely to occur among residents of communities characterized by concentrated disadvantage. This is because, consistent with decades of anthropological investigation (Banfield 1958, Carstairs 1967, Foster 1967, Aguilar 1984) and some sociological accounts (Liebow 1967, Suttles 1968), concentrated disadvantage also breeds pervasive distrust. Chronic economic hardship and a history of exploitation diminishes both individual (Pearlin et al 1981) and collective efficacy (Sampson et al 1999, Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001), leading to high rates of crime, substance abuse, violence, and neglect. The vulnerability and pervasive distrust that residents experience in this context fuel individualistic approaches to getting things done, as illustrated in more recent accounts, such as Elijah Anderson's *Code of the Street* (1999) and Furstenberg et al.'s *Managing to Make It* (1999). Thus, relative to poor residents of comparatively affluent communities, the likelihood of mobilizing one's network of social relations in the neighborhoods characterized by concentrated disadvantage is low. To the extent that residents do cooperate or assist others, it is solely within the context of close friendship ties, for, as Peter Kollock makes clear, "faced with a situation in which one can be taken advantage of, a natural response is to restrict one's transactions to those who have shown themselves to be trustworthy" (1994, p. 318).

Summary

To sum up, based upon previous work, a baseline model of social capital activation (e.g., the probability that job seekers will receive job-finding assistance from job contacts with whom they are connected) would take into consideration properties of the community, the network, the dyad, and the individual. On the community level, we would be concerned with the extent of concentrated disadvantage, as social capital activation is theorized to be lower in communities so characterized because of the way in which the development of strong, cooperative networks is impeded and because of the ways in which concentrated disadvantage breeds vulner-

ability and pervasive distrust. On the network level, we would be concerned with the degree of social closure, based on prior research linking social capital activation to embeddedness in networks of ties that are dense, overlapping, and close. On the dyadic level, we would be concerned with the strength of relationships between potential exchange partners. The stronger the relationship, the greater the likelihood that partners have taken part in iterated, reciprocal exchanges that build trust, emotional affect, and cohesion, thus facilitating further cooperation. And on the individual level, we would be concerned with the reputations and statuses of job contacts and job seekers. Social capital activation is more likely to occur if contacts perceive that the interaction between their reputations and that of their job-seeking ties produces little risk to their future opportunities. Finally, if job contacts' status puts them at risk of losing face, social capital activation is unlikely, and contacts are unlikely to provide assistance to job seekers whose own status indicates low character or mediocre past behavior.

THE STUDY

This study is centrally concerned with uncovering the conditions that enable black, urban, poor job seekers to mobilize their network of relations for job-finding assistance. To this end, two basic questions are explored:

- 1 First, when in possession of job information and/or influence, to what extent are the black urban poor willing to assist their job-seeking ties?
- 2 Second, under what conditions are job contacts willing to extend job-finding assistance? Specifically, to what extent are decisions to assist affected by properties of the individual, the dyad, the network, and the community?

By addressing these central questions, I hope to advance current debates that have generally overlooked the process of activation by offering a single, multilevel conceptual framework within which to understand the context of its occurrence.

Data

Between 1999 and 2002, data were gathered using surveys and in-depth interviews of 105 low-income African-Americans.⁵ The primary site for

⁵ Although 105 in-depth interviews were completed, time constraints prohibited two respondents from completing the survey as well. Thus, completed surveys total 103.

recruitment was one state social service agency ("the center")⁶ located in southeastern Michigan that offered a variety of programs designed to aid the transition to labor force participation from unemployment, public assistance, or a current dissatisfying job. These programs included education, training, and employment programs, including GED classes for high school dropouts, child care referral services, and transportation services. Although the center claimed to cater to all of the county's residents, the majority of clients were black. Many single mothers on public assistance, who were required to spend several hours each week looking for work, would fulfill this requirement by browsing the employment section of the local newspapers or by accessing job bank Web sites on computers that the center provided. To increase their chances of finding work, several took advantage of the GED, job search, and career counseling classes the center offered.

Because of welfare reforms that require welfare applicants to name the fathers of their children, young men are now being held accountable for their children. Ordered by the court to pay child support, employed fathers visit the center between work shifts to find a better-paying job, unemployed fathers stop by hoping to learn about any job. Both are motivated by the desire to stop or, more realistically, slow their child support arrears. However, childless young men and women also stop by to browse local papers, surf the Internet, call employers, and submit résumés via fax or the Internet. All of the above people would also make use of staff members who recruited and screened applicants for local employers willing to hire from this low-skilled population and who encouraged job seekers to attend weekly job fairs. It is largely from this general population of center clients that this sample was drawn.⁷

With the assistance of center staff, subjects who fit the study criteria were recruited. Sought for participation were black men and women between the ages of 20 and 40 who resided in this southeastern Michigan city and who had no more than a high school diploma (or GED).⁸ Re-

⁶ The names of interviewees and institutions used throughout this article are pseudonyms.

⁷ Two-thirds of the sample were recruited at the center. See app. A for details about all of the recruitment methods employed to complete data collection and the potential impact on results.

⁸ Although a few participants did not match one or more of the screening criteria, every respondent can be categorized as economically marginal. Three respondents were below 20 years old, two were over 40 years old. Because the center served the entire county, the poor from other cities and townships in the immediate area also used the center. Eighteen respondents reported residences outside the community. Among high school graduates, 54% reported taking one or more courses at the local community college. Two college-educated respondents are also in the sample. However, their inclusion in analyses does not alter results.

spondents were surveyed about their family background, networks, employment history, and job-finding methods. They were also questioned in depth about their childhood (including childhood impressions of work), marriage, relationships, and children, employment history, experiences, and impressions of work, job referral networks, philosophy of employment, and attitudes and opinions about the extent and nature of job opportunities for low-skilled workers like themselves. Questions posed to respondents regarding the process of finding work are displayed in appendix B. Interviews averaged two hours.⁹

Displayed in table 1 are mean sample characteristics. At roughly 28 years of age, 78% of the sample had never married, and 75% had children—2.5 on average. Of the sample, 84% were high school graduates (or had gotten a GED), and just over half were employed. On their current or most recent job, respondents' mean wages were \$9.30 per hour (median = \$8.50). Furthermore, because median tenure was only 11 months—nearly a third had not worked longer than six months—most families survived on poverty-level earnings. Indeed, one-third of the respondents were receiving public assistance at the time of the interview (17% of the working poor and 45% of the nonworking poor, 14% of men and 47% of women). Nearly half reported having ever received assistance (31% of men and 68% of women).

Orientation to providing job-finding assistance—I determined contacts' general orientation toward job-finding assistance—whether and to what extent they generally assist—by examining responses to the following set of questions:

- 1 When you hear about job openings at your workplace or elsewhere, what do you do? In other words, do you tell the people you know about them?
- 2 Has anyone ever come to you for help in finding or getting a job? Who has come to you for help and why? What types of jobs did she/he/they ask about? How did you help, if at all? Would you help again? Did this/these job seeker(s) get the job(s)?
- 3 What do you think are the positive aspects of helping others to find work? The negative aspects?

Those who reported that they usually choose not to assist or who limited their assistance were deemed *reluctant contacts*. Comments indicative of reluctance included, "I kind of even limit my helping people out to where it won't affect me" or "First of all, I don't know a lot of people that have really looked for employment, and I question the people that I do know. I don't think they would take it as serious, and I don't want to put my

⁹ All interviewers were African-American.

TABLE 1
MEAN SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

Variable	Mean	Range
Age	28.4 (5.9)	17–43
Gender (female)	52	0–1
Never married	78	0–1
Have children	75	0–1
No. of children (if parent)	2.5 (1.4)	1–7
High school graduate/GED	84	0–1
Employed	52	0–1
Hourly wages (in dollars)	9.30 (3.5)	2.5–23.0
Public assistance		0–1
Currently receiving	31	
Women	47	
Men	17	
Ever received	46	
Women	68	
Men	31	
Neighborhood poverty rate		0–1
Low–moderate	69	
High–extreme	31	

NOTE: $N = 103$

name on it.” *Open contacts* were those who were willing to help almost anyone who asked. Comments suggestive of openness included “I never turn nobody down” or “If they come to me, of course I will tell them.”

Properties of the individual Reputation and status—To determine the extent to which properties of the individual affected social capital activation as well as what these properties might be, I looked to respondents’ responses to the question, “When people you know approach you for help finding work, how do you determine whether or not you will help?” Responses to general questions about willingness to assist were also helpful for determining whether and what individual-level properties were important. Specifically, if respondents indicated that they made decisions based on others’ prior behavior (outside the context of the relationship) and what this might mean in terms of how they might behave in the future, I coded this as an indication of respondents’ concern for others’ reputation. If respondents pointed to the positions that job seekers held as an indication of their quality as workers and a signal for how they might behave with assistance, this was coded as an indication of respondents’ concern for others’ status. For instance, some respondents were unwilling to assist job-seeking ties who were currently unemployed be-

cause such a status indicated that they would likely be untrustworthy on the job. Others appeared far more likely to assist when presented with job seekers who were already employed but looking for a second job because this signaled a high level of commitment to the attainment of individual goals specifically, and mainstream values generally.

This line of questioning also allowed me to ascertain the importance that contacts' own reputation and status played in determining whether or not to assist. With regard to their reputations, I paid attention to how they characterized employers' perceptions of them, especially on the subject of future opportunities. I also considered contacts' reputations important if they referred to the effect that prior referrals have had on their standing in the firm. I noted concern about contacts' status whenever they referred to their own social and economic well-being as factors that either facilitated or inhibited their willingness to assist.

Properties of the dyad Tie strength—To ascertain the role of tie strength, I again examined respondents' responses to the following question: "When people you know approach you for help finding work, how do you determine whether or not you will help?" I also determined the importance of dyadic properties by examining responses to general questions about job contacts' willingness to assist. To gauge the importance of tie strength, I looked to responses that indicated that assistance was provided primarily because of an affective bond or because of a history of successful exchanges between the job contact and his or her job-seeking tie that had bred (or not) trust and trustworthiness.

Properties of the network Social closure—It is argued that social capital activation is more likely to occur among those embedded in networks that are characterized by social closure (Coleman 1988, 1990, Granovetter 1985). For instance, Uehara (1990) determined that recently jobless poor black women were more likely to mobilize their ties for assistance when embedded in networks of greater density, intensity, and encapsulation. Unfortunately, these data do not allow for such a rigorous examination. Drawing from prior research, however, it is possible to distinguish, in at least two ways, embeddedness in closed networks from embeddedness in structures in which connections are far more loose and free floating. First, within closed structures, *information* flows through an intricate communication network in the form of "gossip, slander, invective, and confidentiality" (Suttles 1968, p. 105). Within more free-floating networks, information flow is decidedly less elaborate. Individuals know of their potential exchange partners' habits and behaviors in large part because they see these themselves, or because their partners inform them in one-on-one conversations. Trusters are much less likely to have other sources to confirm or deny trustees' presentation of self and thus are less likely

to have the information they need to make well-informed decisions regarding whom to trust and assist

Second, within closed structures, *sanctions* for noncompliance occur on the collective level, including social exclusion from all things social and economic. Outside of closed networks, sanctions take place within the dyad, in the form of withdrawal from future exchanges and/or the relationship. While examinations of information flows and sanctioning methods may not be the most ideal way of determining whether or not respondents are embedded in networks characterized by social closure, they do provide us with some sense, albeit an incomplete one, of the role that social closure plays in facilitating social capital activation vis-à-vis other factors deemed important for the same.

Properties of the community: Concentrated disadvantage—Respondents' addresses were matched with corresponding census tracts to determine the family-level poverty status of their neighborhoods. Employing a variation of the categories of neighborhood poverty concentration typically used in urban poverty studies, I found that 69% of respondents lived in census tracts in which rates of family poverty were low to moderate (0%–29.9%), and 31% resided in neighborhoods with many of the features characterized by the urban underclass literature, with rates of family poverty high to extreme (30% and above). Not surprisingly, in terms of social and demographic indicators, low-to-moderate poverty neighborhoods in which respondents resided differed substantially from the neighborhoods in which poverty rates were high to extreme. In the low-to-moderate poverty neighborhoods in which two-thirds of respondents lived, 31% of residents were black, compared to 78% of the residents in high-to-extreme poverty neighborhoods, 11% of the former had not completed high school, compared to 26% of the latter, 30% of the former were not in the labor force, relative to 43% of the latter, 13% of the former lived in poverty, compared to 43% of the latter, and whereas just 5% of the former received public assistance, 23% of the latter received assistance. For this reason, from here on, I characterize high-to-extreme poverty neighborhoods as neighborhoods characteristic of concentrated disadvantage.

Finally, it should be made clear that this study examines the factors that affect decisions the black urban poor make about whether and how to assist their job-seeking ties. Given that Wilson stresses the importance of being connected to mainstream ties, however, there are some who will argue that a better test than the one presented here would be to explore how middle-class blacks assess the black urban poor's trustworthiness and make decisions about whether and how to provide job-finding assistance. While I agree that an interclass analysis is much needed, an examination of intraclass relations is essential as well. As Newman (1999)

points out, the urban poor rely on each other most for job finding, and while the opportunities these contacts provide lead, by and large, to lateral mobility, the importance of lateral moves should not be diminished, as they represent the overwhelming majority of job moves and allow the urban poor to avoid long spells of unemployment. To the extent that these factors affect social capital activation in ways that further hinder the truly disadvantaged, an important gap in the literature is addressed.

WHAT FACTORS ENABLE SOCIAL CAPITAL ACTIVATION?

To understand what factors enable job seekers to mobilize their job contacts for job-finding assistance, it is important to first outline the concerns that job contacts had when placed in the role of job contact. Primarily for three reasons, those with job information and influence were generally reluctant to provide the type of job-finding assistance that best facilitates employment. As shown in table 2, 20% had come to believe that those without jobs lacked the motivation and determination to follow through on offers of assistance, wasting contacts' time and frustrating them. Another 10% expressed concern that their referrals were too needy, and that by partaking in job-finding obligations, they would become responsible not only for job getting, but also for helping their referrals stay employed, compounding the stresses in their own overburdened lives. Finally, 70% feared that, once hired, those assisted would be delinquent, and that they would act inappropriately, compromising contacts' own personal reputations and labor market stability. In all, 81% expressed one or more of these concerns, having little faith that they would not be worse off by assisting job seekers in finding work.¹⁰

These concerns had consequences. Table 3 displays the percentage of job contacts who expressed reluctance to assist, by concern type. Among the one-fifth who believed that job seekers generally lacked motivation, 78% were generally reluctant to provide assistance, compared to just 56% of those who did not express this concern. While 80% of those who feared that job seekers would be too needy were reluctant to provide assistance, just 58% of those without this concern were reluctant. Finally, among those who feared that their referrals would act badly on the job, in the process ruining their reputations in the eyes of employers, 73% were reluctant to provide assistance, compared to just 35% of those who did not express this concern. In all, 71% of those who expressed one or more

¹⁰ These are not mutually exclusive categories. While 19% of respondents did not express any type of distrust in job seekers, 63% of respondents expressed distrust around one of these three issues, and 19% expressed concern around two of the issues raised.

TABLE 2
RESPONDENTS EXPRESSING CONCERNS ABOUT PROVIDING JOB-FINDING
ASSISTANCE

Concern	Expressed Concern (%)
Major concerns about job seekers	81
Job seekers are too unmotivated	20
Job seekers are too needy	10
Job seekers are prone to delinquency	70

NOTE — $N = 103$

TABLE 3
RELUCTANCE TO ASSIST BY CONCERN TYPE

Concern	Expressed Concern (%)	Did Not Express Concern (%)
Major concerns about job seekers	71	17
Job seekers are too unmotivated	78	56
Job seekers are too needy	80	58
Job seekers are prone to delinquency	73	35

NOTE — $N = 103$

of these three concerns were reluctant to provide job-finding assistance, compared to just 17% of potential contacts who expressed none of these concerns

Given the pervasive distrust that potential job contacts felt around issues of motivation, neediness, and delinquency, it is a wonder that they assisted at all. Indeed, some 87% reported that at some point in the past they had assisted family members, friends, acquaintances, or even strangers who had approached them for job-finding assistance. The question is, What factors affected the likelihood that job contacts would assist, or that job seekers' social capital would be activated for job-finding assistance within the context of pervasive distrust?

PROPERTIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL THE JOB SEEKER

Job Seekers' Reputations

Without question, job contacts determined whether or not to assist based on job seekers' reputations. Indeed, 75% reported that when in possession of job information and influence, they largely based their decisions on what they knew of job seekers' prior actions and behaviors both on the job and in their personal lives. These signaled to contacts the likelihood that job seekers would act appropriately throughout the employment pro-

cess, with particular interest in whether or not job seekers would do anything to affect job contacts' own reputations negatively. However, job contacts rarely made reference to job seekers' status, such as whether or not seekers were employed. These results are displayed in table 4 and discussed below.

Work History, Work Ethic

Is this person staying in a position for awhile? Is this person the type that goes from job to job to job? That's not the type of person I would want to put my name on his application —
Steve Jackson, age 21

Of the respondents, 38% used job seekers' work reputations to decide whether or not to assist. Like employers, they were concerned with whether or not job seekers had been stably employed, the circumstances under which they left their last job, the frequency with which they moved from one job to the next, and how they typically behaved on these jobs. As one respondent proclaimed, "You're doing the same thing an employer would do. Like a reference check." Job seekers known for having integrity on the job—by being dependable, dedicated, productive—were held in high esteem and were readily assisted. Indeed, this was the primary reason why Jessica Bernard, a 28-year-old unemployed mother of three, aided her cousin. She explained,

I have a little cousin. She's 15 or 16 years old, and when I was working for the university—you know, they have the students that do work, a couple of hours for lunch and a couple of hours for dinner—and I know she's a good worker, so I told her that they were hiring, and I talked to my supervisor, and he told me to tell her to come in, and she filled out the application, and she started working that day. She was working at [a fast-food chain], but she had been at [the fast-food chain] for a long time, so I knew that she would work, especially by her being young. I knew she would go to work every day, and she gets upset when she can't be on time, because her mom's got problems. So, I told him about her, because I knew she was somebody who was going to be there.

Jessica determined that her young cousin would be of little risk to her own reputation because, at such a young age and with enormous obstacles, her cousin had accumulated a solid record of employment. That she had been employed at the fast-food chain for some time and took great pains to arrive at work punctually, in spite of a troubled mother, was evidence enough of her strong work ethic and general trustworthiness. With a steady record of employment, job contacts calculated the risk of helping as minimal and thus were willing to do so.

TABLE 4
 PROPERTIES OF THE JOB SEEKER OBSERVED TO DETERMINE ASSISTANCE, BY
 GENDER

PROPERTIES OF THE JOB SEEKER	RESPONDENTS MOTIVATED BY THIS PROPERTY (%)		
	Total	Women	Men
Reputation	75	69	80
Work (work ethic)	38	50	26
Personal (ghetto behavior)	43	29	59
Both	6	10	5
Status	2	0	4

NOTE —*N* = 103

Where job seekers with stellar reputations were embraced, those deemed to have a poor work ethic—those who transitioned in and out of jobs frequently, were habitually absent or tardy, or had a poor work attitude—were summarily denied assistance or were given weak referrals to other jobs. Typical were comments such as that provided by Shirley Wyatt. A 27-year-old unemployed, single mother of four, Shirley exclaimed, “If I know what type of person they is, if I know whether they actually going to get the job and stay at the job, or they one of them people that, you know, I know after the first two little paychecks, they going to be quitting, ain’t even no need for me to be telling you because you ain’t going to be staying there.” Indeed, this was how Cynthia Wilson viewed her own brother’s relationship to employment. Because of his past behavior in the labor market, she was skeptical that he would be consistent and dependable if she were to facilitate his hire at her job. At the time, she worked full time at a calling card company making \$9 per hour and learning computer skills. She explained, “First of all, figure out what type of work history they already have, you know, versus someone like my brother, for instance. He wanted to get [a job]. I’m like no ‘cause you jump from job to job to job. Can’t do that. Well, he finally found a job that he liked. He’s been there, I think, for two years now. *Now* if he came and said ‘Well, Cynthia, is [your employer] hiring?’ No problem, no problem.” Even though the job seeker was her brother, with whom she presumably had a long history, the strength and nature of their relationship was somewhat inconsequential. Instead, the history of his behavior on the job interested Cynthia the most, providing her with precedent from which to deduce her brother’s future conduct. Once he repaired his reputation by working steadily with one employer, Cynthia was willing to provide assistance.

For whom did work history matter? Women were far more likely than

men to assess trustworthiness by considering job seekers' history of employment experiences. Whereas only 26% of men mentioned work history, half of the women did. (Possible explanations for this gender difference are explored in the next section.) Not all contacts assessed trustworthiness in terms of work history, however. For some, job seekers' behavior in the personal realm was most significant.

Acting Ghetto: Bringing the Street to the Job

I don't want to have nobody at work that's just obnoxious and don't have any sense and just, you know, just totally ignorant —Martin Nevins, age 37

Of the respondents, 43% determined whether or not to assist by considering how job seekers carried themselves outside of the employment arena. Of special concern were those whom respondents described as "real ghetto," individuals whose behavior included being loud and raucous, abusing illicit drugs and alcohol, and taking part in criminal behaviors such as robbing and stealing, because such inclinations would almost certainly destroy contacts' reputations. In the form of drug and alcohol abuse and robbing and stealing, ghetto behavior was little tolerated. As Cynthia Wilson explained in reference to another job seeker, Cornelia, "She was like real ghetto, you know. She was heavy off into drugs and I was like, I don't think so. You're not going to make me look bad." Each time Cornelia would inquire about job openings at her place of employment, to save face, Cynthia would lie. She recounted, "I just said they're not hiring. Every time I know one point in time that job got to be hiring, but I was like 'They're not hiring.' [She laughs.] It's a freeze!" Because of Cornelia's drug addiction, Cynthia could not bring herself to inform her friend that her employer was hiring. Since that time, Cynthia and Cornelia have become best friends, and Cornelia now knows that Cynthia misled her about past job opportunities. However, Cynthia still refuses to assist her best friend, who has yet to conquer her addiction.

In situations where contacts were embedded in networks of relations in which a number of people had problematic reputations, the thought of providing job-finding assistance caused great concern. This was Robert Randolph's issue. Robert was a 32-year-old unmarried and unemployed father of three. When asked how he determined whether or not to assist his job-seeking ties, he explained, "You know, because I know a lot of people that smoke rocks, you know and do drugs and not really serious about getting out here and finding a job. Those are the people that, you know, I would say 'Well, there's a person out here that may have something for you, you know, you go talk to.' I will put him in contact with

somebody, you know, but I wouldn't put my name out there and recommend 'em, you know I wouldn't do that, no " Since so many of his own friends regularly committed theft and larceny, Monroe Laschley expressed similar concerns A 35-year-old single father of three, Monroe justified, "I got friends, you know, that's thieves, that want to rob and steal, you know what I'm saying? How would I be like trying to get them a job where I'm working at, you know what I'm saying? Then, the boss's car come up missing or something, or you know a computer come up missing " In these situations, the prospect of providing assistance was inherently risky, because so many of their friends, family members, and acquaintances were known to be of such ill repute that job contacts felt that they could not trust them to behave appropriately

Lee Boswell had very similar concerns At 37 years of age, Lee had recently completed a five-year sentence for assault with intent to do great bodily harm He explained that multiple factors—drug and alcohol abuse, immaturity, and jealousy—converged into murderous rage one evening in which he had beaten his girlfriend until she was close to death Since his release, he had committed a great deal of time to his own rehabilitation He was in therapy and had been taking part in alcoholics and narcotics programs, and, through a temporary employment agency, was working His primary goal, he explained, was to learn how to spend time with himself and to make himself happy So, when asked how he determined whether or not to assist his job-seeking ties—several of the inmates with whom he had been incarcerated had contacted him to gain job-finding assistance upon their release—he explained, "I would know they character and what they doing, and if I know they still messing around or drinking and stuff, then I wouldn't be able to do it and I would let 'em know, you know, once you get yourself together, holler at me then But if I know that they using or got sticky fingers and stuff like that, I wouldn't give no recommendation " These job seekers constituted huge risks to job contacts' reputations and labor market stability As a result, they garnered little or no consideration among job contacts

When expressed as raucous behavior, however, job seekers were afforded slightly more latitude Some, like Henry Wilson, found ghetto behavior offensive at all times, a sure sign that the offender did not share his values and attitudes and thus could not be counted on to represent them well on the job At 32 years of age, Henry was married with two children, steadily employed, and a churchgoer He was proud of the various roles that he played and took his responsibilities very seriously When asked why he was reluctant to provide assistance to job seekers in his network, he explained,

The conversations that they have Uh, I'm a very entrepreneurial-minded

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person, try to be a spiritual person, responsible [This is] not to say that you gotta be like me, but when you're talking outside I'm a married man I like to look at a beautiful woman—you're an attractive woman I like looking at you, but, you know, I don't feel like going beyond that [Mocking those in question] 'Oh, let me see if I can sneak around,' and, you know, and these people that are consistently talking about drinking, partying And I talk about investments or things of that nature or just general family stuff They don't get it, so It's over their head, so I just leave it alone

Similarly, Gary Hanson, a 31-year-old unemployed, single father of seven, expressed concern about how job seekers would represent him, explaining, "If they would be the type of person [to say], 'Oh man, fuck that bitch, man!'" you know, that's not the person I would want to put my name on the line for" Statements such as the one Gary quoted, while far from innocuous, in the context of a private conversation might be interpreted as such However, for respondents making decisions about whom to trust with their names and reputations in the labor market, statements such as these are a sure sign of job seekers' vulgarity and boorishness, attributes that contacts do not want associated with their names And this was of no small consequence for Gary He had once assisted a good friend only to have his employers dismiss the friend for his absenteeism, cursing, and intimidation of others As Gary understood it, "He brought the street to the job, you know, and you don't just bring the street to the job That's a total separation" While they have remained friends, Gary would not contemplate working with his friend again

Other contacts were offended only when individuals seemed oblivious to context For these contacts, acting ghetto itself was not to be scorned Indeed, when socializing with kith and kin, it was quite enjoyable Problems would arise, however, when individuals did not take their social context into consideration Acting ghetto was fine in private settings, but one should be very cautious about taking it outside Job seekers' inability to discern the proper context for acting ghetto was the primary reason Brenda Bowen gave for refusing assistance So, like Cynthia Wilson, she often lied to job-seeking ties so characterized about job openings at her place of employment in order to save face—theirs and her own—as well as to preserve opportunities to receive assistance in the future A 36-year-old separated and unemployed mother of two, Brenda explained,

I hate to be judgmental, but I look at the way this person is reacting If you can't control yourself in public, no matter that you're not at a job, you're out in public and these are people that you really don't know and they're judging you and the only thing they can judge you by is what they see and you don't know how to act, you know, you're speaking ignorant, you know Because I been around people like that, you know Say, for

instance, I don't know you and you're walking past and I'm standing here with this girl and she's just cussing and just saying all kinds of ignorant things I might say it, but when you're walking past, I'll stop

Contacts like Brenda fear that by assisting job seekers who appear unable to appreciate the significance of context, once hired, these job seekers would undoubtedly reveal something about contacts' private lives that they would prefer to remain private

Interestingly, a higher percentage of men looked to these personal habits outside of the work arena for signs of trustworthiness, women prioritized work history as a criterion for assessing trustworthiness Compared to only 29% of women, 59% of men considered the extent to which job seekers acted ghetto when deciding whether and how to assist While it is difficult to determine with these data why men and women diverge in the criteria they use to assess reputation, and thus trustworthiness, this gender difference may be attributable to the frequency with which male contacts are presented with these issues relative to their female counterparts Given the extent to which networks, particularly job referral networks, are segregated by gender (Drentea 1998, Hanson and Pratt 1991, Smith 2000), male contacts likely encounter male job seekers with greater frequency and thus run a higher risk of assisting those who are known for deviant and/or criminal behavior Female contacts, on the other hand, likely come into contact more often with female job seekers and thus run a higher risk of assisting those for whom family responsibility and the like make it more difficult to get to work regularly and punctually This explanation is consistent with prior research that has revealed the different ways in which inner-city employers perceive black men relative to black women Whereas employers often fear that black men will rob and steal from their businesses, and thus are less willing to hire them relative to men of other racial and ethnic groups, inner-city employers' concerns about hiring black women appear largely around the pattern of absences and tardiness that they attribute to women's extensive familial responsibilities (Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991, Neckerman and Kirschenman 1991, Kasnitz and Rosenberg 1996, Wilson 1996) Gender differences in assessment of trustworthiness, then, may be linked to differences in the types of risks that male and female job seekers present to job contacts

PROPERTIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL THE JOB CONTACT

Although job contacts relied heavily upon the attributes and positions of their job-seeking ties to decide whether or not to assist, their own attributes and positions also affected the likelihood that they would be mobilized

as well. In other words, independent of the job seekers' properties, their own reputations, experiences, and status mattered a great deal. Specifically, they were far less likely to assist anyone if their own reputations were sullied or if they had accumulated a history of assisting unmotivated job seekers. Their assistance was also contingent on their own social and economic stability, or lack thereof. These results are displayed in table 5.

Job Contact's Reputation

Because if they going to use my name, I don't want them messing around. I don't want nobody messing up under my name —Belinda Canty, age 39

Why were job contacts so concerned about job seekers' reputations? Overwhelmingly, respondents were fearful of making bad referrals that might tarnish their own reputations and threaten their labor market stability. Roughly 70% (62% of women and 80% of men) feared that if they personally vouched for referrals, there was no way to assure that their referrals would show up to work, work beyond the first paycheck, be prompt and regular, be productive on the job, and/or not steal, curse, fight, or disrespect authority. At the very least, contacts would experience embarrassment for having provided a disreputable referral, at most, they could lose their jobs as well as future employment opportunities.

Jackie York, a 27-year-old single mother of five children, is one such example. Although receiving public assistance, she supplemented her income by caring for other children in her home, one of only a few positions she could envision, given that she had small children of her own. She had recently become certified by the state to provide in-home day care and hoped to obtain an advanced license in order to open her own center.

Previously, Jackie had a year-long part-time position making \$10 per hour supervising a cleaning crew. As supervisor, she could influence hiring, and she described how she helped three friends get jobs. Unfortunately, none worked out. She first assisted her eldest son's granduncle. Although she suspected he had a drug habit, she believed that employment would get him on the track to recovery. At the very least, she reasoned, it would do no harm because there was nothing on the job site that he could steal. Hired on a Tuesday, the uncle worked Wednesday and Thursday, but he did not arrive to work on Friday, nor did he call. Because he had worked so well his first two days, helping the crew to complete their tasks one hour earlier than the norm, Jackie gave him the benefit of a doubt and decided to guarantee his presence by picking him up before work. On Monday and Tuesday, this approach worked, by Wednesday, however, it did not. Within one week of his hire, the uncle was let go, and Jackie

TABLE 5
 PROPERTIES OF THE JOB CONTACT MOTIVATING DECISIONS ABOUT PROVIDING
 ASSISTANCE, BY GENDER

PROPERTIES OF THE JOB CONTACT	RESPONDENTS MOTIVATED BY THIS PROPERTY (%)		
	Total	Women	Men
Work reputation	70	62	80
Status (social and economic stability)	8	8	9
History of providing assistance	20	17	23

NOTE — $N = 103$

described herself as “looking a little foolish.” In trying to assist the uncle in getting to work on time, she had arrived to work late as well. In the process, she began to lose her employer’s trust. She explained, “She’s looking at me like you ain’t picking up your pieces too well.”

Her employer’s perception only worsened with Jackie’s next two referrals. She then aided the girlfriend of her eldest son’s father, reasoning that because their sons were half brothers, the extended family would benefit. However, her ex’s girlfriend was also unreliable. She worked the first day, arrived out of uniform the second day (which meant that she could not work), and did not show at all the third day or thereafter. Although Jackie believed her third referral, an ex-boyfriend, was a good worker, her employer found him too slow and fired him without her knowledge, confirming that her employer had lost confidence in her.

To get job seekers to see these consequences, she reminded them of her own poor SES and pleaded with them to behave appropriately so as not to harm her reputation. Perceiving this approach as ineffective, however, she changed tactics. “I did get smart. I did get a little bit smart. I said, ‘Look, don’t tell them you know me. Just go on in there and get the job.’” However, Jackie now declines to partake in obligations of exchange around job finding at all. When asked about the positive aspects of helping others to find work, she explained, “I’m not the right one to ask that question. I would just have to say that that’s something you got to do on your own. I don’t see anything positive right now. I can’t be objective anymore. ‘No, I ain’t heard nothing about no job.’ You know, I have to say that because if I say, ‘Well I do know some.’ ‘Oh, for real, girl!’ ‘I ain’t heard nothing, you know, about your situation.’” Self-preservation now dictates that she remove herself from the process, which, as with Cynthia Wilson and Brenda Bowen, includes lying about job opportunities about which she is aware.

Terrance Blackburn, a 22-year-old high school graduate, also refuses to vouch for job seekers after getting burned by several referrals, a pattern

that ruined his reputation in the eyes of his employer. When justifying why he would not help a previous referral again, he explained, "Because I got a bad reputation from that guy. You know, my manager said, 'You bringing me all these people and they don't want to work.' So, no, I wouldn't stick my neck out there. I'm going to get my head chopped off. I mean, if they ain't going to stay, why not put your two weeks in. I mean, just so I won't look bad. So [you] quit on the people, [and] they asking me, 'Where your friend at?' It's just . . . I don't know."

Although contacts like Jackie and Terrance were not at risk of losing their jobs, developing a pattern of bad referrals did diminish their reputations with employers. A pattern of bad referrals indicates that one has had poor judgment regarding the assessment of others' character, and this limits the possibility that employers will consider future referrals. It may also reduce prospects for promotions. By distancing themselves from job seekers during the matching process, contacts shield themselves from the stain of bad behavior and the stigma associated with common, negative stereotypes of the black urban poor, what several respondents described as "ghetto" behavior.

Job loss is possible, however. In the case of referrals who steal or who are very unproductive, for example, contacts may become implicated by association, diminishing the trust that employers have in their employees. Such was the case for Jeremy Jessup. Jeremy was 42 years old, and although unemployed when interviewed, he survived by making roughly \$7.50 to \$8.00 an hour working short stints through temporary employment agencies. When asked about the importance of using friends, relatives, and acquaintances during this process, Jeremy appeared unimpressed. Although he thought personal contacts were helpful for job finding, he explained that he preferred to find employment on his own, because if he failed, his actions would not reflect badly on the person who had assisted him. He did not want anyone to be held accountable for his actions. However, Jeremy's hesitancy to provide job-finding assistance was not based on having abused the trust of previous contacts; he had been burned by previous referrals himself. As a supervisor for a construction company contracted to build several homes in the area, Jeremy was in the position to hire many friends he thought needed employment. However, as he explained,

I had worked for [the construction company], and they're building brand new houses, and I hired a couple of my friends, and when they came to work, all they wanted to do was sit down and get paid for it. They felt like they didn't have to work. They figured, like, you know, instead of taking a half-hour lunch, you could take an hour-and-a-half lunch and everything was okay. I was supposed to just let that go. [But] we all got fired because the work wasn't getting done. I couldn't do it all by myself.

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So, no thanks No thanks Now I call [the construction company] trying to get back and they won't even return my calls

Jeremy has since assisted a nephew in getting a job, but he is wary of assisting others Neglecting to determine the reliability of his friends cost him his job as supervisor of the construction company and any future employment opportunities with that firm

The disinclination expressed by Jackie, Terrance, and Jeremy contrasts sharply with the orientation of job contacts like Wilson Smith, whose reputations were still very much untarnished Wilson, a 21-year-old high school dropout, linked his ability and willingness to assist in the past to his good standing on the job As he explained it, "The jobs that I did work at, like you know, the ones that I was doing good at like [a fast-food chain] or the one with [another fast-food chain], I could just pull people in there, because either the boss was cool with me or I just was taking care of business " With an unsullied reputation, he was willing to act on his job-seeking ties' behalf knowing that his own positive standing in the firm would facilitate the hiring of any referrals he made However, once job contacts ceased "taking care of business," making referrals that led to their own loss in status, the likelihood that job contacts would provide job-finding assistance diminished substantially First, as with Jackie, Terrance, and Jeremy, employers were less likely to allow contacts with tarnished reputations to make referrals, questioning their ability to discern trustworthy and employable job seekers Second, contacts began to question their own ability to discern the trustworthy from the negligent and unreliable With little confidence that their job matches would turn out well, contacts with tarnished reputations either avoided providing assistance altogether or only offered assistance that did not link them to the applicant in the minds of employers For instance, while they may have passed along information about job openings, they often provided the caveat, "But don't put my name on it," so that job seekers were clear that they could not refer to their relationships as a signal of their credibility on the job

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always thinking that this might be the one —Jackie York,
age 27

There were circumstances under which contacts would assist job seekers of ill repute Indeed, roughly 8% of respondents indicated that they would assist almost anyone, regardless of reputation, because they could not afford to do otherwise, a finding that differed little by gender Their social

and economic circumstances were so dire, they felt they could not shun any opportunity to partake in obligations of exchange that might serve them in the future. Take Laura Odoms, for instance. Laura was a 33-year-old single mother of four, who, at the time of the interview, supported her children with public assistance. When asked about prior occasions in which she helped others secure employment at her job, she recounted the following experience,

I used to work at [a motel chain], and I helped a friend of mine get a job. But instead of her wanting to help to clean the room, she knew people that stayed in the room where she wanted to go and just sit around and hang out. And you can't do that. So the lady, the supervisor kept saying, "Well, I'm going to let you handle this. You brought her in, I'm going to let you either handle it or fire her." And I had to let her go because it was either me or her, and I had to keep my little job.

Prehire, Laura had counseled the referral, her best friend, about appropriate workplace behavior. However, her best friend broke the rules anyway and suffered the consequences, at Laura's hands. This incident, in and of itself, is hardly unique given the accounts that other respondents relayed of their referrals' betrayals. What is unusual about this situation is that Laura explained that she was still willing to assist her best friend—she remained her best friend even after Laura fired her—if presented with a future opportunity to do so. The overwhelming majority of respondents in similar situations were adamant that, at the very least, they would not assist the particular tie who had acted inappropriately.

Is Laura's response not irrational? Why continue to assist another, even a best friend, who seems to show little interest in respecting the terms, in this case clearly stated, of the exchange? Laura explained her willingness to assist her best friend in the future, indeed her willingness to help anyone, by pointing to her own precarious economic situation. Because she herself was struggling to care for her family and would almost certainly require assistance from others, her friend included, for various tasks in the future, she refused to close any door to a potential future exchange. When asked why she would be willing to provide her best friend job-finding assistance in the future, she explained, "Because the majority of my friends are in situations like me, and we try to help each other. Besides, if I need the help as far as money or a ride or if I need her to watch my 10-year-old, she's there. And I feel people, especially in my situation, I don't have much, and I'm trying to get much because I want my kids to be dependable. That is, when you get old enough to be on your own, this is what you got to do." Laura's explanation indicates that her willingness to assist is intricately tied to her own social and economic vulnerability. Would her disposition toward providing future job-finding assistance sur-

vive if she had access to stable and safe child care, a steady income, and reliable transportation? It seems very unlikely. Lacking these, however, she feels that she cannot burn the bridges she does have, even if her friends' behavior is unpredictable and often irresponsible.

For those who struggled with less desperation, however, providing job-finding assistance was less often a treasure hunt than a chore, requiring more time and energy than they wished to expend, given their already overburdened lives. Such was the case for Steve Jackson. Downwardly mobile at 21, Steve earned \$7.50 per hour working full time as a delivery truck driver. Both of his parents received advanced degrees, and they raised their two children in middle-class, racially mixed neighborhoods. Steve himself was working toward a college degree at a major state university when he learned that he had impregnated his girlfriend. He then returned home, planning to work full time to support his child while taking classes at a local university. Overwhelmed by his responsibilities, however, his grades suffered, and he dropped out. After leaving school, he worked as a sales representative with a telecommunications company, earning \$15 per hour. In his next two positions he earned \$12 per hour selling cellular phones. Because of conflicts with management, however, he quit. With a downturn in the economy, there were few jobs at his preferred wage rate, and pressed to pay off \$2,500 in rising child-support arrears, he settled for \$7.50 per hour driving a delivery truck.

Given the major stresses in his own life, Steve found the task of helping others emotionally daunting, particularly when close friends were involved. He explained, "It could be a lot of stress, and if you take it seriously to the point where you're really trying to get this person some help, it could be stressful for you. You might meet with them and give them some ideas and that could be extra things to do, and you know, you got your own problems without dealing with someone else's job problems." This was especially true because the majority of job seekers who had approached Steve had few marketable skills. He now refuses to assist unless job seekers have résumés in hand with which to work. To Steve, résumés signal that job seekers will not require more time and emotional energy than he can afford. After all, he, too, was struggling to keep his head above water. Absent assurances that job seekers would not overburden him, assistance was unlikely. This was especially the case since he could conceive of making it without the help of others, particularly those who sought help from him. Although struggling, he was far from the level of desperation that Laura experienced constantly. In his position, he was sure that assistance was more a hindrance than a possible help.

History of Providing Job-Finding Assistance

My friend once came to me, but when I got him an application,
he never did fill it out So I said I wasn't going to do that
anymore —Richard Byron, age 19

Before turning our focus to properties of the dyad, there is an additional finding related to job contacts that merits consideration, one that the greater part of the existing literature has ignored Specifically, I found that respondents' willingness to assist was decisively shaped by their histories of prior referrals Indeed, one-fifth of respondents suggested that they were less likely to provide assistance having all too often come across job seekers they perceived to be unmotivated—17% of women and 23% of men They described situations in which their job-seeking relatives, friends, and associates would complain about their labor market detachment and would ask for help finding work Once presented with assistance, typically information about job openings, job seekers would express interest but not follow through They would either fail to call the contact person or neglect to complete the application A few days later, the cycle of complaining and requests for assistance would continue

Many, like Leah Arnold, found this cycle of requests and inaction vexing At the time of the interview, Leah was 25 years old and working full time, earning roughly \$8.25 providing client assistance in a disabled care facility When asked about the negative aspects of trying to help others to find work, she explained,

It's their enthusiasm The negative aspects is, you tell them about it, they sound like "Oh, for real!" like that, and then the next thing you know, two weeks later you done told them about five jobs Two weeks later, "Girl, I still need a job " You're like, okay "Girl, you better look You better go look cause I done told you, and after so many times, hey " So that's the negative aspect is when they don't have the motivation or the enthusiasm to go out there and get it even after [it is] right there

Rolanda Douglass was a 39-year-old mother of four who had recently been hired full time as a dietary aide at a convalescent home Having been employed at six different jobs over the past three years in various service occupations, she knew the low-wage labor market fairly well Furthermore, she remained actively engaged in her job referral network, hoping to learn about "the job" that would take her into retirement Her most recent job, although fine for the moment, did not offer benefits and only paid \$7.50 per hour, a sum roughly \$4 per hour less than she estimated needing for financial security Constantly searching newspapers and working her network, she had learned of many opportunities and passed these on to those in need As a result, Rolanda fashioned herself as a major

source of job information and influence for her network of family and friends

However, Rolanda had begun to feel that her efforts at dissemination and offers to intercede were in vain, because all too often, job seekers would not follow through. She recounted a recent conversation with a neighbor, a young single mother on public assistance, who was on her way to the welfare office to find work. Rolanda informed her neighbor that her employer was hiring and provided a job description, including the hours needed, the type of work required, and the wage rate. She strongly encouraged her neighbor to apply, offering to provide an application and to return it when completed. And she did so with great incentive. Her employer paid at least \$200 for every referral brought in, and given her low wages, Rolanda had hoped to augment her annual income through the referral process. However, days after that conversation, her neighbor had still not initiated further contact. Rolanda explained disappointedly, "Even though you tell 'em about it and they be like 'okay,' it's like I'm wasting my breath." Although her disappointment was mostly caused by the loss of potential bonuses, she also felt less valuable. If few wanted the resources she had to offer, why bother?

Another respondent collected rental and job applications to supply to those she deemed in need. Tylea Bond was a 25-year-old mother of an eight-year-old and an infant daughter. Although she had first given birth when she was just 17 years old and had been on public assistance within a year, by the time of the interview, she had accumulated four years of full-time work experience. She was earning almost \$9 per hour at the local university working in student services, having worked her way up to what she considered a "pretty good" job with "good benefits," Tylea believed that anyone could find a good job, with patience and resolve. With this in mind, she was keen on assisting others. She collected information about housing and jobs and would offer it, oftentimes unsolicited, in the hopes that other women would use it to better their own lives. However, she complained that more often than not, recipients of her attention would not respond, and their inaction infuriated her. She reported,

I told this girl at my church, she has six kids, and I don't know what her living is like, but I keep telling her about this housing up here and stuff. I don't like my area that I live in now, but there are low-income housing areas that are nice in this area, and she will not come up here. And so I just got totally mad. I got mad, because I'm like, "You're just stupid," you know what I'm saying, "because I'm trying to help you out. I'm trying to get you ahead, expose you to some things, and you're not even thinking about none of that stuff. I'm telling you how much money you could be making, and you're not even going to try." So, it's just frustrating.

Frustrated by their perception that the persistently jobless were unwilling to better their circumstances by drawing from the resources contacts had offered, these contacts had become discouraged. Similar to the discouraged worker who had had such difficulty finding work that she or he stopped searching altogether, the discouraged contact was no longer willing to help because the jobless did not partake in obligations of exchange around job information and influence. Tylea had thrown away her folder of job and housing information. Rolanda had come to believe that job seekers so lacked initiative that she now requires evidence that job seekers are committed to employment before she partakes in obligations of exchange. Leah now denies her associates' requests for job-finding assistance, instructing them to look for work themselves. Thus, as with reputational concerns, job contacts' inclination to assist was historically constructed. The likelihood of social capital activation appeared reduced as the number of failed attempts accumulated.

THE STRENGTH OF TIES

It's gotta be a family member—Mary DuBois, age 27

In addition to attributes and positions of job contacts and job seekers, social capital activation was also contingent on properties of the dyad. Roughly one-tenth of respondents determined whether or not to assist primarily based on the strength of their relationships with job seekers. Typical were comments such as the following: "It's gotta be a family member," "I think I'd keep it in the family." Or, conversely, "It depends on how much I know the person. If I don't know them, then I don't really care too much about them." Contacts had greater motivation to assist those with whom they had longstanding relationships, such as relatives and close friends, for two reasons. First, these relationships tended to be founded on a history of successful exchanges that reduced contacts' uncertainty about their exchange partners' reliability, thereby nurturing feelings of deep mutual trust. Second, with a history of successful exchanges, stronger, more cohesive, and affective bonds developed that further facilitated reciprocal exchanges.

In part, these two reasons explain why Yvonne O'Neill, a 30-year-old single mother of two, devoted so much time and energy to securing employment for her best friend, Danielle. At the time of the interview, Yvonne was making \$190 every two weeks working part time at a family-owned portrait studio. Over the previous six years, she had held five jobs averaging 10 months each, most often in health care, assisting with and monitoring clients' personal care. Even with her spotty work history, she

had gained quite a bit of work experience. When asked how she had helped job seekers, Yvonne provided the following example:

I helped [my best friend] get a job through [a health care center]. I used to work. She was not too familiar with more technical medical things, far as personal life care. Like she is not comfortable with bathing a person's private areas and things of that nature, so they try to get her things that didn't require that. But at times some of her assignments required that she bathe this person or clean their ostomy bags, and things of that nature. She'll call me. For example, we are going to go out for the evening or whatever, and she had to do a client, and she told me who it was, and I already done that client, and I knew what this entailed. So, what I did, I said, "I will meet you over there, and I will give her a bath and shower, you can cook and we'll be out of there in half the time." I helped in that manner. Or, sometimes I've had to talk her through ostomy care or urine ostomy bag. "I don't know how to change it. I'm going to kill him." "Oh, no you're not. What you do, put your gloves on, make your sterile field, dah dah dah dah dah." So, I've talked her through it over the phone. Still had to go over there, make sure she didn't put the bag on wrong, but it seems like that helps her become more comfortable with it, and now she can do it if she has to.

Essentially, Yvonne provided a recommendation, and then trained her unskilled friend, performed some of her work tasks, encouraged her regularly, and likely shielded her from job loss. However, even with such a high level of involvement, Yvonne never spoke about assisting Danielle as a sacrifice or a burden. Instead, it was a continuation of a series of material and symbolic exchanges between the two that helped to reproduce the long-term obligations of support and encouragement they provided each other. During Yvonne's own spells of unemployment, Danielle would call Yvonne regularly with reports of employment opportunities after having scoured local newspapers for job listings that matched Yvonne's skill set. She would also provide encouragement to ensure that Yvonne would act. Yvonne continued,

When I am looking for work and I already have a job like say now, I have like three or four little things I do, keep me busy. If I am looking for something else, she'll call me up. She works for YCUA, midnight [shift]. She'll call me at 3:00 in the morning. "I'm looking through the paper. I want you to write this down. Okay, call this person in the morning, they're doing office work, or they're doing housecleaning work, or they're doing private care. This, that, and the other. They will need some help. Call." You know, she will go down the list, and I'm like, "Danielle, it's 4:00 in the morning." [Danielle replies] "I don't care. Write it down." You know, she is very helpful. If I see something, I'll leave it on her answering machine or her voice mail, or I'll call her up and, you know, always whether it be looking for a better car, looking for an apartment, or see something in the paper far as like household items, you know, like a garage sale.

Evident is the mutual trust and affection that Yvonne and Danielle share as a result of their history of successful reciprocal exchanges. Furthermore, the fact that their exchanges were not limited to the realm of work likely cemented the strength of their tie and facilitated Yvonne's willingness to aid Danielle in the ways that she did. In other words, in the context of relationships characterized by such mutual trust and affection, social capital activation, oftentimes unsolicited, is undertaken with little forethought, even at the relatively high levels of time, energy, and commitment that Yvonne described.

Close relationships hardly guaranteed that job contacts would assist their job-seeking ties, however. Job contacts frequently denied assistance to job seekers they considered close. Cynthia Wilson, the 29-year-old married mother of three, declined to aid her brother and her best friend, judging both to be unfit for employment. Monroe Laschley, the 35-year-old single father of three, refused to provide assistance to his close friends, fearing that his employer would inevitably become victim to their relentless thievery. And although he was very sympathetic about his close friends' plight of joblessness, Steve Jackson, the 21-year-old downwardly mobile university dropout, avoided requests for assistance because he was overwhelmed by the extent and nature of the assistance often required. Even Yvonne, who without forethought did more than most job contacts would probably do to aid her best friend, intimated that properties of individuals mattered most. In other words, overwhelmingly, those in possession of job information and influence were influenced most by individual-level attributes, and less so by properties of the dyad, when determining whether or not to assist.

This is not to negate the significance of close ties, specifically, and properties of the dyad, generally. Instead, what this suggests is that tie strength serves another function. As Vincent Roberts explained when asked how he determines whether or not to assist, "I would say family members, you know, because I know them better. Be around them. You know, it's more easier, okay." In other words, job contacts most preferred to assist close relations not so much because of the reciprocity that occurred in the past between them, but because closeness provided access to firsthand knowledge about job seekers' past actions and behaviors outside the context of the relationship, reducing information asymmetries that made it difficult to ascertain the level of risk to which they were exposing themselves by providing assistance. Thus, although important, properties of the dyad were secondary. Decisions to assist were overwhelmingly based on how job contacts perceived the individual-level attributes of their job-seeking ties.

SOCIAL CLOSURE

Based upon prior research, it is possible to distinguish, in at least two ways, whether or not contacts are embedded in networks of relations characterized by social closure. The first way is through information flows, and the second is through sanctioning methods.

Information Flow

Within network structures characterized by social closure, information flows through an intricate communication network in the form of "gossip, slander, invective, and confidentiality" (Suttles 1968, p. 105). However, within structures of relations that are less effective at facilitating cooperation, information flow is decidedly less elaborate. Individuals know of their potential exchange partners' habits and behaviors in large part because they either see these behaviors and actions themselves or their potential partners inform them in one-on-one conversations. Trusters are much less likely to have other sources to confirm or deny trustees' presentation of self, and thus are less likely to have the information they need to make well-informed decisions regarding who to trust and to assist.

Interestingly, there was very little variation in how job contacts received information concerning their job-seeking ties' reputations. The overwhelming majority based their decisions on information they had gleaned in two ways. They either knew of job seekers' past behaviors and actions because they had observed these firsthand, or, in cases where contacts had little information to go on, they would engage job seekers in lengthy conversations in order to gather bits of information they believed would provide a more accurate picture of their job seekers' character. In other words, through one-on-one encounters, contacts sought to reduce information asymmetries. In these data, information about job seekers' reputation rarely filtered through an intricate communication system. When queried about how they knew what they did or how they would go about finding the information they needed, just one other respondent replied in the way that Yvonne O'Neill did. Yvonne explained that her information was "based on knowing them personally. Or, uh, asking about them, like 'Does she go to work? What does she do? What did she do all day? What did she do with her time?'" In other words, she would refer to others in her network for information about job seekers' past actions and behaviors, if she lacked firsthand knowledge.

This was not the case for the overwhelming majority of contacts, however. Instead, the majority most often limited their assistance to close friends and family members, because these were the people about whom they had firsthand knowledge upon which to make reasonable assessments.

of trustworthiness Recall Vincent Roberts's declaration, "I would say family members, you know, because I know them better Be around them You know, it's more easier, okay" Job contacts most preferred to assist close relations because closeness provided access to firsthand knowledge about job seekers' past actions and behaviors outside the context of the relationship, thus reducing information asymmetries that made it difficult to ascertain the level of risk to which they were exposing themselves by providing assistance

When contacts did not have firsthand knowledge of their job-seeking ties' reputations, they would seek out information they needed to determine trustworthiness—and thus, whether or not to assist—not by contacting interconnected trusted friends, family members, and acquaintances, but by engaging job seekers in lengthy conversations Typical were comments such as, "Ask the person," and "I just asked a lot of questions [of job seekers]" By engaging job seekers in lengthy conversations that resembled, in many ways, a job interview, contacts believed that they could ascertain job seekers' trustworthiness and thus accurately calculate the risk they might incur if they were to assist

This is how Annette Charles approached this dilemma At the time of her interview, Annette was 28 years old, unmarried, without children, and working part time doing clerical work at a community college Not only was Annette concerned about the effect that a bad referral might have on her reputation, she was also concerned about whether or not she would enjoy having the job seeker on the job with her For both of these reasons, she felt it important to ascertain as much about job seekers' reputation as possible, and she did so by engaging them in conversations that would elicit bits of information that would provide her with a more accurate picture of job seekers' character and intentions She explained, "I'll get to talking to them, and if they have a good, you know, standing, then, you know, I'll go up to somebody and say, 'You know, for this position, I know somebody who can do this'"

Similarly, Sally Lowe, a 24-year-old high school dropout and single mother of a toddler, was very concerned about job seekers' reputations, especially after having been burned by a previous referral, the sister of her son's father After this experience, she reported, "I'm still going to help people, [but] I'll get into your background a little more and all that" When asked how she planned to delve more into job seekers' backgrounds, she did not refer to others in her network as a primary source of information Instead, she said the following,

Just talk, openly talk to them, and open the conversation, you know Talk about myself, and hey, if you got something similar to it, open your mouth and let me know Let me know what's going on with you, because I'd

rather know if you're my friend, or you're my buddy, I'd rather know how your life was and how your life is now, than to be trying to go and guess, you know Because, a friend, if you're my friend and I'm trying to be your friend, I need to know as much as I can about you because we have this friendship And, if something goes wrong, I want to be able, if you don't have anybody else, to come and say, 'Yeah, you know, this is my friend I'm here to help her I'm here to give her the strength she needs, you know ' I would rather you open up to me than for me to have to wait and see and find out later on that you're just not right

Here again one is struck by the lack of reference to a network of ties that could potentially provide Sally with the information she requires in order to make determinations about who to assist Instead, she makes assessments based on one-on-one conversations with potential exchange partners, conversations that while potentially illuminating, are also potentially rife with disingenuousness and exploitation Indeed, this is why one seeks the counsel of others, so as to gain additional information that either confirms or disproves characterizations that people make of themselves However, like Sally, contacts in this position rarely mentioned the counsel they received from others in their network

What this pattern indicates is that contacts are largely determining the trustworthiness of others in isolation, to a great extent, outside of the context of a vibrant or intricate information network What rarely showed up in these data were references to knowing or determining others' reputations by chatting, gossiping, or sharing information with others in their network or community Instead, communication most often occurred within the dyad The sheer absence of intricate communication networks was most salient, indicating that people relied relatively little on others to monitor the behavior of those with whom they had dealings This is not indicative of embeddedness in closed networks, as there was little evidence of a flow of information from dense, overlapping, or close-knit relations

Sanctions

Without an intricate communication network, community- or network-backed sanctions were unlikely, and this is what the data suggest as well Within closed structures, sanctions for noncompliance occur on the collective level, including social exclusion from all things social and economic Outside of closed networks, sanctions take place within the dyad, in the form of withdrawal from future exchanges and/or the relationship While these data provide overwhelming evidence that sanctioning occurred within the dyad, there was absolutely no indication that sanctioning was backed by the collective, be that the network of relations or the community

of relations. When job seekers failed to fulfill their obligations, as happened frequently, contacts most often responded by withdrawing from future exchanges of that type, refusing to provide job-finding assistance to job seekers who had forsaken them, and, as with Jackie York and Terrance Blackburn, eventually refusing to assist anyone at all. As evidence, one-fourth of contacts reported having been burned by previous referrals—referrals failed to show after a few days, acted boorishly on the job, and/or stole from employers, for instance. For all but one of these job contacts—Laura Odom—referrals' transgressions were managed by pledging not to assist these particular job seekers again with job information and influence. However, most maintained relations on some terms, even if to a lesser degree than before—no contacts reported ending relationships for their ties' misdeeds. After his referral "brought the street to the job," for instance, Gary Hanson shared that while he would no longer consider working with his former co-worker, they were still good friends.

This form of sanctioning is consistent with that which occurs within the dyad, not in communities in which norms of cooperativeness prevail. If the latter were true, we would expect contacts to discuss how the job seeker had been excluded from social functions and economic opportunities by the network or the community. No one shared this type of information. There appeared to be no sanctions backed by the community that the debtor had to bear. Only the less severe sanctions of withdrawal from contacts were enforced. Here again, informal structures supporting trustworthiness appear weak, if not absent.

In summary, these data indicate that in the context of job finding, social capital activation among the black urban poor is not a function of social closure. That there was so little variation in how job contacts learned of their job-seeking ties' reputations, and the way they appeared to sanction those who failed to behave as expected—both indications of the extent to which contacts were embedded in closed networks—strongly suggest that social closure was not a defining factor in whether or not job contacts would provide assistance. The question is, Does this also negate the significance of residing in neighborhoods of concentrated disadvantage? This is a pertinent question because social disorganization theory posits that concentrated disadvantage acts through network structures to affect outcomes like cooperation.

CONCENTRATED DISADVANTAGE

Community SES was related to orientation to and concerns about providing job-finding assistance (see table 6). While 47% of contacts from

TABLE 6
JOB-FINDING ASSISTANCE ORIENTATION AND CONCERNS, BY COMMUNITY SES

Orientation/Concern	Total	Low-Moderate Poverty	Concentrated Disadvantage
% open to providing assistance	40	47	21
% will help all	16	17	8
% concerned with job seekers' reputation	70	67	82
% concerned with work reputation	38	39	42
% concerned with ghetto reputation	43	37	54
% burned by previous referral	26	21	41

NOTE —*N* = 103

low-to-moderate (low) poverty neighborhoods expressed a general openness to providing job-finding assistance, just 21% of contacts from high-to-extreme (high) poverty neighborhoods did. Indeed, while 17% of contacts from low-poverty neighborhoods reported that they would be willing to help all who requested job-finding assistance, just 8% of contacts from high-poverty neighborhoods did.

What explains this difference in orientation? Examining properties of the network, the difference cannot be explained by variation in network embeddedness. Using information flow and sanctioning approaches as proxies for embeddedness in closed networks, I discovered that residents of neighborhoods characterized by concentrated disadvantage were not less likely than residents of less disadvantaged neighborhoods to be embedded in closed networks. Indeed, so few contacts—two—appeared embedded in closed networks that it could not explain differences in the likelihood of assisting. Residents of low-poverty neighborhoods appeared to be just as embedded in loosely connected networks of relations in which information flow was disjointed and sanctioning took place within the dyad. Thus, in these data, the relationship between concentrated disadvantage and job-finding assistance is not mediated by variations in the degree of social closure.

There are important correlations to consider, however. First, 70% of all respondents expressed distrust regarding job seekers' use of their names, and thus their reputations, to gain employment at their place of work. However, a noticeably higher percentage of contacts who resided in a context of concentrated disadvantage expressed this fear than did those from low-poverty neighborhoods—82% versus 67%. Furthermore, contacts who feared that their job-seeking ties would behave badly and ruin their reputations expressed far greater reluctance, generally, to provide job-finding assistance. While 73% of contacts who distrusted how others would perform in the job generally took a reluctant approach to

providing assistance, just 35% of those without this concern were as reluctant

Second, contacts residing in neighborhoods of concentrated disadvantage had good reason to be reluctant. Compared to those living in low-poverty neighborhoods, a higher percentage of the former had been burned by their referrals. Indeed, although roughly one-fifth of residents of low-poverty neighborhoods had been negatively affected by providing assistance, almost half of residents from neighborhoods of concentrated disadvantage had had a similar negative experience. This is noteworthy because whereas residents of neighborhoods characterized by concentrated disadvantage represented less than one-third of the sample, they were almost 46% of those who had been burned by prior referrals.

Consistent with concerns of being burned, when asked how they determined whether or not to assist their job-seeking ties, a higher percentage of contacts from high-poverty neighborhoods made determinations based on job seekers' personal reputation—specifically, whether or not job seekers were deemed to be ghetto. Whereas 54% assessed whether or not they would assist using this criterion, just 37% of those from low-poverty neighborhoods did the same. However, they were no more concerned than were residents of low-poverty neighborhoods about job-seekers' reputation. Whereas 39% of the latter used this criterion to judge their job-seeking ties, 42% of the former did.

That residents of neighborhoods of concentrated poverty were far more concerned about "ghetto" behavior is likely attributable less to any inherent differences in how people assess trustworthiness than to differences in the types of issues that arise for contacts whose socio-structural positions differ. In neighborhoods in which rates of poverty are high to extreme, and in which a significant minority of residents are unemployed or out of the labor market altogether, "ghetto behavior" is more prevalent and perceived to be so. And while the majority of residents in such neighborhoods do not act ghetto, residents undoubtedly employ this distinction to ferret out, in various contexts, those who can and cannot be trusted. Indeed, this is what Elijah Anderson's (1990, 1999) work shows. Thus, residents of neighborhoods in which rates of poverty were low to moderate likely encountered these behaviors to a lesser extent and thus were less likely to employ this criterion to assess whether or not they would assist. In other words, because they reside in less risky social environments, they were less likely to perceive job-finding assistance as a risky endeavor.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The employment problems of the black urban poor have largely been attributed to a lack of jobs (Kasarda 1995, Wilson 1987), to cultural deficiencies (Mead 1992, 1985, Murray 1984), and to employer discrimination (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2002, Pager 2002, Turner et al 1991) This study implicates another factor that has not yet been fully considered Personal contacts represent a major conduit of employment information and influence in the United States, matching roughly half of all job seekers to employers Conventional wisdom now has it that the black urban poor are less efficacious in this regard because job seekers, suffering from social isolation, have very limited access to ties of social worth However the findings of this study suggest that access explains only one part of the puzzle, at best Instead, the social capital deficiencies apparent among the black urban poor seem to have to do more with activation or mobilization than with access In other words, even when information is available and contacts can influence hires, they often do not That job contacts express such great reluctance to provide the type of job-finding assistance that facilitates employment adds an additional layer of understanding to this complex and persistent problem The following quotation illustrates this point "If they get the job, in the first couple of weeks or so, everything seems to be fine, or maybe even the first 90 days but somehow when they get past that, you see a definite, a marked difference They tend to laziness or there's something there I've seen this pattern over and over again, you know I think people are willing to give them a chance and then they get the chance and then it's like they really don't want to work " Although strikingly similar to the views expressed by my job contacts, this statement was made by an employer interviewed for the Urban Poverty and Family Life Study's survey of Chicago-area employers, quoted by William Julius Wilson in *When Work Disappears* (1996, p 118) Resembling the distrusting job contacts described in this study, employers expected from black job seekers, especially males, tardiness and absenteeism, unreliability, and an unwillingness to work when on the job Furthermore, they believed that the probability of theft, cursing, fighting, and disrespecting authority were greatly enhanced with black hires relative to other racial and ethnic groups (Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991, Kasinitz and Rosenberg 1996, Wilson 1996)

Given these similarities in perspective, it should come as no surprise that job contacts expressed great reluctance to assist their job-seeking ties Nor should it come as a surprise that the factors that facilitated assistance among job contacts were very similar to those that affected employers' decisions about who to hire As with employers, contacts were displeased by job seekers who transitioned in and out of jobs frequently, who were

habitually absent or tardy, or who had poor work attitudes. Furthermore, they were also concerned about whether or not their job-seeking ties would “bring the street to the job,” which included, among other things, showing the effects of alcohol and drug abuse, acting raucously and boisterously, stealing, and intimidating authority figures and co-workers. As a result, job contacts overwhelmingly made determinations about whether or not to assist based on their job-seeking ties’ reputations, both at work and home, as these provided contacts with some indication of how their job-seeking ties might behave on the job. Job seekers’ status mattered little, however. Contacts were far less concerned that a job-seeking tie was unemployed, for instance, than they were about the reason behind the unemployment, reasons that time and again implicated job seekers’ reputations.

Another factor mattered less than anticipated. Drawing from social exchange theory, one could have expected that tie strength would be of greater importance than it was. However, when deciding whether and how much to assist, contacts based the bulk of their decision not on their history of past exchanges with potential exchange partners or what they might gain from job seekers in the future, but on job seekers’ history of work and personal habits. Thus, contacts’ close relations—siblings, best friends, and others with whom contacts presumably had extensive exchanges—were often forsaken if evidence existed that they were either not up to the task or would not represent their contacts well. These decisions had little to do with the history of relations between contact and job seeker, except that it provided contacts with the information they needed to assess trustworthiness and thus the risk they might undertake by providing assistance.

Job contacts paid so much attention to the reputations of their job-seeking ties because of the potential damage job seekers might do to their own reputations. Indeed, it was the interaction between the two—job contacts’ and job seekers’ reputations—that seemed to matter most in their determinations, consistent with Robert Wilson’s (1985) treatment of the concept. It was noteworthy that contacts with stellar reputations on the job, like Wilson Smith, were generally open to providing job-finding assistance, while those who had tarnished their reputations in the eyes of their employers, like Terrance Blackburn, were patently against providing assistance. What was striking, however, were the narratives provided by contacts like Jackie York and Jeremy Jessup. Both began providing referrals while in good standing with their employers, and because they were held in high regard initially, they were willing to influence a few questionable hires. As these hires failed to work out, both of their reputations became tarnished, and they became increasingly reluctant to recommend any of their friends for jobs, deeming the process inherently

risky Jackie eventually lost the confidence of her employer, Jeremy lost his job. As a result of potential outcomes like these, both job seekers' and job contacts' reputations dominated contacts' concerns about whether or not to assist.

There was a contingency to reputational concerns, however. Even for job seekers of ill repute, job contacts could be mobilized if their levels of social and economic stability were very low. Those who perceived their situations to be dire, like Laura and, initially, Jackie, were willing to provide assistance to anyone who came along, regardless of reputation, hoping that those assisted would quickly become sources of social and material support. Contacts less overwhelmed by their circumstances because they had greater personal, social, or material sources to draw upon were less likely to come to the aid of others without regard to reputation. However, status did not affect social capital activation in the way that we might expect. There was no indication in the data that job contacts were reluctant to assist because they were too ashamed to admit that they were employed in positions of low status and esteem.

Other individual-level properties of the job contact mattered as well. Whether or not job contacts could be mobilized for job-finding assistance was also affected by their history of prior attempts to assist. Specifically, job contacts for whom attempts to intercede were met with job seekers' disengagement were far less open to providing assistance than those whose history of assistance included successful matches of motivated job seekers. After a time, the former became like discouraged workers—they eventually stopped trying to assist, perceiving the activity to be a waste of time because they deemed job seekers too unmotivated to take advantage of the information they had to offer or the influence they could wield.

Job contacts were similar to employers in at least one other way. Previous research indicates that to avoid black job seekers (employers' proxy for poor-quality workers), inner-city employers selectively recruited by advertising job vacancies in neighborhood newspapers that were not widely distributed in poor black communities (Neckerman and Kirschenman 1991, Wilson 1996). Likewise, distrusting job contacts in this study avoided potential bad referrals by informing only those whom they deemed "worthy" of their information and influence, while deceiving the "unworthy" about vacancies or routing them to employment opportunities at other firms. Just as employers reported spending a great deal of time interviewing black job seekers to assess their commitment to employment (Neckerman and Kirschenman 1991),¹¹ so too did job contacts engage job

¹¹ Although employers in the Chicago-area study indicated that they take extra time and care to interview black job applicants to assess their willingness to work, audit studies suggest that employers actually take less time and are less engaged with black

seekers in long conversations, hoping to elicit information that would help them determine whether or not job seekers were resolute, with some contacts requiring job seekers to supply résumés as evidence of their resolve before they agreed to assist. Given prior research, there is little doubt that employers are skeptical of the work ethic of the black urban poor, question their motivation, and fear the ghetto among them. At the very least, this is the rationale they provide for their great reluctance to hire from this pool of applicants. Until this study, however, no treatment has examined systematically the extent to which these same perceptions prevail among the black urban poor and inform the decisions that they make about whether and how to assist their job-seeking ties. As such, this study represents an important empirical contribution.

This study contributes conceptually as well. While there exists a wide variety of earlier investigations that suggest that the factors favorable to social capital activation operate at multiple levels, to date there has been no single, multilevel conceptual framework within which to understand social capital activation. In addition to the individual- and dyadic-level properties mentioned above, decisions to assist were also contingent on the SES of contacts' community of residence. Residents of neighborhoods characterized by concentrated disadvantage were more concerned about the reputations of their job-seeking ties than were residents of low-poverty neighborhoods. Consistent with this trend, they were generally less open to providing job-finding assistance as well, perceiving greater risk in assisting for at least two reasons. First, residence in communities of concentrated disadvantage put them into much more regular and frequent contact with individuals whose reputations would be called into question—those whose behavior would be deemed ghetto. Second, they were more likely to have been burned in the past by job-seeking ties who, in different ways, behaved offensively. Thus, for them, job seekers were generally seen as untrustworthy, and providing job-finding assistance was more likely socially constructed as a risky endeavor.

However, there was little evidence to implicate social closure, as proposed by James Coleman (1988, 1990) and others. Far from dense, overlapping, and close-knit, networks were, by and large, open and free-floating structures. This trend varied little, regardless of contacts' orientation to providing job-finding assistance, a point that is somewhat surprising for two reasons. First, prior work has shown that structures of embeddedness have important effects on cooperative efforts among those sharing a network of relations. As an example, Uehara (1990) showed that network structures affect the ability and willingness of recently job-

applicants than with comparable white applicants at every stage of the recruitment and screening process (Turner, Fix, and Struyk 1991)

less, poor, black women to mobilize their ties for instrumental aid, with network structures characterized by social closure facilitating this type of assistance. Second, to the extent that community SES is believed to matter, structures of embeddedness are theorized to be the mediating factor. Social disorganization theory informs us that community SES affects both the density of network relations—the extent to which networks can be characterized as closed—and the links between local institutions within communities, and that these then shape the development and maintenance of common values and effective social controls that facilitate cooperation and community problem-solving behaviors among residents.

Because of proxies that I used to determine social closure, I cannot say with certainty that these particular findings are beyond dispute. However, there is reason to believe that what I report is accurate, without disputing the larger claim that network structures can either facilitate or inhibit cooperation among those who share network relations. First, although previous research finds that greater closure leads to greater cooperation, we also know that residents of urban communities are far less likely to be embedded in closed networks—those that are dense, overlapping, and close-knit—than are residents of small towns or rural communities (Amato 1993, Cook and Hardin 2001, Fischer 1982). In other words, we would not expect a great deal of social closure among residents of urban communities. This does not mean, however, that cooperation does not occur among residents of urban communities. Instead, as Cook and Hardin explain, “In more urban settings the networks individuals form to establish relationships of social exchange and cooperation (or merely to coordinate joint activity) tend to be more specialized, less multiplex, more sparsely connected, and more numerous” (2001, p. 336). Thus, while I would not exclude measures of social closure from a model of social capital activation, I would argue that its relevance would be highly contingent on the social context within which cooperation is predicted to occur—urban or rural, for instance.

Second, although community social organization theory assumes that “locality-based social networks constitute the core social fabric of human ecological communities” (Sampson and Groves 1989, p. 779), the growing complexity of modern life increasingly calls this assumption into question. Nowadays, individuals’ close relations, whether close friends or family members, are far less likely than in the past to reside in the same neighborhood (Amato 1993). Indeed, some would argue that the suburbs have thrived in part because, when given the option, people opt out of such dense, overlapping, and close-knit relations whose obligations once encumbered them (Sennett and Cobb 1972). What this means is that community social organization can and probably does act on outcomes like cooperation and collective efficacy through some other mechanism than

dense networks of relations. Indeed, I would argue that even though the residents of low-poverty neighborhoods in my sample were similarly embedded in open, free-floating networks of relations, because they lived in neighborhoods in which crime and deviance were less prevalent, they perceived themselves to be in less risky circumstances and thus were generally more likely to be mobilized for assistance. Thus, controlling for network closure, community SES can act on cooperation and collective efficacy by affecting residents' perceptions of the risk that they face at the hands of those around them because of the environment in which they live.

Finally, although this project does not speak directly to racial and ethnic differences in the efficaciousness of social capital, it does motivate future research centered on this question. What the findings reported here suggest is that relative to other racial and ethnic groups, poor, urban blacks are less likely to benefit from their network of relations, not so much because they lack access than because their networks are less likely to be mobilized for assistance. This work lays the groundwork for future research designed to test such hypotheses rigorously. Thus, not only may we wish to explain racial and ethnic differences in status attainment in terms of accessed and mobilized models of social capital, as has been done quite extensively to date, we may also explain these differences in terms of the likelihood of activating the contacts to whom individuals are connected, problematizing properties of the individuals involved in the exchange, such as the reputation (work and personal) and motivation of the job seeker, and the reputation, status, and general inclination to assist of the job contact. Properties of the dyad should not be ignored either. Instead, we may consider the strength and length of job contacts' relationships with their job-seeking ties. We would also problematize properties of the community, taking into consideration the community's SES, and, consistent with Coleman's (1990) approach, the size of the community as well. And, despite the lack of evidence in this study, we may also problematize properties of the network, taking into consideration such measures as density, intensity, and encapsulation. This multilevel approach to understanding social capital activation provides a fruitful avenue for future research and promises to fill many empirical and conceptual gaps that currently exist in the literature.

Indeed, the findings reported here encourage a different and potentially instructive interpretation of findings from prior work. I employ two studies as examples. First, Green, Tigges, and Diaz (1999) compared three methods of assistance employed by job contacts—informing job seekers about vacancies, talking to employers on job seekers' behalf, or hiring job seekers—and found that blacks were significantly less likely to have job contacts assist proactively during the matching process. Second, Hol-

zer (1987) found that roughly one-fifth of the black-white racial difference in the probability of a young person gaining employment could be explained by differences in receiving offers after having searched through friends and relatives. When black youths searched through friends and relatives, they were less likely to be offered employment than were their white counterparts. In the former case, blacks' relative lack of access was implicated. In the latter, no clear explanation was offered. However, in both studies, it may be that properties of the individual, dyad, network, and community may further disadvantage those in low-wage labor markets where employers rely heavily on contacts for recruitment and screening. Indeed, this perspective may help to explain why, among African-Americans, social support networks often lag behind those of other racial and ethnic groups in terms of expressive aid, such as advice giving, and instrumental aid, such as money lending or giving (Eggebeen 1992, Eggebeen and Hogan 1990, Green, Hammer, and Tigges 2000, Hofferth 1984, Morgan 1982, Parish, Hao, and Hogan 1991), despite research from the 1970s describing strong obligations of exchange within poor black communities (McAdoo 1980, Stack 1974).

APPENDIX A

Data Collection Strategies

As is often the case when studying low-income populations, the principal investigators of this project had great difficulty recruiting participants through random sampling techniques, although great effort was made to do so (Edin and Lein 1997). In the summer of 1999, we contacted GENESYS Sampling Systems, a service that provided us with publicly listed names, addresses, and telephone numbers of 350 randomly selected residents from a poor census tract. Although we had initially thought to restrict the sampling to those ages 25–34 (the 1990 census indicated that there were 379 residents in this census tract ages 25–34), because there were so few listings for residents in this age group (48 records), we broadened our criteria. From GENESYS, we received the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of 350 residents. We attempted to contact residents with the phone numbers we had been given, but found ourselves facing three major obstacles: many lines were no longer in service, residents had moved, and many households did not have a resident matching our criteria. Thus, from August to December 1999, we had a yield of only nine interviews.

Our next approach involved canvassing the community and recording every address for every housing structure. We then mailed recruitment letters asking respondents to participate and promised to provide a \$25

incentive for participation. This method generated only two additional interviews.

Our third strategy involved canvassing the community, by going door-to-door and requesting participation. We began canvassing the area's housing projects with the intent of working our way through all of the housing projects in this community. Canvassing usually took place between 10:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Although few people who fit the criteria refused to participate when asked, we were presented with some challenges. The projects that housed the most disadvantaged residents were relatively unsafe. Gang activity, including drug dealing, occurred conspicuously. Violent crime was so prevalent that few residents that we spoke with would allow their children to play outside or would venture outside themselves except to leave the neighborhood. Furthermore, residents would often refuse to answer their doors. Many had eviction notices posted on their doors and may have thought that we were bill collectors. We also believed that some did not want interviewers to see their homes. Self-conscious of her dwelling, one respondent requested that we conduct the interview in her barely functioning car.

Because we perceived ourselves to be in some danger, and because many residents clearly had issues of trust where interviewers were concerned, we then decided to recruit residents from social service agencies, where the more semi-public arena would reassure interviewers who feared for their safety, as well as reassure residents who feared for their own well-being. From contacts in the area, we discovered two social service agencies—one catered to residents experiencing various housing issues and provided some employment assistance as well, the other agency (the center) was most fruitful, yielding the bulk of our 105 interviews conducted (71) between August 2000 and June 2002. In all, 72% were recruited at both social service agencies. During this time, interviewers took up residence at the center's office during regular business hours. With the assistance of center staff, they approached prospective subjects who fit the study's criteria and requested their participation. The response rate was fairly high—roughly 80%.

There may be some concern that respondents recruited in the early stages of the project differed from those recruited through the social service agencies. Comparing the full sample to center-recruited respondents, I found minor differences in terms of mean age, number of children, and hourly wages (see app. table A1). There were also minor differences in the percentage who had children and received public assistance. However, a lower percentage of the center-recruited sample was female, was ever married, graduated from high school, was employed, and was a resident of a high-to-extreme poverty neighborhood. A higher percentage was currently on public assistance, but a lower percentage had ever received

TABLE A1
MEAN SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS BY DATA COLLECTION STRATEGY

Variable	Full Sample (<i>N</i> = 103)	Random Sample (<i>N</i> = 27)	Center-Recruited Sample (<i>N</i> = 76)
Age	28.4 (5.9)	30.1 (5.5)	27.8 (6.0)
Gender (female)	52	67	46
Never married	78	67	83
Have children	75	74	75
No. of children (if parent)	2.5 (1.4)	2.6 (1.1)	2.5 (1.5)
High school graduate/GED	84	10	78
Employed	50	89	36
Hourly wages (in dollars)	9.30 (3.5)	8.57 (2.8)	9.57 (3.7)
Public assistance			
Currently receiving	31	19	36
Ever received	46	58	40
Neighborhood poverty rate			
Low-moderate poverty	67	37	78
High-extreme poverty	33	63	22

TABLE A2
PERCENTAGE OF CENTER-RECRUITED EXPRESSING CONCERNS ABOUT PROVIDING JOB-
FINDING ASSISTANCE

Concern	Full Sample	Center-Recruited Sample
Major concerns about job seekers	81	84
Job seekers are too unmotivated	20	13
Job seekers are too needy	10	11
Job seekers are prone to delinquency	70	71

NOTE.—*N* = 76

assistance. Thus, these different sampling methods yielded individuals from somewhat different populations.

To determine whether this influences findings, I recalculated the mean percentage of respondents who distrust, by demographic characteristics, for the center-recruited sample only. Results are displayed in appendix table A2. However, differences were minor, changing in no substantive way the findings reported in the main text.

APPENDIX B

Job-Finding Questions

Now I'd like to ask a few questions about finding work

- 1 In general, how difficult would you say it is to find a job, any job?
 - a How difficult would you say it is now to find a good job?
- 2 What obstacles have *you* had finding work?
- 3 How important is it to use friends, relatives, and acquaintances to find out about job opportunities?
- 4 When you hear about job openings at your workplace or elsewhere, what do you do? In other words, do you tell the people you know about them? Explain
- 5 Have you ever gone to anyone you know to ask about job opportunities for yourself or anyone else you know? (If no, go to question no 6)
 - a Who did you ask and why did you ask this person?
 - b What does she/he do for a living and what types of jobs could she/he help you find?
 - c Would you say that she/he has influence or power on the job?
 - d Has this person helped you on more than one occasion?
 - e How did this person help?
 - f Did you get the job?
 - g Would you have been able to get this job without the help of this person?
- 6 Has anyone ever come to you for help in finding or getting a job?
 - a Who has come to you for help and why?
 - b What types of jobs did she/he/they ask about?
 - c How did you help, if at all?
 - d Would you help again?
 - e Did this/these job seeker(s) get the job(s)?
- 7 Now I want you to think about situations in which you have helped someone to find a job. Once the job seeker has been hired for the job, to what extent have you helped them get accustomed to the job?
- 8 When people you know approach you for help in finding work, how do you determine whether you will help or not?
- 9 What do you think are the positive aspects of helping others to find work?
- 10 What do you think are the negative aspects of trying to help others to find work?

- 11 I want you to think about all of your family, friends, and acquaintances Is there a specific person that you know who is helpful in finding work for others?
 - a Who is this person?
 - b What types of jobs?
 - c What does she/he do for a living?
- 12 Finally, for young adults moving from school to work, what advice would you give about how to find jobs?

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Race and the Accumulation of Human Capital across the Career: A Theoretical Model and Fixed-Effects Application¹

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The authors develop an explicitly sociological variant on human capital theory, emphasizing that most human capital acquisition is a social product, not an individual investment decision. The authors apply this model to racial earnings inequality, focusing on how exposure to discrimination influences both human capital acquisition and earnings inequalities as they develop across the career. The authors estimate models of career earnings trajectories, which show flatter trajectories for black and Hispanic men relative to white men, partial mediation by human capital acquired inside the labor market, and much larger race/ethnic career inequalities among the highly educated.

INTRODUCTION

The human capital model has become the baseline model for almost all investigations of earnings inequalities. Although much sociological research is interested in the influence of other processes on earnings, re-

¹ Bruce Western, Tom DiPrete, and Robert Kaufman made helpful comments on this article or aspects of the research. We also thank the three *AJS* reviewers who helped shape this article. This research has been supported by the Sociology Program of the National Science Foundation (SES-0112676). Direct correspondence to Donald Tomaskovic-Devey at the Department of Sociology, Social and Demographic Research Institute, Machman Hall, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts 01003-9278. E-mail: tomaskovic-devey@soc.umass.edu

searchers typically begin with a basic model that includes at least education, labor market experience, and tenure to model human capital influences on earnings. These human capital influences are treated as causally prior to the influence of social or organizational forces on earnings. Thus investigations of the earnings consequences of incarceration (Western 2002), social capital (Bridges and Villemez 1986, Granovetter 1985b), authority (Wilson 1997a, 1997b, Smith 1999), sex and race segregation (England et al 1988, Kaufman 2002, Tomaskovic-Devey 1993), and race discrimination (Grodsky and Pager 2001, Thomas 1993) all begin by estimating human capital models.

Criticisms of these sociological models often begin with the argument that the human capital portion of the model is not well measured, and if it was properly measured, well-observed social influences on earnings would be smaller or would disappear (e.g., Smith 1990, Dickens and Lang 1985, Lang and Dickens 1994, Sakamoto and Chen 1991, Tam 1997, Farkas and Vicknair 1996). In this formulation, estimated sex, race/ethnic, organizational, or job effects on wages in academic models are the result of imperfect measures of worker quality. It is assumed that employers are unlikely to have similar shortcomings.

On the other hand, the common practice of controlling for labor market experience, job tenure, and, in some cases, on-the-job training, is potentially misleading for many sociological investigations. All three of these aspects of human capital are accumulated internally to the labor market. Thus, they do not simply reflect individual (or family) investments in productive capacity, but joint skill accomplishments made by the individual worker, one or more employers, and even co-workers.

We illustrate these arguments using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), focusing on racial earnings inequalities as they emerge across the first 20 years of the careers for a large sample of U.S. men. Using these same data some recent research has concluded that there are no significant contemporary race differences in earnings, net of variation in individual human capital measures (Farkas et al 1997, Neal and Johnson 1996). We argue that this conclusion is premature, partly because it is based on statistical models that control for aspects of human capital (labor market experience and tenure in current job) that are clearly endogenous to the labor market. This conclusion is also suspect because these studies do not investigate race-linked inequalities as they emerge across careers. Since all workers enter the labor market at relatively low wages, earnings inequalities between workers are at their lowest point at the beginning of the career. Race and ethnic differences in experience, tenure, on-the-job training, and earnings grow dramatically across careers (Rosenfeld 1992, Tienda and Stier 1996, Thomas, Herring, and Horton 1994, Wilson, Tienda, and Wu 1995).

We take seriously the human-capital-based critique of sociological earnings models that assert that traditional human capital variables only imperfectly measure the stock of human capital. We develop a set of fixed-effects models to control for unmeasured but stable individual differences in productive assets or employment orientations, while incorporating information on race/ethnic career trajectories. In these models fixed traits such as race/ethnicity and cognitive achievement interact with age in order to capture their influence on individual wage trajectories. Stable influences on potential productivity are controlled by the fixed-effects estimation technique. If race/ethnic earnings inequalities are actually produced by pre-labor-market differences, we would expect no interactions between race/ethnicity and time-varying correlates of earnings in a fixed-effect model. On the other hand, if such differences in slopes exist in a fixed-effects context, it is relatively strong evidence that racial inequalities are produced within the labor market.

THE BASIC HUMAN CAPITAL MODEL

The human capital model is so well known that it requires little introduction. The basic idea is that individuals make investments in their own set of productive skills through education, general experience in the labor market, and specific experiences with current employers. Education is a source of specific skills (e.g., literacy or numeracy) and the general ability to learn new skills. People with more and better-quality education are expected to have both more advanced skills and a higher capacity to learn new skills. General labor market experience is also a source of general skills, including learning the rhythm of workplace life, how to follow orders, and how to work with others. Experience with the current employer is typically interpreted as a proxy for firm-specific skills needed to accomplish the work of the firm successfully. These skills might include training in specific work processes, familiarity with the goals and culture of the organization, and even the social influence required to mobilize joint efforts in the current firm.

Individuals with more human capital are conceptualized to be more attractive employees because their skills can be deployed to produce superior productivity. This might happen directly, because highly skilled people are more effective in their use of tools or communication skills and can accomplish more complex tasks. It can also occur indirectly, because people with more experience and education learn new skills more easily and so move toward peak productivity in a job faster. Human capital can also be as simple as work habits that foster reliability, such as showing up for work every day and on time. The general point is that

individuals with more human capital are expected to be more productive employees in the short and long term

Employers are argued to be able to recognize such skills and to compensate those with such skills with higher earnings. The motive for adequate compensation is seen to arise in competitive labor markets. Failure to compensate a worker commensurate with their human-capital-based skills means employers will eventually lose that worker to other, better-paying employers.

It is possible to take issue with many aspects of the human capital model. At the most abstract level, sociological critiques utilize some variant of the central insight of institutional organizational theory that organizational practices are only loosely determined by efficiency or productivity considerations (Granovetter 1985*a*, Fligstein 1996, Western 1998). Loose coupling between the organization and its environment, combined with the emergence of social norms of interdependence within the organization, lead to a set of wage determination processes that are not based solely on individual productivity. Wages are also influenced by organizational resources (Farkas, England, and Barton 1994), reciprocity and attribution biases (Ridgeway 1997), worker power (Kalleberg, Althausen, and Wallace 1981), and status-based evaluations of jobs or workers (Tomaskovic-Devey 1993). Most sociologists also assume that there is a basic asymmetry in the relative power of employers and employees, thus making the assumption that people are typically paid what they are worth implausible from the outset (Western 1998). Some sociologists have gone so far as to question whether education is even associated with productivity, arguing instead that credentialing is most typically a form of social closure used to monopolize access to high-skill jobs (Berg 1970, Collins 1979, Parkin 1979).

While we are sympathetic to these positions, we also think that sociologists have neglected an opportunity to enhance the basic human capital model with a more sociological image of school and career processes. An important point of this position is that *human capital investment is often not a voluntary and almost never an individual choice*. Human capital acquisition is a social process.

Educational decisions are made for young children by their parents (e.g., Farkas 1996, Fischer et al. 1996, Roscigno 1998). These decisions are often not even consciously about schools, much less career earnings. For example, extended family residence, race, current income, or employer location often influence decisions on which neighborhood to live in and which schools children attend. Similarly, parents vary in the time, cultural, and educational resources they have available to help children with their education. While the image of education as a self-conscious human capital

investment is not shared widely among sociologists, the notion that more education makes more successful workers clearly is

Similarly, the idea that labor force experience, job tenure, or on-the-job training are investment choices by individuals is hard to square with the reality of labor market operation. How long it takes someone to find a job is only partly about job search effort. It is also about the reaction of employers to the human capital and other status attributes of the job seeker (Arrow 1973, Phelps 1972, Vishwanath 1989, Wilson et al. 1995, Holzer 1996). Thus, accumulated experience in the labor market is endogenous to the labor market, because being hired is a joint decision of job seekers and employers. Similarly, long periods of firm-specific tenure require first being hired and then keeping the position. Both can be about human-capital-based skills, but can also be about other social processes such as organizational status politics (Bridges and Villemez 1991), status-based social closure (Tomaskovic-Devey 1993), or status-segregated social networks (Royster 2003, Burt 1997). Finally, the acquisition of firm-specific skills through on-the-job training is clearly a joint investment, requiring the consent and active participation of individual workers, their employer, and co-workers responsible for providing training (Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs 2002).

EDUCATION, RACE/ETHNICITY, AND CAREER PROCESSES

Wages are lowest early in the career for all workers. Earnings inequalities grow across the career, as some people get access to positions in internal labor markets, positions with authority, and positions that provide skill training, while others do not (Rosenfeld 1992, Tomaskovic-Devey 1993). Thomas et al. (1994), comparing cohorts of African-Americans and whites since the 1940s, have shown a consistent pattern in which racial earnings inequalities among men are lowest early in the career, grow rapidly across the first 20 years of the career, and then level off. This was true for the cohort that entered the labor force in the 1940s, for the cohort that entered the labor force in the 1980s, and for all cohorts in between.

If much racial inequality is produced in the labor market, then it should be at its lowest early in the career and then rise because of racial disparities in hiring, employment in good jobs, on-the-job skill training, and promotion across the career. Tomaskovic-Devey (1993) has shown in a cross-sectional study that access to jobs with authority, on-the-job training, and complex tasks explains most racial wage inequality. Tienda and Stier (1996) demonstrate that a key part of this early career process is racial disparities in access to entry-level jobs and longer periods of unemploy-

ment and job search for young African-Americans (see also Wilson et al 1995, Hsueh and Tienda 1995)

Cancio, Evans, and Maume (1996) used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to compare black-white earnings inequalities for the cohort that entered the labor market across the 1970s and those who entered in the 1980s. The point of this study was that the degree of residual racial earnings inequality increased for the younger cohort, consistent with the theory that the improved black labor market position in the 1960s and 1970s was politically mediated, as was the deterioration of black earnings relative to whites in the 1980s (see also Collins 1989). Farkas and Vicknair (1996) criticized these findings, claiming that race differences in the quality of education were the source of the residual estimated race gap, and that increasing labor market returns to cognitive skill in the 1980s was the cause for the observed change in racial earnings inequality (see also Murnane, Willett, and Levy 1995). Estimating similar models, but using the NLSY and controlling for a measure of cognitive achievement, they showed no significant race differences in earnings for the younger cohort.² Other articles using the NLSY cohorts in their early 30s have also shown that once cognitive achievement is controlled, that the residual race/ethnic earnings inequalities are not statistically significant (Farkas et al 1997, Neal and Johnson 1996).³ These results are puzzling given the ample evidence of discrimination by employers available in the literature (see the reviews in Cancio et al [1996], Darity and Mason [1998], and Holzer [1996]).

The Cancio et al (1996) study and the Farkas and Vicknair (1996) response both share the limitations in thinking about human capital that we have outlined above. First, inferences about residual race/ethnic earnings inequalities are made after controlling for cumulative labor market experience, firm tenure, and access to on-the-job training. We have no argument with the idea that experience, tenure, and training are potential sources of individual productivity, but it is also clear that they are endogenous to the labor market. Therefore, they reflect investment decisions, social origins of workers, and the potentially discriminatory actions of employers and co-workers. The Cancio et al (1996) study, while failing to control for cognitive skill, controlled for labor market experience, em-

² In the ensuing exchange Farkas and Vicknair (1996) directed attention to what they saw as the key problem for ethnic minorities in the United States—the quality of education, while Maume, Cancio, and Evans (1996) insisted that employment discrimination was still a problem worth scientific and policy attention.

³ These results seem to be limited to the NLSY data and the use of the cognitive achievement measure. Maume et al (1996) argue that this measure exaggerates racial differences. Using the PSID, Mason (1999, 2000) reports continued residual race differences in earnings after adjusting for cognitive skill.

ployer tenure, and on-the-job training. While the critique that the model was undercontrolled in terms of quality of schooling has merit, the Farkas and Vicknair (1996) response, like all earnings models in contemporary sociology that we have been able to find, failed to see that the models were simultaneously overcontrolled—containing three measures of human capital that are accumulated endogenous to the labor market.⁴

Second, these studies, like most, are oblivious to the fact that human capital and earnings inequalities develop across careers. These particular studies look at early career earnings processes and so are less likely to find race differences in earnings, even if models are correctly specified. It is entirely plausible that there would be little or no observable labor market discrimination influences on earnings early in careers, but that small race differences in short-term employment experiences could accumulate into more substantial race differences in earnings by midcareer. This is certainly the pattern evident in the cohort analyses of Thomas et al. (1994).

BUILDING A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY

In human capital theory, individuals make investments in general and specialized human capital (Becker 1975). General human capital represents productive capacities that would be useful to many employers, such as general educational development, labor force experience, and work habits. Specialized human capital refers to investments that have value to a specific employer. These might include firm-specific skills, such as training and knowledge of work practices and organizational routines. These two forms of human capital are valuable to employers because they increase productivity or decrease training time, and, given competition in the labor market for workers, will tend to be compensated at market rates.

The point we wish to emphasize is that both general and specialized human capital can be the product of joint actions by workers, employers, and, in many cases, co-workers. While an individual job seeker makes the decision to apply for a job, knowledge of job openings is often con-

⁴ It is the case that Cancio et al. (1996) recognized that their models were conservative because they included training time and firm tenure. The practice of treating all human capital as exogenous to sociological analysis probably results from early attempts to define a sociological earnings model as an addition to the human capital one (see the discussion in Granovetter 1981). Our critique of the practice of controlling for endogenous human capital without labeling it as such is not limited to others; one author of this article has done it as well (Tomaskovic-Devey 1993).

tingent on the behavior of employers and the current work force (Brad-dock and McPartland 1987, Granovetter 1985*b*, Holzer 1996) The applicant does not make the hiring decision, an employer or a current employee makes it Thus, the length of job search is conditioned by applicant differences in the urgency of finding work and the flow of information and job offers to searchers Thus, cumulative experience in the labor market is endogenous to the job search process The longer it takes to find a job, the less cumulative experience Thus, the generalized human capital typically measured in terms of labor market experience is endogenous to the applicant-employer interaction

This is also the case for firm-specific human capital Once hired, the probability of being placed into a skill-enhancing job is clearly about both the credentials and behavior of individual workers and the behavior of employers and co-workers Therefore, firm or job tenure and on-the-job training are not simply individual investment choices, but potential sites of social negotiation Employer and co-worker behavior similarly condition the probability of being fired Jackal (1988), in a study of managers, shows that the probability of being fired can be a function of the social networks within which individuals are embedded

Of the typical measures of human capital, only education and cognitive skills should be routinely treated as largely exogenous to the labor market, since they typically do not depend on the decision-making processes of potential employers or future co-workers ⁵

Because earnings profiles develop across careers, it makes sense to model endogenous human capital development as an outcome of social processes as part of our explanatory structure There is, of course, a great deal of research that examines educational and cognitive achievement as social processes (e g , Farkas 1996, Fischer et al 1996, Roscigno 1998) Students of the labor market need to follow the lead of Tienda and colleagues (Tienda and Stier 1996, Hsueh and Tienda 1995, Wilson et al 1995) and begin to model endogenous human capital acquisition as a social product, rather than simply assuming it is an isolated individual investment choice

The application of our version of human capital theory to studies of racial discrimination in earnings is fairly straightforward If there is bias in labor markets, it might be manifested as employer reluctance to hire similarly qualified majority and minority applicants Thus, controlling for exogenous differences in worker quality, if there is discrimination in hiring

⁵ There are obviously cases in which employers encourage or even subsidize education To the extent that cognitive skills are developed in the labor market by challenging work, it makes most sense to utilize measures of cognitive skill that are taken prior to or at least early in the career to model exogenous human capital

in the labor market, we would expect longer periods of job search for minorities than for similarly situated majority job seekers. If this were the case, minorities on average would accumulate general labor market experience at slower rates across their careers than would majority workers. After being hired, race/ethnic discrimination might manifest itself in shorter periods of employment, less access to on-the-job training or complex work, or lower cumulative probabilities of promotion.

It is also clear from prior research that race/ethnic earnings gaps tend to increase with social class. For example, many empirical studies have found that racial disparities in income are greater among those who are more highly educated or work in higher-status occupations than those who are less educated or work in lower-status occupations (e.g., Cotton 1989, Thomas 1993, 1995, Thomas and Horton 1992, Thomas et al. 1994, 1995, Grodsky and Pager 2001). This stable finding contradicts studies (particularly Wilson 1980) which argued that younger middle-class African-Americans had achieved racial parity with middle-class whites. There is reason to suspect a similar empirical finding for Hispanics. Clearly, the interaction of race and class must be taken into account in modeling the impact of human capital on race/ethnic earnings inequality. It cannot be assumed that the impact of race or ethnicity will be uniform across social classes or across careers.

To model such processes, clear distinctions between exogenous and endogenous human capital should be made. Increased race/ethnic earnings inequalities across the career, controlling for exogenous human capital, would be consistent with the claim that discrimination was present in labor markets. If these earnings inequalities were mediated by longer spells of job search, less cumulative experience, or shorter employer or job tenure, than we might say they were explained by endogenous human capital formation.

A FIXED-EFFECTS MODEL OF RACIAL EARNINGS INEQUALITY

We conceptualize the earnings process to be mediated by career differences in access to employment. We focus on a dynamic fixed-effects earnings model.⁶

$$\ln \text{wage}_{it} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \beta_1 \text{age}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{education}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{age} \times \text{education}_{it} \\ + \beta_4 \text{age} \times \text{black}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{age} \times \text{Latino}_{it} + \beta_{6-N} \text{control}_{it} + \varepsilon_{it},$$

⁶ Earnings are standardized to 2002 dollars. In addition very low (less than \$1 per hour) and very high (greater than \$250 per hour) earners are excluded from the analyses. We also estimated models with \$60, \$110, and no upper cutoffs. Conclusions were substantively consistent with those reported below.

where $\ln \text{wage}_{it}$ is the natural log of hourly wage for individual i in year t , standardized to 2002 dollars, α_i is the fixed effect for individuals, α_t is the fixed effect for year of observation, age_{it} is the respondent's age in year of observation, education_{it} is the respondent's years of education in year of observation, $\text{age} \times \text{education}_{it}$ is the product term for age and education, $\text{age} \times \text{black}_{it}$ is the product term for age and black, $\text{age} \times \text{Latino}_{it}$ is the product term for age and Latino, control_{it} is a set of control variables, ε_{it} is a within-person disturbance term, and $\beta_1 - \beta_N$ are coefficients estimated in OLS regression

In this model there is the equivalent of a dummy variable for each person in the longitudinal data set (α_i), as well as a set of dummy variables corresponding to each year (α_t) of observation.⁷ The fixed-effect model controls for every individual's average wage across the observed career, as well as wage variation, which is the result of specific year-to-year (e.g., recessionary) fluctuations. All stable attributes of the individual, even those that are not measured explicitly, are captured by this approach. In essence we model career earnings change and ignore stable individual differences in earnings.

Stable individual traits that are commonly observed in earnings models such as race are not included in the model because they are subsumed by the fixed effect. Race is included in the model in interaction with age ($\beta_4 \text{age} \times \text{black}_{it}$, $\beta_5 \text{age} \times \text{Latino}_{it}$) and in some models with education and $\text{age} \times \text{education}$.⁸ The race-by-age and race-by-education coefficients provide our basic estimates of endogenous career sources of racial inequality in earnings. If the race/ethnic career trajectories are significantly different from each other this is good evidence of encountering within-career discrimination.

By discrimination we refer to a range of processes that have been identified in the literature, including cognitive bias, statistical discrimination, employer taste for discrimination, customer-based discrimination, network-based hiring and promotion barriers, as well as co-worker monopolization of training and promotion opportunities. None of these mechanisms are directly observable with these data. This is a serious shortcoming of any analysis of data collected on samples of individuals. All theories of discrimination imply an evaluation of (potential) workers by employers, managers, or co-workers. Surveys of individuals typically lack such relational and organizational contexts. The use of high-quality panel

⁷ We estimate these models in SAS PROC GLM and use the `absorb` statement tied to individual ID to estimate the fixed effect for individual characteristics. For period effects, we simply included dummy variables for each year, except the last.

⁸ Since race is a social construction, some individuals, presumably of ambiguous phenotype and flexible identities, may switch their race across time or social settings.

surveys such as the NLSY or the PSID allows us to observe race/ethnic or other inequalities as they develop across the career, but not the mechanisms that produce them

We can, however, observe with these data when career inequalities develop and their association with endogenous human capital and job search activity. When race/ethnic (or other) differences in career earnings trajectories are associated with differences in success in finding work, accumulating labor force experiences, and job tenure, we suspect that discrimination in hiring is occurring. When these emerging inequalities are linked to differences in returns to acquired human capital, it is more likely that they reflect discrimination in sorting into jobs and firms. In the models that follow, we supplement our human capital model with controls for detailed occupation and industry to confirm that the career wage inequalities we observe are indeed associated with the quality of employment position attained.

Our basic model includes age, education, and a series of time-varying control variables to capture geographic location (central city, suburb, rural), career returns on cognitive skill, and labor supply motivation (currently enrolled in school, married, hours worked per week).⁹ This basic model also includes education as a time-varying, but conceptually exogenous form of human capital.¹⁰ In the initial model we also enter the interactions of age and race. If there are statistically significant race/ethnic \times age interactions, these will capture the average observed race difference in career trajectories.¹¹ Because they are fixed-effects models, such interactions must reflect processes that happen across the career, rather than the stable characteristics that individuals bring to the labor market. Although we do not observe the discriminatory mechanisms that produce differences in career trajectories, their presence in a fixed-effect context

⁹ We select these control variables because they are common in similar analyses (e.g., Farkas et al. 1997). All are conventional measures except for career returns on cognitive skills, which is measured as an interaction between age and cognitive achievement. We suspect that these models would be better specified if more attention was paid to attributes of local labor markets (e.g., Cohen 1998, Beggs, Villemez, and Arnold 1997) and plan to estimate such models in the near future.

¹⁰ The NLSY contains observations on a single cohort that entered the labor market in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Because of the timing of the survey, we cannot examine the specific hypothesis that returns to cognitive skill increased after the later 1970s.

¹¹ Western (2002) uses log of age in similar models. We think that this is a questionable choice for studies of earnings trajectories for a sample truncated at age 40. It is precisely in the later years in this sample that we see the emergent inequality effects associated with career processes. Not surprisingly, when reestimating models using log of age rather than age, we find similar but attenuated patterns of emerging race differences in career trajectories.

is good evidence that some set of unobserved discriminatory mechanisms exists in the labor market

In the second model, we enter race/ethnic interactions with education and race/ethnic interactions with education and age. This model explores the expectation that race/ethnic differences in the returns to education may be responsible for race/ethnic differences in earnings trajectories observed in model 1. If these models are significant, such interactions would be consistent with statistical discrimination or cognitive bias accounts of discrimination in which employers discount the observed skills of minority applicants.¹²

In the third model, measures of cumulative job search length, mean cumulative labor market experience, and job tenure are added. Cumulative job search length is counted in weeks spent looking for work since entering the labor market. Mean cumulative experience is measured as the total weeks of labor market experience divided by years in the labor force since age 16.¹³ Job tenure is measured in weeks in current job. All three are measured based on weekly reports of labor force activity. Experience and tenure are conceptualized to be human capital acquired endogenous to the labor market. Job search captures the relative difficulty of finding work. To the extent that longer periods of job search by ethnic minorities lead to less cumulative work experience and tenure, the inclusions of these career-based sources of human capital may help explain race/ethnic differences in career earnings trajectories. Prior research has also suggested that there is a stigma effect associated with long job searches (Vishwanath 1989). If earnings are lower for individuals with longer periods of job search after controlling for experience and tenure, this might be interpreted as reflecting such stigma.

We do not have access to more refined measures of firm-specific skills such as job task complexity, authority, or on-the-job training. There are also no good measures of firm resources or practices. We assume that any residual race/ethnic differences in career trajectories reflect differential access to such job and organizational characteristics. We model this as-

¹² All explanatory variables in all models are mean centered. Thus, all coefficients, including interaction terms, can be interpreted as the average effect at the mean of all other variables in the model. We use graphical representations of predicted values to interpret the higher-order interactions in these models.

¹³ This is the same measurement approach used by Western (2002). Dividing cumulative experience by years in the labor force preserves all the between-person variation in experience at a given age, but reduces the zero order association with age. This allows models to be estimated that include both age and experience terms.

sumption by controlling for detailed three-digit occupation and three-digit industry codes in a final earnings model ¹⁴

NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL SURVEY OF YOUTH

The NLSY is a panel sample of young men and women ages 14–22 in 1979. They were interviewed every year through 1994 and then were interviewed biennially in 1996 and 1998. This means we can track the early career of these young Americans through ages 33–41. ¹⁵ We restrict our analyses to the career dynamics of men and compare three race/ethnic categories—white, black, and Hispanic ($N = 6,125$). ¹⁶ Individuals enter the analysis in any year in which they have employment earnings. This means that the typical sample-selection problem (that in any given year, some individuals are out of the labor market) in cross-sectional research is solved by following people across their careers.

Since we think that the consequences of race/ethnicity unfold in a career-based process of cumulative labor-market-specific experiences, the panel nature of these data is a large advantage. We have created a pooled cross section in which each person-year becomes an observation. By following this sample over time, we can track human capital and earnings inequality as they emerge across the early career. ¹⁷

The fact that the NLSY is a panel survey also allows us to develop measures of labor force experience and job search length that are more sensitive than those typically available in cross-sectional research (see other examples in Tienda and Stier [1996] and Wilson et al. [1995]) and that can vary across the career. Since the NLSY data allows us to track a person's status on a week-by-week basis, the measure of experience, unlike those typically found in cross-sectional survey data, is not an age-education proxy but a direct observation of employment spells. Table 1 reports the measures used in the following models and their race- or ethnic-specific means and SDs.

¹⁴ This is done in SAS by using a class statement that includes both the occupation and industry variables, and then including these variables in the PROC GLM model statement.

¹⁵ By 1998, all members of the original panel were 33 or older. Before age 33, yearly sample size increased each year as more men entered the labor force. After age 33, sample size declined, simply because many in the original panel were not yet older.

¹⁶ Sample sizes are too small for separate analyses of Asian, Native American, and other groups, or to disaggregate the various Hispanic ethnicities.

¹⁷ One shortcoming of the sample is that we do not follow respondents long enough to track all of the expected career-based inequality. Age-based earnings inequalities tend to peak in the late 40s. However, most racial divergence in earnings happens by the mid-30s (Thomas et al. 1994).

Race and Human Capital

TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR NLSY SAMPLE OF EMPLOYED LATINO, BLACK, AND
WHITE MEN

	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Total sample ($N = 71,862$)				
Hourly wage	13 16	9 73	1 00	240 96
Age	26 67	5 57	14 00	41 00
Education	12 31	2 45	00	20 00
Mean work experience	33 06	13 77	00	54 43
Job search length	38 31	51 78	00	568 00
Tenure	142 40	173 62	00	1,252 00
Latino men ($N = 12,542$)				
Hourly wage	12 95	9 88	1 01	227 27
Age	26 90	5 64	14 00	41 00
Education	11 58	2 56	00	20 00
Mean work experience	33 23	13 40	00	53 25
Job search length	39 66	49 71	00	440 00
Tenure	134 88	169 60	00	1,073 00
African-American men ($N = 17,871$)				
Hourly wage	11 44	8 10	1 00	210 22
Age	27 17	5 56	14 00	41 00
Education	12 09	2 08	1 00	20 00
Mean work experience	29 66	13 59	00	53 75
Job search length	56 94	63 05	00	568 00
Tenure	115 17	151 88	00	1,083 00
White men ($N = 41,449$)				
Hourly wage	13 97	10 21	00	240 96
Age	26 39	5 54	14 00	41 00
Education	12 63	2 51	00	20 00
Mean work experience	34 48	13 70	00	54 43
Job search length	29 86	44 40	00	448 00
Tenure	139 38	174 56	00	1,252 00

White men average about \$2 50 more per hour in wages across their careers than either black or Latino men. Black men have slightly lower educational attainment than white men, while Latino men average nearly a year less education than white men. In terms of endogenous human capital acquisition, white men average more than an additional week of work experience per year than Latino men and almost five weeks more than African-American men. White men have been in their current job on average for five weeks longer than Latino men and a half year longer than African-American men. Thus, there are substantial average wage and endogenous human capital differences between white, black, and Latino men. Clearly, part of the explanation of these differences is that whites find employment more quickly, averaging only 30 weeks of job

search across their careers, compared to 40 weeks for Latinos and 60 weeks for African-Americans

ENDOGENOUS HUMAN CAPITAL ANALYSES

Table 2 presents estimates from fixed-effects models of labor market experiences. As people age, they accumulate less additional time in job search, but more work experience. African-Americans on average, however, have no effective decline in job search length as they age ($-1.058 + 1.092 = .046$), have equivalently fewer additional weeks of employment experience than whites for each year of age, and 3.1 fewer weeks of tenure in their current job. Once pre-labor-market factors have been controlled, on average, Latinos are no different from whites in their length of job search, although they do accumulate slightly, but significantly, less experience and tenure than whites across the career.

These inequalities relative to whites in labor market experience are less pronounced for both African-Americans and Latinos with higher education. Across the career, Latino high school dropouts' job search length and tenure are very similar to those of white dropouts, both improving with age. African-Americans who did not graduate from high school actually see longer job search and shorter average tenure as they age. The cost of not graduating from high school in terms of access to stable employment actually increases across the career for African-American men. For high school dropouts, all groups have similar increased mean labor force experience as they age.

Among college graduates, all groups enjoy shorter job search and longer job tenure with age. Whites' advantage in job search length over African-Americans and Latinos is down to around 10 weeks among college graduates at age 40. Among college graduates, African-Americans approach white tenure at age 40, and Latinos slightly exceed it. Among college graduates, both Latinos and African-Americans show similar increases in average weeks worked per year. Whites with high education actually work somewhat fewer weeks per year as they age.

Since Latinos do not have longer job search length than whites, net of pre-labor-market characteristics, their experience and tenure deficits may reflect some nondiscriminatory processes associated with job turnover or labor force withdrawal. From these models it would seem that discrimination in hiring is more of a problem for African-American men than it is for Latino men, and especially pronounced among African-American men with low education.

TABLE 2
UNSTANDARDIZED FIXED-EFFECTS COEFFICIENTS PREDICTING LABOR MARKET JOB
SEARCH LENGTH, EXPERIENCE, AND JOB TENURE, 1979-98

Variable	Job Search Length	Mean Work Experience	Tenure
Education	- 965*** (8 15)	1 033*** (31 66)	-16 39*** (25 57)
Age	-1 058*** (3 90)	- 0266 (36)	2 92* (1 99)
Age × black	1 092*** (23 18)	080*** (6 20)	-3 066*** (12 02)
Age × Latino	- 007 (15)	040*** (2 90)	- 776* (2 83)
Age × education	- 161*** (17 37)	- 035*** (13 79)	570*** (11 34)
Education × black	- 979*** (3 65)	- 185** (2 50)	6 32*** (4 35)
Education × Latino	310 (1 11)	152* (1 97)	6 85*** (4 52)
Age × education × black	- 097*** (5 58)	031*** (6 48)	166* (1 76)
Age × education × Latino	061** (3 63)	027*** (5 83)	- 035 (38)
R ²	847	836	603

NOTE — Table presents results for variables of substantive interest only. All models include the following control variables: hours worked per week, marital status, suburb/central city residence, current school enrollment, age × cognitive achievement, and person and period fixed effects. Absolute value of *t*-statistic in parentheses. *N* = 71,862 person-years.

* *P* < .05, one-tailed test

** *P* < .01

*** *P* < .001

EARNINGS ANALYSES

Figure 1 charts observed career earnings disparity. All wages are inflation adjusted and standardized to 2002 dollars. At age 16, the observed mean hourly wage of African-American men is \$7.58, an average white man earned \$7.15, and an average Hispanic man earned \$7.03. However, after age 18, a different pattern emerges. White men begin to earn more than their African-American and Hispanic counterparts. This small gap grows across the career.¹⁸ At age 40, African-Americans are earning on average 70% of white earnings, and Latinos earn 75% of white earnings.

Table 3 reports the results of our earnings analyses. Model 1 shows not only that earnings increase with age, but also that the trajectory of earnings is lower for African-American men than it is for white or Hispanic

¹⁸ The drop in mean wages for Latinos at age 40 reflects the small sample size at this age in the NLSY, rather than a real drop in earnings across the career.




FIG 1 —Observed mean hourly wage (2002 dollars) for NLSY 1

TABLE 3
FIXED-EFFECTS REGRESSION OF LOG HOURLY WAGES FOR NLSY MEN, 1979–98,
STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS

Variable		Model 4	Model 5
Education		0445*** (20 95)	0333*** (15 55)
Age		0145** (3 02)	0096* (2 07)
Age × education		0027*** (16 22)	0025*** (14 49)
Age × black		− 0074*** (7 51)	− 0067*** (6 85)
Age × Latino		− 0012 (1 13)	− 0009 (91)
Education × black		− 0146*** (3 06)	− 0110** (2 35)
Education × Latino		− 0293*** (5 81)	− 0243*** (4 95)
Age × education × black		− 0011*** (3 72)	− 0010* (3 29)
Age × education × Latino		− 0006* (1 98)	− 0004 (1 37)
Job search length		− 0009*** (13 09)	− 0008*** (11 30)
Mean work experience		0060*** (25 72)	0054*** (21 46)
Tenure	0002*** (14 54)	0002*** (13 77)	0002*** (16 41)
Tenure × black		0002*** (5 09)	0002*** (3 88)
Tenure × Latino		0001 (1 58)	0001 (1 23)
Age × tenure × black ^a		− 0001** (2 82)	− 0001* (1 90)
Age × tenure × Latino		− 0000 (84)	− 0000 (064)
Occupation (707) and industry (404) fixed effects	No	No	Yes
R ²	5905	5908	5939
N	71,862	71,862	71,862
		68,276	68,276

NOTE —All models include the following control variables: a person-specific fixed effect, a year-specific fixed effect, hours worked per week, marital status, suburb/central city residence, age × cognitive achievement, and current school enrollment. A baseline model that includes only the fixed effects has an R^2 of 448. Since our full models have R^2 s around 600, these models explain about 20% $\{[(600 - 448)/(1 - 448)] = .295\}$ of intracareer earnings inequality. Absolute value of t -statistic in parentheses. $N = 6,125$ person-years.

^a Coefficient multiplied by 10.

* $P < .05$, one-tailed test.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

men Hispanic age-wage trajectories are lower than those for whites, but higher than those for African-Americans. Men with higher education tend to have steeper earnings trajectories, at least in the first two decades of their careers we observe here.¹⁹ Since this model is a fixed-effects model and controls for both cognitive skill and education, the lower age-earnings trajectories for African-Americans and Latinos are not simply a function of race/ethnic differences in the quality of education. This does not mean that cognitive skill or education are unimportant, but that there are additional race/ethnic differences in earnings *that develop internal to the labor market*.

We looked at the predicted values for hourly wages across the career based on model 1.²⁰ At age 16, the predicted hourly wage of an African-American man with average characteristics on all other variables is \$8.33. A similar Hispanic man would earn \$8.01, and a similar white man would earn \$7.44. During the first 16 years of the career, the wage gap is extremely small after adjusting for exogenous human capital and the fixed effects. After age 30, there emerges evidence of racial disparities in hourly wages.

At age 40, African-American men with average characteristics on all variables in the model are predicted to earn \$14.10 per hour. Similarly situated Hispanics have predicted earnings of \$14.93, while whites have predicted earnings of \$16.37. This represents an average 14% black-white wage gap and a 9% white-Hispanic wage gap, net of all differences in exogenous human capital at age 40.²¹ About 62% of the observed black-white wage gap at age 40 reported in figure 1 is linked to exogenous human capital and the control variables. For the Latino-white wage gap, the comparable figure is 66%. Thus, about 1/3 of the observed race/ethnic

¹⁹ Although not reported in the table, the interaction between cognitive skill and age is significant and positive. In this cohort there are rising returns to quality of education across the career.

²⁰ All predicted values are calculated at the sample mean for all other variables in the model except marriage and currently enrolled in school. These two variables are strongly related to age and earnings. Thus, age-specific means for current enrollment and currently married are used in the estimation of predicted wages.

²¹ Predicted hourly wages are consistently lower than observed hourly wages for whites, and in fig. 3, for those with high levels of education. This reflects the use of logged earnings in the statistical models used to generate the predicted levels of earnings. Regressions based on logged earnings reduce the influence of high earners on the calculations of predicted means. Since most high earners are white and/or have high education, this downward pressure on predicted wages is largest for whites and for those with high education. For this reason, figs. 2 and 3 display conservative estimates of the wage gap, especially among those with higher education and among older populations.

gaps in earnings observed by age 40 emerge as a result of processes that occur inside the labor market ²²

Model 2 of table 2 adds interactions between race/ethnicity and education, as well as age, education, and race/ethnicity. There are significant race/ethnic differences in the returns to education. African-American and Hispanic men receive lower returns to education inside the labor market than do white men. The three-way interaction between age, education, and race/ethnicity suggests that African-Americans and Hispanics with high levels of education receive lower returns to that educational attainment than their white counterparts, and these disadvantages relative to white men accumulate across the career. Latinos show particularly low returns to education, and two-thirds of their career trajectory gap relative to white men ($\beta_6 \text{age} \times \text{Latino}_i = -.0022$ in model 1 and only $-.0008$ in model 2) is associated with differential returns to education.

Figure 2 uses the estimates in model 2 to display age \times race/ethnicity \times education interactions for people with 10 and 12 years of education ²³. Figure 3 does the same thing for men with 16 and 20 years of education. These figures illustrate how the age-by-race/ethnic interaction is conditioned by levels of education. As figure 2 illustrates, for those with 10 years of education, the predicted wages for whites, blacks, and Hispanics increase only weakly with age ²⁴. Among those with only 10 years of education, at age 40, African-American men earn the same predicted wages as whites, and Latinos have predicted wages of 110% of white men's low wages. A striking finding for those with 10 years of education is how different the three groups' wage trajectories are. White men who fail to graduate from high school have very low wages through age 40, but also have a much steeper wage trajectory than African-American men, suggesting that if we observed these men through their 50s, that white male high school dropouts might substantially outearn black men in later life. Controlling for pre-labor-market characteristics, Latino high school dropouts outearn both black and white men through age 40, and if the trajectory continues, will do so for the rest of their careers.

²² We treat hours worked and marriage as control variables. To the extent that they reflect processes endogenous to the labor market such as access to full-time jobs or desirability as a mate, these are conservative estimates.

²³ These years of education were selected because they represent key transitions along the educational attainment trajectory (i.e., 10 years represents the age at which most youngsters drop out of school, 12 years corresponds to obtaining a high school diploma, 16 years corresponds to a college degree, and 20 years corresponds to a graduate or professional degree). We do not display predicted wage until the cohort is old enough to have accumulated the amount of education the data series represents.

²⁴ In fact, more than a third of the upward trajectory on wages for high school dropouts in fig. 2 is produced by age-specific changes in school enrollment and marriage.




FIG. 2 —Predicted hourly wage (2002 dollars) by age and race/ethnicity for NLSY men with a high school education or less




FIG 3 —Predicted hourly wage (2002 dollars) by age and race/ethnicity for N

Among those with 12 years of education, the race/ethnic wage gap appears in the 30s, and by age 40 is only 2% for Latinos, but is 10% for African-Americans. Among high school graduates, the predicted earnings of whites and Hispanics rise faster than those of blacks across the career.

Figure 3 makes the same comparisons for those with 16 and 20 years of education. For those with a college degree, white wage trajectories are visibly steeper than African-American or Latino wage trajectories across the entire observed career. This same pattern in an exaggerated form is apparent for those with graduate degrees. For both types of degrees, the wage trajectories of African-American and Latino men are essentially identical. Not only is the race/ethnic gap greater at higher levels of education, but the white advantage and black and Hispanic disadvantage in career earnings trajectories is severest for those with the highest levels of education. At age 40, African-American men with college degrees earn a predicted 78% of the earnings of otherwise equivalent white men with college degrees and similar pre-labor-market characteristics. For those with graduate degrees, African-American men earn 56% of white male wages at age 40. The comparable Hispanic-white comparisons are 80% for college degrees and 55% for graduate degrees. Interestingly, among those with high school degrees or less, Latino and white wage trajectories are similar, and among those with a college degree, black and Latino wage trajectories are more similar.

Model 3 introduces cumulative job search length, mean labor force experience, and job tenure as potential endogenous sources of earnings variation. Individuals with longer periods of job search in their careers have lower wages. Large race differences in job search length clearly contribute to explaining the racial/ethnic gap in hourly wages. As documented in table 1, across their observed careers, African-Americans on average searched for jobs for 57 weeks, compared to Hispanics who searched for 40 weeks, while whites searched for work for 30 weeks. As expected, experience and tenure are positively and significantly associated with wages.

Once these labor market experiences are added to the model, the effect of age \times black and education \times Hispanic coefficients are slightly reduced relative to model 2. Longer periods of job search and the resultant lower human capital accumulation for black and Hispanic male workers are partial sources of their lower wage trajectories and lower returns to education.

The ethnicity \times education and age \times ethnicity \times education coefficients are essentially stable after controlling for endogenous human capital acquisition. This, together with the finding that the age \times black term is still statistically significant in model 4, suggests that much of the race/ethnic inequality which emerges across the career happens after employ-

ment This is most likely about access to higher-paying jobs and wage increases within firms That the education \times ethnicity interactions are largely unaffected by controls for endogenous human capital suggests that differential returns to education are largely firm- rather than labor-market-level processes Another way to interpret these findings is that the degree of racial disadvantage in finding jobs is roughly mirrored in the degree of racial disadvantage in getting good jobs and pay raises after being hired

We also explore the interaction between tenure and race²⁵ Model 4 reports for African-Americans that the tenure effect ($0003 = 0002 + 0001$) was significantly steeper than it was for whites (0002) The Latino coefficient was also steeper but not statistically significant This result is consistent with George Wilson's particularistic mobility thesis (1997), in which African-Americans' within-firm mobility is observed to be more closely tied to firm-specific human capital than is white mobility The negative coefficient for age \times tenure \times black suggests that the higher tenure returns for African-American men are more pronounced at younger ages We suspect that this finding also represents the reality that whites and Latinos find jobs much more quickly than African-Americans and so are less dependent on long job tenure for increased earnings²⁶

In our final model we add controls for the 707 detailed occupational titles and 404 detailed industry categories of respondents' jobs While we would prefer job- and firm-level data, we see occupation and industry as a reasonable proxy for the social closure and workplace politics processes that produce discrimination Grusky and Sorensen (1998) make a strong argument for this type of detailed approach to occupations (see also Grodsky and Pager 2001) Adding detailed occupational and industry fixed effects increases explained variance and decreases observed coefficients The most dramatic coefficient reductions are for education and education interactions with race All of these coefficients are reduced by the addition of occupation and industry fixed effects Thus, some of the differences in returns to education between black, white, and Latino men is a function of differences in industry and occupational sorting Race-specific age and tenure trajectories are not consistently influenced by the addition of industry and occupation fixed effects, suggesting that most of the emerging ethnic inequality not tied to education happens within, rather than between occupations and industries

²⁵ Models 4 and 5 are estimated on slightly smaller samples because there are additional missing data for industry and occupation

²⁶ We reestimated model 3 with cumulative experience substituted for age in all terms to insure that this result was not an artifact of multiple age-dependent variables in the model Results were nearly identical

CONCLUSIONS

This article focuses our attention on two ideas. The first is the distinction between types of human capital. Educational and cognitive skills are primarily formed outside of and prior to the labor market. Other aspects of human capital, such as experience, tenure, and on-the-job training, are acquired internal to the labor market. This means they are not simply the investment-based assets of individual workers and their families, but also reflect the hiring, promotion, and personnel practices of employers. The second idea is simply that earnings inequalities develop across the career. Both of these ideas have potential consequences for analyses of labor market inequalities.

We develop these ideas with reference to recent research on race differences in earnings. Unlike some prominent recent research, we show that there are substantial career differences in the earnings of black and white men. These differences grow across the career and are partially a function of access to endogenous human capital as well as different returns to education after being hired. This result suggests that from a human capital point of view, employers may tend to overvalue white education or undervalue minority education. Since we control for the quality of that education with a measure of cognitive skill and in a fixed-effects modeling context, this result is consistent with some form of employment bias or discrimination in job assignment. The conclusion in past research that there are no race differences in earnings produced in the labor market is clearly not supported. These differences exist in the contemporary United States, grow across the career, and are produced at least partially by differential access to employment. The key difference between our results and those that found no race differences in earnings is our focus on career trajectories rather than cross-sectional comparisons of relatively young cohorts.

Perhaps the most disturbing finding of the analysis is that not only is the race/ethnic gap greater at higher levels of education, but the white advantage and black and Hispanic disadvantage in early career earnings trajectories is severest for those with the highest levels of education. Thomas (1993), focusing only on the black-white wage gap, suggests that this particular race-class interaction "may be at least partially explained by the inability of blacks with high levels of education and occupational attainment, to translate these 'assets' into income due to discrimination in the labor force. Whites, who are untouched by these discriminatory barriers, can more easily convert these sources of 'human capital' into income" (p. 341).

The analysis presented here is consistent with this interpretation. Blacks and Hispanics receive lower wages than whites not only because they

have lower average levels and quality of education, but because the human capital they do possess is devalued in the labor market. The negative impact of this is cumulative over the work career and increases with education.

While our findings are consistent with Thomas (1993, Thomas et al 1994, 1995), they are clearly more satisfying for two reasons. First, they are not vulnerable to the typical criticisms of sociological earnings models that they miss race-linked sources of individual heterogeneity in the quality of education or cultural orientations. Second, we follow individuals across their careers, rather than relying on synthetic cohorts to infer career processes. That we reach the same conclusions as Thomas and colleagues increases our confidence that their conclusion that racial discrimination continues to operate in U.S. labor markets was correct. The recent field experiment by Pager (2003), as well as employer accounts of how they use race in decision making (Holzer 1996), are more direct evidence that discriminatory processes are in play in at least some labor market contexts.

Race/ethnic differences in the level and quality of education are important sources of earnings differences. In fact, because the influence of both education and cognitive skill are cumulative across the career, initial educational advantages and disadvantages are quite powerful, accounting for over half of the wage gap with white men for both black and Latino men by age 40. It is also clearly the case that processes internal to the labor market, such as employer hiring and job-allocation decisions, produce substantial inequalities across the career.

The estimates also suggest that for those who lack the class advantages that come with educational attainment, race or ethnicity has a smaller direct impact on career earnings growth.²⁷ Among those with low education, most wage growth happens by the mid-20s. It is for these men that the very basic problems of the quality of education, as well as the credentialing that comes with degrees, are most consequential. This population has also borne the brunt of the decline in real working-class wages in the United States since the 1970s (Morris and Western 1999). It is this decline in the career prospects of U.S. workers with low levels of education that produces our estimates of relatively flat earnings trajectories for all men with low levels of education. It is ironic, to say the least, that racial equity in labor markets among those with low education is produced, at least in part, by the declining prospects of all working-class men.

Men with more education, by contrast, have steeper wage trajectories

²⁷ Of course, minorities have lower access to quality education and lower probabilities of marriage, both of which influence career earnings trajectories dramatically. Thus, the history of racial inequality on family formation and resources has a dramatic influence on the life chances of minority men with low educational achievement.

across the career. We assume that this represents access to more skilled, skill-enhancing, and authority-invested employment, as well as the increasing returns to education during this period documented in past research. Education is important for white, black, and Hispanic men in gaining such access, although it is not equally effective. White men receive greater returns to education than do African-American and Hispanic men, and these advantages accumulate across the career.

Career trajectories can and should be explored in a dynamic context. Using a hierarchical linear models framework, Cotter et al. (2001) explore models with some similarity to the ones presented here. Although there are differences in estimation strategy, the similarities are more important. Both types of models allow us to explore inequalities as they develop across careers. In addition, the use of fixed effects allows researchers to control for the unmeasured individual heterogeneity that threatens cross-sectional inferences on earnings inequalities. Finally, most analyses compare inequalities at the mean of population distributions. Cotter et al. (2001) focus on where in the income distribution people are found. We estimate education-specific career earnings trajectories. These are alternative but clearly complementary methods for exploring the topography of earnings distributions. The absence of a significant mean race (or gender) difference in earnings across an entire distribution is not surprising if we suspect that the bias process is more likely to take place among very high earners or certain educational or occupational locations. More fundamentally, we should always expect higher levels of inequality where earnings are higher, since the baseline possibility for distinctions is larger. The nearer we get to zero income, the lower the inequality. The higher the income, the more likely we will find large wage disparities.

The theoretical and statistical models developed in this article and in Cotter et al. (2001) open up a new area of potential research focusing on both the dynamics and the context of inequalities. These inequalities might focus on gender or race, or other potential axes of inequality such as spatial location or marital status.

This article establishes for a cohort of men that entered the U.S. labor market in the late 1970s and early 1980s that race/ethnic inequality in wages are in part produced inside the labor market. Extending the conceptualization and models introduced in this article to other topics with strong human capital and career components is an obvious avenue for future research. Other research must also explore the mechanisms that produce these career patterns—especially for the more highly educated—in a much more direct manner. In a recent study, Kaufman (2002) reached a similar conclusion. In his analyses, black-white workplace segregation was tied to work characteristics most plausibly associated with stereo-

typing processes in job allocation. But the mechanisms there, as here, were not well developed.

Reskin's (2003) recent call to investigate discrimination mechanisms directly is important to advancing knowledge in this field. Within a status-attainment or human capital framework, we cannot observe discrimination. These are essentially theoretical models that assume a more or less meritocratic labor market allocation process. They have encouraged social scientists to collect data on individuals' characteristics and labor market attainment. Thus, discrimination is not observed, but must be inferred as a residual significant effect, once presumably meritocratic factors have been statistically accounted for. It seems unlikely that we will ever advance knowledge of discrimination mechanisms with data collected in a human capital or status-attainment framework. In this article, the best we could do is produce strong evidence that wage gaps are endogenous to both the job search and job matching processes.

We already have a series of theories about discrimination processes and mechanisms. The oldest, associated with Becker (1975), is that employers might have a taste for discrimination and so refuse to hire minorities (or other groups). To observe this mechanism, we would need to observe hiring and motive directly. There are other theories about employer behavior, such as statistical discrimination which posits that employers observe or believe that some workers are less productive, will have higher turnover, or lack soft skills, and so discriminate in hiring or job assignment (Arrow 1973, Holzer 1996). Similar arguments have been made about powerful workers excluding others from access to desirable jobs because of their monopoly on skill training or control of hiring decisions (Tilly 1998, Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs 2002).

Network-based recruitment has also been shown to be a source of racial discrimination, although in this case, in-group favoritism is the dominant process (Braddock and McPartland 1987, Royster 2003). Research on cognitive processing has shown that actors will tend to misjudge the skills and potential of stereotyped groups and be biased in favor of their own group, leading to discrimination in job assignment, evaluations, and promotion (Allport 1954, Ridgeway 1997). In these last two theories, there is not necessarily conscious bias or racial animus, but substantial discrimination can be expected in the decision making of employers, managers, and co-workers.

All of these mechanisms point to minority workers either having more difficulty getting hired or being steered into lower-quality or secondary-sector jobs. African-Americans are underrepresented in primary-sector jobs (Lichter 1988) and in authority-invested positions (Smith 2002), and accumulate less skill and on-the-job training than whites with comparable human capital (Tomaskovic-Devey 1993). It is also the case that some

jobs become race typed (Kmec 2003) Our finding that controlling for detailed occupation and industry explains some of the race differences in earnings trajectories is direct evidence that race-linked job sorting is a primary mechanism through which discrimination happens

While there are substantial differences across these theories in the proposed mechanisms that produce employment bias, they all share a focus on evaluative and allocative decisions in specific organizational contexts To observe discriminatory employment mechanisms, we will need to collect data in a relational and organizational context When we do this, we will not only advance knowledge of mechanisms, but also the contexts in which we find some mechanisms are more powerful than others, and perhaps even identify those contexts where bias processes in general are weakest

Thus, we see future inequality research has at least two valuable but different terrains to explore—individual career trajectories and the social mechanisms that produce them The former require longitudinal data on career processes, and the latter require data on interactional and workplace dynamics

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The Institutional Logic of Occupational Prestige Ranking: Reconceptualization and Reanalyses¹

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Departing from the earlier literature that emphasizes power and resources as sources of occupational prestige, the author proposes to explain the phenomenon of occupational prestige ranking from an institutional logic of social recognition that is centered on the principle of legitimacy and appropriateness. The author develops theoretical arguments to explicate the mechanisms that generate the intersubjective evaluation of the “social standings” of occupations and that give deference to occupations that can make legitimate claims on the bases of nature and reason. The proposed theoretical ideas are tested by examining patterns of occupational prestige ranking reported in 1989 GSS data. The findings are consistent with the hypotheses derived from the institutional logic that motivates this study.

Quite generally, “mere economic” power, and especially “naked” money power, is by no means a recognized basis of social honor. Nor is power the only basis of social honor. Indeed, social honor, or prestige, may even be the basis of political or economic power, and very frequently has been —Max Weber (1946, p. 180)

Occupational prestige has been one of the most fascinating and puzzling social facts in sociological inquiries. On the one hand, it has been widely observed that there is a high consensus in occupational prestige ranking.

¹ The data used in this study were made available in part by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), Ann Arbor, Michigan. The data for occupational prestige ranking were originally collected in the 1989 General Social Survey module on occupational prestige, designed by Keiko Nakao and Judith Treas. The data for occupational measures from the *Dictionary of Occupational Titles* for the 1980 census-detailed occupations were originally collected by Paula England and Barbara Kilbourne. Neither the collectors of the original data nor the consortium bear

among individuals located in different social positions, across different societal contexts, and over time (Blau and Duncan 1967, Hodge, Siegel, and Rossi 1964, Hodge, Treiman, and Rossi 1966, Treiman 1977) On the other hand, there has been an equally enduring debate on the meaning, measurement, and use of occupational prestige in social stratification research Unfortunately, research in this area has not led to satisfactory explanations and definitive conclusions, instead, the role of occupational prestige is often found to be at odds with other measures of socioeconomic status (see Wegener [1992] for a review) Featherman and Hauser (1976, p 405) concluded that “prestige scores are ‘error-prone’ estimates of the socioeconomic attributes of occupations” in research on intergenerational mobility Since the 1980s, debates in this area have erupted occasionally (Balkwell, Bates, and Garbin 1980, Guppy 1982, Guppy and Goyder 1984, Hodge 1981, Hodge, Kraus, and Schild 1982, Jencks, Perman, and Rainwater 1988) But, by and large, researchers have turned their attention to other research agendas, and important issues surrounding the occupational prestige phenomenon have been abandoned rather than resolved

The marked stability in occupational prestige raises fundamental issues about core sociological explanations that are centered on variations in structural positions, social institutions, and cultural contexts How does one reconcile the apparent high stability and consensus in occupational prestige ranking, on the one hand, with noticeable differences among social classes or groups, on the other? In this study I revisit this puzzle and develop an institutional logic of explanation to address this unsolved problem

My theoretical focus and analytical strategies differ from earlier studies Much of the earlier debate on occupational prestige is located within the framework of social stratification processes, especially the importance of *authority relationships* and *economic resources* that affect either the perceptions of those who rate occupations or the perceived status of the occupations being rated In contrast, I begin with the recognition that the processes that generate social recognition of occupational prestige belong to the institutional realm of values and beliefs Theoretically, I develop an institutional logic of social recognition to explain how the role of legitimacy and appropriateness governs intersubjective processes of eval-

any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here Earlier versions of this article were presented in seminars at Academia Sinica, Duke University, MIT, Stanford University, and the Academy of Management meeting in 2000 I thank Glenn Carroll, Roberto Fernandez, Mark Granovetter, James March, John Meyer, Hayagreeva Rao, Arthur Stinchcombe, Tony Tam, John Wilson, Wei Zhao, Ezra Zuckerman, and seminar participants for their helpful comments, and Ann-Walton Garrison for her assistance in collecting information on occupational associations Direct correspondence to Xueguang Zhou, Department of Sociology, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708 E-mail xzhou@soc.duke.edu

uation and generates observed empirical regularities in occupational prestige ranking, on this basis, I derive a set of theoretical propositions and their empirical implications. Empirically, I test these ideas in an analysis of occupational prestige ranking patterns in the 1989 GSS module of occupational prestige data. Methodologically, I adopt statistical models for ranked data that allow me to model directly patterns of ordinal rank scores in the occupational prestige ranking data and to incorporate in analyses both occupation-level job attributes and individual-level socioeconomic (SES) characteristics of the raters.

THE OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE PHENOMENON UNSOLVED PROBLEMS

Building on a series of earlier studies (Hodge et al. 1964, Hodge, Treiman, and Rossi 1966), Treiman (1977) is the most comprehensive study of the occupational prestige phenomenon, which established the remarkable empirical regularity that occupational prestige has been stable and consistent over time and across societies. Influenced by the dominant functionalist theory of the time, Treiman's explanation identified as the major sources of occupational prestige the importance of differential authority relationships and resources associated with occupations. That is, the division of labor through occupational differentiation reflects the "functional imperatives" of a society and is associated with differential allocation of resources and privileges. At the center of this argument is the role of power. As Treiman (1977, pp. 5–6) put it: "Thus, since the division of labor gives rise to characteristic differences in power, and power begets privilege, and power and privilege begets prestige, there should be a single, worldwide occupational prestige hierarchy." The marked regularities in occupational prestige ranking over time and across social groups "bolster a conception of occupational prestige ratings as peculiarly collective perceptions of social reality rather than expressions of personal values" (Treiman 1977, p. 59).

The recognition of occupation ranking as "collective perceptions" points to intersubjective processes of social judgment that generate the prestige phenomenon. I concur with this observation and take it as the starting point of my inquiry. However, I depart from Treiman's argument on the causal relationship between power and occupational prestige; instead, I see the relationship between power (and privilege) and prestige as unresolved and problematic. A fundamental sociological insight is that prestige, like other social statuses or social honors, is related to but distinctive from one's economic resources or structural positions. This distinction was carefully drawn in Weber's writing: "In contrast to the purely eco-

nomically determined 'class situation' we wish to designate as 'status situation' every typical component of the life fate of men that is determined by a specific, positive or negative, social estimation of honor" (1946, pp 186–87) Moreover, "‘mere economic’ power, and especially ‘naked’ money power, is by no means a recognized basis of social honor Nor is power the only basis of social honor Indeed social honor, or prestige, may even be the basis of political or economic power, and very frequently has been" (1946, p 180) It is true that, as Weber observed, economic power and prestige often go hand in hand in everyday life, but the mechanisms that generate power and prestige may differ and need to be explained rather than assumed Indeed, the relationship between power and prestige and the role of legitimacy in this relationship have long been the focus of discussion in social science literatures (Douglas 1986, Goldthorpe and Hope 1972, Heinz and Laumann 1994)

The apparent stability in occupational prestige was also a methodological construct involving two aggregation problems (for discussions of aggregation problems in sociological research, see Blalock [1964] and Hannan [1971]) First, an occupation's prestige score is a weighted average of aggregated ranking scores over all raters, which reduces all information into one statistic of central tendency (Siegel 1971, pp 21–22, Nakao and Treas 1994) As a result, the prestige score thus computed ignores, by definition, information on within-occupation ranking variations among the raters Note that my critique is not directed at the statistical measure of prestige score per se, but at the use of this measure to gauge evidence of consensus and stability in occupational prestige order Second, in Treiman's (1977) analytical framework, variations in prestige scores across occupations were then explained by broadly construed causal factors such as power and education for instance, noting that the level of education required for performing jobs in an occupation is closely related to occupational prestige, Treiman uses education/skill as an indicator of "power" But educational requirements associated with an occupation may be generated by distinct mechanisms, such as legitimacy on the basis of formal knowledge in an occupation (a doctoral degree or a long-term apprenticeship) or authority positions (e.g., educational credentials for managers and administrators such as MBA degrees) The second aggregation problem then confounds multiple, and potentially competing, mechanisms that generate prestige rating behavior

I argue that the two aggregation problems—aggregation over occupational prestige ranking and over causal mechanisms—have inadvertently masked important sources of variation in the prestige ranking phenomenon and fostered the image of stability and uniformity in the status order of occupations I propose to overcome these problems in two ways First, I develop an institutional logic to reconceptualize the research issues

and to identify distinct mechanisms that may generate variations in occupational prestige ranking. Second, I adopt appropriate analytical strategies to model variations in both occupational rating and in distinct generating mechanisms.

THE INSTITUTIONAL LOGIC OF SOCIAL RECOGNITION IN OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE RANKING

I begin this inquiry by noting a central characteristic, indeed a salient paradox, of the prestige phenomenon. That is, prestige as social distinction is based on persistent differences in social positions, at the same time, it must transcend these social boundaries and be accepted by a broad audience. This observation seems self-evident: prestige is necessarily a *status-ordering* phenomenon. If all occupations have the same esteem, there is no need for the notion of prestige to emerge. On the other hand, prestige must go beyond immediate interacting parties and be recognized by third parties outside the transaction. If professors are appreciated only by those who attend their classes, if judges are esteemed only by those who appear in their courtrooms, then occupational prestige loses much of its sociological significance. As Goode (1978, p. 18) put it, prestige acquisition "is structurally different from contracts or even many social exchanges because the essential relationship is not dyadic, but triadic. Prestige is thus the outcome of interaction between one person, another, and significant third parties."

In this light, the making of occupational prestige is a dual process of *differentiation* and *incorporation*. The emergence of occupational prestige is above all a process of differentiation among occupations along some hierarchical order. However, such a hierarchical order must be recognized through a meaning system shared by the members of the same community. That is, prestige making must be, at the same time, an incorporation process through which the audience comes to accept and share the criteria, taste, and manner of those prestige makers or holders. Weber (1946, pp. 188–90) offered a most striking example in this regard: ethnic groups are merely ethnically segregated groups that are *horizontally* distributed in a population. They become *vertically* ordered into a status hierarchy (e.g., the caste system) only when the logic of social recognition infuses meanings such as social honor and privileges into the relationships among these groups. Similarly, occupations are types of jobs associated with a variety of job attributes. A prestige order arises among occupations only when certain attributes are interpreted through value judgments and organized into a hierarchical order.

To elaborate these ideas, the imagery of an "institutional order" in Shils's

writing is a useful illustrative device. Shils argues that, in any society, there is an institutional order of values and beliefs—an “official religion,” as Shils put it—that is taken for granted and serves as the basis to confer legitimacy and appropriateness to social artifacts and behaviors. In this light, *an institutional order also confers a hierarchical order*: those social positions or behaviors that are located closer to, or positioned higher in, the institutional order are seen as more appropriate or legitimate and receive deference, prestige, or social status. Following this logic, Shils argued that “occupational roles are ranked in a sequence which appears approximately to correspond with the extent to which each role possesses these properties” (1968, p. 279). That is, variations in the prestige of occupations are a function of their locations in the institutional order.

I propose an *institutional logic of social recognition* to explicate the causal mechanisms. The core idea is that, to acquire prestige or status, all social positions, roles, and behavior must justify their claims on the basis of legitimacy and appropriateness in reference to the institutional realm of shared values and beliefs, a theme emphasized in the institutional theories of organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Meyer and Rowan 1977, March 1994, Scott 2001, Zucker 1977). Moreover, what is appropriate and legitimate must be seen as transcending self-interests and group boundaries, and be accepted by a large audience. In contemporary societies, claims of legitimacy and appropriateness tend to rest on nature and reason, which are seen as providing “objective” bases immune from artificial manipulation motivated by self-interests. Douglas made this point explicitly: “Most established institutions, if challenged, are able to rest their claims to legitimacy or their fit with the nature of the universe.”

In response to further questioning the final answer refers to the way the planets are fixed in the sky or the way that plants or humans or animals naturally behave” (1986, pp. 46–47). Stinchcombe developed a similar line of argument, emphasizing the role of reason and its relatives as “norms governing a body of thoughts recognized as authoritative in a culture” and providing “socially instituted protections of decision processes from corruption by passions or interests” (1986, pp. 152–53). In this light, the *naturalization* of social categories is a powerful mechanism of differentiation among occupational statuses. Once social differences can be justified on the basis of a “natural order”—be it genetic makeup, a taken-for-granted social inheritance system, or innate IQ—they are easily accepted by all social groups. Social recognition involves (or presumes) the acceptance of both the evaluative criteria and the process of linking certain attributes of performances or behaviors with the established hierarchical order. As Parkin (1971, p. 42) put it: “Thus it is not the ranking of occupations as such which is formally upheld by the socialization process, rather it is the criteria by which positions are to be ranked. That is to

say, certain criteria become institutionalized as 'relevant' for ranking purposes, while other criteria are excluded or defined as 'irrelevant'. Once a given set of rank criteria has been successfully legitimized throughout society, then the main lines of the status order will have been laid down." By this logic, if an occupation can make claims and justify its status on the basis of nature or reason, it is placed higher in the institutional order and can more effectively acquire deference and prestige.

The capacity to make legitimate claims successfully is not equally distributed. Compliance to legitimacy and appropriateness can be manipulated through the use of symbolic and other resources (Bourdieu 1991). However, such manipulation is not arbitrary. It must be consistent with, and justified through, the shared social reality. Therefore, the logic of social recognition points to those distinct mechanisms that affect both differentiation and incorporation processes. Consider the role of interest politics in occupational status attainment. As is well recognized in the sociology of occupations, interest politics serve as an important mechanism in promoting occupation-based SES. Occupational groups provide organizational bases for collective action in interest articulation (Grusky and Sørensen 1998) and help gain sponsorship from state regulation (Zhou 1993). They actively engage in a "collective mobility project" (Larson 1977, p. 66), "carving out a labor-market shelter, a social closure, or a sinecure for its members in the labor market" (Freidson 1986, p. 59). The resulting social closures deliver considerable economic benefits to these organized interests (Weeden 2002).

Yet all interest groups exercise their political and economic power to pursue self-interest, what, then, distinguishes those professions' deliberate pursuit of status from other interest politics in everyday life? "The key question for the professions," as Freidson (1986, p. 225) observed, "is whether the exercise of those powers also advances or imposes the formal knowledge by which they distinguish themselves from other occupations. Is professional power the special power of knowledge or merely the ordinary power of vested economic, political and bureaucratic interest? That is the critical question." It is a well-established finding in the sociology of professions that profession-based interest groups devoted an enormous amount of resources not to collective bargaining for immediate economic gains, but to develop a formal knowledge basis. The creation of formal knowledge, which tends to be "depersonalized" and "objectified," provides a link to "the dominant system of cognitive legitimation" (Larson 1977, pp. 40–41). The cultural control of professional jurisdictions, as Abbott (1988, p. 86) argued, "is legitimated by formal knowledge that is rooted in fundamental values," which provides a critical condition for competing professionals to make claims on overlapping jurisdictions. The pursuit of knowledge, or "intellectual challenge," provides an important source of

prestige even among those power-conscious, highly competitive legal practitioners (Heinz and Laumann 1994, chap 4, Sandefur 2001) In this regard, it is instructive to note that the once-powerful labor unions have not been successful in creating or maintaining the prestige of those occupations in which their members concentrate These studies reveal the subtle dynamics in which cultural meanings were shaped and transformed and in which the intersubjective processes of institutional building took place Conflicts over occupational status can be seen as symbolic struggles over the basis, such as formal knowledge, on which different fields can make legitimate claims to be placed higher in the institutional order

So far, my discussion has focused on the role of the differentiation process in providing the basis for legitimate claims in differential access to the institutional order Equally important to this line of argument is my proposition that social recognition must also be based on the effectiveness of incorporating different social groups into the institutional realm of shared values and beliefs The very logic of social recognition may generate divergence and contention, rather than consensus, in social judgment among groups For example, actions based on naked power or economic resources do not confer prestige or status so long as they are *perceived* as inconsistent with prevalent expectations or norms (Goldthorpe and Hope 1972) By the logic of social recognition, such behaviors are seen as inappropriate and, as a result, their prestige is undermined These considerations imply that the incorporation processes may vary across contexts and evolve over time For example, as Treiman (1977, p 59) reported, the rating of religious denominations in the United States reveals a pattern of “social distance” as a result of social differences resting on distinctive and competing religious bases It is one of the key tasks of the proposed theory to recognize and examine those social processes that may generate alternative bases of legitimate claims among social groups and undermine shared values and beliefs in the “official” institutional order, thereby calling into question the existing status order In emphasizing variations in incorporation processes, I seek to move beyond the focus of taken-for-grantedness in the institutional analysis and to understand how the logic of social recognition and interest politics interact in constructing the social reality of occupational prestige

These arguments anticipate that the rating of occupational prestige differs in important ways from the conception of SES in the social stratification literature Whereas most SES measures (e.g., income and education) capture the overt social distance and resource inequality among social groups, occupational prestige ranking follows a logic of social recognition that transcends group boundaries For an occupation to receive higher prestige than another, it must gain recognition and deference on the basis of commonly recognized attributes that crosscut group bound-

aries. In other words, processes of intersubjective evaluation of social positions must be based on shared criteria that transcend the very socioeconomic boundaries created by resource-based variations in education and income. In this light, the fact that prestige scores are "error-prone" measures of the socioeconomic attributes of occupations, as observed by Featherman and Hauser (1976), is a logical consequence of the institutional mechanisms in conferring social recognition.

These considerations highlight significant differences between functionalist arguments and the institutional logic proposed in this study. Both recognize the central role of an institutional order as the basis for occupational prestige. A functionalist logic sees power and privileges as neutral phenomena reflecting the functional importance of social positions, as a result, differences in social positions are *naturally* accepted by all members of a society. For example, consistent with a functionalist logic, human capital theory predicts that investment in education will have positive returns (including prestige) because higher educational credentials are associated with "functionally important" jobs and are rewarded accordingly. In contrast, in developing the institutional logic, I see the occupational hierarchy as socially constructed and follow an institutional logic of social recognition. As a result, occupational prestige should vary systematically with the bases for making legitimate claims and with group membership as a function of their incorporation into the institutional realm of shared values.

EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY FOR OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE RANKING

The proposed institutional logic points to distinct generating mechanisms that govern how deference and social recognition are conferred and subjects them to sociological analysis. As a baseline of comparison, I note two key empirical implications in the functionalist logic (see Treiman 1977): first, those occupations associated with power or authority positions are likely to receive high prestige because of their functional importance and associated privileges; second, there should be a high consensus (or no systematic dissensus) among social groups in their evaluation of occupational status. As I demonstrate below, the proposed institutional logic leads us to a different set of empirical implications.

Differentiation Processes

The presence of an occupational prestige hierarchy depends on the effectiveness of differentiation processes that distribute occupations into

different positions within a status order. As I argued earlier, the key mechanism of differentiation is an occupation's capacity to make legitimate claims in the realm of shared values and beliefs. My preceding discussions highlight the important role of "nature and reason" in providing the basis for making legitimate claims. But what constitutes "nature" and "reason" is socially constructed and therefore historically contingent. This observation leads to the following theoretical proposition: *Those occupations that can effectively associate their attributes with the socially constructed images of nature and reason are more likely to receive high prestige ranking.* In contemporary societies, access to nature and reason is closely related to rational, abstract knowledge and science. The depersonalized and objectified characteristics of formal knowledge imply a successful "naturalization" process. We come to appreciate natural orders through priests, doctors, and scientists, whose work is in turn legitimated by abstract knowledge (Abbott 1988). Therefore, if an occupation can base its legitimate claims on formal knowledge and science, it is likely to demonstrate those qualities that place the occupation higher in the institutional order relative to other occupations. As a result, such an occupation is likely to be seen as appropriate and legitimate and to receive high prestige ranking. Hodge et al. (1964) observed the historical trend that "scientific occupations were increasing in prestige" since the early 20th century. Thus, I derive the following empirical implication:

HYPOTHESIS 1 — *The more salient the attributes of formal knowledge and science in an occupation, the higher its prestige ranking.*

The proposed institutional logic calls for a careful distinction between power and prestige and treats the relationship between the two as problematic. Naked power and social conflicts may be at odds with the logic of social recognition and undermine the institutional order and therefore the basis for making legitimate claims. Political conflicts and competing claims on overlapping jurisdictions among professional groups may create "status strain" and reveal the arbitrariness of the competing claims and behaviors, making it difficult to naturalize claims in that arena (Abbott 1981). For example, the publicity of conflicting standards in legal proceedings (such as those in Court TV, the O. J. Simpson trial, or the Bush-Gore presidential election controversies) may convey a sense of arbitrariness and self-interest in the function of the legal profession (Sheerwin 2000), making it difficult to make claims on the basis of nature and reason. This argument is summarized in the second proposition: *The more an occupation is exposed to social conflicts, the more difficult it is for the occupation to make legitimate claims, and the less likely that occupation is to receive high prestige ranking.*

Empirically, in contrast to the image of objectivity and disinterestedness that formal knowledge and science project, those occupations that involve

frequent human interaction, especially those having authority positions, are likely to be exposed to social tensions that undermine their basis of legitimacy or appropriateness. These considerations give us the following hypothesis

HYPOTHESIS 2 —*The more an occupation is involved in human interaction or has advantages in authority relationships, the more likely that it experiences social tensions and that its authority is contested and challenged, hence the less likely that its claims can be “naturalized” and that it receives higher prestige rating compared with those knowledge-based occupations*

Note that hypothesis 1 can be derived from both the functionalist logic and the institutional logic, but that hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 jointly provide a test of the empirical implications of the institutional logic

Following the same logic, my third theoretical proposition is that *the more organizing capacities an occupation has, the more likely it is to receive higher occupational prestige ranking*. As I noted before, it is well documented that professional organizations have been actively involved in developing their knowledge basis, in protecting their labor market boundaries, and in competing for claims in overlapping jurisdictions. From the institutional perspective, it is the *organizing capacities* in constructing appropriate (knowledge-based) claims, rather than the exercise of naked power, that enable those occupations to enhance their prestige. The sociology of profession literature shows that the establishment of associations and rationalization of formal knowledge (often organized by professional associations) are important markers of the professionalization processes. Empirically, I use the age of an association and the number of publications in that association to indicate the associational power of the occupation, and hypothesize that

HYPOTHESIS 3 —*The greater the associational power of an occupation, the more likely that it will receive a higher rating. Specifically, the longer the association exists in an occupation, or the more publications the association has, the more likely that the occupation has higher prestige*

The effectiveness of the institutional order depends on social acceptance. In the mass politics of contemporary societies, the perception of having equal access to the institutional order (i.e., based on objectified criteria) is an important prerequisite for the acceptance of such an order. On the other hand, if access is too lax, knowledge-based claims and social closure cannot be maintained. There are similar parallels in social stratification: some mobility across social strata increases the legitimacy and acceptance of the stratification order, but a high rate of mobility undermines such an order. On this basis, my fourth proposition is, *The availability of access to an occupation increases its visibility and acceptability, but too much accessibility reduces its effectiveness in making legitimate*

claims Therefore, I hypothesize a nonlinear relationship between the size of the occupation and its prestige rating

HYPOTHESIS 4 —*There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between an occupation's accessibility and its prestige. An initial increase in accessibility (occupational size) increases prestige, but beyond a certain threshold, greater accessibility decreases occupational prestige*

Incorporation Processes

The acceptance of the institutional order, on which intersubjective evaluation is based, is a consequence of how various social groups are *incorporated* into the institutional realm. Since institutionalization is an evolving process, there are inevitably considerable variations in the extent to which different social groups are incorporated into the institutional order. This idea leads us to examine mechanisms of incorporation. Earlier studies of occupational prestige ranking have emphasized intersubjective processes and group-based differences (Balkwell et al. 1980, Guppy 1982, Guppy and Goyder 1984, Hodge et al. 1982). I emphasize the link between the raters' SES and incorporation processes governed by the logic of social recognition.

Specifically, I argue that the raters' SES group membership is especially pertinent because it reveals their distance from the institutional order, which affects their evaluation of different occupations. Research on social stratification has long examined the relationship between SES and class identification (Centers 1953, Coleman and Rainwater 1978, Curtis and Jackson 1977, Hodge and Treiman 1968). More recently, Yamaguchi and Wang (2002) found evidence that gender, ethnicity, and occupational location contribute to one's class identification. Based on these considerations, one can expect systematic variations in the effects of group membership (identity) on rankings of occupational prestige. Take racial group membership for example. Because of racial discrimination and the resulting economic disparity, African-Americans as a group are less likely to have access to key social institutions. Such life experiences are likely to lead them to resist the "official" institutional order and develop their competing values and beliefs. As a result, one can expect that there are significant differences between whites and African-Americans in their evaluation of types of occupational attributes. On this basis, I develop my fifth proposition: *Those social groups that are less incorporated in the official institutional realm or those that are peripheral to the institutional order are more likely to deviate from the dominant occupational prestige ranking pattern.* I postulate that minority groups and women are two social groups located in peripheral positions to the institutional order because of the discrimination and inequality they experience in labor.

markets, in work organizations, and in the broader cultural context (England 1992, Reskin and Roos 1990) In contrast, those with higher educational levels (e g , a college degree or above) or those in advantageous occupations (e g , professional and managerial occupations) are more likely to be incorporated into the institutional realm One should note that, among these group categories, scholars especially diverge on the role of gender in class identification (Goldthorpe 1983, Sørensen 1994) Yamaguchi and Wang (2002) also cautioned about the conditional nature of these group identities These qualifications notwithstanding, I suspect that group-based differences are especially salient with regard to authority relationship, which is the basis of social contentions and social conflicts Therefore, I propose

HYPOTHESIS 5—Minority groups and women are less likely to give high prestige ranking to those occupations that have advantages in authority relationships Conversely, those groups with higher educational credentials or managerial/professional occupations tend to give higher prestige ranking to those occupations that have advantages in authority relationships

As I argued before, affinity to nature and reason provides a more robust basis for acquiring legitimacy and appropriateness, because naturalization processes conceal self-interested behaviors and mask potential conflicts that may undermine the legitimate basis for intersubjective evaluation This line of reasoning leads me to an additional hypothesis

HYPOTHESIS 6—Differences in occupational ranking among social groups are less pronounced with regard to the attributes of science and knowledge bases than with regard to the attributes of authority relationships

RESEARCH DESIGN

Analytical Issues and Strategies

The proposed institutional logic identifies distinct mechanisms in conferring social recognition, but I do not claim that institutional mechanisms alone can explain all variations in occupational prestige ranking Instead, I explicitly acknowledge that the rating of occupational prestige involves multiple processes For example, when asked to evaluate “the social standing” of an occupation, a rater’s response may be influenced not only by the institutional logic proposed here, but also by other attributes (e g , income) related to the social desirability of the occupation to him or her What I do claim is that, even after controlling for other sources, the proposed institutional logic should have significant explanatory power for the observed patterns of prestige ranking Therefore, it is a critical task

to develop appropriate analytical strategies and research designs to control for other processes before I test the implications of the theoretical ideas proposed in this study

One analytical problem is distinguishing between authority positions and resources associated with these positions. This is important for constructing a critical test of competing arguments derived from the functionalist theory. Resources associated with an occupation may be a result of its functional importance (as conceptualized in the functionalist theory), or it may be based on power in the class structure of a society (e.g., property-based power). A respondent's ranking of an occupation associated with higher income may reflect the confounding effects of its desirability with respect to economic resources *and* the deference that occupation commands. Therefore, an observation that higher income (associated with an occupation) increases the prestige ranking of that occupation does not help identify the different mechanisms that generated this empirical association. To examine the effect of authority relationships on occupational prestige, I propose to control for the effects of resources (e.g., income) in the model estimation.

Similarly, one also needs to devise measures of occupational attributes that can capture multiple mechanisms in making legitimate claims. In particular, one needs to distinguish between two types of occupational attributes—those related to knowledge-based versus authority-based claims. For this purpose, I make use of detailed measures of occupational attributes in the *Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT)* (U.S. Department of Labor 1991). My strategy is to adopt *DOT* measures of specific occupation attributes that explicitly capture the two distinct mechanisms identified in my preceding discussions so as to decompose the effects of multiple processes underlying occupational prestige ranking.

Previous research has used *DOT* information to study various aspects of occupations, from occupational segregation to inequality in resource distribution and privileges (England 1992, Kilbourne et al. 1994, Weeden 2002). The *DOT* measures are criticized as biased in gender and other sociological dimensions (Miller et al. 1980). For my research purposes, however, these features should *not* affect my analyses and conclusions, so long as these characteristics reflect the instituted occupational hierarchies as the intersubjective basis for prestige ranking. Note that, if this assumption is not satisfied, there should be less or no systematic variation between the *DOT* measures and patterns of occupational prestige ranking in the empirical data, resulting in findings that would weaken rather than strengthen my theoretical arguments.

Another empirical issue that deserves careful consideration is the role of educational requirement or qualification associated with an occupa-

tion² In sociological and economic literatures, several theoretical arguments (e.g., functionalist and human capital theories) treat educational requirements as an indicator of the “functional importance” of the occupation. But there are also other alternative, competing arguments that conceptualize educational qualifications as signals or sorting mechanisms that may not be associated with productivity (see Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, Spence 1973, Weiss 1995). There are large, diverse literatures associated with these competing theoretical arguments. For this reason, it is difficult to give a substantive interpretation of this variable based on a single theoretical logic alone, so I adopt the strategy of treating “educational qualifications” for an occupation as a statistical control. If the institutional logic makes a distinctive contribution, the proposed theoretical model should have good explanatory power even after controlling for the effect of educational requirements. Otherwise, the institutional logic would not be distinguishable, on empirical grounds, from alternative explanations based on educational requirements. I will revisit this set of issues in the discussion section of this article.

Finally, the recent development of statistical models for analyzing ranked (ordinal) data makes it possible to model ranking scores of occupational prestige rating directly. Moreover, one can link these patterns with the disaggregated information of both the attributes of the occupations being ranked and raters’ attributes in an appropriate statistical framework.

Data

Data from this study are drawn from several sources. The occupational prestige rating information is obtained from the 1989 General Social Survey (GSS) module on occupational prestige. The 1,500 respondents in the GSS sample were divided into 12 subsamples of 125 respondents each. Of 12 subsamples, 10 rated occupational prestige ($N = 1,166$). Each subsample was presented with a common core of 40 occupational titles (from the benchmark 1964 survey) and a randomly assigned set of an additional 70 titles unique to the subsample (see Nakao and Treas [1994] for details). That is, each subsample rated 110 occupational titles, a total of 740 occupations were rated.

To examine sources of prestige ranking patterns, I linked the GSS module on occupational prestige with several other data sets. First, to obtain information on the attributes of occupations, I matched the prestige data with “Occupational Measures from the *Dictionary of Occupational Titles* for 1980 Census Detailed Occupations,” a data set prepared by England

² I thank a reviewer who called my attention to this set of issues.

and Kilbourne (1988) These data contain information on the prevalence of selected *DOT* measures in the Current Population Survey (CPS) sample for 1980 census-detailed occupational categories, allowing me to include selected occupational attributes associated with these occupations in the empirical study Second, I linked the prestige data with the 1989 GSS survey data so as to incorporate information on selected individual attributes (e g , race, gender) of the raters in my analyses Finally, I collected information on occupational associations from the *Encyclopedia of Associations* (Gale Group 2000) As a result of these efforts, I am able to include in my analysis information that measures several potential sources of occupational prestige as postulated in my preceding discussions

The occupational categories in the 1989 GSS occupational prestige ranking do not match perfectly with the 1980 census-detailed occupations As a result, a small number of occupations that do not match in these two data sets are omitted from analyses³ For the purpose of testing the goodness of model fit across analyses, I kept only those cases with no missing values on any of the variables in the analyses This decision results in deleting an additional small number of cases in the sample The analyses reported in this study cover 671 occupations whose “social standings” are rated by 1,122 GSS respondents (see app A for more information)

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the rank score on an ordinal (one to nine) scale given to occupations by the GSS respondents (raters) The respondents were asked to rank the “social standing” of occupations on a one-to-nine scale I use the raw ranking score given by the raters rather than the transformed prestige score as my dependent variable, because the raw rank score directly measures the actual outcome of the evaluation (and variations therein) by the respondents in the GSS survey

Independent Variables

Our theoretical discussions identified multiple sources of occupational prestige Accordingly, I include several sets of variables in order to measure these sources, as well as for statistical control

DOT measures —As I argued before, occupational attributes provide the basis for making legitimate claims to deference and prestige I adopt measures of occupational attributes based on the *DOT* data These at-

³ Of the 740 occupations rated in the GSS rating data, 54 occupational titles did not have matching codes in the 1980 census-detailed occupational categories, I omitted this group from my analysis

tributes are linked to occupational measures for the 1980 occupational categories in a sample of individuals from the 1970 census (England and Kilbourne 1988). These variables measure the *proportion of employees in an occupation* who have attributes along these dimensions. Therefore, variations in these variables can be interpreted as the *salience* of these occupational attributes in the labor force that might affect raters' perception of occupations' social standing.

I adopted two alternative sets of *DOT* measures. The first set includes four variables that measure occupational attributes drawn from the *DOT*. The four variables are chosen based on my reading of the descriptions of the *DOT* variables to identify those that most closely fit two distinct sources of prestige. The first two variables measure an occupation's proximity to "nature and reason," and the next two measure an occupation's authority position. (The quoted descriptions below are drawn from the *Handbook for Analyzing Jobs*, an instructional manual for the coding of *DOT* attributes, prepared by the Manpower Administration in the U.S. Department of Labor [1972]. I included the original variable names [as in the data prepared by England and Kilbourne (1988)] in parentheses for the reader's reference.)⁴

Salience in knowledge/science (SCINPREF)—Percentage of workers in an occupation who have "a preference for activities of a scientific and technical nature" (p. 317)

Salience in creativity (FIF)—Percentage of employees in an occupation where "the worker is called upon to use creativity, self-expression, or imagination" (p. 298)

Salience in authority (DCP)—Percentage of workers in an occupation in which "the worker is in a position to negotiate, organize, direct, supervise, formulate practices, or make final decisions" (p. 297)

Salience in influence (INFLU)—Percentage of workers in an occupation where "the worker is in a position to motivate, convince, or negotiate" (p. 299)

Of the four *DOT* measures, the variables of salience in knowledge and salience in authority are most closely related to my theoretical concepts of knowledge-based versus authority-based claims, respectively. In my view, salience in creativity is closely related to knowledge-based claims,

⁴ There are some discrepancies in the variable names used in England and Kilbourne (1988) and the data file provided by the ICPSR. In such cases, I followed the former.

whereas salience in influence is related to human interaction. Therefore, I include them as multiple indicators of the respective concepts.

I also adopted a second, alternative set of *DOT* variables based on factor analysis of eight *DOT* measures. I selected these eight *DOT* variables based on their relevance to knowledge/science, creative activities, or human interactions and authority relationship. The factor analysis identified three distinct factors associated with knowledge, creativity, and authority relation. I conducted statistical analyses using this set of *DOT* factors instead of the four *DOT* variables above. These two alternative sets of *DOT* measures allow me to check the reliability of the *DOT*-based variables (see app. A for more information on the choice of the *DOT* variables and the factor analysis).

To take into consideration and to control for the role of educational requirements in the ranking process, I include another *DOT* variable on training time in model estimation.

Training time (TRAIN) —“The amount of general educational development and specific vocational preparation required of a worker to acquire the knowledge and abilities necessary for average performance in a particular job-worker situation” (p. 209).

The training time variable combines information on both general educational development (GED) and special vocational preparation (SVP), and provides a more refined measure of required training time (ranging from one to 105 months) than broad categories used by GED (six levels along three dimensions) and SVP (nine categories). Not surprisingly, the training time variable is highly correlated with the GED variable ($R = .84$) and the SVP variable ($R = .90$).

Organizing capacity —I collected information on associations in each of the occupations as an indicator of organizing capacities. For each occupation in my study, I used the *Encyclopedia of Associations* (Gale Group 2000) to collect information on the two variables below (see app. A for information on the data collection of these two variables).⁵

Age of association —I use the age of the association in an occupation to indicate the organizing capacities of that occupation.

Number of publications —I use the number of publications by an association to indicate the extent of professionalization and knowledge basis in that occupation.

For those occupations with no identifiable associations ($N = 69$), I as-

⁵ The association data was collected via the Gale Group's Web site (<http://www.galegroup.com>) in 2000–2001.

sume that there were no associations for these occupations and coded their association age and number of publications to be zero. Among the 69 occupational titles with no association information, 54 of them did not have matching codes in the 1980 census-detailed occupational categories, hence they were excluded from the data analysis.

To test hypothesis 4 on the role of occupation size for prestige ranking, I drew information from England and Kilbourne (1988) and constructed the following variables:

Occupational size and size² —I use the number of practitioners in an occupation to measure the first-order and second-order effects of occupational size, and to detect the possible nonlinear relationship between size and prestige ranking.⁶

Attributes of raters —To examine the influence of raters' attributes, I use the following variables from the 1989 GSS data to measure the identity or group membership of the raters:

Black —A dummy variable to indicate the race of the respondent (black = 1), "white" is the reference category.⁷

Female —A dummy variable to indicate the respondent's gender (female = 1).

College education —A dummy variable to indicate whether the respondent has a college-level or higher education (college or higher education = 1), with high school or lower education as the reference category.

Occupational status —A dummy variable to indicate whether the respondent works in a managerial or professional occupation (professional/managerial = 1), with other (nonmanagerial, nonprofessional) occupations as the reference category.

Control variables —Occupational prestige ranking is generated by multiple processes. This study focuses on the institutional logic, but there is a need to control for other confounding factors. For this purpose, I include a set of variables for statistical control: (1) the mean wage of an occupation (in logarithm form) to control for the perceived economic benefits (resources) associated with that occupation, and (2) a variable on percentage

⁶ For those occupations with missing information (because of their negligible size in the original CPS data), I added a minimum number of one to these occupations so as to include them in data analyses.

⁷ To avoid potential complications, I included only whites and blacks in my analyses and omitted respondents with other ethnic backgrounds. This decision excludes about 4% of the sample.

of male employees in an occupation to control for the effect of gender composition. Information on these variables is drawn from England and Kilbourne (1988).

Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of these variables. Because some variables are related to occupation-level attributes and others to individual rater-level attributes, the sample size (or N) for these variables varies accordingly. The final data set is constructed based on rater-occupation records for the statistical analysis of ranked data (see below). The correlation matrix among the variables (table 2) reports Pearson's correlation matrix among the *DOT* variables and other variables of occupational attributes.

Statistical Models

My task in the statistical analyses is to model patterns of occupational prestige ranking on an ordinal scale (one to nine) and to estimate how both the attributes of the occupations being rated and those of the raters affect these patterns. To accomplish these goals, I adopt a set of conditional logistic models for ranked items. McFadden (1974) first developed the conditional logit model to incorporate both choice attributes and individual attributes in the analysis of qualitative choices. This model was later generalized to models of ordinal variables involving an incomplete set of choices or tied rankings (see Punj and Staelin 1978, Beggs, Cardell, and Hausman 1981). Allison and Christakis (1994) introduced this class of models to the sociology community.

Following Allison and Christakis's (1994) notation, let Y_{ij} be the rank given to an item (occupation) j by respondent i , in occupational rating. Based on an underlying random utility model, I assume that respondent i has a certainty utility U_{ij} for each item j . Each U_{ij} is the sum of a systematic component μ_{ij} and a random component ε_{ij} .

$$U_{ij} = \mu_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij},$$

where ε_{ij} is identically and independently distributed with an extreme-value distribution. The component μ_{ij} can be decomposed into a linear function of a set of explanatory variables

$$\mu_{ij} = \beta_j \mathbf{x}_i + \gamma_j \mathbf{z}_j + \theta \mathbf{w}_{ij},$$

where the \mathbf{x}_i vector contains variables that describe the attributes of the respondents, and the \mathbf{z}_j vector contains variables for the attributes of the occupation, \mathbf{w}_{ij} is a vector of variables that describe possible relations between i and j , which are not specified in my model. For my research purposes, the effects of the raters' attributes on prestige ranking as moderated by the attributes of those occupations being rated needs to be

TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE COVARIATES

Covariates	<i>N</i>	Mean/%	SD
<i>DOT</i> measures *			
Salience in knowledge/science	671	13.8	25.8
Salience in creativity	671	3.3	12.9
Salience in authority	671	25.9	30.9
Salience in influence	671	12.9	23.6
Training time	671	27.4	20.5
Occupational attributes			
Log(wage)	671	9.7	3
Size (in 100,000s)	671	4.1	9.7
Association age	671	58.3	38.3
No. association publications	671	3.0	3.8
% male in occupation	671	7	3
Rater attributes in GSS 1989 †			
Female	1,122	56.7	
Black	1,122	10.2	
Managerial/professional occupation	1,122	37.2	
College education	1,122	20.1	

* Cases with missing values on any of the *DOT* measures and occupational attributes in the table are excluded.

† Only raters with white or black ethnicity are included in the sample.

assessed. To accomplish this goal, I include in the model estimation interaction terms between the raters' attributes (e.g., race, gender, etc.) and the attributes of the occupation in the \mathbf{z}_i vector (see Allison and Christakis 1994 for a discussion of the procedures to accommodate different types of variables in the model). The proposed model also has the advantage of dealing with tied ranking scores as well as variable choice sets for different respondents—both are the distinctive features of the 1989 GSS occupational prestige ranking data (see Nakao and Treas 1994). The data are organized into respondent–occupational title records to facilitate statistical analysis. The models reported in this study are estimated using the SAS program; similar statistical procedures are also available in STATA 8.0.

RESULTS

A Baseline Model: Analyses Based on Aggregate Information

I begin with a baseline model that examines patterns of occupational prestige ranking at the aggregate occupational level. Specifically, I examine how the overall *mean rank score* of an occupation, aggregated from all respondents' rank scores for that occupation, is related to the occu-

Occupational Prestige Ranking

TABLE 2
PEARSON'S CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE COVARIATES IN OCCUPATIONAL ATTRIBUTES

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1 Salience in science										
2 Salience in creativity	.08									
3 Salience in authority	.30	.02								
4 Salience in influence	-.02	.18	.18							
5 Training time	.46	.31	.59	.23						
6 Log(wage)	.31	.02	.55	.16	.60					
7 Size (in 100,000s)	-.06	-.04	.43	-.05	.10	.34				
8 Association age	.13	.00	.12	.05	.16	.15	.02			
9 No association publications	.23	.01	.37	.26	.40	.32	.13	.28		
10 % male in occupation	.11	.01	.11	-.06	.27	.55	.06	.06	.02	

pational attributes of theoretical interest. This set of analyses serves several purposes: first, earlier work (e.g., empirical studies reported in Treiman [1977]) examined sources of occupational prestige mainly at this aggregate level. It is important to replicate these analyses and to establish a baseline to assess new contributions from the subsequent analyses based on alternative modeling of disaggregated information. Second, these preliminary analyses allow me to assess the reliability of the choice of covariates in the model. Since I use the functionalist arguments as the baseline for comparison, I need to ascertain that these selected variables have the expected explanatory power on occupational prestige ranking at the familiar aggregated level before I use these variables in more complicated models for ranked data. For the purpose of validity analysis, I also examine the effects of these occupational attributes on the general educational level (GED) and on the logarithm of mean wage ($\log[\text{wage}]$) for that occupation.

For this set of analyses, I used the conventional linear regression model and regressed the mean rank scores of occupational prestige, GED, and $\log(\text{wage})$ on a set of covariates of occupational attributes, respectively. I estimated three nested models for each dependent variable: the first one includes only the four *DOT* measures, the second one adds the "training time" variable, and the third one includes other occupational attributes in the model. The results are reported in table 3. I report standardized regression coefficients so as to compare directly the magnitudes of effects among these variables.

Panel 1 of table 3 reports the parameter estimates from the regression of mean rank score on occupational attributes. In model 1, all four *DOT* variables show significant and positive effects on mean occupation prestige. The variables salience in knowledge and salience in authority have comparable effects. In model 2, after controlling for the effect of training time, both salience in knowledge and salience in authority position have

TABLE 3
PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF OLS REGRESSION OF OCCUPATIONAL OUTCOME
ATTRIBUTES

	MEAN OCCUPATION RANKING SCORE			Model 4
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	
<i>DOT measures</i>				
Salience in science	338**	193**	149**	388*
Salience in creativity	092**	− 031	030	176*
Salience in authority	394**	161**	024	425*
Salience in influence	117**	068*	− 011	276*
Training time		481**	319**	
<i>Occupational attributes</i>				
Log(wage)			509**	
Association age			− 010	
No. association publications			097**	
Size			066	
Size ²			− 136	
% male in occupation			− 273**	
Adjusted R^2	39	50	60	60

NOTE — Parameter estimates are standardized β $N = 671$

* $P < .05$

** $P < .01$

smaller, but still significant, positive effects on the mean rank score, with salience in influence having a much smaller effect. The effect of the salience in creativity variable is no longer significant, suggesting that the effect of this variable is confounded with the training time variable, which has a strong, positive effect. Moreover, I note that the training time variable may have captured the confluence of several mechanisms and hence defies a clear theoretical interpretation.

Model 3 in the “mean rank score” column adds several variables measuring occupation attributes in the model. Among the four *DOT* variables, only salience in knowledge has a significant, positive effect on mean rank score, net of the effects of these occupational attributes. Overall, mean wage (in logarithm) and number of publications in an occupation increase an occupation’s mean rank score, but an increase in the proportion of male workers in an occupation reduces the prestige score (see also England 1979). Occupation size has no statistically discernible effect.

All three models in panel 1 show good explanatory power. The four *DOT* variables in model 1 explain 39% of the variation in mean rank scores among occupations being rated ($R^2 = .39$), whereas models 2 and 3 explain 50% and 60% of the variations, respectively. Given the multifaceted processes involved in occupational prestige ranking, these results show that the selected *DOT* variables have reasonably good explanatory power for variations in the mean rank scores.

The second panel in table 3 reports analyses of the effects of occupational attributes on GED. GED is a measure of general education needed to perform jobs in a particular occupation. Previous research shows that GED is one of the most influential factors for predicting mean rank score in occupational prestige. If my choice of the four *DOT* measures of occupational attributes is sensible, they should be closely related to variations in GED across occupations. Indeed, as model 1 shows, all four *DOT* variables contribute significantly to GED requirement, accounting for 60% of the variations in GED. This finding is especially important for my purposes, because I intend for these variables to capture occupational attributes related to knowledge-based versus authority-based claims, thus allowing me to decompose and disentangle distinct mechanisms behind educational credentials. Adding the training time variable in model 2 accounts for 78% of the variations in GED, but the variable on salience in creativity is no longer statistically significant. In model 3, the inclusion of other occupation attributes shows that, net of the effects of these occupational attributes, the effect of salience in creativity becomes statistically significant, but salience in authority is no longer statistically significant.

Finally, I estimate the effects of these occupation attributes on mean wage (in logarithm form) in an occupation. These covariates also show

a good model fit, accounting for 33% to 65% of the variations in log(wage) in the three models. I focus on model 3 to highlight some interesting patterns. First, among the four *DOT* variables, salience in authority has the largest effect on mean wage among the other four *DOT* variables, with salience in influence having the second-largest effect. In contrast, salience in knowledge has a positive but much smaller effect. Salience in creativity has a negative, significant effect. Second, in model 2, percent of male workers is positively associated with mean wage. Recall that the proportion of male composition significantly lowers mean occupational prestige in the earlier analysis (see column 1 of table 3). These patterns suggest that those processes that increase income may be different from those that generate higher prestige.

To summarize, the four *DOT* variables in the model estimation show good explanatory power for the main characteristics of occupations—mean rank score, general education required, as well as the mean income in the occupation, and they show significant effects independent of one another. Some of these effects are reduced or become statistically insignificant after I control for other occupational attributes in the model, reflecting the confluence of several mechanisms affecting occupational prestige and resources. In particular, variables related to authority relationship are noticeably more sensitive to resources associated with an occupation than those knowledge-based variables are. The patterns of these findings are largely consistent with Treiman's general conclusion that an authority position begets privileges, which in turn lead to higher occupational prestige. However, these analyses are only the starting point of my research: first, one must recognize that the use of aggregated mean rank scores, as the property of the central tendency measure implies, ignores variations in prestige ranking at the individual level. Second, we have not considered nor controlled for other sources of occupational prestige, especially with regard to the role of raters' attributes. Below, I turn to statistical analyses that explicitly address these issues.

Sources of Occupational Prestige: A Model for Disaggregated Data

To test the hypotheses drawn from the proposed institutional theory, one needs to consider distinctive attributes of occupations as well as those of individual raters. As noted before, I also want to model the ordinal rank score directly so as to retain all variations in prestige score ranking among the raters. For this purpose, I estimated a set of conditional logit models for ranked data to examine the contribution of sets of covariates that are related to my theoretical interest.⁸ Table 4 reports the parameter estimates of these statistical analyses.

⁸ As the descriptive statistics in table 1 show, although the four *DOT* variables are

Occupational attributes —Our first set of analyses (models 1–4) focuses on the effects of the *DOT* measures and other occupation-level attributes on variations in prestige rank scores. That is, I specified the following model

$$\mu_{ij} = \gamma \mathbf{z}_{ij}$$

where μ_{ij} , the rank score given by respondent i for occupation j , is a function of occupation-level characteristics, \mathbf{z}_{ij} . In my statistical analyses, the \mathbf{z} -vector consists of three sets of covariates: (1) the four *DOT* measures of occupational attributes used in the earlier analyses, (2) variables related to organizing capacities, and (3) control variables such as training time, income, size, and gender composition of the occupations. I estimated a set of nested models to examine the contribution of these sets of covariates.

In model 1, I include only the four *DOT* covariates of occupational attributes. Recall that these occupational attributes measure the proportion of workers in that occupation who share the respective occupational attributes. I interpret the parameter estimate associated with a *DOT* variable as the effect of the salience of the corresponding occupational attribute on the rating of occupational prestige. As one can see, the patterns of effects for these covariates are similar to those in the aggregated model in table 3: all four covariates contribute significantly and positively to occupational prestige ranking, with salience in authority positions and in knowledge having the largest magnitudes of effects. Salience in creativity has a distant third-largest contribution, and salience in influence the smallest contribution of all four covariates.

Model 2 adds the training time variable, which has a significant and positive effect on occupational prestige ranking. If one interprets training time as an indicator of human capital, then this finding renders support for the functionalist argument that the “functional importance” of an occupation increases its prestige. But, as I noted before, the training time variable is highly correlated with the educational/training requirement variables (GED and SVP) and reflects the confluence of several distinctive mechanisms. Its relevance to knowledge-based mechanisms is obvious; positions involving authority and human interactions also require extensive educational training (e.g., the MBA programs). For this reason, I

measured on the same scale, their distributions vary considerably, making it difficult to compare the effects of these variables directly. (This was not a problem in the OLS regression in table 3 because standardized coefficients were reported there.) To facilitate the comparison of the effects of the four *DOT* variables in this set of analyses, I first standardized these four *DOT* variables. Let x'_i be the standardized *DOT* variable x associated with occupation i , then the standardization formula can be expressed as follows: $x'_i = (x_i - \bar{x})/\sigma_x$. (Parameter estimates based on unstandardized *DOT* variables are available upon request.)

TABLE 4
PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF CONDITIONAL LOGISTIC MODELS FOR RANKED DATA

Covariates	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
<i>DOT measures</i>								
Salience in science	298**	164**	187**	172**	182**	172**	157**	155**
Salience in creativity	106**	− 075**	− 020**	061**	067**	058**	039**	040**
Salience in authority	354**	105**	034**	014*	027**	036**	− 020**	− 022**
Salience in influence	046**	019**	− 005	− 108**	− 109**	− 145**	− 116**	− 125*
Training time		027**	020**	016**	016**	016**	016**	016**
<i>Rater attributes</i>								
Black × science					− 095*			
Black × creativity					− 060**			
Black × authority					− 127**			
Black × influence					011			
Black × log(wage)					037			
Female × science						− 001		
Female × creativity						004		
Female × authority						− 038**		
Female × influence						064**		
Female × log(wage)						052		
College × science							079**	

College × creativity				
College × authority				
College × influence				
College × log(wage)				
Occupation × science				
Occupation × creativity				
Occupation × authority				
Occupation × influence				
Occupation × log(wage)				
Occupational attributes				
Log(wage)			753**	
Association age/100				
No association publications				
Size				
Size ²				-
% male in occupation				-
χ^2/df	15,790 1	23,193 0	25,075 7	31
df	4	5	6	
Improvement in χ^2/df		7,402 9/1	1,882 7/1	5,

NOTE – White is the reference category for black interaction terms, nonprofessional high school or lower education for college interaction terms. The four *DOT* variables are
* $P < .05$
** $P < .01$

include this variable mainly for the purpose of statistical control. I expect that main effects of the four *DOT* variables will be consistent with my theoretical predictions, even after I control for the training time variable. Indeed, as one can see in model 2, measures of knowledge and authority as well as influence still have significant contributions to occupational prestige, after controlling for the training time variable. But the confounding effect of training time on other *DOT* attributes can be readily seen: the effects of salience in knowledge, authority, and influence are noticeably smaller, salience in creativity now has a negative, significant effect.

Model 3 includes the log(wage) variable. This analysis examines a critical question underlying the institutional logic of prestige ranking. Although the respondents were asked to rank an occupation's "social standing," I suspect that respondents' ranking decisions may in part reflect the general desirability of the occupation being rated. In particular, economic benefits (e.g., income) associated with an occupation may significantly influence a respondent's perception of job "desirability" (Jencks, Perman, and Rainwater 1988). Theoretically, the proposed institutional logic makes a careful distinction between prestige acquired on the basis of appropriateness and that acquired on the basis of resource desirability. By controlling for the effect of mean income in model estimation, one can assess the role of relevant occupational attributes, after the resource-induced job desirability is removed from consideration. If deference and prestige are derived from the logic of social recognition, as I argued here, their effects on an occupation's social standing should remain above and beyond the effects of resources associated with that position.

There are several interesting findings from this model estimation. First, the finding that resources, as measured by log(wage), significantly increase an occupation's prestige confirms my suspicion that respondents do give higher prestige ranking to those occupations that are associated with more resources. However, the empirical patterns also render support to my hypotheses, after controlling for the role of resources. First, the effect of salience in knowledge has increased, after resources are controlled for, suggesting that knowledge-based claims are even more effective, net of considerations of resources. Second, the effects on prestige ranking of the two variables on authority relationships change drastically, once the role of resources is controlled for. Salience in authority position is still positive and statistically significant, but its magnitude is reduced by nearly two-thirds ($\gamma_{\text{authority}} = 0.105$ in model 2, but $\gamma_{\text{authority}} = 0.034$ in model 3), salience in influence now has no significant effect. Third, the negative effect of salience in creativity was also greatly reduced, net of resource considerations. Clearly, in rating occupational prestige, those occupations involving human interactions and authority relationships benefited greatly

from the resources associated with their positions, in contrast, occupations related to knowledge and creativity receive higher ratings when the effects of resources are controlled for. These findings are consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2 that occupational attributes salient in knowledge and science increase occupational prestige, whereas those salient in authority relationships are likely to be contested, and their legitimate claim for prestige undermined. These patterns are especially prominent when resource considerations are removed from rating decisions.

Model 4 adds variables measuring “organizing capacities” of the occupation as well as other control variables. There are interesting patterns in the effects of the *DOT* variables. Change is relatively small in the effect of salience in knowledge but is much larger in the variable of salience in authority. Salience in creativity now has a positive and significant effect on prestige ranking, controlling for the effects of organizing capacities. In contrast, salience in influence has a significant, negative effect. These patterns indicate that the effects of variables on authority and influence in previous models benefit greatly from the organizing capacities of these occupations, whereas the opposite is true for the variable of salience in creativity.

I use number of publications to indicate the extent of professionalization or the establishment of knowledge basis, and the finding shows that prestige ranking increases with the number of publications in the professional association, as consistent with hypothesis 3. But contrary to my expectation, association age does not have a significant effect. One plausible explanation is that many occupations (hence their associations) that emerged recently tend to be more professionally oriented (e.g., computer technicians). As a result, the historical timing of the establishment of the occupational associations, as measured by association age, may no longer be positively associated with the extent of professionalization in an occupation. I suspect that this finding reflects the limitation of the chosen variable rather than a refutation of my hypothesis on the importance of associational power. For example, in my exploratory analyses of the 40 occupations (in the benchmark 1964 survey) that all GSS respondents rated, association age has a significant, positive effect on prestige ranking.

Occupational size shows an inverted U-shape, as I predicted in hypothesis 4. I plotted the nonlinear pattern of the size effect in figure 1, in which a multiplier of one indicates that occupational size has no effect on prestige ranking. A multiplier greater than one increases the prestige ranking, and a multiplier less than one decreases prestige ranking, net of the effects of other covariates in the model. As I predicted in hypothesis 4, an initial increase in an occupation’s size increases prestige because of the visibility and legitimacy in access to the institutional order. But excess




FIG 1 —Effect of occupational size on prestige ranking

increase in size eventually undermines the effectiveness of social closure and leads to a lower prestige rating, other things being equal

Rater attributes—The analyses reported in models 1–4 focus on how the characteristics of an occupation being rated provide the basis for legitimate claims and thus affect individual-level variations in the rank scores. I now extend the model to examine the effect of raters' group membership on occupational prestige ranking. This set of analyses addresses issues of incorporation into the realm of shared values and beliefs. As I argued before, the extent to which different social groups are incorporated into the institutional realm may vary considerably, as a result, I expect to observe significant variations in shared values and beliefs in different social groups, leading to group-based behavioral differences in conferring prestige.

To address this set of issues, in models 5–8, I introduce the attributes of the raters into the model. I focus on the following four dimensions: (1) racial difference between whites and blacks, (2) gender difference, (3) occupational groups—those in managerial/professional occupations versus those in other occupations, and finally (4) educational difference—the group with college or higher education versus those with high school or lower education. Because these four dimensions are likely to overlap considerably, I estimated their effects in separate models. That is, I estimated a model as follows:

$$\mu_{ij} = \beta_j \mathbf{x}_i + \gamma \mathbf{z}_i,$$

where \mathbf{x}_i is a set of variables of rater attributes associated with respondent i . In the implementation of model estimation, I entered this set of variables through interaction terms between these group indicator variables and occupational attributes to detect variations of groups in their response to different dimensions of occupational attributes (see Allison and Christakis [1994] for details). For control purposes, I also included interaction terms of these indicator variables with $\log(\text{wage})$. The χ^2 statistic associated

with model improvement in models 5–8 (reported in the last row of table 4) is based on the likelihood ratio statistics of comparison between the current model and model 4

Model 5 examines the role of ethnic background (black vs white) in raters' ranking of occupational prestige. I include a set of interaction terms between "black" and the four *DOT* job attributes. Thus, the interaction terms measure the additional contribution of the "black" group to prestige score, relative to (and in addition to) the main effects in the model, as a result of this group's response to that particular occupational attribute. For instance, the coefficient of -0.095 associated with the interaction of black and knowledge (black \times knowledge) means that the occupational attribute of salience in knowledge contributes to the rank score of occupational prestige by only 0.087 ($0.182 - 0.095$) for the African-American group as a whole, compared with 0.182 (the main effect) for whites, net of the effects of other variables in the model. This finding shows that, in occupational prestige ranking, African-Americans as a group give less weight to the prevalence of knowledge. Overall, the African-American group gives less weight to attributes of salience in knowledge, in creativity, and *especially* in authority relationship ($\beta_{\text{black} \times \text{authority}} = -0.127$), relative to the "main effects" for whites in the model. But the African-American group shows no significant difference in the ranking of those occupations that are in "influence" position, as indicated by the insignificant interaction effect with the variable of salience in influence.

I estimated gender differences in these four *DOT* job attributes, as shown in model 6. There is no significant difference between men and women in their ranking along the dimension of salience in knowledge or in creativity. However, women show a pattern similar to blacks in that they give less weight to those occupational attributes that are associated with authority positions, but they give more favorable ranking of those occupations that are salient in "influence," relative to the main effects for men.

Models 6 and 7 examine the effects of social positions associated with the rater's occupation (managerial/professional occupations vs other occupations) and education (college or higher education vs high school or lower education). Because both groups have higher SES, I speculate that they are more incorporated into the institutional order relative to their respective reference groups, hence, these groups are more likely to give an occupational prestige rating that reinforces the "main effects." The findings are consistent with this hypothesis: raters in high-status occupations or with higher educational levels give considerably higher scores to those occupations that are salient in authority positions ($\beta_{\text{college} \times \text{authority}} = 0.173$, $\beta_{\text{occ} \times \text{authority}} = 0.096$).

This set of analyses reveals several important patterns that are consis-

tent with my core theoretical arguments. First, as predicted in hypothesis 5, groups that are more distant from the institutional order (blacks and women) tend to give noticeably lower prestige ratings to those occupations that occupy authority positions, relative to the main effects, whereas the opposite is true for those groups that are closer to the institutional order (the group with college or higher education and the managerial/professional group). Second, consistent with hypothesis 6, group differences with regard to the job attribute of salience in knowledge are less pronounced than those with regard to authority relationship: the magnitudes of the coefficients associated with salience in authority relationship are the largest among three of the four groups and in the predicted directions, whereas the magnitudes of coefficients for salience in knowledge are relatively small. Third, it appears that responses toward occupational attributes salient in creativity and in influence are less systematic among the four groups. I suspect that this is because attributes along these two dimensions are less institutionalized and subject to multiple interpretations among the raters, hence, these findings may reflect the lack of shared values and beliefs concerning these dimensions. I will revisit this set of issues in the discussion section.

Finally, I note that the parameter estimates of the variables measuring occupation size and gender composition are stable across models 5–8. I will not discuss their effects further.

Assessment of Goodness of Model Fits

To what extent do these proposed models explain the observed empirical patterns of occupational prestige ranking? To address this issue, I now turn to the assessment of goodness of model fits using likelihood ratio statistics, see table 5. I note that, in the realm of nonlinear models involving maximum likelihood estimation, there is no absolute baseline for assessing the goodness of model fit, and the likelihood ratio statistic varies with sample size.

In the first set of model fit statistics in table 5, I estimated the model fits for four sets of covariates—the four *DOT* variables, the training time variable, the log(wage) variable, and the five variables on organizing capacities and control variables—separately. The contribution of the training time variable is especially salient, relative to other sets of covariates. As I noted before, this variable may have captured several distinctive mechanisms in prestige ranking. The model statistic also shows that the four *DOT* variables have good explanatory power, comparable to that of log(wage).

The second set of models estimated various combinations of these sets

Occupational Prestige Ranking

TABLE 5
LOG-LIKELIHOOD TEST OF GOODNESS OF MODEL FITS

Models	Test Statistic	df
Models for separate sets of covariates	$\Delta\chi^2$ over null model	
Model 1 four <i>DOT</i> measures	15,790 1	4
Model 2 training time	20,732 2	1
Model 3 log(wage)	14,761 3	1
Model 4 organizing capacities/control variables	9,059 6	5
Models for combination of covariates		
Model 5 M1 + M2 + M4	25,167 6	10
Model 6 M1 + M2 + M3	25,075 7	6
Model 7 M2 + M3 + M4	28,210 5	7
Model 8 M1 + M3 + M4	28,527 3	10
Model 9 M1 + M2 + M3 + M4	30,109 7	11
Test of nested models	$\Delta\chi^2$ over model 9	
Model 10 M5 vs M9—log(wage)	4,942 1	1
Model 11 M6 vs M9—organizing capacity	5,034 0	5
Model 12 M7 vs M9—four <i>DOT</i> variables	1,899 2	4
Model 13 M8 vs M9—training time	1,582 4	1

NOTE —Test statistic is calculated as $-2 \log$ -likelihood statistic between models M stands for model

of covariates Model 9 is the full model that includes all four sets of covariates in the model

I also tested the model fits between the full model (model 9) and the models that restrict each of the four sets of covariates to zero (models 5–8). If my operationalization of the key concepts is valid, these sets of variables should have a significant and sizeable contribution to model fit even after controlling for other covariates in the model. The test results under the heading “test of nested models” in table 5 show that all four sets of covariates make a significant and large contribution to the model fit, *after* controlling for other covariates in the model. In particular, the *DOT* measures for the two distinct (knowledge-based and authority-based) claims—the core of my theoretical arguments—show significant explanatory power for patterns of occupational prestige ranking, even after controlling for resources, training time, and other aspects of occupational attributes.

Among the four sets of variables measuring GSS raters’ group identity, the model statistics (see the bottom row of table 4) show that African-Americans as a social group are more distant than women from the “official” institutional order, and that, among the four group dimensions considered here, educational level (college education or above) is perhaps

the most important dividing line in respondents' rating of occupational prestige

Further Exploration An Alternative Measure of *DOT* Attributes

At the core of the institutional logic is my argument about the importance of distinct bases for making legitimate claims. On this basis I used a set of four *DOT* measures to distinguish knowledge-based versus authority-based mechanisms. One may question whether the four *DOT* variables have adequately measured distinct sources of occupational prestige and whether findings based on the four *DOT* measures are robust compared with alternative *DOT* variables. To address this question, I developed a set of alternative *DOT* measures based on a factor analysis of eight *DOT* variables. The factor analysis reveals three distinct factors that are closely related to my conceptions of knowledge, creativity, and authority relationship (see appendix A for further information on the factor analysis). Consistent with my choice of *DOT* variables in previous analyses, the factor analyses indicate two distinctive factors for salience in knowledge and in creativity, respectively. But salience in authority positions and in influence belong to the same dimension. I constructed three factor scores along these three dimensions for each occupation that was rated in my data. I replicated previous analyses using the three factor scores instead of the four *DOT* variables.

Table 6 reports analyses that replicated those reported in table 3. Note that, as a conventional practice of factor score construction, all three factor variables are standardized with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. In panel 1, mean occupational score is regressed on *DOT* factors and occupational attributes. All three factor variables show positive and statistically significant effects on mean rank score. The inclusion of variables on organizing capacities greatly reduces the effect of the "authority" factor, but its effect on knowledge and creativity factors is relatively small. In panel 2 for the analysis of GED, the three *DOT* factors have impressive explanatory power on variations in GED ($R^2 = 0.73$ in model 1). In panel 3, I regressed log(wage) on the set of *DOT* factors and other occupational attributes. Again, a similar pattern results, in that the "authority" factor has the largest contribution to average income in an occupation, whereas the "creativity" factor has a negative effect, controlling for the effects of variables of organizing capacities. In sum, this set of results is largely consistent with those findings reported in table 3, suggesting that these three *DOT* factors provide a good operationalization of the theoretical concepts that they are intended to measure.

I reestimated the conditional logit model using the three *DOT* factor scores, and the parameter estimates are reported in table 7. I summarize

TABLE 6
PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF THE OLS REGRESSION OF OCCUPATIONAL OUTCOMES ON *DOT* FACTOR SCORES AND OTHER OCCUPATIONAL
ATTRIBUTES

	MEAN OCCUPATION RANKING SCORE			GED			Log(wage)		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>DOT</i> measures									
Knowledge factor	462**	239**	174**	510**	246**	237**	454**	249**	154**
Creativity factor	208**	064*	084**	341**	171**	171**	033	− 100**	− 051**
Authority factor	436**	274**	077**	583**	392**	299**	466**	318**	322**
Training time		391**	255**		462**	416**		360**	239**
Occupational attributes									
Log(wage)			495**			262**			
Association age			000			− 021			023
No association publications			096**			031			035
Size			054			− 024			− 234*
Size ²			− 137			− 071			409**
% male in occupation			− 286**			− 245**			429**
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	46	51	60	73	81	85	43	48	68

NOTE — Parameter estimates are standardized β $N = 671$

* $P < .05$

** $P < .01$

TABLE 7
PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF CONDITIONAL LOGISTIC MODELS FOR RANKED DATA (with *DOT* Factor Scores)

Covariates	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
<i>DOT</i> measures								
Knowledge factor	468**	214**	183**	238**	253**	267**	212**	213**
Creativity factor	198**	017**	048**	092**	100**	077**	066**	064**
Authority factor	358**	209**	146**	012	023**	− 005**	− 024**	− 033**
Training time		023**	018**	013**	013**	013**	013**	013**
Rater attributes								
Black × science					− 140**			
Black × creativity					− 075**			
Black × authority					− 111**			
Black × log(wage)					114*			
Female × science						− 051**		
Female × creativity						026**		
Female × authority						030**		
Female × log(wage)						− 049		
College × science							133**	

College × creativity				
College × authority				
College × log(wage)				
Occupation × science				
Occupation × creativity				
Occupation × authority				
Occupation × log(wage)				
Occupational attributes				
Log(wage)			592**	1
Association age/100				
No association publications				
Size				
Size ²				—
% male in occupation				—1
χ^2/df	19,607 4	23,450 2	24,605 1	29,
	3	4	5	
Improvement in χ^2/df		3,842 8/1	1,154 9/1	5,1

NOTE — White is the reference category for black interaction terms, nonprofessional, high school or lower education for college interaction terms

* $P < 05$

** $P < 01$

the main findings below. First, the effects of the three *DOT* factor variables are highly consistent with, and even more salient than, the patterns revealed in the previous analyses: the “knowledge” factor has the largest positive effect on prestige score in all models. The “creativity” factor also has a significant and positive effect on prestige ranking, but the magnitude of its effect is much smaller. Second, the factor involving “authority relations” has the smallest effect on prestige ranking, after taking into consideration the resources associated with these occupations (model 3). Its effect becomes statistically insignificant when the effects of organizing capacities are controlled for (model 4).

Finally, with some exceptions, patterns of the effects of the GSS rater characteristics are largely consistent with my theoretical hypotheses and previous findings (models 5–8). Those groups peripheral to the official institutional order (blacks) give a lower prestige ranking for occupations involving authority relations than their reference groups, whereas the opposite pattern can be observed for managerial/professional groups and for the group with college education. These patterns are consistent with hypothesis 5. The exception is for women, who have a positive effect on the rating of authority-based attributes. In view of the findings in the previous analyses, this pattern is not difficult to interpret. Note that the “authority” factor (table A1 in app. A) includes both variables that measure authority positions (DCP) and influence (INFLU). My previous findings (table 4) show that women have opposite responses to these two attributes. As a result, the effect of the “authority” factor in table 7 reflects the confounding and opposite effects of the composite variables. Similarly, hypothesis 6 is partially supported in that, as hypothesized, the managerial/professional group and college-educated group have the largest discrepancy regarding the authority-based *DOT* factor compared with their reference groups. But this is not the case for blacks and women, who show a larger discrepancy for the “knowledge” factor among the three *DOT* factors. Again, this is caused by the fact that the “authority” factor is composed of the two variables (DCP and INFLU), to which African-Americans and women have different responses (see table 4). After unpacking the “authority” factor, it is reasonable to conclude that the findings reported in table 7 are essentially the same as those in table 4.⁹

Overall, patterns of these findings using the three alternative *DOT* factors are consistent with those reported in the previous analyses using the four *DOT* variables. The tests of goodness of model fit (not reported) also show similar patterns to those in table 5. These results increase one’s

⁹ Our interpretation is on the basis that the “factor score” is calculated as a weighted linear combination (“load”) of the composite variables.

confidence in the validity of the *DOT* measures developed here and in the robustness of the findings reported in this study

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Departing from the earlier studies that emphasize the role of authority and resources for occupational prestige, in this study, I proposed an institutional logic of social recognition to identify and explain variations in occupational prestige ranking. My core theoretical arguments are centered on the role of legitimacy and appropriateness in conferring deference and social status, and in differential access to the institutional order. This theoretical logic led me to highlight the dual processes of differentiation and incorporation in the making of occupational prestige. First, I identified those differentiation mechanisms—knowledge-based versus authority-based claims—associated with occupational attributes that generate different bases for making legitimate claims for deference and prestige. Second, I considered variations in the incorporation processes of differential social groups and the implications for their ranking of occupational prestige. On this basis, I derived a set of hypotheses and tested these ideas using the most recent and comprehensive occupational prestige ranking data collected in the 1989 GSS. I also improved the research design in important ways: first, I adopted statistical models that allow me to model disaggregated information of both occupation-level and individual-level attributes and to analyze variations of ranking scores among the raters; second, I devised empirical measures that distinguish knowledge-based versus authority-based occupational attributes to test competing theoretical ideas properly. Below, I first assess the empirical findings and then discuss the implications of my study in comparison with alternative theoretical explanations. I conclude this study with a discussion of the emerging agenda for future research.

Before discussing the findings in this study, we first need to ask this basic question: Are the observed “occupational prestige” patterns a “social fact” that is subject to sociological investigation, or are they merely a statistical construct resultant from years of “operationalism” by the research community (Blalock 1968, 1982)? I think that there is indeed a status order among occupations as an instituted social reality. In everyday observations such as choices of careers and of educational training (e.g., college majors), government forecasts on occupation outlook, as well as in surveys of job desirability (Jencks, Perman, and Rainwater 1988), the evidence points to an implicit and often explicit status order of occupations. The large sociological literature on occupations and professions has also revealed conscious efforts by professional practitioners to pursue the

collective conquest for status as well as status changes among occupations over time (Abbott 1988, Heinz and Laumann 1994, Larson 1977, Starr 1982, Reskin and Roos 1990). Moreover, the findings in this study indicate that the patterns of occupational prestige ranking are not randomly distributed and are subject to sociological explanations.

The findings reported in this study are largely consistent with the hypotheses derived from the institutional logic developed in this study. First of all, I find two distinctive mechanisms of occupational prestige as measured by the two sets of occupational attributes: those occupations whose work is salient in their "science and technical nature" tend to receive higher prestige than those occupations that are less salient in this respect. In contrast, although occupations associated with authority positions also contribute to higher prestige, the contribution of "authority position" is greatly reduced after controlling for the resources, measured by mean income and training time associated with these occupations. These patterns are consistent with the hypotheses derived from the institutional logic: the prevalence of knowledge in an occupation attribute makes it much easier to "naturalize" the claims for deference on the basis of legitimacy, whereas occupations salient in authority positions are likely to encounter social tensions and conflicts, making it more difficult to naturalize their claims. This is reflected in the systematic, diverse ranking of occupations that are salient in authority positions. As a result, the apparent high prestige associated with occupations with authority positions is less derived from the logic of social recognition than from the resources they command, which requires a different logic of explanation.

Second, the logic of social recognition also points to the importance of incorporation of social groups into the institutional realm of shared values and beliefs. The recognition of variations in incorporation processes led me to consider the effect of group membership on the ranking of occupational prestige. I examined four group bases: race, gender, educational credential, and occupational status. The empirical patterns are largely consistent with the proposed institutional logic. Those groups who are more remote from the institutional order (e.g., African-Americans and women) tend to give lower prestige ratings to those occupations that involve authority positions than their reference groups, whereas those groups who are close to the institutional order (e.g., those with a college education or those in managerial/professional occupations) tend to reinforce the main patterns (as captured by the main effects in the models in table 4). Although it is possible to imagine ad hoc explanations for these observed patterns, the institutional logic developed in this study provides a logically coherent theoretical explanation, and the empirical patterns are largely consistent with the derived hypotheses.

It appears that group differences with regard to occupational attributes

of “creativity” and “influence” are less systematic than I hypothesized. My interpretation is that these patterns may have resulted in the ambiguity of such occupations in the institutional order of the society. For example, an occupation salient in influence (e.g., counseling) may be seen partly as having an authority position but partly as helping people, which projects a sense of appropriateness. Similarly, occupations salient in creativity are likely to project multiple, conflicting images to different groups. Therefore, the inconsistent effects of salience in creativity and in influence may reflect variations in the institutionalization of these occupational traits, rather than the effectiveness of the mechanisms they are intended to measure. This set of issues remains to be examined in future studies that can better specify the institutional conditions associated with these occupational traits.

I recognize that there are other mechanisms in operation that are not conceptualized in my theoretical arguments, hence, I do not claim that the proposed institutional logic accounts for all variations in the occupational prestige phenomenon. I used the functionalist theory of occupational prestige as the comparative framework. Some empirical implications derived from the institutional logic coincide with those in the functionalist theory of occupational prestige. For instance, both theories predict that the prevalence of formal knowledge as an occupational attribute increases prestige ranking. However, the logics of explanation are different. In the institutional logic, the role of formal knowledge and science firmly belongs to the realm of values and beliefs and results from intersubjective processes. I emphasize the role of formal knowledge in the naturalization of social categories and in acquiring legitimacy and deference. In contrast, the functionalist theory argues for the functional importance of these occupations in a society (see my discussions around hypothesis 1). Both theories recognize group differences in the rating of occupational prestige. But the functionalist theory sees such differences as largely accidental and provides ad hoc explanations, whereas the institutional logic provides a more logically consistent explanation (see discussions with regard to hypotheses 5 and 6). Finally, whereas the functionalist argument sees educational qualification as indicating a job's functional importance, the institutional logic leads us to unpack this theoretical concept and reveal distinct underlying mechanisms (i.e., knowledge-based, authority-based, and resource-based claims).

To what extent can these empirical patterns be explained by the functionalist logic? Examining the findings from the lens of the functionalist logic, one may interpret the training time variable as an indicator of human capital, and both knowledge-based and authority-based *DOT* variables as measures of functional importance. On this basis, the empirical patterns in this study—the significant, large contribution of training time

and the positive effects of both knowledge-based and authority-based *DOT* variables—show that the functionalist logic identifies an important mechanism in generating the observed patterns in occupational prestige ranking

In my view, the institutional logic can better explain several salient findings revealed in my study. First, as table 3 shows, both the knowledge-based and authority-based attributes are highly associated with educational requirement (GED). If both are good indicators of human capital, the functionalist logic would predict similar effects of both sets on occupational prestige. But the two behave differently in their effects on occupational prestige, once we control for resource considerations (see table 4). The most striking finding in this study is that, after controlling for resources (e.g., mean wage), the contribution of authority positions is greatly diminished (or even reversed). At a minimum, this finding suggests that the main reason that authority positions confer prestige is not because of their functional importance, but because of the resources they command. Second, if the functional importance of an occupation (as indicated in the human capital requirement) is naturally accepted in the society, I should expect no systematic differences across social groups regarding their rating of occupational prestige. The empirical findings in patterns of group membership revealed systematic and significant differences, which are consistent with the empirical implications derived from the proposed institutional logic. Third, as I discussed before, in the social science literature, there are multiple, competing interpretations of educational requirements as human capital, as signals, or as sorting mechanisms for class closure. All these arguments predict a positive and significant association between educational qualification and status attainment (and occupational prestige), but they point to distinct and competing causal mechanisms. For this reason, I treated training time as a control variable and focused instead on those *DOT* variables that have a more concrete, substantive interpretation.

I recognize that there are limitations to my study in the operationalization of key concepts and in measurements of variables, and that some empirical findings are subject to multiple interpretations. Therefore, I do not see the empirical evidence presented here as conclusive in adjudicating between competing theoretical arguments. I do think that, even if we were to accept the human capital interpretation of training time, the proposed institutional logic arguably offers a more satisfactory and logically consistent explanation for the discrepancies in the effects of knowledge-based and authority-based occupational attributes and for the systematic variations in the role of group membership in prestige ranking, above and beyond the explanation offered by the functionalist logic.

The institutional logic proposed here raises a set of new research issues

in understanding occupational prestige phenomena. First, the recognition of distinct mechanisms of differentiation and incorporation points to the logical plausibility that the prestige of occupations associated with knowledge versus authority positions may vary considerably over historical periods because of the institutionalization of science and technology and the expansion of education. Second, one should also observe significant variations in group-based occupational ranking over time as a function of social tensions and social conflicts, or as a function of changes in group/identity consciousness. For example, the institutional logic would lead one to expect that, after the civil rights movement and the feminist revolution, the increased consciousness in group identity would lead to a stronger association than before between occupational prestige ranking and group membership of African-Americans and women, other things being equal. Similarly, better-conceptualized group identity (e.g., the class basis in Wright [1984]) may reveal more systematic variations in prestige ranking than the ones used in this study. Third, the institutional logic would further predict that there are systematic variations in prestige across societies as a function of variations in institutional arrangements and in bases for making legitimate claims in different societal contexts. These issues point to rich empirical ground for future research to adjudicate between competing theoretical logics.

To return to the puzzle identified at the beginning of this article, I have shown that the apparent uniformity and stability in occupational prestige order in the earlier studies were largely constructed through the lens of the functionalist logic and suffered from problems in methodological aggregation. The use of aggregated occupational prestige scores or aggregated group information for raters in the earlier studies may have inadvertently concealed those variations in the prestige ranking that need to be explained. The considerable and systematic variations in occupational prestige ranking reported in this study highlight the fact that the research issues in explaining occupational prestige ranking are far from resolved; instead, they demand further, more careful sociological inquiries. My study develops a logic of social recognition that has explanatory power distinctive from the role of functional importance, resources, and authority. Moreover, in my view, the logic of social recognition is a major organizing principle in everyday social and economic activities. Because prestige, honor, and deference are meaningful and important rewards for *homo sociologicus*, the logic of social recognition induces him or her to behave in ways that are not always consistent with those predicted by a logic of consequence (March 1994). Therefore, the institutional logic plays a central role not only in explaining occupational prestige, but also in other social phenomena that involve processes of intersubjective evaluation.

APPENDIX A

Explanation and Data Sources of *DOT* and Association Variables

Choice of the Four DOT Variables

The *Dictionary of Occupational Titles* provides a rich set of variables measuring various attributes of an occupation. Below I discuss the considerations on which I based my selection of the four *DOT* variables for the analyses reported in tables 3–5.

First, I want to select those *DOT* measures of occupational attributes that are salient in knowledge-based or authority-based claims, because these are two key theoretical concepts in this study. For this reason, I exclude those *DOT* variables that are not directly related to these two dimensions (e.g., those *DOT* variables that are related to physical work environment such as heat, physical strength, etc.).

Second, I want to select those *DOT* variables that provide reasonably good explanatory power on mean occupation score (as in Treiman's study) and GED at the aggregated occupation level. This is because I take the functionalist argument as my baseline for comparison, and I am interested in decomposing distinct mechanisms of prestige ranking behind educational qualification to address the aggregation problems discussed in the text. Several *DOT* variables (e.g., MVC) that have meanings similar to my theoretical concepts but that have poor explanatory power on mean prestige score or GED are not chosen for this reason.

Third, I choose those *DOT* variables whose meanings have a close fit to my concepts and that have intuitive interpretations. For this reason, I exclude those variables that are ambiguous in interpretation. For example, the *DOT* variable ADTPPPL measures "adaptability to dealing with people beyond giving and receiving instructions." This definition appears to be relevant to authority positions. But a close reading of the detailed *DOT* coding instructions (U.S. Department of Labor 1972) shows that the kinds of jobs prevalent on this work trait also include scheduling "appointments with employer or other employees for clients or customers by mail, phone, or in person, and records time and date of appointments in appointment book" (p. 304), which does not imply an authority position. Similarly, a *DOT* variable measuring "a preference for activities resulting in prestige or the esteem of others" (PRSTPREF) is not chosen because its meaning is not clearly interpretable with regard to either of the two mechanisms.

Finally, if several variables measured similar work traits, then I chose the ones that are not highly correlated with each other. The four *DOT* variables used in the text were selected based on these criteria.

Alternative DOT Measures Based on Factor Analysis

To further investigate the robustness of the chosen *DOT* measures and of the main findings, I also developed alternative *DOT* measures based on a factor analysis of additional *DOT* variables. I included eight *DOT* variables whose definitions (and detailed descriptions) are related to either knowledge/creativity, or authority relations/human interactions. In addition to the four *DOT* variables I identified before, I included the following four *DOT* variables:

Salience in jobs using verifiable criteria (MVC)—Percentage of workers in an occupation whose jobs involve “making generalizations, judgments, or decisions based on measurable or verifiable criteria” (p. 302)

Salience in business relations (BUSPREF)—Percentage of employees in an occupation who have “a preference for activities involving business contact with people” (p. 317)

Salience in jobs of “abstract and creative nature” (ABSCREAT)—Percentage of workers in an occupation who have “a preference for activities of an abstract and creative nature” (p. 317)

Creative preference (CREATPREF)—This variable is defined as related to “creative preference” in England and Kilbourne (1988)

I conducted a factor analysis to examine underlying dimensions among these eight *DOT* variables. Table A1 reports the factor loading statistics. The statistics are based on orthogonal rotation using varimax method, chosen for its simplicity in interpretation, but other methods (e.g., component analysis and oblique rotation method) show the same pattern.

The factor analysis reveals three distinctive factors. FIF and ABSCREAT have the highest loading on the first factor, MVC and SCITECH have the highest loading on the second factor, and DCP, INFLU, and BUSPREF have the highest loading on the third factor. Interestingly, CREATPREF has large loadings on all three factors. Thus, the three factors closely correspond to creativity, knowledge/science, and authority/human interaction dimensions. I labeled these three factors creativity, knowledge, and authority factors, respectively, and calculated the factor scores for each occupation in my sample.

Comparing these three factors with the four *DOT* variables I chose before, one can see that FIF and SCINPREF have high loadings on the first and second factors, respectively, and DCP and INFLU have high loadings on the third factor. Hence, my previous choice of the four *DOT* variables is consistent with the patterns revealed in the factor analysis. I

TABLE A1
FACTOR LOADING OF THE EIGHT *DOT* VARIABLES

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
ABSCREAT	922	035	085
FIF	905	– 068	– 030
CREATPREF	599	440	516
MVC	– 166	836	– 177
SCINPREF	166	784	088
DCP	– 021	361	781
INFLU	194	– 259	684
BUBSPREF	– 077	– 450	589

NOTE — The calculation is based on the varimax method for orthogonal rotation

used the four *DOT* variables and the three *DOT* factors alternatively in my analyses reported in the text

Data Sources and Coding of Association Variables

To measure organizing capacities of the occupations, I collected information on associations or unions of these occupations. I used the Gale Group's *Encyclopedia of Associations* (2000–2001) and its Web site (<http://www.galegroup.com>) as the main data sources and matched associations to their occupations based on the descriptions of these associations. I developed a procedure by first comparing the names of the occupations and associations, then checking the “descriptions” for these associations to make sure that they were matched. Wherever possible, I used association membership size and occupation size to see if the association was too broad or too narrow for the occupation. Once I matched an occupation and its association, I collected information on more than a dozen variables. But I used only two variables—association age and number of publications in an association—for their theoretical relevance and relatively fewer missing values.

There is an entry in the *Encyclopedia* on the founding year of associations. The variable “association age” is calculated as the difference between the year 2000 and the founding year. The *Encyclopedia* lists publications by the associations. The number of publications variable is constructed as a count of the number of publications listed for that association, excluding items such as newsletters or membership directories. For those occupations with missing values on these variables, I tried to search for their Web sites to collect additional information. In my analyses, if the associations had missing values on these two variables, I recoded them as having no associations (therefore, association age = 0 and number of publications = 0).

Sensitivity Analysis

In preparing the data for analyses and in operationalization, I made several decisions in the selection of variables and of the sample. I conducted sensitivity analyses to make sure that the findings are not sensitive to these decisions. I briefly summarize these analyses.

First, in those models that incorporate raters' group membership (tables 4 and 7), I removed the effects of resource considerations by controlling for the logarithm of mean wage in the occupation in my model estimation. One may wonder whether the patterns of results are artificial because of the statistical control of the mean wage variable. To explore this issue, I estimated the same set of models as in tables 4 and 7, but did not control for income (i.e., I removed interaction variables with log[wage] from model estimation). The patterns of parameter estimates are consistent with previous findings and do not affect my main conclusions.

Second, I included two variables measuring associational power (association age and number of publications) in my model estimation. Because I relied on a single data source (the Gale Group publication [2000–2001]), these variables may have measurement errors in reporting and recording. Also, the matching between occupational titles and association titles was not always perfect. To check on the sensitivity of the findings to these two variables, I estimated models without these two variables. The findings are robust in the absence of these two variables.

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The Case for a New Class Map¹

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It is increasingly fashionable to claim that social classes are purely academic constructs that no longer provide much information about lifestyles, attitudes, and other individual-level outcomes. The few available tests of this claim rely on stylized measures of social class that either group detailed occupations into a small number of “big classes” or reduce them to scores on vertical scales of prestige, socioeconomic status, or cultural or economic capital. We show that these conventional approaches understate the total effects of the site of production by failing to capitalize on the institutionalized social categories that develop at the detailed occupational level.

Over the last 25 years, the goal of class analysis has shifted from developing accounts of collective action, revolutions, and other macrolevel outcomes (e.g., Thompson 1963, Braverman 1974, Burawoy 1979) to explaining variability in individual-level life chances, attitudes, and behaviors (see Holton and Turner 1989, cf. Sørensen 2000).² This revolutionary shift in the rationale for class analysis has not been accompanied by a corresponding shift in the class maps that are used to prosecute class

¹ The research reported here was supported by a National Science Foundation research grant (SBS-9906419) and with discretionary funds from Cornell University, the University of Chicago, and Stanford University. We are grateful for helpful comments from Julia Adams, Vivek Chibber, Dalton Conley, Paul DiMaggio, Kathleen Gerson, John Goldthorpe, Michael Hout, Guillermina Jasso, Christopher Jencks, Michèle Lamont, Robert Mare, Jeffery Paige, Margaret Somers, George Steinmetz, Ross Stolzenberg, Bruce Western, and Yu Xie. We also thank Miller McPherson and the *AJS* reviewers for especially detailed and useful comments. For the deficiencies that remain, we take full responsibility. Direct correspondence to Kim A. Weeden, Department of Sociology, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853. E-mail: kw74@cornell.edu.

² For convenience, we will often refer to these individual-level correlates as “outcomes,” even though we appreciate that some of them are not effects of class membership.

analysis. Indeed, contemporary debates about the structure of social classes (e.g., Wysong and Perrucci 1999) are eerily similar to debates that dominated when the macrolevel agenda still held sway, almost as if one can devise and justify class maps without considering their purpose. We redress this oversight by asking whether a new, highly detailed class scheme devised explicitly for the microlevel agenda performs better than conventional class maps.

The intellectual backdrop for our analyses is ongoing dissatisfaction with the explanatory power of the usual social class maps (esp. Kingston 2000). Most notably, postmodernist critics have argued that class analysis has failed to deliver on the new microlevel agenda, in large part because attitudes and behaviors arise from a "complex mosaic of taste subcultures" that are unrelated to class membership (Pakulski and Waters 1996, p. 157; see also Clark and Lipset 2001, Beck 2000, Inglehart 1997, Kingston 2000). These critics conclude that the concept of social class, while useful for explaining behavior in the early industrial period, is an intellectual dead end that misrepresents the "basic fissures that define the contours of social life" (Kingston 2000, pp. 210–12). The postmodern critique implies that social action is increasingly individualistic and that any remaining institutional constraints on action (e.g., religion, gender, race) are generated largely outside the site of production.³

This conclusion, popular though it is, ignores the possibility that social classes remain well formed and only appear to have weak effects because the class concept has been so poorly operationalized. The long-standing, untested, and seemingly problematic assumption of conventional class models is that the site of production is organized into a small number of big classes (e.g., "service class," "routine nonmanual class"). This "big-class assumption" allows class analysts to ignore or dismiss the smaller social groups (i.e., "occupations") that emerge around functional niches in the division of labor and that typically become deeply institutionalized in the labor market. We argue below that occupations have considerable explanatory power by virtue of this institutionalization. Indeed, whereas big classes affect individual-level outcomes primarily through a rational action mechanism (e.g., Goldthorpe 2000), occupations shape behavior through the additional sociological forces of self-selection, differential recruitment, socialization, and interactional closure, all of which become activated in the context of institutionalized categories. It follows that occupations are better suited than big classes for the new microlevel agenda of explaining individual-level behaviors and attitudes (see Grusky and Sørensen 1998, 2001, Grusky, Weeden, and Sørensen 2000, Grusky

³ We use the term "site of production" to refer to the social organizational setting within which goods and services are produced.

and Weeden 2001, 2002, Weeden and Grusky 2005, in press, Grusky 2005, Weeden 2005)

We develop this argument in five parts. In the first section, we consider why contemporary sociologists should care about constructing class maps, thereby motivating our own efforts to build a new map for the microlevel tradition. We then develop the theory underlying our argument that institutionalized categories become internally homogeneous and thus allow for a more powerful account of individual-level outcomes. In the next two sections, we provide indirect tests of this argument: the first section explores the extent to which competing class maps (i.e., big class and disaggregate) capture the bivariate structure at the site of production, and the second section examines the more purely causal effects of class in the context of multivariate models. To foreshadow our results, we find that the disaggregate class model outperforms big-class models in both cases, even when modeling life chances and other outcomes that are conventionally regarded as the home ground of big-class analysis (see Goldthorpe and McKnight in press). We conclude by discussing alternative ways of rethinking conventional class models and by arguing that such alternatives to our approach may be only marginally useful for a microlevel research agenda.

THE MICROLEVEL RATIONALE FOR A CLASS MAP

Anticlass rhetoric has so permeated the discipline that it is now necessary to argue what once was taken for granted: that sociologists of all stripes, not just self-identified class analysts, should be interested in developing a class model that lives up to the demands scholars place on it. We begin, then, by making the case for a new class scheme that is designed with the microlevel research tradition in mind. The main purpose of a refurbished class scheme, we argue, is to identify structural positions at the site of production that provide the strongest possible signal of “life conditions,” where this refers to the panoply of circumstances that define the quality and character of our social lives, including the economic flows and resources that we control, our institutional affiliations and commitments, the types of lifestyles that we lead, and our sentiments and attitudes. We are thus looking for an information-rich class map that represents the “geography of social structure . . . by describing important differences between structural locations” (Sørensen 2000, pp. 1526–27, Giddens 1973, pp. 171–72, Goldthorpe 2000, p. 206). This class concept is not very demanding, after all, classes that are fine-tuned to the microlevel agenda do not need to embody antagonistic interests, act collectively on behalf of these interests, or bring about fundamental macrolevel

change. These more ambitious claims, while not developed here, may nonetheless be defensible for our new class map. In some of our prior work, for example, we have argued that occupations are the main vehicle through which rent is extracted, thus implying that interoccupational antagonisms might emerge in the competition over rent (Weeden 2002, see also Abbott 1988).

Here, however, we focus on the more delimited task of defining categories that capture the available structure at the site of production and hence are good information-conveying “containers.”⁴ We will assess such “class structuration” (Giddens 1973) in two ways: first by evaluating how a disaggregate model fares (relative to big-class maps) in capturing the bivariate association between structural categories and life conditions, and then by evaluating how it performs in a multivariate explanatory context. As we argue below, the first test is relevant to analyses in which social class is treated as a dependent variable, while the second is relevant to analyses in which it is treated as an independent variable. We next review these two forms of microlevel analysis and ask how an optimal class map might be devised for each.

The Determinants of Class

The class standing of an individual is treated as a dependent variable in much of contemporary sociology. For example, class maps are used as dependent variables in analyses of class reproduction and mobility, class-based assortative mating, class-based friendship and network ties, and class or occupational segregation (by sex and race). These research traditions are best served by a class scheme that provides a strong signal of life conditions. That is, insofar as the objective of such research is to determine how and why individuals are allocated to different life conditions, the analyst should use a class scheme that successfully captures variability in life conditions.

This conclusion, obvious though it may seem, has not informed the construction or testing of contemporary class maps. The typical class analyst develops some preferred class map by (a) nominating a particular variable (e.g., authority, employment relations) as especially useful in understanding the structure of the site of production, and (b) then defining class categories that capture differences across workers on that variable.

⁴ As will become evident, our new formulation redefines the class concept. It is, however, not so radical a redefinition as to break with the longstanding assumption (e.g., Marx [1869] 1963, Weber 1946) that class categories should characterize the available structure *at the site of production*. We do not seek to devise categories that represent structure that emerges outside the site of production (e.g., religions, racial groups, gender groups).

For example, Goldthorpe (2000) first argues that the “form of regulation of employment” (e.g., salaried, short-term contract) is analytically important, and he then demonstrates that the categories of the Erikson-Goldthorpe (EG) big-class scheme differ in their characteristic forms of regulation. Attempts to test class schemes, if any are made, typically involve showing that the proposed categories indeed succeed in capturing the privileged analytic variable (e.g., Evans 1992, Evans and Mills 1998, Rose and O’Reilly 1997, 1998).

This standard approach is a vestige of the old macrolevel agenda that does not transfer gracefully to the new microlevel agenda. To be sure, when the goal of class analysis is to understand how opposing interests might generate class antagonisms, it makes sense to build a class map around that one critical variable (e.g., property ownership, authority relations) that defines class interests, latent though it may be. If, by contrast, the goal is to understand differential life conditions, the standard approach is no longer defensible. After all, “life conditions” is an intrinsically synthetic concept, and it is unlikely that a single variable can exhaust it. It is curious that theorists who have abandoned the macrolevel agenda (if ever they held it) continue to motivate and test their class maps in terms of a criterion variable that has been nominated, seemingly by fiat, as especially important. While we cannot know for sure, we suspect that class analysts have carried over this conventional approach to the new microlevel agenda quite unthinkingly, as if old macrolevel objectives were still relevant.

At the same time, it is possible that conventional class models can serve as broad, synthetic indicators of life conditions, even though they were more narrowly devised to capture a single criterion variable. Although a conventional class map might be justified this way, few scholars do so (cf. Bourdieu 1984), perhaps because there is little in the way of research results that might sustain this justification. As we have noted, some scholars (e.g., Evans 1992) have tried to validate their class map against a few preferred criteria, but such tests do not provide the comprehensive assessment that an omnibus measure of life conditions demands. These tests are also problematic because they consider only big-class maps and, as a result, prematurely cut off debate on a logically prior question, namely whether *any* big-class model is up to the task of capturing the available structure at the site of production (e.g., Evans and Mills 1998, Evans 1992, Halaby and Weakliem 1993, Kingston 2000).

The only line of research that comes close to assessing the explanatory potential of a disaggregate approach is that of Bourdieu (esp. 1984) and

Lamont (e.g., 1994, also, Peterson and Simkus 1992)⁵ This research, which does often draw on detailed occupational categories, is an important impetus for our own approach. At the same time, it falls well short of a comprehensive assessment of the explanatory potential of occupations, not just because the preferred class maps are “top-heavy” hybrids that disaggregate professional occupations and aggregate all others, but also because such maps have been “validated” against a quite narrow range of outcomes, typically only lifestyles and consumption practices. We extend this line of research by evaluating a fully disaggregate class scheme with respect to a far more comprehensive set of outcomes.

This evaluation entails assessing the strength of the bivariate relationship between the postulated class maps (e.g., big class, disaggregate) and various life conditions (e.g., life chances, lifestyles, cultures).⁶ We appreciate that tastes will vary regarding which conditions should be privileged as constitutive of class. Weberian purists emphasize that life chances alone are relevant, whereas advocates of more imperialist definitions of class reject the usual distinction between class and status (i.e., “habitus”) and opt for schemes that capture both (see Bourdieu 1984, Giddens 1973, Lamont 1994). We can remain agnostic on these debates because our results indicate that conventional big classes fall short for *all* aspects of life conditions. As we will show, no matter how widely or narrowly class is conceived, it is difficult to defend conventional big classes.⁷

The Effects of Class

We have argued that research on the determinants of class membership should be based on class maps that capture as much of the variability in life conditions as possible. Should analyses of the *effects* of social class be subject to the same stricture? As the microlevel agenda diffused, such

⁵ There is a relatively large body of research on how cultural practices are related to gradients of education, socioeconomic status (SES), or prestige (e.g., Bryson 1996, 1998).

⁶ If classes were instead defined as *constellations* of conditions (e.g., life chances, lifestyles) that cluster together, the relevant test might be a latent class analysis assessing whether such constellations appear at the big-class or occupation level (see Birkelund, Goodman, and Rose 1996, also see Grusky and Weeden 2002, pp. 234–35). Here, we will only address whether class locations capture variability in each condition taken separately, but we will be taking on a more ambitious latent class analysis in subsequent research (e.g., Grusky and Weeden in press).

⁷ We appreciate that some research questions are best resolved by analyzing particular aspects of life conditions (e.g., income) rather than some omnibus measure. In such cases, scholars should simply use the individual-level variable of interest without first pushing it through the fulcrum of class. The analytic niche for a class map rests with scholarship that requires an omnibus measure of life conditions (see Grusky 2005, pp. 6–7).

analyses became ubiquitous, so much so that, for virtually any individual-level variable, a well-developed research literature can now be found that treats that variable as class determined. These analyses of class effects typically take the form of a sociological horse race that pits social class against other core sociological variables (e.g., race, gender, religion) to assess which variable is the most important. The task of revealing “true” class effects therefore involves estimating a full multivariate model that eliminates any possible confounding of class with other causes.

This approach makes it especially important to use a class map that captures the available structure at the site of production, thereby protecting against any downward bias in estimated class effects. Given that many commentators have argued that class effects are now weak (e.g., Pakulski and Waters 1996, Kingston 2000), a special burden rests on class analysts to either concede the point or, alternatively, to demonstrate that conventional class maps fail to exhaust the structure at the site of production. We take on this task with illustrative multivariate models that show whether class effects can be strengthened by replacing the nominal categories of big-class maps with more deeply institutionalized microclass categories. Armed with these analyses, we can determine whether the apparent weakness of class effects arises merely because class has been poorly operationalized or because, as postmodernists would have it, class is now truly a weak force. As we see it, the main rationale for developing a new microlevel map is that much of sociology is oriented toward the microlevel task of teasing out the strength and pattern of class effects, a task that is compromised insofar as class maps do not maximize explanatory power.

We appreciate that social class is also one of the most frequently used control variables in sociological research. In such research, class acts as little more than a nuisance variable that must be “controlled” for the purpose of securing unbiased estimates of other, presumably more interesting variables (e.g., race, religion). Typically, issues of operationalization are treated cavalierly when a control for class is needed, as if the choice between various big-class maps is more relevant in theory than in practice. This is unfortunate. Indeed, insofar as conventional big-class models fail to capture the explanatory power available at the site of production, much sociological research may be subject to the omitted variable bias that arises when class effects are only partly purged. It follows that researchers who wish to control for class should also use a class map that is tailor-made for the microlevel research objective.

Overview of Analytic Strategy

If the goal of a class map is to provide an omnibus signal of life conditions, then it is appropriate to evaluate our class maps across a wide range of individual-level outcomes. We carry out bivariate analyses that incorporate 55 variables from four topical domains: (a) life chances (e.g., income, education, working conditions), (b) lifestyles (e.g., consumption practices, institutional participation), (c) culture (e.g., political preferences, social attitudes), and (d) demographic composition (e.g., race, ethnicity). The first three domains represent areas that have historically been viewed as crucial “litmus tests” for class maps. As we noted above, some scholars (e.g., Weber 1946) regard life chances as the main life conditions of interest, whereas others (e.g., Bourdieu 1984, Thompson 1963) prefer more encompassing definitions of class that incorporate lifestyles and sentiments. We provide evidence pertaining to all three domains and allow readers to pick and choose those that correspond to their preferred definition of class. The fourth domain, demographic composition, is not directly relevant to typical definitions of class (cf. Bourdieu 1984), but we include it because commentators have long argued that class formation and structuration can be undermined by racial and ethnic cleavages (e.g., Bradley 1996, Bonacich 1972, Giddens 1973). Again, our objective is to provide the most comprehensive validation of class maps to date, while appreciating that some of our readers might prefer a narrower assessment.

We also carry out analyses that test standard gradational representations of inequality. Up to now, we have made much of the hegemony of big-class schemes, but other models of inequality obviously remain in play. In particular, gradational formulations have long been popular, whether in the “American” tradition of scaling occupations according to SES or prestige (e.g., Hauser and Warren 1997, Nakao and Treas 1994), or the “French” tradition of treating occupations as subtle signals of the economic and cultural capital controlled by their incumbents (esp. Bourdieu 1984). The main problem with both traditions is that they simply assume that occupations can safely be reduced to one or two continuous variables (e.g., prestige, cultural capital). As with big-class approaches, scaling obscures the far more complicated effects of occupational cultures or other forms of “horizontal” differentiation that arise when social closure is secured at the detailed occupational level. Put differently, conventional scales tell stories about *why* occupations matter but overlook the logically prior issues of *how much* occupations matter and whether they matter in ways other than the preferred stories. We take on these logically prior issues in our analyses.

In summary, all conventional approaches begin with a characterization of the site of production that aggregates occupations into big classes or

represents them with continuous scales, thus ignoring the possibility that such practices conceal much of the association between occupations and individual-level outcomes. Although there is considerable debate over how big classes should be defined (e.g., Evans and Mills 1998), how occupations should be scaled (e.g., Hauser and Warren 1997), or whether big-class schemes are superior to scales (e.g., Rytina 2000, Hout and Hauser 1992, Kalleberg and Griffin 1980), scholars invariably assume that at least one of these forms of data reduction is satisfactory. We will test this assumption and thereby ask whether a more fundamental recasting of class maps is necessary.

WHERE IS STRUCTURATION FOUND?

If class is as central to sociology as the preceding section implies, then the discipline should have a more than passing interest in determining the level of aggregation at which class categories structure outcomes. This issue is best addressed by considering whether the proximate mechanisms that generate class homogeneity operate principally at the big-class or occupational level. In the present section, we outline the three main processes that generate within-group homogeneity (i.e., allocation, social conditioning, and institutionalization of conditions), with our objective being to specify the level at which each such process operates. As discussed below, some of the sociological processes that generate the class-outcome relationship operate at the big-class level, whereas others operate more directly and forcefully at the disaggregate level. It follows that real structure obtains at both levels. We argue, however, that selection, socialization, and other homogeneity-inducing mechanisms operate with special force at the occupation level, implying that conventional big-class models will conceal a substantial portion of the structure at the site of production (see table 1).

The first mechanism, allocation, refers to the selective processes that affect the types of individuals who are found in particular positions in the productive sphere. This mechanism operates on both the supply and demand sides. On the supply side, workers self-select into positions based not only on their perceptions about which occupations are remunerative and intrinsically rewarding (see, e.g., Logan 1996), but also on their beliefs about which occupations provide a good fit in terms of their preexisting beliefs, attitudes, lifestyle predilections, and demographic attributes. For example, individuals with liberal political values are more likely attracted to the profession of sociology, given its reputation as a haven for left-leaning politics; this self-selection in turn solidifies the dispositional reputation itself (Caplow 1954). Similarly, we might expect journalists to self-

TABLE 1
MECHANISMS GENERATING STRUCTURATION AT THE SITE OF
PRODUCTION

MECHANISM	LEVEL	
	Aggregate	Disaggregate
Allocation		
Supply	Weak	Strong
Demand	Weak	Strong
Social conditioning		
Training	Weak	Strong
Interactional closure	Weak	Strong
Interest formation	Strong	Strong
Learning generalization	Strong	Strong
Institutionalization of conditions	Weak	Strong

select for inquisitiveness, social workers for empathy, lawyers for argumentativeness, religious workers for spirituality, and printers for political radicalism. Although these examples all focus on dispositional reputations, class positions also have demographic "reputations" (e.g., the female typing of nursing) and lifestyle "reputations" (e.g., the staidness of accountants) that serve as self-fulfilling prophecies by selecting workers who find those reputations appropriate, attractive, or at least acceptable in light of their own traits or lifestyles.

On the demand side, employers and other gatekeepers filter applicants on the basis of individual-level attributes, thus creating additional within-category homogeneity by matching the traits of new recruits with those of current employees. These gatekeepers are presumably well aware of the dispositional, demographic, and related reputations of occupations and are often motivated to recruit according to those reputations, whether because of discriminatory tastes or in the interests of workplace harmony. In some cases, such demand-side filtering is formalized via explicit selection devices (e.g., licensing boards, unions, certifying organizations) that establish whether the attributes, training, and experience of potential employees are consistent with expectations for the position being filled. In other cases, demand-side filtering is carried out informally through referral-based hiring practices, which typically tap social networks that are relatively homologous (e.g., Petersen, Saporta, and Seidel 2000, Fernandez and Weinberg 1997, Granovetter 1995). Regardless of its source, demand-side filtering generates within-category homogeneity with respect to a wide variety of traits, not only those related to potential productivity, but also to demographic attributes, political attitudes, social attitudes, and consumption practices.

The key question for our purposes is whether the allocative processes of self-selection and differential recruitment operate principally at the big-class or occupational level. Here it is relevant that occupations, more so than big classes, tend to be institutionalized in the labor market, embedded in the cognitive maps of workers and employers, and characterized by the cultural reputations that drive allocative processes. Indeed, in many occupations, licenses and credentials serve as explicit gatekeeping devices, restricting entry to certain qualified eligibles and promoting the social closure that generates distinctive cultures and reputations. The generalized reputations that attach to big classes tend to be comparatively weak. The classes of “nonskilled managers” (Wright 1997) or “routine nonmanuals” (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992) are, for example, largely academic constructions that lack well-developed closure mechanisms and have accordingly amorphous reputations. The main gatekeeping device at the big-class level is the bachelor’s degree, yet this form of closure maps onto just one big class (i.e., the “service class”), and only imprecisely at that. Although many occupations are poorly institutionalized and lack preexisting reputations or formalized selection devices (e.g., “assemblers,” “systems analysts”), insofar as closure mechanisms can be found at all, it is mainly at the occupational level.

If the allocation mechanism evokes the imagery of social classes as vessels for individuals with common preexisting attributes, the “social conditioning” mechanism (Bourdieu 1984, p. 101) is instead explicitly causal, referring to the transformative effects of the objective conditions of work and the social practices characteristic of a class position. These conditions and practices shape the development of classwide and local political interests (Marx 1963, Dahrendorf 1959, Krause 1996), alter the attributes that workers value both on and off the job (Kohn [1980] 1994, pp. 436–37, Kohn and Schooler 1983), affect lifestyles and patterns of family interactions (Zablocki and Kanter 1976, p. 276, see also Menaghan 1991), and motivate workers to learn particular skills (Becker 1967). Four submechanisms, all of which fall under the social conditioning rubric, generate these diverse effects: training, interactional closure, interest formation, and learning generalization. We review each of these below.

The first two submechanisms, training and interactional closure, draw explicitly on the classical sociological forces of socialization and normative control. The training submechanism becomes relevant whenever employees complete lengthy class-specific education (i.e., generalized liberal arts curriculum) or occupation-specific training (e.g., apprenticeships, police and military academies, graduate and professional schools) that solidifies preexisting attitudes, instills explicit codes of behavior, or otherwise generates homogeneity among recruits (e.g., Caplow 1954). Although formal training is the most obvious mode of such socialization, informal

training also occurs as incumbents interact with like-minded colleagues and are exposed to the political beliefs, social attitudes, perceived interests, and consumption practices characteristic of a given structural location. This “interactional closure” at the site of production generates homogeneous communities (e.g., Park 1952, p. 196) because political and social attitudes crystallize out of social interactions (e.g., Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954), and because groups impose sanctions against members who deviate from normative beliefs or behaviors (e.g., Wilensky and Ladinsky 1967).

Do training and interactional closure generate homogeneity of outcomes primarily at the big-class level or at the occupation level? It is relevant that these two submechanisms come into play in the context of institutionalized groupings characterized by formalized training regimens (e.g., apprenticeships, graduate training) and substantial intraclass interaction. By implication, they will be especially apparent at the disaggregate level where occupational groupings are well formed, and their boundaries, far from being arbitrary academic constructions, are explicitly defended by employers, unions, professional associations, and credentialing bodies. As we have stressed elsewhere (Grusky and Weeden 2001), not all occupations have well-developed training regimens and dense networks, but at the same time many do (e.g., Van Maanen and Barley 1984, Hughes 1958, Caplow 1954). By contrast, such organic communities have proved elusive at the big-class level (e.g., Brint 1984, 1994, Goldthorpe and Lockwood 1969), emerging in well-developed form only at particular historical moments (e.g., Thompson 1963).

If training and interactional closure are thus less developed at the big-class level, we do not mean to suggest that they are completely absent, even in the contemporary period. Most notably, postsecondary schools provide generalized training for members of a broadly defined “service class,” a form of training that should generate classwide homogeneity on at least some outcomes (e.g., tolerance, liberalism). This training is not, however, widely regarded as preparatory for any particular big class, at least not to the extent that most vocational training (e.g., the JD) is preparatory to a particular occupation (i.e., lawyer). It follows that training-based closure is relatively poorly developed at the big-class level. Likewise, interactional closure is also weakly developed at the big-class level because it primarily takes the form of class-based residential segregation, not constraints on workplace interaction. That is, neighborhood residents often fall into the same big class, a form of segregation that creates the *potential* for interactional closure at the big-class level. This source of homogeneity is relatively weak given that interaction between neighbors is both less frequent and less extensive than interaction between coworkers. Thus, although residual forms of classwide socialization and normative control

persist, these processes operate more directly and powerfully at the level of institutionalized occupations

The remaining two submechanisms, interest formation and learning generalization, become relevant insofar as class categories are homogeneous with respect to working conditions, opportunities, and the resulting “logic” of the class situation. The standard formulation here, as expressed by Bourdieu, is that “homogenous conditions of existence impose homogenous conditionings and produce homogenous systems of dispositions capable of generating similar practices” (1984, p. 104, see also Becker and Carper 1956). This homogeneity of practice is established either because (a) the underlying opportunities, constraints, and logic of the class situation generate a characteristic set of interests (Goldthorpe 2002), or (b) there is a “direct translation of the lessons of the job to outside-the-job realities” (Kohn 2001, p. 539). The distinction between these two submechanisms lies in the emphasis placed on instrumental calculation. In the interest-based account, class incumbents adopt beliefs or pursue courses of action that, given the logic of the class situation, allow them to best realize their objectives. The learning generalization account instead implies that class incumbents unconsciously appreciate and value salient features of their job or workplace. For example, workers involved in substantively complex tasks should learn to value complexity and intellectual prowess both on and off the job, thus creating a preference for intellectually demanding leisure activities.

Both accounts assume that members of a putative class experience a workplace environment that is similar in terms of the conditions that form interests or lead to learning generalization. The key issue, then, in determining whether aggregation undermines these mechanisms is the extent to which it introduces intraclass heterogeneity in the workplace conditions of interest (e.g., income, substantive complexity, autonomy). In this context, it is not necessarily troubling that big-class categories are poorly institutionalized, because sociologists typically construct them to be homogeneous with respect to at least some working conditions. At the same time, the smaller categories that employers devise (i.e., occupations) will likewise be homogeneous insofar as their job-construction efforts are guided by a consensual “template” that specifies the job tasks, working conditions, and rewards of an occupation. Put differently, the homogeneity of big classes arises because sociologists attempt analytically to combine jobs or occupations into coherent groups, whereas the homogeneity of occupations arises because employers (and, to some extent, workers) fashion jobs that correspond with ideal-typical occupational templates.

This implies that homogeneous class categories may be constructed either by employers or sociologists. We cannot make a priori judgments about the effects of aggregation because it is unclear whether sociologists

have succeeded in defining big classes in ways that retain much of the homogeneity that matters for interest formation or learning generalization. Given this ambiguity, we have assumed in table 1 that these mechanisms generate roughly the same amount of homogeneity at the two levels, although it is conceivable that sociologists are in fact better than employers at constructing categories that capture variability in the dimensions governing interest formation or learning generalization.

The final mechanism listed in table 1, "institutionalization of conditions," refers explicitly to the processes by which work is typically structured and rewarded. This mechanism becomes relevant when explaining why the objective conditions of work (e.g., work hours, income) tend to be similar within big classes and occupations. As noted above, occupations tend to encompass similar work conditions, given that they are the institutionalized categories in terms of which employers fashion jobs (see, e.g., Bridges 1995). Moreover, occupational associations and unions attempt to homogenize further the work conditions of particular occupations, with their success revealed in the diffusion of occupation-specific licenses, credentials, certifications, and apprenticeship systems (e.g., Weeden 2002, Freidson 1994, 2001, Murphy 1988). Only rarely, and even less often successfully, do these organizations seek to effect classwide changes in the conditions of work (Abbott 1988). To be sure, sociologists who aggregate occupations into big classes are again sorting on work conditions, at least insofar as work conditions are correlated with the criteria by which the preferred big classes are explicitly defined. This sorting is likely, however, to be indirect with respect to the particular outcomes included in our life chances domain.

The main implication of this discussion is that most of the mechanisms that generate the class-outcome association operate more directly and decisively at the level of detailed occupations (see table 1). It follows that big-class theorists must fall back on a limited menu of mechanisms when describing how classes structure individual-level outcomes. For example, Goldthorpe (2000, 2002, also Goldthorpe and McKnight in press) explains this relationship almost entirely in terms of a rational action account (i.e., interest formation), whereby class incumbents pursue courses of action that are subjectively sensible given the particular bundle of constraints and opportunities characterizing their class situation. This rational action account may be the strongest card that a big-class theorist can play, but it is far weaker than the homogeneity-inducing mechanisms available to the theorist of institutionalized class categories. It follows that big-class maps encourage analysts to search for association between the site of production and individual outcomes where only a fraction of that association is likely to be found.

SOCIAL CARTOGRAPHY

We begin our empirical analyses by examining whether big-class maps successfully capture variability in life conditions. These “cartographic” analyses involve characterizing the bivariate association between class membership and a wide range of variables in the life chances, lifestyles, culture, and demography domains. We proceed by first describing the data and then presenting our class maps, models, and results. The multivariate analyses, to which we turn in the subsequent section, rely on largely similar data and methods and thus will be presented more economically.

Data

We assess the strength of the relationship between class maps and outcomes as comprehensively as possible by examining 55 individual-level variables drawn from our four topical domains. Within each domain, we chose variables that offered large sample sizes, consistent coverage across survey years, and similar item wording over time. After imposing these restrictions, we found that a few of the topics (e.g., abortion attitudes) were covered by an extremely large number of items. Rather than overweight the analyses with these items, we chose a representative sampling of them.⁸

The variables pertaining to life chances and demographic composition are principally drawn from the 1972–2002 March CPS (Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS] 2004), while those in the remaining domains are drawn from the 1972–2002 GSS (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 2004). We combined multiple years of the surveys to obtain adequate sample sizes. In a companion piece (Weeden and Grusky 2005), we have disaggregated by sample year and examined trends in the strength of the class-outcome relationship, but these trends proved to be relatively weak and do not alter our main conclusions here. Appendix table A1 lists all variables and their source questions, response categories, and contributing surveys.

We define class and occupation schemes with 1970 Standard Occupation Classification (SOC) codes. Unfortunately, data from post-1991 GSS and post-1982 CPS files are only published in 1980 or 1990 SOC schemes, forcing us to reconcile classifications. We back-coded the more recent data into the 1970 scheme by (a) translating the 1990-basis data into the 1980 scheme, (b) multiplying each 1980-basis record by the number of 1970 SOC codes that contribute to the 1980 code (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989), and (c) assigning sex-specific weights to each record in

⁸ We have no reason to believe that our results would be any different had we selected different items.

the resulting expanded data set.⁹ This weight equals the proportion of the 1980 code that is drawn from the constituent 1970 code, multiplied by the survey weight and, for CPS data, a deflation factor that retains the original sample size. The GSS and CPS analyses are both restricted to adult respondents ages 25–64 in the civilian labor force, and the CPS samples are further restricted to households in months one to four of the sampling rotation to ensure that a given household does not contribute more than one observation to the sample (see BLS 2004).

Class Maps

We translated the 1970-basis SOC codes into various class maps, with our featured map being a new, highly disaggregate scheme of 126 occupations (see app. table A2). In deciding which detailed codes to combine and which to retain, we sought to identify institutionalized boundaries as revealed by the distribution of occupational associations, unions, and licensing arrangements, as well as the technical features of the work itself. We carried out this task by referring to Weeden's (2002) archive of occupation-level data on the forms of social closure (e.g., credentialing, certification, associations, licensing) that detailed occupations have pursued and realized. This archive, which is described in more detail in Weeden (2002), allows us to identify the institutionalized boundaries that generate intracategory homogeneity.

We were, however, forced to make various compromises in constructing this scheme, not only because we often lacked the cases needed to maintain distinctions that are institutionalized in the labor market, but also because we sought to construct a classification that is nested in conventional big-class schemes. We recognize, then, that some of our categories combine SOC occupations that differ in bases of recruitment and self-selection, work conditions, and constraints on interaction, while others define an occupation that is only "deeply institutionalized" insofar as it has appeared in thousands of administrative publications (e.g., "professionals, n e c"). Indeed, we often resorted to combining occupations (e.g., professionals, n e c) that were similar only by virtue of their working conditions, a basis for aggregation that is admittedly no different than that routinely deployed, albeit on a far broader scale, by conventional class analysts. The resulting 126-category scheme, while clearly imperfect, is nonetheless a

⁹ For a given 1980 occupation, suppose that 90% of incumbents would have been coded into occupation *X* in the 1970 scheme, while 10% would have been coded into occupation *Y*. Each person with this 1980 occupation contributes two records to the expanded data set: one record receives code *X* and a weight of 0.9, and the other receives code *Y* and a weight of 0.1.

substantial improvement over aggregate class models because it captures far more of the institutionalized social groupings in the division of labor. If this imperfect scheme performs relatively well, one might reasonably surmise that elaborated schemes that capture yet more of the institutionalized categories in the labor market would perform even better.

We evaluate our 126-category scheme against conventional big-class and gradational representations of the site of production. Obviously, there is less than complete consensus within the aggregate and gradational camps, making it difficult to carry out a definitive analysis without deploying several schemes. We represent the big-class tradition with two well-known schemes and the gradational tradition with four scales. Unfortunately, we cannot include Wright's (1997) neo-Marxian class scheme, preeminent though it is. The GSS and CPS do not allow us to implement this classification precisely enough to do it justice, while Wright's (e.g., 1997) U.S. survey contains less than 1,500 cases, too few to sustain an occupation-level analysis.

Instead, we apply the EG scheme, which has arguably become the de facto standard within the big-class tradition. Although this scheme has a detailed 11-class version, we use the more commonly applied seven-class version. This version has become standard because the more detailed variant rests on information on firm size and employer status, neither of which is routinely available in the GSS surveys or in many of the other surveys commonly used in inequality research (see Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992, pp. 35–47). The categories of the seven-class version are service workers, routine nonmanuals, petty bourgeoisie, skilled craft workers, unskilled manual workers, farmers, and agricultural workers. In translating the 1970 SOC codes into this scheme, we relied principally on the EG protocol for recoding 1960 SOC codes, but then checked our results against ISCO-based protocols developed by Ganzeboom, Luijkx, and Treiman (1989).¹⁰

For all its popularity, the EG scheme has not entirely supplanted alternatives based on aggregate census bureau categories. Consequently, we also consider a 12-class scheme in which the constituent categories are self-employed professionals, employed professionals, employed managers, self-employed managers, sales workers, clerical workers, craft workers, operatives, service workers, laborers, farmers, and farm laborers.¹¹ This "Featherman-Hauser" (FH) scheme, so labeled because Featherman and

¹⁰ We thank Walter Muller, John Goldthorpe, Harry Ganzeboom, Ruud Luijkx, and Donald Treiman for sharing the conversion protocols.

¹¹ We opt against a 17-category version of the FH scheme because the industrial distinctions that it adds to the 12-class version (e.g., retail sales workers, wholesale sales workers) typically fall outside the purview of class analysis.

Hauser (1978) popularized it, is easily implemented by cross-classifying census major occupations and employment status¹² The relationships between the FH, EG, and detailed schemes are specified in appendix table A2

The lack of consensus within the gradational tradition also requires that we evaluate our occupation scheme against several formulations The obvious suspects are SES and prestige scales, both of which dominated North American scholarship in the latter half of the 20th century Although interest in these scales has waned, gradational approaches that score occupations by their level of cultural capital or “occupational education” (see Hauser and Warren 1997) are increasingly popular The main convention here, which we follow, is to measure occupational education as the proportion of incumbents who have at least 13 years of schooling (e g , Kalmijn 1994) We also implement Bourdieu’s two-dimensional formulation by distinguishing between the total volume of cultural and economic capital and the relative amounts of each (Bourdieu 1984, see also DiMaggio and Mohr 1985) We measure the first dimension, total capital, as the sum of the *Z*-scores of occupational education and earnings (Hauser and Warren 1997), and the second dimension, capital composition, as the ratio of occupational education to earnings¹³

We assigned scores on each of these five scales to the 126 occupations in our detailed classification scheme We obtained 1980-basis prestige scores from Nakao and Treas (1994), and 1980-basis SES, cultural capital, total capital, and capital composition scores from Hauser and Warren (1997) We then back-coded these 1980-basis scores into the 1970 SOC (see above), assigned these scores and the 126-category occupation codes to all CPS respondents, and constructed a weighted average within each of the 126 occupations¹⁴ Although aggregating up to the level of 126 occupations suppresses some within-category heterogeneity in these scales, supplementary analyses (not shown) indicate that this lost heterogeneity

¹² To maintain consistency across class schemes, we assigned 14 (of 428) sparsely populated SOC occupations to FH categories that diverge from the major occupation group These inconsistencies occur when technically similar occupations are coded into different SOC major groups Milliners, for example, are coded as operatives in the SOC, while tailors are coded as craft workers There are too few milliners to justify a separate occupation in our scheme, so we combine milliners with tailors and, to be consistent with EG, assign the resulting occupation to the FH “craft worker” class We privileged EG because it is gaining ascendancy in the day-to-day practice of sociology, even in North America (see, e g , Manza and Brooks 1999)

¹³ It follows that “total capital” is a socioeconomic scale in which income and education are weighted equally

¹⁴ We used 1980-basis rather than 1970-basis SES and prestige scales because this allows us to center better on the time period covered by our surveys Given the stability of these scales, this decision is likely inconsequential

is trivially small. That is, when the disaggregate scales are regressed on the corresponding aggregate ones, the explained variance is quite high (SES .946%, prestige .932%, cultural capital .963%, total capital .935%, capital composition .835%)

Models and Methods

We carry out our analyses with 55 four-way tables formed by cross-classifying detailed occupation, employment status, gender, and outcome. We then decompose the total occupation-by-outcome association into a component that is explained by big classes (or scales) and a component that remains unexplained by big classes (or scales), thereby giving us a measure of the relative cost, in terms of explanatory power foregone, of aggregation (or scaling).

These simple decompositions are carried out with data that have been smoothed in two ways. First, we smooth away any residual three-way interactions between sex, occupation, and outcome, which allows for more powerful tests of the effects of aggregation. Although we would prefer to analyze tables for men and women separately, the three-way cross-classification of sex, occupation, and outcome is sparse for the GSS variables, thereby increasing the risk that the analysis will unfairly capitalize on noise. By smoothing across sex, we can retain the pooled sample size, halve the number of models to be presented, reduce “noise,” and still allow for sex differences in the outcome and occupation distributions.

The second type of data smoothing is necessary because the EG and FH schemes, unlike our occupation-based scheme, distinguish between employed and self-employed members of some classes (i.e., professional and managerial). The detailed and big-class schemes are therefore nested only if we further disaggregate occupations by employment status. However, such extreme differentiation is not only inconsistent with our conceptual approach, but also makes the GSS tables unacceptably sparse. The solution to this problem differs by class scheme. In analyses using the FH scheme, we disaggregate professional and managerial occupations by employment status, but then constrain the three-way interaction between occupation, employment status, and outcome to be the same for all occupations within the professional class and for all occupations within the managerial class. This approach maintains consistency with the FH approach by allowing for interactions with employment status at the big-class level (but not the detailed occupational level).

The FH tables are smoothed, then, by fitting to each disaggregate table a model that (a) constrains the association between occupation and outcome to be identical for men and women, while allowing two-way interactions between sex and occupation and between sex and outcome, and

(*b*) constrains the association between detailed occupation and outcome to be identical across employment status for all occupations except those in the professional and managerial classes. The following model implements these restrictions

$$m_{ijgp} = \alpha_i \phi_j \nu_g \mu_p \beta_{ig} \delta_{jg} \varepsilon_{ij} \gamma_{jp} \eta_{jp} \lambda_{gp} \theta_{igp}, \quad (1)$$

where *i* indexes occupation, *j* indexes outcome, *g* indexes sex, and *p* indexes employment status.¹⁵ The employment status variable has three levels: self-employed professionals, self-employed managers, and all other occupations. The η_{jp} term therefore allows (*a*) self-employed professionals to have different responses on the outcome than employed professionals, and (*b*) self-employed managers to have different responses than employed managers. These differences take the form, however, of classwide “shift effects” that pertain equally to all detailed occupations within the professional (or managerial) category. The expected values from this model become the data to which we fit all subsequent models (for a related approach, see Featherman and Hauser [1978, pp. 86, 131, 167, 173]).¹⁶

The logic of the EG scheme does not allow a similar treatment of employment status. Because Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) assume that occupation is irrelevant within the petty bourgeoisie, occupations as diverse as child care attendant and ship’s officer are, for self-employed respondents, aggregated together. It follows that incumbents of such occupations are assumed to be identical in their responses on the outcome variables. By contrast, our approach privileges occupation over employment status, with the result being that the two classification schemes are not nested. This problem can be resolved by carrying out two separate analyses. We first present results pertaining to arrays in which the petty bourgeoisie have been excluded, thereby making the EG scheme and the disaggregated scheme nested. We then present supplementary analyses of CPS outcomes (where sample sizes are sufficiently large) that assess the extent to which the petty bourgeoisie is a homogenous class.

The smoothing model for the EG tables is therefore applied to three-way arrays of sex, occupation, and outcome from which the petty bourgeoisie has been excised. As with the FH analysis, we purge the three-way association between these variables, thereby removing any sex

¹⁵ We identify the parameters of this and all subsequent models by imposing standard constraints. For brevity’s sake, we will note the identifying constraints only when they are unclear or affect the interpretation of the model.

¹⁶ We have added a constant (0.1) to empty cells (e.g., Agresti 1990).

differences in the occupation-outcome association from the pool of total association to be explained. This yields the following model

$$m_{ijg} = \alpha_i \phi_j \nu_g \beta_{ig} \delta_{jg} \varepsilon_{ij}, \quad (2)$$

where all symbols are defined as above. The fitted values from this model are again used for all subsequent EG analyses. It bears emphasizing that these data-smoothing procedures merely exclude residual forms of association that neither the big-class nor microclass approaches predict.

With the smoothed FH and EG data in hand, we fit models that decompose the total occupation-by-outcome association into (a) within-class and between-class components (to evaluate big-class formulations), and (b) vertical and horizontal components (to evaluate conventional scales). The first task is to quantify the total occupation-by-outcome association at the site of production that may be explained by either big classes or scales. In the FH tables, this is represented by the log-likelihood statistic of a model that fits the outcome-sex association (δ_{jg}), the three-way association between occupation, sex, and employment status (θ_{igp}), and all lower-order interaction terms, but does not fit the three-way interaction between occupation, employment status, and outcome

$$m_{ijgp} = \alpha_i \phi_j \nu_g \mu_p \beta_{ig} \delta_{jg} \gamma_{ip} \lambda_{gp} \theta_{igp} \quad (3)$$

The analogous model for the EG tables, which exclude self-employment status, merely fits the two-way associations between occupation and sex (β_{ig}) and between outcome and sex (δ_{jg})

$$m_{ijg} = \alpha_i \phi_j \nu_g \beta_{ig} \delta_{jg} \quad (4)$$

The next models allow us to assess the strength of big-class effects on outcomes by permitting an interaction between big classes and the response categories of the outcome variable. These models are given as follows for the FH and EG tables, respectively

$$m_{ijgp} = \alpha_i \phi_j \nu_g \mu_p \beta_{ig} \delta_{jg} \gamma_{ip} \lambda_{gp} \theta_{igp} \zeta_{jc}, \quad (5)$$

$$m_{ijg} = \alpha_i \phi_j \nu_g \beta_{ig} \delta_{jg} \zeta_{jc}, \quad (6)$$

where c indexes big class, and the remaining symbols are defined as before. The mapping of detailed occupations (and employment status) into the class variable, c , is described in appendix table A2. In the FH tables, p is nested within c because p identifies self-employed professionals and managers, two of the 12 FH classes. The unexplained association in the models of equations (5) and (6) is generated by the relationship between the outcome variable and the occupations constituting a big class. The

fit statistics from these models thus allow us to evaluate the assumption of within-class homogeneity

Similarly, we evaluate the scaling traditions by assessing the extent to which conventional scales, such as SES or prestige scales, account for the total occupation-by-outcome association. We fit an association model in which the scale values for the response categories are estimated freely, while the scale values for occupations are fixed at the appropriate index score (e.g., SES, prestige, cultural capital)

$$m_{\nu\epsilon p} = \alpha_i \phi_j \nu_{\epsilon} \mu_p \beta_{i\epsilon} \delta_{j\epsilon} \gamma_{ip} \lambda_{\epsilon p} \theta_{i\epsilon p} \omega_j^{S_i} \quad (7)$$

As indicated above, S_i is the predefined scale value of the i th occupation, while ω_j is the estimated scale value of the j th response category. When S_i refers, for example, to the SES scale, we can determine how much of the association between detailed occupation and each outcome is attributable to vertical differentiation by SES. However, because the occupational scales lack distinct values for self-employed and employed occupations within the professional and managerial categories, the residual association is generated by an employment status effect as well as a detailed occupation effect.

We evaluate Bourdieu's approach by scaling occupations in accord with two dimensions rather than one. That is, we fit effects for total capital and capital composition simultaneously, yielding the following model:

$$m_{\nu\epsilon p} = \alpha_i \phi_j \nu_{\epsilon} \mu_p \beta_{i\epsilon} \delta_{j\epsilon} \gamma_{ip} \lambda_{\epsilon p} \theta_{i\epsilon p} \omega_j^{T_i R_i}, \quad (8)$$

where T_i and R_i are the fixed occupational scores for the i th occupation, ω_j and τ_j are the estimated scale values for the j th response category, and all other symbols are defined as before. As before, we ask how much of the association is vertical and how much is horizontal, but in this case vertical association is represented with two scales, total capital and capital composition.

These tests are based on decompositions of likelihood-ratio test statistics, with all the advantages and disadvantages that such decompositions entail. In part, the test statistics pertaining to the within-class association will be large because they involve so many degrees of freedom, and the critical issue will be whether classical significance tests and BIC imply that this wanton expenditure of degrees of freedom is warranted. Because the number of workers appearing in each detailed occupation is (typically) small, it will be difficult to secure much improvement in fit by expending a within-class degree of freedom, and classical significance tests will constitute an especially stringent assessment of the returns to disaggregation.

Although BIC, classical significance tests, and likelihood-ratio decompositions all provide useful assessments of the returns to disaggregation, it will be instructive to supplement them with direct comparisons of the

parameter estimates themselves. To this end, we reparameterize a standard log-multiplicative association model (e.g., Goodman 1979) to distinguish between (a) the strength of the class-outcome association *between* big classes, and (b) the strength of the occupation-outcome association *within* big classes. This produces the following model

$$m_{y_g} = \alpha_i \phi_j \nu_k \beta_{ig} \delta_{jg} e^{(\rho_i \chi_j + \kappa_c \chi_j)}, \quad (9)$$

where κ_c are scale values for classes (constrained to sum to zero), ρ_i are scale values for detailed occupations (constrained to sum to zero within each class), χ_j are scale values for response categories, and all other symbols are defined as before.¹⁷ The occupational scale values estimated by this model can be used to define two summary indices, A_B and A_W , that characterize the amount of association between and within big classes

$$A_B = \exp \left\{ [1/(C-1)] \times \sum_{c=1}^C \kappa_c^2 \right\}^{1/2},$$

and

$$A_W = \exp \left\{ [1/(I-C)] \times \sum_{i=1}^I \rho_i^2 \right\}^{1/2}, \quad (10)$$

where C refers to the total number of big classes and I to the total number of occupations.¹⁸ As indicated in equation (10), A_B measures the deviation of the big-class association parameters around the overall mean, while A_W measures the deviation of occupation scale values around the big-class means. We also define a ratio index, A_R , which compares the strength of association between and within big classes

$$A_R = \ln(A_B)/\ln(A_W) \quad (11)$$

These indices can be directly applied to the EG tables. For the FH tables, two sets of professional and managerial scale values must be estimated, one for self-employed respondents and another for employed

¹⁷ The specification of eq. (9) does not include global parameters for within-class and between-class association. Although such parameters could have been incorporated into the model, we have instead defined two summary indices that pertain to the global amount of association.

¹⁸ As we have noted, eq. (10) is saturated only for binary outcomes. Consequently, we also fit a multidimensional association model (with $J-1$ sets of occupation scale values) to each array with more than two response categories, and then calculated the corresponding $J-1$ values of A_B and A_W . The results indicate that, if anything, the multidimensional models are even less supportive of big-class formulations. Because these models yield substantially more parameters and are sensitive to sparse cell counts, we present the decompositions from the unidimensional model.

respondents. In this case, A_B is calculated as shown in equation (10), but A_w is calculated as the geometric mean of A_{WEM} and A_{WSE} , where A_{WEM} equals the value of A_w after excluding the two self-employed classes, and A_{WSE} equals the value of A_w after excluding the two employed classes. The values of A_{WSE} and A_{WEM} are identical for binary outcomes (for which model 9 is saturated). They differ for outcomes with more than two response categories, but disparities between them are trivial and nonsystematic, and our conclusions are not affected by resorting to the mean.

Results

The results from our decomposition exercise are presented for all 55 outcomes in appendix B, tables B1–B3. We summarize these results in table 2 by presenting, for each domain, the average percentage of the total association that remains after big classes (columns 1–2) or vertical scales (columns 3–6) are fit. This table indicates that the conventional practice of aggregating or scaling occupations conceals much of the structure at the site of production. Depending on the domain, aggregate class maps leave 36%–75% of the total association in the tables unexplained, whereas gradational representations of class fare even worse, leaving 37%–85% of the total association unexplained. When averages are calculated across all domains (see bottom row), the unexplained association ranges from 50%–68%, meaning that none of the conventional approaches accounts for more than half of the structure at the site of production, and some account for as little as a third of that structure.

These results reveal that conventional models of class and status vary in their explanatory power, but probably not enough to justify all the debate about their relative merits. The FH scheme accounts for more of the total association at the site of production than does the EG scheme, but it also expends more degrees of freedom and is devised specifically for the idiosyncrasies of the U.S. classification schemes. Although some of the class-based association is suppressed by excluding the petty bourgeoisie from the EG tables, our supplementary analyses of the CPS outcomes (see app. table B2) suggest that these losses are likely offset, if not overshadowed, by the substantial occupation-level structuration within the petty bourgeoisie.¹⁹ Among gradational approaches, the SES and cultural capital scales capture roughly equivalent proportions of the total association, and both perform better than prestige scales (see Hauser and Warren 1997). The two-dimensional scale inspired by Bourdieu accounts

¹⁹ The model of independence, when applied to the outcome-by-occupation array for the petty bourgeoisie, is rejected under all conventional measures of fit (see app. table B1).

TABLE 2
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF OCCUPATION-BY-OUTCOME ASSOCIATION REMAINING AFTER
CLASSES OR VERTICAL SCALES ARE FIT

Domain	EG	FH	SES	Prestige	Cultural Capital	Bourdieu
Life chances	48.2%	36.3%	42.9%	48.5%	49.1%	37.4%
Lifestyles						
Consumption practices	62.3	54.6	67.5	69.6	67.1	65.1
Institutional participation	74.8	61.8	83.8	85.0	82.5	79.0
Class-based sentiments						
Political attitudes and behaviors	65.6	54.4	73.0	78.1	72.8	69.9
Social attitudes and dispositions	52.8	47.4	55.7	65.4	53.6	54.1
Demographic composition	50.1	40.8	56.7	61.7	59.5	54.4
All domains	58.5	50.1	62.4	67.9	62.2	59.6

for a slightly greater percentage of the association than the one-dimensional scales. At the same time, the differences between scales are quite modest, implying that “French” alternatives to SES have to be marketed on virtues other than increased explanatory power. More important, variation among the various aggregate and gradational approaches pales in comparison to the costs of aggregating or scaling in the first place, suggesting that the long-standing competition between advocates of particular big-class or gradational models is misplaced. We should instead ask whether *any* form of aggregation or scaling is warranted.

The results of table 2 are average, and, as such, they mask variability in the performance of aggregate and gradational approaches across particular outcomes. We explore this variability in figures 1, 2, and 3 by graphing, for each outcome, the association left unexplained by the two big-class schemes and the SES scale.²⁰ All three figures show considerable cross-outcome variability, although the costs of aggregating or scaling tend to be substantial regardless of outcome. There are nonetheless some outliers, for example, conventional big classes capture much of the variability in years of schooling, with only 23%–32% of the total association remaining unexplained by big-class models (see educ, figs. 1 and 2).²¹ Moreover, big classes also capture much of the variation in attitudes that are strongly affected by schooling, such as the social tolerance items pertaining

²⁰ We privilege an SES scale because it is so frequently used, but our conclusions are much the same with other scales.

²¹ We would undoubtedly find much greater within-class heterogeneity if education were measured by type of degree achieved (e.g., law, nursing) rather than years of schooling acquired (see Arum and Hout 1997).




Fig. 1—Association remaining after EG classes are fit to occupation-by-occupation arrays




FIG 2—Association remaining after FH classes are fit to occupation-by-occupation arrays




FIG 3 —Association remaining after SES is fit to occupa

to racial intermarriage and to deviant or minority behaviors. These results suggest that some attitudes crystallize in college and are not greatly modified within the occupational communities to which college graduates subsequently disperse²²

In the life chances domain, some of the items are organized in big-class terms (i.e., educ), whereas others clearly are not. For example, the likelihood of working full time (as opposed to part time) differs substantially within big classes (see ftpt), presumably because employers, employees, and unions rely on occupation-specific, not classwide, "templates" as they establish working conditions. The comparison of bank tellers and postal clerks, both routine nonmanuals, provides a useful illustration of this conclusion. In recent years, bank tellers have increasingly become part-time employees as banks react to intensified competition with a "low-road" reorganization of the labor force (i.e., reduced benefits, female employment), whereas postal clerks have been protected from such reorganization because of strong unions and a quasi-public ethos. Because working conditions are governed, at least in part, by forces that play out at the occupational (rather than big-class) level, there is considerable interoccupational heterogeneity in such conditions. Likewise, other outcomes within the life chances domain (e.g., income, tenure) also show substantial within-class heterogeneity, suggesting that even the strictest of Weberian scholars should consider defining class in less aggregate terms.

The culture domain (i.e., "sentiments and dispositions") also exhibits much local association, with items pertaining to pornography (pornlaw), abortion (abrape), affirmative action (helpblk), crime and punishment (courts, cappun), and family orientation (chldidel) all registering at the 60% level or higher. The shared college experience evidently operates on a select few attitudes, leaving many others to be principally a function of differential recruitment, self-selection, socialization, and other occupation-specific forces. In the lifestyles domain, big classes fail even more spectacularly, sometimes leaving as much as 80%–90% of the association at the site of production unexplained (e.g., church attendance). The lesson, then, is that conventional class schemes conceal much of the variability in life conditions. Although big-class schemes do adequately signal years of schooling and a select set of attitudes that are evidently determined by schooling (e.g., tolerance), they fail to provide the omnibus measure of life conditions that the microlevel agenda demands.

The critic of these results may properly point out that our decompositions capitalize on sampling variability. We have estimated the conse-

²² The "class identification" item (class) is also an outlier. This result is hardly surprising given that the item elicits subjective identification with aggregate rather than disaggregate classes (see Emmison and Western 1990).

quences of such “overfitting” (see, e.g., Hauser and Logan 1992) by drawing five random samples of CPS respondents, each of which reflects the average sample size of the GSS tables (approximately 15,000), and then calculating the residual within-class association for all samples. The latter statistics may be compared to those obtained for the full CPS sample.²³ Across all CPS outcomes, the residual association calculated from the GSS-sized samples is, on average, less than 2% greater than that calculated from the full CPS samples. We conclude that a relatively small proportion of the occupational heterogeneity within big classes is due to parameterized noise.²⁴

The case for microclasses is also supported by significance tests. By this standard, disaggregate models are favored for 49 to 51 of the 55 outcome variables, depending on the significance level and class scheme (see app. B).²⁵ Again, there are only minor differences in test results across our various class schemes and scales, with the FH scheme fitting slightly better than the EG scheme and SES scale. The FH class model (see eq. [5]) is rejected at the .05 level for all but three variables and at the .01 level for all but six (satfam, socfriend, memhobby, mempolit, fewwork, helpothr), whereas the EG class model is rejected at the .05 level for all but two variables and at the .01 level for all but four (memhobby, mempolit, chldidel, helpothr). The SES scale is likewise rejected at the .01 level for all but three outcomes (memhobby, mempolit, helpothr).

If conventional tests of significance favor our disaggregate approach, the BIC criterion (e.g., Raftery 1995) is more ambiguous. Ironically, BIC universally prefers the less parsimonious occupation models for outcomes drawn from the relatively large CPS sample, but, conversely, it prefers the more parsimonious class models for outcomes drawn from the relatively small GSS sample. It seems unlikely that all CPS outcomes happen to be structured at the occupational level while all GSS outcomes happen to be structured at the class level. Moreover, if BIC is rejecting the CPS class models because CPS items are truly structured at the occupational

²³ We aggregate response categories to reflect the level of detail we would have used had we been limited to GSS-sized samples. For example, the full CPS sample could support an analysis of five marital statuses, but we would have combined the “widowed,” “separated,” and “divorced” categories had only 15,000 cases been available.

²⁴ It is relevant here that the correlation between sample size and residual association (in the GSS tables) is positive. If small-sample outcomes were inflating the averages in table 2, we would expect to find negative correlations.

²⁵ The df used in the model contrasts are adjusted to reflect the smoothing procedure. When contrasting the models of eqs. (3) and (5), the appropriate df is given by $(I - 1)(J - 1) - (C - 1)(J - 1)$, where I is the number of occupations, J is the number of response categories, and C is the number of aggregate classes (see app. B for fit statistics for all outcomes). We have not sought to make further adjustments to the df that may be required in sparse arrays.

level, it should deliver the same verdict for the deflated (i.e., $N = 15,000$) CPS tables. Instead, the BIC values universally switch sign when applied to these deflated tables, indicating that the disaggregate approach is no longer preferred.²⁶ This reversal of fortune implies that the BIC statistic differs across the GSS and CPS items simply because the CPS offers larger samples.

It is worth noting that BIC was developed for the case in which conventional significance tests encouraged researchers to adopt a complicated model even when the added parameters conveyed little additional information (see, e.g., Grusky and Hauser 1984, Raftery 1995). We face the opposite situation: the more parsimonious models account for an unacceptably low share of the association, but BIC nonetheless encourages us, at least for GSS outcomes, to accept these “counterintuitive” models. This conundrum motivated Raftery (1995) to comment that BIC often prefers the “sociologically unacceptable” but parsimonious model relative to the overparameterized alternative (pp. 152–53). The standard recommendation in this circumstance is to search for an intermediate model that reveals the sociologically relevant association, but does so with fewer parameters (e.g., Raftery 1995, p. 153). In the present context, the association left unexplained by big classes may arise from residual vertical heterogeneity (e.g., SES) within big classes, thus implying that big-class and gradational effects should be fit simultaneously. The resulting hybrid model combines the specifications of equations (5) and (7)

$$m_{ygp} = \alpha + \phi_j \nu_g \mu_p \beta_{ig} \delta_{jp} \gamma_{ip} \lambda_{gp} \theta_{igp} \omega_j^S \zeta_{cp}, \quad (12)$$

where all symbols are defined as above. We applied this model using the FH scheme and the SES scale.

The fit statistics from this model indicate that very little of the residual association within big classes is due to socioeconomic differences among the constituent occupations (see fig. 4). For the life chances and tolerance items, SES captures a respectable percentage of the residual association, which is unsurprising given the dominant weight of education in this scale (Hauser and Warren 1997). However, our hybrid model accounts, on average, for only 14% of the residual within-class association, and it fails conventional significance tests for 48 of the 55 outcomes (at $\alpha = .05$). Again, BIC provides a more ambiguous reading, almost universally preferring the parsimonious hybrid models for the GSS variables, while pre-

²⁶ The corollary of this is that if we could analyze CPS-sized samples for the GSS outcomes, BIC would presumably prefer the occupation models, thereby coming in line with conventional L^2 tests.

ferring the occupation models for the CPS variables²⁷ These results indicate that researchers must look elsewhere to find the elusive model that simultaneously fits the data, captures an acceptable proportion of the total association at the site of production, and yet meets BIC's high standards for parsimony We return to this point in our concluding comments

We conclude this section by calculating parametric indices of the strength of association at the big-class and occupational levels (see eqs [10] and [11]) These indices are provided for all 55 outcomes in appendix B and are summarized in table 3 For the most part, values of A_R in table 3 hover around unity, indicating that there is as much association within big classes as between them The only exceptions to the latter claim are within the life chances and demographic domains In the life chances domain, the value of A_R registers as high as 1.33, implying that there is 33% more heterogeneity between big classes than within them At the same time, the absolute amount of within-class heterogeneity in this domain remains very high, in fact higher than in any other domain Because big-class formulations suppress much heterogeneity in the life chances domain, such formulations are problematic even when a pure Weberian definition of classes is preferred (see Goldthorpe and McKnight in press, p. 2)

In summary, there is little empirical justification for aggregating occupations, decades of class-analytic practice to the contrary If the amount of between-class association is regarded as large enough to justify big-class analysis, then the residual within-class association must also be regarded as large enough to warrant occupational analysis This is because there is just as much occupational variability around the big-class means as big-class variability around the grand mean To be sure, the values of A_R are again deflated by overfitting, but not to the extent that our main conclusion can be questioned²⁸ Although our critics often suggest that there are diminishing returns to moving beyond the usual big-class formulations, the data make it clear that analysts will secure just as much additional information by expending a within-class degree of freedom as a between-class degree of freedom These results imply that scholars who end their analysis at the big-class level do so without empirical justification

²⁷ The only exception is Spanish ethnicity (spneth), a CPS outcome for which BIC prefers the hybrid model In this case, there is little residual association to be explained at the occupation level, and BIC is on the mark

²⁸ If there is any doubt on this point, it is worth comparing the values of A_R in the CPS samples to those in the GSS samples, which are more susceptible to overfitting The size of this index is similar in the two samples (see app. table B1), suggesting that overfitting does not have an unduly large effect

TABLE 3
 INDICES OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN AND WITHIN BIG CLASSES, BY DOMAIN

DOMAIN	EG			FH		
	A_B	A_W	A_R	A_B	A_W	A_R
Life chances	4 296	2 856	1 300	4 118	2 711	1 332
Lifestyles						
Consumption practices	1 676	1 745	0 875	1 719	1 691	0 985
Institutional participation	1 841	1 834	0 931	1 754	1 738	0 916
Class-based sentiments						
Political attitudes and behaviors	1 584	1 676	0 949	1 636	1 615	1 111
Social attitudes and dispositions	1 619	1 538	1 023	1 658	1 500	1 137
Demographic composition	2 056	1 423	2 012	1 829	1 407	1 742
All domains	1 869	1 745	1 026	1 871	1 688	1 106

NOTE.—Index values for all outcomes are given in app. B. EG values exclude the petty bourgeoisie.

CAUSAL MODELS OF CLASS EFFECTS

The preceding analyses speak to the usefulness of conventional class maps in their role as dependent variables representing variability in life conditions. In our introductory comments, we emphasized that sociologists also frequently use class maps as independent variables, either because of an intrinsic interest in the causal effects of class or because such effects may be confounded with other effects in which the analyst is especially interested. When class maps are used as independent variables, the goal should be to define class categories that capture the causal effects of the site of production, meaning that a proper evaluation of a class map rests on its performance in the context of the appropriate multivariate model.

The preceding bivariate results could be misleading in this regard. After all, the residual association within big classes could be generated solely by self-selection and differential recruitment into detailed occupations, implying that it would disappear in multivariate analyses that control for correlates of class that drive such selection. Although we have argued that causal processes other than selection (i.e., training, closure, interest formation, learning generalization) generate some of the class-outcome association, we have not yet provided evidence for this argument. We turn now to multivariate analyses that show whether such causal processes come into play most powerfully for class schemes that encompass institutionalized categories.

Ideally, we would like to test comprehensively whether conventional class maps fall short as control variables, where "falling short" involves either (a) underestimating the net effects of class, or (b) failing to fully eliminate the omitted variable bias that arises among other variables that are correlated with class. However, because a class control is applied in

such a wide range of literatures, a comprehensive test would require redoing a daunting amount of quantitative social science. We instead offer illustrative analyses of the sources of political beliefs and of leisure time and overwork. These analyses will provide suggestive evidence on the usefulness of a disaggregate class map for multivariate modeling, serve as a template for future research on the net effects of social class, and also address debates within sociology that are important in their own right.

The Sources of Political Beliefs

We begin with an analysis of political beliefs. The relationship between social class and political beliefs has long occupied center stage in stratification research, not only in early Marxian scholarship on class and interest formation, but also in subsequent post-Marxian investigations of the “democratic” class struggle. In the contemporary literature, the empirical relationship between class and political behavior remains much analyzed, principally for the evidence it brings to bear on the “death of class” debates (e.g., Manza and Brooks 1999, Evans 1999, Clark and Lipset 2001, Hechter 2004). This literature thus provides a fitting context for determining whether conventional class effects are weak merely because class has been poorly operationalized or because, as postmodernists allege, the site of production is no longer the main stage on which political beliefs develop.

We suspect that the former interpretation is on the mark. When class models are recast in terms of institutionalized categories, we expect stronger effects to emerge not only because political beliefs are often forged in the secondary socialization that specialized training provides (e.g., professional schools), but also because they are maintained and reproduced within a “habitus” that can develop in institutionalized and socially closed categories (e.g., Bourdieu 1984). For example, professional sociologists come into constant contact with colleagues who are committed to liberal political beliefs, thus reducing exposure to alternative views and raising the costs of straying. Although occupation-specific political cultures are probably most prominent in the professions, they may also emerge in the crafts (e.g., the political radicalism of printers) and in other relatively closed occupations.

We proceed by applying the state-of-the-art causal model developed by

Manza and Brooks (1999) This model can be specified as an ordered logit

$$\Pr(y_i|\mathbf{X}_i) = \begin{cases} F(\alpha_1 - \mathbf{X}_i'\beta) & j = 1 \\ F(\alpha_1 - \mathbf{X}_i'\beta) - F(\alpha_{j-1} - \mathbf{X}_i'\beta) & 1 < j \leq J - 1 \\ 1 - F(\alpha_1 - \mathbf{X}_i'\beta) & j = J, \end{cases} \quad (13)$$

where F designates the cumulative logistic distribution, and the number of response categories, J , equals five. The response variable, y_i , thus ranges from one (very liberal) to five (very conservative), while α_j refers to the $J - 1$ estimated cut points for this variable. The vector \mathbf{X}_i includes age, education, year, sex, race, religion, and the site of production. In the full model, the site of production is represented by detailed occupation effects and by main effects of self-employment for the professional and managerial FH classes. The implicit claim, by contrast, of conventional class analysts is that the site of production can be adequately represented by trimmed models that only allow for FH class effects, SES effects, or a combination of FH class and SES effects.²⁹ We also fit models that omit demographic variables from \mathbf{X}_i and thereby allow us to evaluate their strength relative to that of the big-class and detailed occupation variables.

All models are fit to the 1972–2002 GSS data ($N = 23,260$) for respondents of ages 18 to 64. The inclusion of the younger group of respondents, which is conventional in the class politics literature (e.g., Manza and Brooks 1999), generates a slightly larger sample than in the bivariate analyses. Although we have omitted respondents who are not in the labor force, supplementary analyses indicate that doing so does not change our conclusions in any important way (see Manza and Brooks 1999).

As table 4 shows, the fit statistics for our models indicate that political beliefs vary substantially by occupation, even after fitting effects for other social cleavages. The site of production places second only to religion in net association explained, surpassing such sociological standbys as education, race, sex, and region (table 4). Of the production-based association, FH classes account for 16.7%, while vertical heterogeneity within classes accounts for a mere 2.3%. Nominally, this result implies that scholars who represent social class with the standard 12-category FH scheme will ignore over three-quarters of the story, although overfitting again leads to a slightly inflated estimate. Classicists will note that the likelihood-ratio contrasts favor the detailed occupation model ($L^2 = 742.3$ with 115 df , table 4), whereas Bayesians will note that BIC prefers the more parsimonious

²⁹ We continue to use SES scores aggregated to the 126-occupation level, thus allowing us to decompose the total association generated at the site of production.

TABLE 4
FIT STATISTICS AND MODEL CONTRASTS FROM ORDERED LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY ON DEMOGRAPHIC AND OCCUPATION COVARIATES

Model or Model Contrast	Fit Statistic	df	BIC	L_h^2/L_o^2
Models				
1) DEM + ES + OCC	-89,207.6	23,120	-51,645	
2) DEM + ES + OCC - educ	-89,210.2	23,121	-51,650	
3) DEM + ES + OCC - South	-89,251.6	23,121	-51,567	
4) DEM + ES + OCC - race	-89,428.5	23,122	-51,223	
5) DEM + ES + OCC - female	-89,279.4	23,121	-51,511	
6) DEM + ES + OCC - religion	-90,052.4	23,126	-50,015	
7) DEM	-89,666.2	23,247	-51,992	
8) DEM + FH	-89,589.5	23,236	-52,036	
9) DEM + FH + SES	-89,578.8	23,235	-52,047	
Model contrasts				
Contribution of social cleavage variables				
Education model 2 vs model 1	5.2	1		
Region model 3 vs model 1	88.0	1		
Race model 4 vs model 1	441.8	1		
Sex model 5 vs model 1	143.6	1		
Religion model 6 vs model 1	1,689.5	6		
Site of production model 7 vs model 1	917.3	127		
Cost of aggregating occupations				
Total heterogeneity model 7 vs model 1	917.3	127		100.0
FH-based heterogeneity model 8 vs model 7	153.4	11		16.7
Within-FH vertical heterogeneity model 9 vs model 8	21.5	1		2.3
Within-FH horizontal heterogeneity model 1 vs model 9	742.3	115		80.9

NOTE — $N = 23,260$. The fit statistic is the log likelihood (models) or L^2 contrast (model contrasts). DEM includes year, age, education, southern region, black, other race, female, and religion (liberal Protestant, moderate Protestant, conservative Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, other, none). OCC is the 126-category occupation scheme, SES is a socioeconomic scale, FH is the 12-category FH class scheme, and ES is a three-category collapse of FH that distinguishes between self-employed professionals, self-employed managers, and all others.

monious class specification, as has been the case for all of our analyses that use the smaller GSS samples.

It is useful in this context to examine the parameter estimates. In figure 5, we have graphed the partially normalized coefficients for selected demographic variables as well as detailed occupations (grouped by FH class), thus allowing readers to compare the size of coefficients. We find that the within-class occupation coefficients are just as dispersed as the coefficients




FIG 5—Estimated effects of demographic variables and occupation (by FH class) on p
($N = 23,260$) Estimated coefficients, normalized to sum to zero, are from model 1 in table 4
status Values shown are class-specific means

for other major covariates of political beliefs (e.g., race, gender, region). Moreover, this heterogeneity emerges in all of the big classes, not just the professions. By implication, scholars who deem it necessary to include measures of race, gender, or region in their models would seem obliged to include measures of detailed occupation as well. While big-class effects are significant (table 4), figure 5 makes it clear that they fail to account for much of the structure at the site of production, leaving conventional class analysts open to the postmodernist critique that their star variable is rather weak.

The Sources of Overwork

We turn now to our analysis of working hours. This topic has attracted much scholarly attention, presumably because work commitments affect leisure time, serve as a natural starting point in understanding the shifting balance between work and family obligations, and set limits on earnings and economic security (Jacobs and Gerson 2001, p. 40). In recent scholarship, long-term trends in working hours are widely debated, with many analysts reporting a substantial increase in working hours and a consequent decline of leisure (Schor 1991, cf. Jacobs and Gerson 2001, Robinson and Godbey 1997). According to Hochschild (1997), work commitments are also increasingly encroaching on the needs of families, as employees come to appreciate the workplace as a refuge from the demands of family life.

This line of research rests decisively on quantitative models of the individual and institutional sources of "overwork." In conventional models of overwork, scholars often fit a big-class "professions effect," but more detailed occupational effects have not, to our knowledge, been estimated. The latter effects are likely to arise through two mechanisms. First, workers who enter "greedy" occupations (Coser 1974) encounter and interact with like-minded employees who, in a gruesome display of workaholic codependency, encourage each other to work yet longer hours (e.g., Freidson 1994, Epstein et al. 1999). In the terminology of table 1, this is a form of interactional closure whereby workplace practices, such as norms about working hours, diffuse widely and are internalized by occupation members. Second, work practices are embedded in an institutional context that, for at least some occupations, place real limits on individual discretion over work hours. The medical residency, for example, requires physicians to log (and become accustomed to) long hours, while the typical practice of measuring productivity by billable hours encourages lawyers to do the same. By contrast, the accounting profession has a built-in cyclical workload, meaning that most accountants will work long hours only during tax season. These examples, all of which speak to the insti-

tutionalization of conditions (see table 1), suggest that work hours are likely to vary substantially by occupation rather than big class

We estimate a logistic regression model that predicts whether respondents usually work 49 hours or longer in a given week. This model, which is applied to data from the 1998–2002 outgoing rotation group (ORG) files of the CPS ($N = 306,420$), takes the following form³⁰

$$\ln \left[\frac{\Pr(Y_i = 1)}{1 - \Pr(Y_i = 1)} \right] = \alpha + \beta_x \mathbf{X}_i, \quad (14)$$

where Y_i is a dichotomous variable coded unity if the respondent usually works 49 or more hours a week at his or her main job and zero otherwise. The vector \mathbf{X}_i contains the covariates that conventionally appear in models of overwork: years of education, race (white, African-American, Asian American, Native American, and Hispanic), sex, age in years, the square of age, presence of a spouse in the home, presence of a child in the home (no child, youngest child 0–2 years old, youngest child 3–5 years old, youngest child 6–13 years old, youngest child 14–17 years old), and interaction terms between sex and the family status variables.³¹ As in the preceding analysis, \mathbf{X}_i also contains measures of FH class, SES, detailed occupation, and employment status. We can again assess the relative contributions of demographic variables, big classes, and detailed occupations by estimating models containing various permutations of the elements of \mathbf{X}_i .

The fit statistics from these logistic regression models (see table 5) reveal two noteworthy results. First, the site of production again has a substantial effect on the odds of overwork, even after controlling for the demographic and family attributes that presumably affect recruitment or self-selection into class locations. Second, the decomposition of the site-of-production effect into big-class, vertical, and horizontal components reveals that aggregation entails a substantial cost, although big classes perform better in this analysis than in the preceding one. As table 5 shows, the FH class

³⁰ We use the ORG files (instead of the March files, see BLS [2004]) because they include a measure of “usual hours” at the main job. For 7.5% of the cases, we assume that hours worked last week can proxy for usual hours, thereby reducing the percentage of cases with missing data to 0.6. The sample is restricted to the adult civilian labor force in households in month four of their CPS rotation.

³¹ In some economic analyses of overwork, family income is included to signal reservation wages, and hourly wages are included to measure the benefits of working additional hours. We exclude these variables because they are partly endogenous: family income will rise with hours worked, and hours worked are used to calculate hourly wages for salaried workers. Thus, the occupation effects in our models may be capturing, in part, omitted income and wage effects. If including these regressors weakens occupation effects, the interpretation would be unclear.

TABLE 5
FIT STATISTICS AND MODEL CONTRASTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF OVERWORK
ON DEMOGRAPHIC AND OCCUPATION COVARIATES

Model or Model Contrast	Fit Statistic	df	BIC	L_h^2/L_o^2
Models				
1) DEM* + ES + OCC	-584,677	306,273	-2,870,721	
2) DEM* + ES + OCC - educ	-587,799	306,274	-2,864,489	
3) DEM* + ES + OCC - race/ethnicity	-585,305	306,277	-2,869,518	
4) DEM* + ES + OCC - sex	-601,703	306,282	-2,836,787	
5) DEM* + ES + OCC - age - age ²	-585,488	306,275	-2,869,125	
6) DEM* + ES + OCC - family status	-587,300	306,285	-2,865,634	
7) DEM*	-632,751	306,400	-2,776,249	
8) DEM* + FH	-604,612	306,389	-2,832,381	
9) DEM* + FH + SES	-602,712	306,388	-2,836,167	
Model contrasts				
Contribution of demographic variables				
Education model 2 vs model 1	6,246	1		
Race/ethnicity model 3 vs model 1	1,256	4		
Sex (by family status) model 4 vs model 1	34,053	9		
Age model 5 vs model 1	1,623	2		
Family status (by sex) model 6 vs model 1	5,246	12		
Site of production model 7 vs model 1	96,148	127		
Cost of aggregating occupations				
Total heterogeneity model 7 vs model 1	96,148	127		100 0
FH-based heterogeneity model 8 vs model 7	56,277	11		58 5
Within-FH vertical heterogeneity model 9 vs model 8	3,800	1		4 0
Within-FH horizontal heterogeneity model 1 vs model 9	36,071	115		37 5

NOTE — $N = 306,420$. The fit statistic is the log likelihood (models) or likelihood ratio test statistic (model contrasts). The dependent variable is coded unity if the respondent usually works at least 49 hours per week and zero otherwise. DEM* includes years of education, race (non-Hispanic [NH] white, NH African-American, NH Asian American, NH Native American, and Hispanic), sex, age and age squared, spouse present, age of youngest child (no child, 0–2, 3–5, 6–13, 14–17), and the interaction of the family status variables with sex. OCC, SES, FH, and ES are defined as in table 4.

scheme accounts for 58.5% of the total association at the site of production, while the remaining 41.5% is attributable to within-class heterogeneity, of which a mere 4.0% is credited to SES. The within-class effects account for a smaller share of the association than in the prior analysis, but BIC nonetheless now prefers the model that fits detailed occupation effects.³²

The case for disaggregate analysis is strengthened by examining the coefficients themselves. In figure 6, we have graphed the additive coefficients for selected covariates of overwork, thus facilitating a comparison of effects across variables. We find that intraclass differences in working practices dwarf differences between categories of the demographic variables. Again, such occupational effects emerge not only in the professions, but also within the managerial, clerical, craft, operative, and service classes. For example, restaurant managers are four times more likely than government managers and officials to work long hours, even after controlling for employment status. This disparity is likely driven less by restaurant managers' preference for long hours than by differences in work conditions. That is, restaurant managers are often required to be available during the full range of hours when customers want service, whereas government officials are rarely so obligated. The big class of craft workers is also heterogeneous, for example, automobile mechanics are three times more likely to work long hours than printers, a disparity no doubt attributable to the success of printers in gaining union contracts that place explicit restrictions on the amount of overtime and that reduce the need for overtime by protecting superfluous positions in the face of declining demand. These results suggest, then, that conventional big-class models fail in the analysis of overwork because they do not operate at the level at which workplace practices, such as hours worked, are institutionalized.

DISCUSSION

The class analytic tradition has come under attack from postmodernists, anti-Marxists, and other commentators who argue that social class is an antiquated concept of little use in understanding modern or postmodern inequality (e.g., Pakulski and Waters 1996, Kingston 2000, Clark and Lipset 1991, 2001, Pahl 1989). In large part, the retreat from class analysis should be blamed on class analysts themselves, because they continue to resort to old class categories that are no longer deeply institutionalized in the labor market, if ever they were. The main empirical cost of using

³² If we instead specify the dependent variable as the logit of full-time work status or as a continuous measure of work hours, conventional significance tests and BIC still prefer the detailed occupation model.




FIG. 6 —Estimated effects of demographic variables and occupation (by FH class) on log odds of working 49 hours or more per week. Data are from the 1999–2002 ORG files of the CPS ($N = 306,420$). Estimated coefficients, normalized to sum to zero, are from model 1 in table 5. The coefficient of sex pertains to childless adults. Values shown are class-specific means.

such categories is that they are poorly correlated with the life conditions that they are supposed to represent and the individual-level behaviors that they are supposed to explain. This empirical weakness of big classes (e.g., Kingston 2000) has unfortunately led to strong and overstated claims about the declining importance of the site of production itself (esp. Hall 2001). That is, postmodernists and other critics of class analysis have ignored the possibility that the site of production is well organized at the local level and that conventional class analysts, by virtue of their obsession with big-class formulations, have simply failed to capture this local structure.

Why has so much local structure developed in advanced industrial societies?³³ Up to this point, we have merely argued that institutionalized groupings are generated mainly at the local level, and that these local groupings should be exploited when constructing class categories. We have not, however, discussed *why* structure tends to emerge and become institutionalized at the local level. As we see it, the usual Smithian ([1776] 1991) account is relevant, because it points to the gross inefficiencies that would obtain if firms in large-scale societies relied on big-class generalists to staff positions. We doubt, for example, that a Silicon Valley computer firm could survive by hiring "service class" generalists who were at once responsible for computer programming, accounting, lawyering, marketing, and all the other tasks that the EG service class now encompasses. To be sure, standard stories about postoccupationalization (e.g., Casey 1995) suggest that there are limits to the returns to specialization, but even the most radical postoccupationalists would recognize that the division of labor implied by big-class categories is far too gross to be efficient in the modern context.

Although Smith (1991) argues at length about the efficiency of the division of labor, he does not speak to why a particular division of labor comes to be institutionalized in the form of occupations. The division of labor could well take on a purely idiosyncratic form in which each firm devises from scratch its own system of job categories and then relies on in-house training in staffing them. However, rather than resorting to such in-house solutions, most firms fall back on the prepackaged solutions that the occupational division of labor represents, presumably because (a) it would be costly to reinvent the division of labor, (b) these prepackaged solutions allow firms to outsource occupation-specific training to vocational and professional schools and hence capitalize on the returns to scale within the training production function, and (c) such solutions protect firms from the risk involved in providing lengthy firm-specific training to employees who could subsequently exit the firm. From the perspective

³³ We thank Miller McPherson for sparking our interest in this question.

of workers, this solution also has its advantages, most obviously that of providing them with marketable general human capital as well as the organizational means (e.g., professional associations) for capturing rent through social closure (e.g., Sørensen 2000, Weeden 2002). Granted, a range of institutional solutions to these organizational problems is available, with some societies (e.g., Japan) opting for well-developed internal labor markets that allow them to reduce, if only to some extent, their reliance on occupational training. Although some variability in the extent of occupationalization is clearly possible, all modern labor markets draw heavily on prepackaged occupational solutions (see Brinton in press).

It does not follow that the division of labor realized in contemporary labor markets is by any means optimal. The combined effects of inertia and partisan interoccupational struggle result in suboptimal solutions that persist by virtue of path dependency (e.g., Abbott 1988). The current division of labor among, for example, opticians, optometrists, and ophthalmologists reflects the strategic decisions that each occupation has made in competing for particular tasks, the power that they can bring to bear on organizations (e.g., licensing boards) that legitimate and support particular divisions of labor, and a myriad of other historically contingent circumstances. If an efficiency account cannot predict the particular division of labor that obtains, it does at least tell us that a far more specialized division of labor than that implied by conventional big-class schemes will emerge. In this sense, the blunt instrument of efficiency only selects out grossly suboptimal solutions, such as those embodied in conventional big-class schemes.

Why, then, have generations of class analysts aggregated deeply institutionalized local categories into big classes? It is not merely that Marx formulated his class model at a time when the scale of production was far smaller and hence the division of labor was less developed. More important, the main objective of Marxian class analysis has long been to make inferences about the fundamental interests of workers (and hence the likelihood of collective action), and such interests were presumed to be similar among all workers regardless of their occupation. As noted in the introduction, these models of macrolevel class action are now less fashionable, and class analysts have accordingly become less interested in identifying fundamental interests and more interested in explaining "surface-level" behaviors and attitudes (Holton and Turner 1989). This recasting of class analysis, which has occurred gradually and without much fanfare, has so far rested on the assumption that the aggregate class models devised for old macrolevel analysis can also serve well the new microlevel agenda. We have argued, to the contrary, that aggregate class models fall short for this new agenda because they are largely nominal and hence must rest on weak rational choice mechanisms for their ex-

planatory power If class analysts are serious about developing class-based accounts of individual-level outcomes, they would be well advised to formulate new class categories that meet the demands of microlevel analysis

Our results for U S data are consistent with this line of argument We find, for example, that conventional aggregate models mask approximately half of the total association at the site of production, while gradational models perform even worse As table 2 shows, the various aggregate and gradational approaches differ only modestly in the amount of structure they capture, meaning that the crucial decision is not *which* aggregate class map or vertical scale to adopt, but the logically prior one of *whether* to aggregate or scale occupations at all This conclusion holds for the wide range of criterion variables in terms of which big classes have historically been defined or justified Indeed, our results even threaten neo-Weberian versions of big-class analysis, given that conventional big classes aggregate occupations that differ substantially in their life chances (see table 3)

We have also examined the viability of big-class formulations in the context of multivariate explanatory models In our analysis of political beliefs, we found that detailed occupations account for over 80% of the association at the site of production, even when socioeconomic scales are allowed to absorb residual vertical heterogeneity within big classes Although big classes perform somewhat better in our multivariate models of overwork, they still conceal about 40% of the variability in this dependent variable If social classes are indeed the "crack troops in sociologists' war on unexplained variance" (DiMaggio 2001, p 542), such sizable losses in explanatory power should give pause

The skeptic might well argue that our microclass models must necessarily perform well because they expend so many degrees of freedom This is not a defensible position For almost all outcomes, the test statistics for our microclass models are reduced by an amount that is far in excess of what would be expected given the degrees of freedom expended, and our parametric measures further indicate that there is as much association within big classes as between them The latter result implies that, insofar as the amount of between-class association is regarded as large enough to justify big-class analysis, then so too the residual within-class association must be regarded as large enough to justify occupational analysis In short, there is no warrant for ending analysis at the big-class level, because just as much structure is revealed by continuing on and analyzing within-class variability

Why are microclass categories so powerful? Unlike big classes, microclasses are institutionalized through various closure-generating mechanisms (e g , associations), and this social clothing worn by functionally

similar jobs gives them much explanatory power (even though they cannot capture simple hierarchical effects to the extent that big-class categories can) There are four mechanisms, in particular, through which institutionalized categories come to be filled with workers who are similar to one another (see table 1) First, many occupations have preexisting stereotypes (about the skills, proclivities, and personalities of incumbents) that attract workers who find those stereotypes appealing and repel those who do not, thereby converting the stereotypes into self-fulfilling prophecies (i.e., self-selection) Second, such recruits are often subjected to explicit training in the form of vocational programs, apprenticeships, or graduate or professional school, all of which generate occupation-specific homogeneity in behaviors and worldviews (i.e., training) Third, social interaction occurs disproportionately within occupational boundaries even after the formal training period is completed, thus preserving and reinforcing occupation-specific lifestyles and worldviews (i.e., interactional closure) Fourth, because employers from diverse firms and industries construct jobs in accord with the same occupational templates, there is much within-occupation consistency in working conditions (i.e., institutionalization of conditions) These four processes combine to convert technical categories into socially meaningful ones and to generate closed groupings at the occupation level

In some cases, such closure-generating processes also operate at the big-class level, but typically in weakened form For example, postsecondary schools provide generalized socialization for members of a broadly defined EG “service class,” generating some cultural homogeneity at the big-class level through training and ongoing interactional closure Consistent with this interpretation, we found evidence of considerable big-class homogeneity in those outcomes (e.g., attitudes toward racial intermarriage) that reflect the liberalizing and tolerance-inducing effects of postsecondary schooling (see figures 1 and 2) Although there is, then, some opportunity for generalized socialization at the big-class level, scholars more often argue that a rational action mechanism generates big-class effects To be sure, a rational action mechanism also operates for institutionalized groupings, but it is supplemented by a package of additional sociological forces (i.e., self-selection, training, interactional closure, institutionalization of conditions) that generate additional explanatory power

The preceding discussion makes the case that scholars have overinvested in the search for aggregate classes and underinvested in the study of more deeply institutionalized groupings at the disaggregate level The critic might well counter, however, that the study of local organization is perfectly suitable for scholars of occupations and professions, but is hardly the heady stuff appropriate for class analysis proper (see Goldthorpe 2002, Kingston 2000) This reaction, while understandable, fails to appreciate

the classlike behavior that emerges at the local level. We have argued elsewhere (e.g., Grusky and Weeden 2001, 2002) that occupations act collectively on behalf of their members, extract rent and exploit non-members, and otherwise behave precisely as class theorists have long thought aggregate classes should. Although class analysts are free to claim that such processes are of interest only when revealed at aggregate levels, this reaction closes off an important route for revitalizing class analysis and protecting it from those who exploit the characteristic weakness of big classes to advance (misleadingly) broader claims about the irrelevance of the site of production. If class analysts can move beyond their obsession with big groupings and own up to the explanatory power of smaller classlike groupings, the microlevel business of class analysis can be addressed in much more persuasive ways.

We appreciate that our analyses are merely a first step in building a new microlevel class analysis that capitalizes on these homogeneity-inducing mechanisms. For most items, we now know that conventional aggregate schemes fail to capture much of the structure at the site of production, but we have not established that our own disaggregate scheme dominates other possible class schemes that are either more or less disaggregate. We are referring, for example, to (a) hybrid schemes that fit big classes in some regions of the division of labor and detailed occupations in others, (b) occupational scaling schemes that convert occupations into abstract variables, and (c) suboccupational scaling schemes that convert jobs into abstract variables. The first two alternatives presume that our microclass scheme is too disaggregate and that a simpler specification should be sought, whereas the third alternative presumes that our scheme is too aggregate and that more fine-grained schemes should be pursued. We argue below that some of these alternatives do not have much empirical support, while others are plausible and should be explored further.

We begin by asking whether institutionalized occupational categories are as widespread as our microclass model assumes. For reasons of parsimony, it might make sense to search for a middle-ground model that disaggregates those big classes in which closure has flourished at the detailed occupational level, but retains big classes whenever such occupationalization has been suppressed. In a follow-up paper (Weeden and Grusky in press), we have estimated a hybrid model that allows for occupationalization in the professional, craft, and service sectors but retains big classes elsewhere in the division of labor, thereby taking seriously the long-standing claim that occupationalization has proceeded unevenly (e.g., Wilemsky 1966). We find that this hybrid model fits poorly because there is substantial microclass variability in all big classes, even those in which occupationalization presumably has been suppressed. Evidently, occupationalization has diffused well beyond the boundaries of the professional

and craft classes, thus undermining the rationale for a model that selectively allows for big classes in some regions but not others (see Weeden and Grusky [in press] for details)

Can a more parsimonious specification be achieved by modeling this intraclass heterogeneity as a function of occupation-level variables (e.g., authority, prestige, SES)? The resulting “scaling model” has only rarely been applied in the context of big-class mappings, presumably because they contain too few categories to adjudicate between the many competing scales of interest. Scaling is, however, tractable in a microclass context in which many more degrees of freedom are available (see Hout 1984, 1988, Hout and Jackson 1986). The question that then arises is whether such a scaling exercise is likely to pay off in this data-rich context.

The answer to this question depends on the purpose of the research. For analysts who wish merely to apply a “control” for social class, it would be superfluous, for example, to scale occupations. After all, if a scaled version of the class mapping cannot fully capture the structure at the site of production, then the analyst who nonetheless uses the scale is needlessly risking omitted variable bias. In this research context, the main objective should be to ensure that the coefficients of interest are unbiased, which requires class effects to be represented in their entirety.

The role for scaling is also circumscribed in analyses that assess the overall strength of the class effect rather than its particular pattern across the categories of the class variable. We care about the overall strength of class effects when we ask, for example, how deeply the “class principle” has been institutionalized in different time periods, countries, or social groupings (e.g., races, ethnic groups). The scholar addressing such descriptive questions is obligated to apply a class map that fully captures the association at the site of production and is therefore sensitive to all forms of change or variability in the global class effect. Given this obligation, the secondary step of scaling the underlying class categories is not only superfluous, but also counterproductive if it conceals some of this structure. We might add that all of the scales considered here (e.g., SES, prestige, cultural capital) are counterproductive in this sense.

A scaling exercise is more useful, however, when class analysts entertain hypotheses about the *pattern* of class effects, not just their overall strength. It is often hypothesized, for example, that incumbents of higher social classes are more likely to read newspapers, participate in “high culture,” vote for conservative candidates, or join churches and other voluntary associations. These types of hypotheses can be addressed by scaling classes in terms of SES (or some other gradational index) and assessing whether the socioeconomic effect is in the predicted direction. Even in this context, the analyst will want to begin with a model that fits the full complement of occupation effects, with the question then being whether the variability

revealed in this full model follows a socioeconomic gradient. As we have emphasized, it is useful to formalize this test by explicitly scaling the class categories (rather than merely inspecting the unconstrained pattern of class differences), a constraint that becomes viable only when there are enough class categories to test it reliably. We hope, then, that our new class map will reinvigorate the scaling tradition by making it possible to distinguish successfully between competing hypotheses about the underlying pattern of class effects.

It follows that class analysis should rest on two forms of class maps, a microclass base that is used for purging class effects or measuring their overall strength, and various scalings of that base that are used to test hypotheses about the underlying pattern of the occupational parameters. If we part ways with advocates of scaling, it is only because they presume that a categorical map has *no* role in class analysis and can be replaced for all research purposes with a parsimonious scaling. As we have argued, a scale could legitimately serve all research purposes only if it captured all available structure at the site of production, a daunting requirement in light of our own negative results on the explanatory power of SES, prestige, and other scales (see fig. 4). Although it is worth searching for new variables that perform better, it is unrealistic to expect that a complete account will be developed in the near term.

We have so far addressed criticisms of our microclass approach that involve simplifying it, either by restoring big classes in selected regions of the class structure or by converting occupations into underlying “dimensions” that explain interclass variability. We next consider the critique that our model is *overly* aggregate because it ignores suboccupational forms of organization (e.g., Kohn 2001, Halaby and Weakliem 1993). Under this formulation, occupations are dismissed as largely arbitrary constructions that mask real differences in job-level work conditions, and jobs instead become the base units of analysis. Given the intractably large number of jobs, some form of simplification is typically necessary. However, instead of aggregating up to socially constructed occupational boundaries, job-level analysts prefer to identify the technical conditions of work that distinguish jobs (e.g., autonomy, authority, complexity) and presumably affect behavior and attitudes (Shu et al. 1996, Kohn and Schooler 1983, Mortimer and Lorence 1979).

This approach has clearly yielded important results. At the same time, because jobs that share the same working conditions are not typically organized into meaningful groups, the resulting class model cannot capture the social effects of selection, shared training, and interactional closure. We have argued at length that the explanatory losses involved in foregoing these social effects may be substantial. In ignoring institutionalized categories, the advocates of job-level scaling presume, as do many

class analysts, that sociologists should be oriented toward discerning those deeper analytic forces that are concealed from ordinary view. This anti-institutional bias can and should be subjected to empirical test. If our skepticism is on the mark, the returns to disaggregating big classes into occupations should be substantial, whereas the returns to disaggregation beyond the occupational level should quickly diminish. This paper confirms the first hypothesis, but the second has yet to be tested.

The typical analyst of jobs might also argue that the usual job-level measures of working conditions can help explain interoccupation variability in attitudes, political behavior, and other individual-level outcomes. In this case, our critic is not necessarily suggesting that class analysts should disaggregate beyond the occupational level, just that differences across occupations in outcomes might be explained in terms of job-level variables. We have acknowledged in table 1 that some interoccupational variability in outcomes is generated by job-level variables that affect interest formation and learning generalization. However, because these are merely two of many mechanisms that generate interoccupational heterogeneity, we doubt that job-level variables will offer a complete account.

This claim is best illustrated by example. If we were asked to account for the humanist, antimaterialist, and left-leaning habitus of sociologists, we would emphasize (a) the left-leaning reputation of sociology and the consequent self-selection of left-leaning recruits, (b) the inculcation of a liberal worldview through lengthy professional training and socialization, and (c) the reinforcing effects of interaction with like-minded colleagues. We would be hard-pressed, by contrast, to explain this complex of attitudes and behaviors in terms of the working conditions under which sociologists labor, given that such conditions (e.g., high autonomy, low authority, high complexity) are much the same as those of other academics.³⁴ This homogeneity in working conditions is problematic for conventional class analysis because many professors, such as economists, are strikingly more conservative than sociologists in their politics and lifestyles. It would be difficult to account for the relative conservatism of economists without recognizing that they are self-selected for conservatism, that their graduate training in neoclassical approaches reinforces this preexisting affinity for conservatism, and that their ongoing inter-

³⁴ We have argued in this study that occupations are breeding grounds of difference, but we have not tried to explain the content of these differences. Why, for example, did economics rather than sociology develop a conservative worldview? If pressed, we would emphasize that the two disciplines have different orientations to the centers of economic and political power. That is, sociologists work principally in academia and are isolated from centers of power (in business and politics), whereas economists are deeply entrenched in the business and political worlds and hence are less likely to develop the oppositional resistance of those, like sociologists, who are powerless.

action with fellow economists discourages alternative views. In this case, abstract working conditions (e.g., high autonomy, low authority, high complexity) provide little explanatory power, and intra-academy differences in attitudes and lifestyles must instead be explained through the proximate mechanisms of self-selection, training, and interactional closure.

We are left with the conclusion that a microclass mapping should be employed for most of the sociological research that requires a class indicator. Although our critics (e.g., Portes 2000, Goldthorpe 2002, Therborn 2002) regard this as a radical prescription, it bears emphasizing that our class scheme incorporates all the big-class structure found in conventional maps, merely supplementing it with additional microclass structure. In fact, big-class purists will appreciate that total class effects can easily be decomposed into components generated within and between big classes, thus distinguishing big-class effects from “residual” microclass effects (see figs. 5 and 6). Using this two-level parameterization, one might ask whether class effects are weakening over time at the big-class or microclass level (Weeden and Grusky 2005), whether political behavior is governed principally at the big-class or microclass level (e.g., Weeden 2005), whether a big-class representation of mobility processes conceals rigidities generated by microclass closure (e.g., occupation-specific credentialing or training), or whether the burgeoning literature on health disparities understates the extent of class-based inequalities by focusing exclusively on big-class or gradational differences. We hope, then, that our approach can be judged on the wide range of research questions that it opens up rather than the relatively few questions that, at this early point, it resolves.

APPENDIX A
Details and Descriptions

TABLE A1
VARIABLE MNEMONICS, SOURCES, DESCRIPTION, AND RESPONSE CATEGORIES, BY DOMAIN

Mnemonic	Source	Description and Response Categories (in Parentheses)
Life chances		
educ	CPS	Highest grade completed (less than high school, high school, some college, college, some graduate school)
ftpt	CPS	Full-time/part-time status (usually works full time, usually works part time)

TABLE A1 (Continued)

Mnemonic	Source	Description and Response Categories (in Parentheses)
ftincome	CPS	Income 1 Wage, self-employment, and farm income of currently working respondents who usually work 35+ hours per week (year-specific quintiles)
income	CPS	Income 2 Wage, self-employment, and farm income of currently working respondents (year-specific quintiles)
finrela	GSS	Subjective position Income compared with American families in general (below average, average, above average)
tenure	CPS	Wealth Ownership of living quarters (rents, owns)
Lifestyles		
Consumption practices		
news	GSS	Intellectual pursuits 1 "How often do you read the newspaper?" (less than once a week or never, once a week, a few times per week, daily)
tvhours	GSS	Intellectual pursuits 2 "On the average day, about how many hours do you personally watch television?" (five or more, 3-4, 1-2, 0)
memlit	GSS	Intellectual pursuits 3 "Are you a member of literary, art, discussion, or study groups?" (no, yes)
satfam	GSS	Family orientation 1 "How much satisfaction do you get from your family life?" (little or none, quite a bit, a great deal, or a very great deal)
socrel	GSS	Family orientation 2 "How often do you spend a social evening with relatives?" (at least once a week, once to "several" times a month, fewer)
socommun	GSS	Friendship orientation 1 "How often do you spend a social evening with someone who lives in your neighborhood?" (at least once a week, once to "several" times a month, once or twice a year, never)
socfrend	GSS	Friendship orientation 2 "How often do you spend a social evening with friends who live outside the neighborhood?" (at least once a week, once to "several" times a month, fewer)
memserv	GSS	Service 1 "Are you a member of service clubs?" (no, yes)
memfrat	GSS	Service 2 "Are you a member of [nonscholastic] fraternal groups?" (no, yes)
memsport	GSS	Sports and hobbies 1 "Are you a member of sports groups?" (no, yes)
memhobby	GSS	Sports and hobbies 2 "Are you a member of hobby or garden clubs?" (no, yes)

TABLE A1 (Continued)

Mnemonic	Source	Description and Response Categories (in Parentheses)
memnum	GSS	Communitarianism No of group or club memberships (0, 1, 2, 3 or more)
satjob	GSS	Work orientation 1 "On the whole, how satisfied are you with the work you do? (very, moderately, dissatisfied)
richwork	GSS	Work orientation 2 "If you were to get enough money to live as comfortably as you would like for the rest of your life, would you continue working or stop working?" (stop, continue) Employed respondents only
hours	CPS	Work orientation 3 Hours worked last week (1–34, 35–40, 41–60, 61 or more) Working respondents only
Institutional participation		
marstat	CPS	Marriage 1 Current marital status (never married, separated, divorced, widowed, married)
divorce	GSS	Marriage 2 "Have you ever been divorced or legally separated?" (yes, no) Ever-married respondents only
child	GSS	Children "How many children have you ever had?" (4+, 3, 2, 1, 0)
relig	GSS	Religion 1 "What is your religious preference?" (Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, none, other)
attend	GSS	Religion 2 "How often do you attend religious services?" (never, 1–3 per year, 1–3 per month, 1+ per week)
union	CPS	Union membership "On this job, are you [is household member] a member of a labor union or of an employee association similar to a union?" (yes, no) Wage and salary workers in 1983–2002
vet	CPS	Veteran status (yes, no) Men only
Class-based sentiments		
Political attitudes and behaviors		
partyid	GSS	Party identification "Do you usually think of yourself as a " (strong Democrat, Democrat, independent, Republican, strong Republican)
polviews	GSS	Political ideology 1 "Where would you place yourself on a scale?" (extremely conservative, slightly conservative, moderate, slightly liberal, extremely liberal)

TABLE A1 (Continued)

Mnemonic	Source	Description and Response Categories (in Parentheses)
helpnot	GSS	Political ideology 2 "Assess the federal government's intervention into our country's problems" (government doing too much, government should do more, both)
mempolit	GSS	Collective action "Are you a member of political clubs?" (no, yes)
Social attitudes and dispositions		
spkath	GSS	Tolerance 1 "Should [an atheist] be allowed to make a speech in your community?" (no, yes)
spkcom	GSS	Tolerance 2 "Should [an admitted Communist] be allowed to make a speech in your community?" (no, yes)
homosex	GSS	Tolerance 3 "Are sexual relations between two adults of the same sex wrong?" (always, sometimes, not at all)
pornlaw	GSS	Tolerance 4 "Which of these statements comes closest to your feelings about pornography laws?" (should be laws against the distribution whatever the age, should be laws against the distribution to persons under 18, should be no laws forbidding distribution)
cappun	GSS	Crime 1 "Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?" (favor, oppose)
courts	GSS	Crime 2 "Do you think the courts in this area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals?" (too harshly, not harshly enough, about right)
prayer	GSS	Church and state separation "The court has ruled that governments may not require the reading of the Bible in public schools" (disapprove, approve)
racmar	GSS	Racial attitudes 1 "Do you think there should be laws against marriages between blacks and whites?" (yes, no) Nonblacks only
racopen	GSS	Racial attitudes 2 "Which law would you vote for?" (a) a homeowner can decide to whom to sell his house, (b) a homeowner cannot refuse to sell his house to a black (law a, law b) Nonblacks only
helpblk	GSS	Racial attitudes 3 "Do you think the government is responsible for redressing past discrimination?" (government should not give special treatment to blacks, government is obligated to help blacks, both)

TABLE A1 (Continued)

Mnemonic	Source	Description and Response Categories (in Parentheses)
fework	GSS	Gender attitudes 1 “Do you approve or disapprove of a married woman earning money in business or industry if she has a husband capable of supporting her?” (disapprove, approve)
fepol	GSS	Gender attitudes 2 “Most men are better suited emotionally for politics than are most women” (agree, disagree)
abnomore	GSS	Abortion attitudes 1 “[Should abortion be legal if a woman] is married and does not want any more children?” (no, yes)
abrape	GSS	Abortion attitudes 2 “[Should abortion be legal if a woman] became pregnant as a result of rape?” (no, yes)
anomia	GSS	Anomia “It’s hardly fair to bring a child into this world with the way things look for the future” (agree, disagree)
chldidel	GSS	Family attitudes “What do you think is the ideal number of children for a family to have?” (as many as they want, 4+, 3, 2 or fewer)
obey	GSS	Values for children 1 “If you had to choose, which thing would you pick as the most important for a child to learn to prepare him or her for life? (1) To obey” (most important, 2nd or 3rd, 4th or 5th)
thnkself	GSS	Values for children 2 “To think for himself or herself” (most important, 2nd or 3rd, 4th or 5th)
helpothr	GSS	Values for children 3 “To help others” (most important, 2nd or 3rd, 4th or 5th)
class	GSS	Subjective identification “What is your social class?” (lower or working, middle, upper)
Demographic composition		
race	CPS	Race (black, white, other)
ethnic	GSS	Ethnicity Country or part of the world from which respondent’s ancestors came (Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, Northern Europe, other)
spneth	CPS	Spanish ethnicity (Mexican/Chicano[a], Puerto Rican, Cuban, other Spanish, not Spanish)

NOTE —Data are from 1972–2002 surveys, although not all questions were asked in all years (see Davis, Smith, and Marsden 2004, BLS 2004)

TABLE A2
EG AND FH CLASS CODES BY OCCUPATION AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS

OCCUPATION	EG CLASS		FH CLASS	
	Employed	Self-Employed	Employed	Self-Employed
101 architects	1	1	2	1
102 engineers	1	1	2	1
103 natural scientists	1	1	2	1
104 engineering and science technicians	1	1	2	1
105 physicians and dentists	1	1	2	1
106 other health professionals	1	1	2	1
107 nurses and dental hygienists	1	1	2	1
108 therapists	1	1	2	1
109 health technicians	1	1	2	1
110 social scientists	1	1	2	1
111 religious workers	1	1	2	1
112 social workers	1	1	2	1
113 professors and instructors	1	1	2	1
114 primary, secondary teachers	1	1	2	1
115 jurists	1	1	2	1
116 librarians and curators	1	1	2	1
117 creative artists	1	1	2	1
118 authors and journalists	1	1	2	1
119 designers and decorators	1	1	2	1
120 accountants	1	1	2	1
121 computer specialists	1	1	2	1
122 personnel workers	1	1	2	1
123 public relations professionals	1	1	2	1
124 applied research workers	1	1	2	1
125 professionals, n e c	1	1	2	1
201 government officials	1	1	3	4
202 financial managers	1	1	3	4
203 buyers	1	3	3	4
204 sales managers	1	3	3	4
205 office managers, n e c	1	3	3	4
206 building managers	1	3	3	4
207 restaurant managers	1	3	3	4
208 health administrators	1	3	3	4
209 school administrators	1	1	3	4
210 managers, n e c	1	3	3	4
301 insurance agents	1	3	5	5
302 real estate agents	1	3	5	5
303 agents, n e c	1	3	5	5
304 salespersons	2	3	5	5
401 clerical supervisors	1	3	6	6
402 estimators and investigators	2	3	6	6
403 insurance adjusters	1	1	6	6

TABLE A2 (Continued)

OCCUPATION	EG CLASS		FH CLASS	
	Employed	Self-Employed	Employed	Self-Employed
404 cashiers	2	3	6	6
405 bank tellers	2	3	6	6
406 counter clerks, except food	2	3	6	6
407 secretaries	2	3	6	6
408 accounting clerks	2	3	6	6
409 office machine operators	2	3	6	6
410 tabulation clerks	2	3	6	6
411 postal clerks	2	2	6	6
412 mail carriers	6	6	6	6
413 mail distribution clerks	6	3	6	6
414 telephone operators	2	3	6	6
415 expeditors	2	3	6	6
416 stock clerks and storekeepers	6	3	6	6
417 warehouse clerks	2	3	6	6
418 teacher aides	2	3	6	6
419 clerks, n e c	2	3	6	6
501 supervisors of manual labor	5	3	7	7
502 inspectors	5	3	7	7
503 metal processors	5	3	7	7
504 machinists	5	3	7	7
505 structural metal workers	5	3	7	7
506 stationary engine operators	5	3	7	7
507 heavy machinery operators	5	3	7	7
508 power and phone line workers	5	3	7	7
509 railroad conductors and engineers	5	5	7	7
510 printers	5	3	7	7
511 tailors	5	3	7	7
512 bakers	5	3	7	7
513 heating and cooling mechanics	5	3	7	7
514 aircraft mechanics	5	3	7	7
515 automobile mechanics	5	3	7	7
516 small electronics mechanics	5	3	7	7
517 heavy equipment mechanics	5	3	7	7
518 mechanics, n e c	5	3	7	7
519 electricians	5	3	7	7
520 brickmasons	5	3	7	7
521 carpenters	5	3	7	7
522 painters	5	3	7	7
523 plumbers	5	3	7	7
524 construction crafts, n e c	5	3	7	7
525 craft workers, n e c	5	3	7	7
601 graders and sorters	6	3	8	8
602 launderers	6	3	8	8
603 sewers	6	3	8	8
604 textile operatives	6	3	8	8
605 precision machine operatives	6	3	8	8

TABLE A2 (Continued)

OCCUPATION	EG CLASS		FH CLASS	
	Employed	Self-Employed	Employed	Self-Employed
606 finishing machine operatives	5	3	8	8
607 assemblers	6	3	8	8
608 welders	5	3	8	8
609 meat cutters	6	3	8	8
610 packagers	6	3	8	8
611 machine operatives, n e c	6	3	8	8
612 miners	6	3	8	8
613 lumbermen and sawyers	6	3	8	8
614 forklift operatives	6	3	8	8
615 home delivery workers	6	3	8	8
616 mass transit drivers	6	3	8	8
617 taxicab drivers and chauffeurs	6	3	8	8
618 truck drivers	6	3	8	8
619 garage workers	6	3	8	8
620 operatives, n e c	6	3	8	8
701 freight handlers	6	3	10	10
702 retail stock handlers	6	3	10	10
703 construction laborers	6	3	10	10
704 gardeners	6	3	10	10
705 laborers, n e c	6	3	10	10
801 cleaners	6	3	9	9
802 bartenders	2	3	9	9
803 waitstaff	2	3	9	9
804 cooks	2	3	9	9
805 kitchen helpers	6	3	9	9
806 practical nurses	2	3	9	9
807 health aides	2	3	9	9
808 child care workers	2	3	9	9
809 hair stylists	2	3	9	9
810 attendants, n e c	6	3	9	9
811 law enforcement officers	1	3	9	9
812 guards	2	3	9	9
813 firefighters	5	5	9	9
814 housekeepers, ex private	2	3	9	9
815 food counter workers	2	3	9	9
816 private household workers	6	3	9	9
901 farmers	4	4	11	11
902 farm laborers	7	4	12	12

NOTE — The EG classes are as follows 1 = service class, 2 = routine nonmanual workers, 3 = petty bourgeoisie, 4 = farmers, 5 = skilled workers and foremen, 6 = nonskilled workers, 7 = employed farm laborers. The FH classes are as follows 1 = self-employed professionals, 2 = employed professionals, 3 = employed managers, 4 = self-employed managers, 5 = sales workers, 6 = clerical workers, 7 = craft workers, 8 = operatives, 9 = service workers, 10 = laborers, 11 = farmers, 12 = farm laborers.

APPENDIX B

Fit Statistics and Measures of Association

TABLE B1
FIT STATISTICS AND MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION FROM EG MODELS APPLIED TO 55 OUTCOME TABLES

DECOMPOSITION OF TOTAL ASSOCIATION																
DOMAIN AND VARIABLE	N, no PB	Total Association (eq [4])		Within-EG Association (eq [6])			N, PB	Total Associa- tion in PB		Between- and Within-Class Structuration						
		L ²	df	L ²	df	% w/in EG		L ²	df	A _B	A _W	A _R	A _B [*]	A _B [*]	A _W	
													no PB	w/PB	in PB	
Life chances																
educ	813,911	498,625 81	500	161,322 42	480	32 35	53,054	7,404 70	360	21 059	6 216	1 668	14 827	11 328	3 533	
ftpt	741,400	43,709 27	125	36,012 50	120	82 39	48,368	2,011 87	90	1 852	2 406	0 702	1 709	1 752	2 039	
funcome	655,823	204,070 30	500	78,957 16	480	38 69	39,442	4,120 15	360	6 960	3 730	1 474	6 398	5 092	3 993	
income	813,910	259,324 33	500	107,378 53	480	41 41	53,055	5,172 96	360	6 373	3 863	1 370	5 982	4 749	3 401	
finrela	20,432	3,161 65	250	1,186 39	240	37 52	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 949	1 749	1 194	1 931	1 893	n/a	
tenure	735,685	24,294 91	125	13,761 00	120	56 64	48,038	1,320 88	90	1 865	1 440	1 710	1 878	1 835	1 836	
Lifestyles																
Consumption practices																
news	13,827	830 94	375	540 71	360	65 07	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 688	1 486	1 322	1 660	1 587	n/a	
tvhours	13,317	1,188 40	375	571 11	360	48 06	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 686	1 568	1 162	1 564	1 514	n/a	
memlit	8,961	626 96	125	277 18	120	44 21	n/a	n/a	n/a	2 114	2 431	0 843	2 059	2 012	n/a	
satfam	11,110	470 17	375	441 00	360	93 80	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 170	1 446	0 426	1 223	1 216	n/a	
socrel	12,796	653 05	375	434 50	360	66 53	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 279	1 359	0 803	1 272	1 249	n/a	
socommun	12,775	675 96	375	469 32	360	69 43	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 331	1 501	0 703	1 307	1 279	n/a	
socfrend	12,794	574 23	375	445 00	360	77 50	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 597	1 400	1 390	1 608	1 564	n/a	
memserv	8,963	435 75	125	170 32	120	39 09	n/a	n/a	n/a	3 690	2 397	1 494	3 824	3 670	n/a	
memfrat	8,968	312 82	125	214 71	120	68 64	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 451	2 399	0 426	1 402	1 387	n/a	
memsport	8,976	311 22	125	177 04	120	56 88	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 334	1 711	0 537	1 333	1 314	n/a	
memhobby	8,960	201 69	125	147 80	120	73 28	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 633	2 362	0 570	1 705	1 684	n/a	
memnum	9,049	1,459 93	375	770 50	360	52 78	n/a	n/a	n/a	2 170	1 735	1 406	2 136	1 991	n/a	

satjob	20,324	961 90	250	494 36	240	51 39	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 415	1 394	1 047	1 429	1 440	n/a
richwork	13,157	400 10	125	259 47	120	64 85	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 668	1 648	1 025	1 660	1 589	n/a
hours	741,401	85,443 70	375	53,833 26	360	63 06	48,373	5,552 57	270	2 020	1 949	1 054	1 911	1 892	2 204
Institutional participation															
marstat	813,911	25,120 34	500	15,931 96	480	63 42	53,062	1,447 15	360	1 479	1 347	1 315	1 885	1 675	1 529
divorce	13,418	306 06	125	229 44	120	74 97	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 395	1 640	0 673	1 433	1 425	n/a
childs	21,236	1,406 09	500	863 63	480	61 42	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 683	1 497	1 291	1 671	1 594	n/a
relig	21,243	1,278 44	500	873 32	480	68 31	n/a	n/a	n/a	3 266	2 468	1 310	4 896	5 077	n/a
attend	21,077	1,082 06	375	970 42	360	89 68	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 274	2 008	0 348	1 302	1 283	n/a
union	294,895	35,433 73	125	28,707 09	120	81 02	n/a	n/a	n/a	3 144	2 714	1 147	n/a	n/a	n/a
vet	489,698	11,579 82	125	9,777 99	120	84 44	35,157	477 71	90	1 579	1 567	1 017	1 613	1 567	2 526
Class-based sentiments															
Political attitudes and behaviors															
partyid	20,879	1,233 01	500	839 47	480	68 08	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 580	1 560	1 029	1 586	1 597	n/a
polviews	18,268	1,063 09	500	752 60	480	70 79	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 306	1 336	0 923	1 231	1 213	n/a
helpnot	10,363	579 11	250	361 61	240	62 44	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 579	1 439	1 255	1 571	1 556	n/a
mempolit	8,969	238 34	125	145 28	120	60 95	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 931	2 630	0 680	1 822	1 755	n/a
Social attitudes and dispositions															
spkath	14,062	930 95	125	235 61	120	25 31	n/a	n/a	n/a	2 181	1 559	1 756	2 101	1 985	n/a
spkcom	13,913	1,200 55	125	254 34	120	21 19	n/a	n/a	n/a	2 230	1 527	1 894	2 138	2 019	n/a
homosex	12,705	1,222 29	250	475 88	240	38 93	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 752	1 477	1 439	1 713	1 654	n/a
pornlaw	13,245	441 76	250	382 84	240	86 66	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 244	1 403	0 646	1 194	1 170	n/a
cappun	18,071	477 97	125	410 42	120	85 87	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 269	1 548	0 515	1 252	1 232	n/a
courts	18,734	498 54	250	420 59	240	84 36	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 167	1 353	0 510	1 137	1 124	n/a
prayer	11,108	572 59	125	259 79	120	45 37	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 393	1 504	0 813	1 364	1 331	n/a
racmar	12,644	1,125 13	125	246 20	120	21 88	n/a	n/a	n/a	2 559	1 999	1 357	2 234	2 088	n/a
racopen	9,985	302 50	125	178 72	120	59 08	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 762	1 449	1 529	1 716	1 631	n/a
helpblk	10,790	429 21	250	368 58	240	85 87	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 415	1 443	0 947	1 405	1 366	n/a
fework	11,861	432 43	125	180 18	120	41 67	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 669	1 797	0 874	1 591	1 561	n/a
fepol	11,551	351 86	125	194 71	120	55 34	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 516	1 458	1 103	1 502	1 455	n/a
abnomore	15,647	662 40	125	271 71	120	41 02	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 432	1 420	1 025	1 403	1 384	n/a
abrape	15,643	392 22	125	244 97	120	62 46	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 863	1 775	1 084	1 801	1 728	n/a
anomia	9,280	886 78	125	201 13	120	22 68	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 765	1 467	1 482	1 757	1 687	n/a

chldidel	13,800	598 56	375	422 72	360	70 62	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 580	1 587	0 991	1 510	1 455	n/a
obey	8,335	726 60	250	361 89	240	49 81	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 574	1 586	0 983	1 498	1 450	n/a
thnkself	8,336	597 57	250	345 78	240	57 86	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 359	1 496	0 761	1 339	1 315	n/a
helpothr	8,341	386 73	250	281 71	240	72 84	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 248	1 381	0 688	1 240	1 222	n/a
class	20,559	3,951 38	250	1,102 16	240	27 89	n/a	n/a	n/a	2 189	1 688	1 496	2 051	1 972	n/a
Demographic com- position															
race	813,911	41,327 88	250	22,186 58	240	53 68	53,054	1,992 54	180	2 061	1 408	2 113	2 077	1 979	2 758
ethnic	16,400	1,131 53	375	705 55	360	62 35	n/a	n/a	n/a	1 758	1 439	1 550	1 789	1 702	n/a
spneth	795,104	27,355 21	500	9,397 39	480	34 35	51,631	942 25	360	2 400	1 422	2 489	2 430	2 288	1 759

NOTE — PB=petty bourgeoisie CPS samples are weighted by the year-specific person weight, GSS samples by the black oversample weight Sample sizes also reflect the addition of 0 1 to zero cells See app table A1 for variable definitions and the text for explanation of the models, A_B , A_W , and A_R Values of A_B are not purged of occupational composition effects

TABLE B2
FIT STATISTICS AND MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION FROM FH MODELS APPLIED TO 55 OUTCOME TABLES

		DECOMPOSITION OF TOTAL ASSOCIATION											
		Total Association (eq [3])			Within-FH Association (eq [5])			Hybrid (FH + SES, eq [12])			Between- and Within- Class Structuration		
DOMAIN AND VARIABLE	<i>N</i>	<i>L</i> ²	<i>df</i>	<i>L</i> ¹	<i>df</i>	% residual	<i>L</i> ²	<i>df</i>	% in FH exp by SES	<i>A_B</i>	<i>A_W</i>	<i>A_R</i>	
Life chances													
educ	866,958	506,828 09	500	118,844 09	456	23 45	58,958 13	452	50 39	23 970	5 331	1 898	
ftpt	789,767	47,310 89	125	25,314 31	114	53 51	21,889 18	113	13 53	1 870	2 363	0 728	
ftincome	695,253	218,303 02	500	71,507 29	456	32 76	30,984 90	452	56 67	5 449	3 658	1 307	
income	866,956	275,833 69	500	94,330 53	456	34 20	45,750 12	452	51 50	5 059	3 644	1 254	
finrela	22,608	3,375 39	250	983 10	228	29 13	558 77	226	43 16	2 367	1 667	1 687	
tenture	783,721	25,293 64	125	11,338 04	114	44 83	7,922 81	113	30 12	1 667	1 419	1 460	
Lifestyles													
Consumption practices													
news	15,333	899 79	375	517 17	342	57 48	444 58	339	14 04	1 684	1 448	1 407	
tvhours	14,782	1,249 65	375	531 66	342	42 54	433 81	339	18 40	1 905	1 565	1 439	
memlit	9,927	657 18	125	218 30	114	33 22	211 46	113	3 13	2 751	2 375	1 170	
satfam	12,305	473 61	375	404 63	342	85 44	390 72	339	3 44	1 175	1 373	0 509	
socrel	14,191	652 20	375	416 89	342	63 92	414 33	339	0 61	1 259	1 334	0 799	
socommun	14,168	720 64	375	453 22	342	62 89	402 35	339	11 23	1 370	1 487	0 794	
socfrend	14,189	578 25	375	388 07	342	67 11	382 54	339	1 43	1 489	1 340	1 359	
memserv	9,931	519 22	125	193 01	114	37 17	170 31	113	11 76	3 295	2 270	1 455	
memfrat	9,934	334 31	125	234 74	114	70 21	185 05	113	21 17	1 680	2 386	0 596	
memsport	9,944	321 85	125	152 82	114	47 48	146 15	113	4 36	1 385	1 571	0 720	
memhobby	9,926	199 44	125	129 80	114	65 08	127 07	113	2 10	1 644	2 173	0 640	
memnum	10,032	1,540 26	375	740 36	342	48 07	624 26	339	15 68	2 053	1 723	1 322	
satjob	22,494	1,106 55	250	524 41	228	47 39	503 58	226	3 97	1 571	1 392	1 367	
richwork	14,599	443 45	125	209 37	114	47 21	206 76	113	1 25	1 612	1 573	1 055	
hours	789,768	96,378 91	375	42,095 03	342	43 68	36,029 79	339	14 41	1 936	1 936	1 000	

Institutional participation												
marstat	866,958	27,295 53	500	12,408 02	456	45 46	11,018 48	452	11 20	1 411	1 320	1 241
divorce	15,038	323 54	125	182 67	114	56 46	182 23	113	0 24	1 380	1 571	0 712
childs	23,503	1,484 46	500	786 15	456	52 96	750 69	452	4 51	1 569	1 457	1 195
relig	23,512	1,356 67	500	758 63	456	55 92	697 56	452	8 05	3 299	2 364	1 387
attend	23,319	1,125 50	375	905 28	342	80 43	900 90	339	0 48	1 255	1 953	0 340
union	294,895	35,433 73	125	24,082 71	114	67 97	22,302 68	113	7 39	2 820	2 243	1 283
vet	489,698	11,318 54	125	8,327 15	114	73 57	6,957 86	113	16 44	1 433	1 531	0 845
Class-based sentiments												
Political attitudes and behaviors												
partyd	23,106	1,329 29	500	729 11	456	54 85	708 62	452	2 81	1 709	1 511	1 300
polviews	20,243	1,118 73	500	682 92	456	61 04	670 30	452	1 85	1 350	1 298	1 150
helpnot	11,466	616 96	250	300 92	228	48 78	283 93	226	5 65	1 545	1 382	1 344
mempolit	9,938	254 49	125	135 01	114	53 05	121 55	113	9 97	2 011	2 509	0 760
Social attitudes and dispositions												
spkath	15,569	948 07	125	204 18	114	21 54	128 59	113	37 02	2 146	1 490	1 914
spkcom	15,414	1,237 56	125	223 75	114	18 08	136 39	113	39 05	2 370	1 476	2 215
homosex	14,094	1,228 74	250	435 97	228	35 48	367 87	226	15 62	1 768	1 465	1 493
pornlaw	14,652	452 16	250	378 12	228	83 63	369 39	226	2 31	1 201	1 379	0 569
cappun	20,034	489 78	125	321 58	114	65 66	305 89	113	4 88	1 309	1 476	0 691
courts	20,738	530 89	250	354 84	228	66 84	334 17	226	5 83	1 231	1 326	0 736
prayer	12,297	581 05	125	218 95	114	37 68	181 80	113	16 97	1 485	1 477	1 015
racmar	14,098	1,120 83	125	230 36	114	20 55	177 17	113	23 09	2 621	1 829	1 596
racopen	11,070	333 47	125	189 69	114	56 88	189 11	113	0 30	1 537	1 460	1 136
helpblk	11,932	443 37	250	312 47	228	70 48	309 17	226	1 06	1 344	1 368	0 944
fework	13,151	426 88	125	151 38	114	35 46	137 24	113	9 34	1 777	1 588	1 243
fepol	12,808	358 62	125	207 38	114	57 83	185 65	113	10 48	1 434	1 461	0 952
abnomore	17,319	693 84	125	285 86	114	41 20	233 18	113	18 43	1 546	1 422	1 236
abrape	17,307	395 74	125	260 28	114	65 77	217 86	113	16 30	1 694	1 744	0 947
anomia	10,331	916 88	125	176 13	114	19 21	149 02	113	15 39	1 977	1 416	0 959
chldidel	15,252	610 49	375	422 92	342	69 28	404 71	339	4 30	1 487	1 716	0 734
obey	9,204	733 02	250	323 35	228	44 11	277 43	226	14 20	1 663	1 538	1 181
thnkself	9,204	615 55	250	341 34	228	55 45	297 95	226	12 71	1 461	1 476	0 974
helpothr	9,211	401 57	250	249 90	228	62 23	233 27	226	6 65	1 289	1 347	0 852
class	22,751	4,292 12	250	864 12	228	20 13	520 34	226	39 78	2 877	1 656	2 094

Demographic composition												
race	866,957	43,420 71	250	16,906 27	228	38 94	15,903 99	226	5 93	1 877	1 394	1 895
ethnic	18,164	1,171 59	375	615 00	342	52 49	583 25	339	5 16	1 587	1 430	1 291
spneth	846,717	27,360 58	500	8,494 72	456	31 05	5,435 31	452	36 02	2 054	1 396	2 159

NOTE —CPS samples are weighted by the year-specific person weight and GSS samples by the black oversample weight. Sample sizes also reflect the addition of 0.1 to zero cells. See app. table A1 for variable definitions and the text for explanation of the models, A_B , A_W , and A_R .

TABLE B3
FIT STATISTICS FROM GRADATIONAL MODELS APPLIED TO 55 OUTCOME TABLES

DOMAIN AND VARIABLE	SES (eq [7])			PRESTIGE (eq [7])			CULTURAL CAPITAL (eq [7])			BOURDIEU (eq [8])		
	<i>L</i> ²	<i>df</i>	% residual	<i>L</i> ²	<i>df</i>	% residual	<i>L</i> ¹	<i>df</i>	% residual	<i>L</i> ²	<i>df</i>	% residual
Life chances												
educ	95,502 45	496	18 84	157,310 91	496	31 04	61,615 13	496	12 16	98,779 98	491	19 49
ftpt	40,008 09	124	84 56	37,703 63	124	79 69	42,526 27	124	89 89	35,097 95	123	74 19
funcome	68,437 24	496	31 35	89,034 73	496	40 78	92,634 09	496	42 43	55,046 12	491	25 22
income	95,708 48	496	34 70	114,402 17	496	41 48	125,880 96	496	45 64	76,964 98	491	27 90
finrela	1,004 38	248	29 76	1,387 23	248	41 10	1,255 31	248	37 19	837 06	246	24 80
tenure	14,750 91	24	58 32	14,427 51	124	57 04	16,997 28	124	67 20	13,308 69	123	52 62
Lifestyles												
Consumption practices												
news	593 95	372	66 01	630 55	372	70 08	555 17	372	61 70	526 65	369	58 53
tvhours	537 96	372	43 05	606 59	372	48 54	551 17	372	44 11	527 79	369	42 24
memlit	292 68	124	44 53	327 42	124	49 82	248 62	124	37 83	275 84	123	41 97
satfam	449 87	372	94 99	439 28	372	92 75	452 15	372	95 47	449 71	369	94 95
socrel	494 12	372	75 76	535 13	372	82 05	485 00	372	74 36	477 05	369	73 14
socommun	505 44	372	70 14	526 76	372	73 10	510 82	372	70 88	483 00	369	67 02
socfrend	480 55	372	83 10	495 49	372	85 69	476 15	372	82 34	472 80	369	81 76
memserv	260 79	124	50 23	293 52	124	56 53	264 89	124	51 02	249 49	123	48 05
memfrat	235 52	124	70 45	233 37	124	69 80	241 14	124	72 13	227 07	123	67 92
memsport	201 91	124	62 73	227 73	124	70 76	209 37	124	65 05	187 17	123	58 16
memhobby	149 87	124	75 14	150 94	124	75 68	148 35	124	74 38	137 61	123	69 00
memnum	708 75	372	46 02	709 76	372	46 08	683 38	372	44 37	722 36	369	46 90
satjob	765 04	248	69 14	679 25	248	61 38	785 80	248	71 01	747 40	246	67 54
richwork	369 85	124	83 40	371 41	124	83 75	357 13	124	80 53	379 87	123	85 66
hours	74,643 25	372	77 45	75,598 80	372	78 44	78,370 77	372	81 32	70,666 88	369	73 32
Institutional participa- tion												
marstat	20,531 34	496	75 22	20,029 78	496	73 38	20,637 86	496	75 61	19,440 84	491	71 22
divorce	264 70	124	81 82	255 31	124	78 91	251 32	124	77 68	262 49	123	81 13
childs	1,012 05	496	68 18	1,127 44	496	75 95	966 40	496	65 10	985 81	491	66 41
relig	985 37	496	72 63	1,095 36	496	80 74	976 92	496	72 01	981 25	491	72 33

attend	1,055 57	372	93 79	1,013 47	372	90 05	
union	35,432 96	124	99 99	35,383 97	124	99 86	3
vet	10,713 22	124	94 65	10,839 86	124	95 77	1
Class-based sentiments							
Political attitudes and behaviors							
partyid	1,107 29	496	83 30	1,146 77	496	86 27	
polviews	855 90	496	76 51	921 01	496	82 33	
helpnot	444 95	248	72 12	478 88	248	77 62	
mempolit	152 84	124	60 05	168 10	124	66 05	
Social attitudes and dispositions							
spkath	196 44	124	20 72	345 87	124	36 48	
spkcom	274 21	124	22 16	461 45	124	37 29	
homosex	504 17	248	41 03	688 65	248	56 05	
pornlaw	403 83	248	89 31	423 54	248	93 67	
cappun	481 40	124	98 29	486 16	124	99 26	
courts	450 72	248	84 90	458 95	248	86 45	
prayer	216 99	124	37 34	314 05	124	54 05	
racmar	296 95	124	26 49	444 46	124	39 65	
racopen	290 10	124	86 99	304 34	124	91 26	
helpblk	437 43	248	98 66	438 63	248	98 93	
fework	193 91	124	45 42	248 49	124	58 21	
fepol	203 78	124	56 82	248 87	124	69 40	
abnomore	304 59	124	43 90	414 02	124	59 67	
abrape	273 68	124	69 16	306 45	124	77 44	
anomia	240 26	124	26 20	327 57	124	35 73	
chldidel	465 87	372	76 31	486 14	372	79 63	
obey	313 37	248	42 75	405 98	248	55 39	
thinkself	320 33	248	52 04	375 21	248	60 96	
helpothr	283 29	248	70 55	316 43	248	78 80	
class	1,107 61	248	25 81	1,696 93	248	39 54	
Demographic composition							
race	28,132 02	248	64 79	29,540 75	248	68 03	2
ethnic	846 69	372	72 52	904 66	372	77 22	
spneth	8,944 23	496	32 69	10,889 99	496	39 80	

NOTE — Sample sizes and the fit statistics of the baseline model, eq (3), are given in app table B2

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A Theory of Scandal: Victorians, Homosexuality, and the Fall of Oscar Wilde¹

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Oscar Wilde is considered to be the iconic victim of 19th-century English puritanism. Yet the Victorian authorities rarely and only reluctantly enforced homosexuality laws. Moreover, Wilde's sexual predilections had long been common knowledge in London before his trials without affecting the dramatist's wide popularity. Focusing on the seemingly inconsistent Victorian attitudes toward homosexuality and the dynamics of the Oscar Wilde affair, this article develops a general theory of scandal as the disruptive publicity of transgression. The study of scandal reveals the effects of publicity on norm enforcement and throws into full relief the dramaturgical nature of the public sphere and norm work in society.

Scandals are ubiquitous social phenomena with unique salience and singular dramatic intensity. They can mobilize much emotional energy, at times with momentous consequences. Scandals in effect trigger a great deal of the normative solidification and transformation in society. At the same time, avoiding them is an essential motive and ongoing activity of individuals, groups, and institutions. Scandal is the public event par excellence, and any theory of the public sphere is sorely lacking without an understanding of its nature. Many famous scandals have served as case studies for social scientists. A general model of scandal, however, remains an unrealized desideratum.

Focusing on the seemingly inconsistent enforcement of homosexuality norms in Victorian England and the dynamics of the Oscar Wilde affair, this article will develop a phenomenology that would allow us to study

¹ The author is grateful to Andrew Abbott, Odul Bozkurt, Robert Hogg, Harris Kim, Jim Leitzel, Michael Reinhard, Dana Simmons, and the *AJS* reviewers for their comments. A much earlier version was presented at the University of Texas at Austin and at Princeton University. I thank the two audiences for their helpful feedback. Direct correspondence to Ari Adut, Burdine Hall 376, Department of Sociology, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712. E-mail: ariadut@mail.la.utexas.edu

the frequency, dynamics, and effects of scandals in different social systems I will argue that only a theory of scandal as the disruptive publicity of transgression can explain significant and otherwise inexplicable variations in norm enforcement We will also see that scandals forcefully throw into relief the transformative powers of publicity and the dramaturgical dimension of the public sphere and norm work in society

THE VICTORIAN HYPOCRISY AND OSCAR WILDE

Pitilessly punished by the English homosexuality laws in 1895, Oscar Wilde is commonly considered to be the iconic victim of Victorian puritanism (e.g., Fisher 1995, p. 136, Pritchard 2001, p. 149) The Victorians held homosexuality in horror, and Britain stood out at the turn of the 20th century as the only country in Western Europe that criminalized all male homosexual acts with draconian penalties Wilde was prosecuted and condemned to the fullest extent of the law even though the evidence against him was circumstantial, uncorroborated, and tainted When Wilde's first criminal trial terminated with a hung jury, the legal officials demonstrated fierce fervor in securing a conviction in a second trial Wilde was vehemently vilified during his trials and was transformed into a pariah in the wake of his two-year prison-with-hard-labor sentence for gross indecency

The wrath directed at Wilde stands in contrast, however, to the fact that homosexuality norms were rarely and reluctantly enforced in Victorian England (e.g., Greenberg 1988, p. 400) During the 1840s, for instance, the annual number of sentences for sodomy ranged between 12 and 18, and high-status actors rarely figured among the convicts (Radzinowicz 1968, p. 330, Gilbert 1977*a*, 1977*b*) The police looked the other way (Ellis 1912) The proclivities of Wilde were, moreover, common knowledge in London for a long time before his tribulations began Homosexuality was implied in some of his writings and was part and parcel of his public persona Yet Wilde was the darling of London society While Wilde's art was later to be branded as corrupt, his works received considerable critical acclaim and remained very popular across all social classes until the day of his arrest

Why would audiences and authorities accommodate those who are widely known to commit a transgression deemed repulsive by society and criminal by law? And why does such a transgression suddenly elicit very harsh reactions after being overlooked for a long time?

Norm underenforcement, the first part of the puzzle, obtains three not necessarily incompatible accounts in sociology: weakness of the norms, high status of the offender, and practical impediments to enforcement

Structural-functionalists argue that norms are underenforced when they are weak. Norms deteriorate either because of rapid social change (Durkheim [1897] 1951) or as a result of the breakdown of regulatory processes in society (Merton 1957). There is also some evidence indicating that norms are underenforced when the offenders are high-status actors who can get away with deviance either because they can evade monitoring or because their clout protects them (e.g., Black 1976, pp. 11–36, Edgerton 1985, pp. 75–93, Goode 1978, p. 252). As rational choice theorists have pointed out, elites are more apt to participate in deviant acts with impunity because others are dependent on them (Posner 2000, p. 28). Finally, it seems self-evident that norms would be underenforced if there were practical impediments to chastising malefactors—even more so if the violations are of a victimless variety. Coleman has underlined the costs borne by sanctioners in norm enforcement (1988, pp. 244–45), and common sense suggests that monitoring the target group, establishing violations, and disciplining individual offenders are costly, especially in the case of elite offenders. The risk of reprisals could translate into underenforcement.

Although these accounts have surface validity, they prove unsatisfactory in elucidating the ordinary underenforcement of homosexuality norms in Victorian England, much less the ostensibly inconsistent treatment of Oscar Wilde. There is no indication that disgust of homosexuality declined during the Victorian period. The capital punishment for sodomy was supplanted with life imprisonment only in 1861. A proposal to abolish it ran into parliamentary resistance in 1841 and was aborted, even though there were no executions after the 1830s (Lafitte 1958, p. 16). Historians have documented incidents where those convicted of homosexuality have been the victims of mob violence (e.g., Greenberg 1988, pp. 338–40, Harvey 1978, p. 940). It is true that the law enforcers ran into difficulties in substantiating guilt. Prosecutors had to rely upon accomplice witnesses who were either unlikely to cooperate or who were deemed noncredible according to the English law of evidence. The severity of the sentences might also have made juries loath to convict and prosecutors unenthusiastic about bringing charges. And the high status of Oscar Wilde might have enabled him to get away with his well-known deviance. But why then did the Victorian law later turn so suddenly and heavy-handedly against Oscar Wilde despite substandard legal evidence, and why did society ostracize him so mercilessly for something that was hardly news?

Using the Wilde case, I will maintain here that many inconsistencies in norm enforcement cannot be understood unless we take into account the externalities on third parties that may be unleashed when transgressions are publicized—as opposed to when they are simply known. These externalities, whose dynamics and conditions of emergence I will study in this article, transform real or alleged transgressions into scandals. The

publicity of homosexuality (especially of elites) generated very disruptive scandals in 19th-century England, and only an adequate theory of scandal can explain both the habitual Victorian underenforcement and Wilde's harrowing fate. Simply put, my argument is as follows. A scandal exerts various costs on third parties in the form of contaminations and provocations. Hence, especially in cases where the transgression does not involve an immediate and identifiable victim, the anticipation of scandal may discourage audiences and authorities from sanctioning offenders. The norm will then be underenforced as long as its transgressions are committed in, or remain, private. Once a scandal breaks, however, the externalities that are put in motion by the publicity of the transgression may prod polluted or provoked third parties into showing extraordinary zeal vis-à-vis the offender, to signal rectitude or resolve.

THE DISRUPTIVE PUBLICITY OF TRANSGRESSION

There are two common ways to reflect on scandals in the social scientific and journalistic discourses. The first one, which we can call "objectivist," focuses on the conditions and characteristics of significant (exceptionally costly or offensive) transgressions that elicit (or should elicit) reaction once publicized. The privileged object of study is the abuse of public trust through political or corporate corruption (e.g., Baker and Faulkner 1993, Biggart 1985, Markovits and Silverstein 1988, Shapiro 1987, Vaughan 1983). This approach treats scandals as the proverbial tip of the iceberg, that is, as events in which the usually concealed criminal components of social systems are revealed to the public. One is to disregard the brouhaha surrounding the exposure so that the deep structures that have enabled the deviance can be dispassionately dissected.

Despite its invaluable insights into the social organization of transgressive behavior, the objectivist position, ironically, often suffers from a subjective and normative streak, reproducing the attitudes of the victims or denouncers of deviance. Treating scandals as the epiphenomena of real transgressions, this perspective ignores that the latter need not be authenticated to occasion scandals (as evinced by the Whitewater affair), and that unpublicized yet very well-known transgressions (as we will see in the Wilde case) often do not cause scandals at all. Objectivists give short shrift to, or are simply uninterested in, the dynamics that are set in action when transgressions are publicized, as well as ignoring the autonomous logic of the ensuing legal and/or social norm enforcement process.

The other approach to scandal, the "constructivist" perspective, concentrates on the social reactions to and representations of transgressions (e.g., Alexander 1989, Becker 1963, Ducharme and Fine 1995, Fine 1996,

Lull and Hinerman 1997, Maza 1993, Larson and Wagner-Pacifici 2001, Molotch and Lester 1974, Sherman 1978, Verdes-Leroux 1969) Scandal (or related phenomena like moral panics, witch hunts, or political purges) is then the creation of the collective consciousness of a society, the media, or the performative discourse uttered by moral entrepreneurs In terms of its effects, scandal is either a social control mechanism (Fisse and Braithwaite 1983, Gluckman 1967, Lang and Lang 1983, Sherman 1978) or a ritual through which groups assert their core values and purify themselves by publicly marking certain individuals and behaviors as deviant (e g , Alexander 1989, Durkheim 1933, Erikson 1966, Fisher 1995, Randulf 1964)

The constructivist approaches to scandal rightfully remind us that reactions to transgressions cannot be derived from the transgressions themselves But they often tend to adopt a voluntaristic theory of social construction and have difficulty explaining the variations in the public reactions to deviance As we will see in the Wilde case, however, scandals often involve violent condemnations of transgressions that were widely known and tolerated before Furthermore, reactions often morph during the course of a scandal And few scandals ritually renew societies even when they are occasioned strategically for this purpose On the contrary, scandals often generate very profane phenomena prone to pollute all those who come into any contact with them By reducing scandals to social construals of transgressions, constructivists ignore that reactions in scandals are in large part shaped by the way publicity transforms the sense and effects of transgressions ²

Scandal is a polysemic word A significantly offensive normative violation, the reaction to this violation, and the discredit heaped on persons and institutions as a result are all referred to as scandal in everyday parlance Despite different usages, however, scandal, as a social occur-

² This short discussion cannot do justice to the rich empirical observations and theoretical insights produced by the constructivist literature on scandal Here, one would have to mention in particular Gary Alan Fine's (1996) provocative work on reputational politics, which often revolves around scandals, and Jeffrey Alexander's (1989) Durkheimian analysis of Watergate and the American civil religion, which makes a penetrating contribution to the study of social pollution Constructivists have not, however, put forth a general model of scandal that would account for the conditions, incidence, dynamics, and effects of scandals with different contents and publics John Thompson's *Political Scandal*, which sees scandals "as struggles over symbolic power in which reputation and trust are at stake" (Thompson 2000, p 245), contains incisive points about the rise of "politics of trust" in Western countries But Thompson exaggerates the role of the media in the making of political scandals and does not adequately address the objective conditions that underlie the rise of scandal activity in the recent decades Finally, his understanding of scandal is difficult to generalize to nonpolitical scandals

rence, assumes the publicization of an apparent transgression to a "norm audience," to use Ellickson's term (2001). The norm audience is a public united by some level of identification with the norm that has apparently been violated, and it is in some capacity attentive and negatively responsive to the publicized transgression.

It is crucial that the publicity of a real or alleged transgression be distinguished from extensive or even common knowledge about it. All or most members of a norm audience may know of a transgression. Members may be aware of each other's knowledge of it. Such communications however, often fall short of creating a scandal. Publicity is usually achieved only when the members of a public are exposed simultaneously to a transgression, either actually or discursively, from a single source of communication. This way, each member knows and cannot pretend not to know the position of the other members as the recipient of the discreditable information. Here, it is important to note that the authoritativeness of the source of communication augments the probability and power of publicity—especially when the transgression is merely alleged and ascribed to a high-status actor. Elites are likely to be judged as more credible both by audiences and authorities. The high status of elites lends salience and significance both to their communication and to the transgressions they publicize.

Publicity decreases the coordination costs between the members of a public—or between the different subpublics in a given society. Coordination can be particularly difficult to achieve in gossip or rumor. Gossip tends to keep information within bounds, participation in it is dependent on membership in groups (Gluckman 1963) that are often much smaller than the norm audience. On the other hand, rumor, which involves the serial transmission of unverified information usually through weak ties (Granovetter 1973), creates ambiguities by content transformation, since it often involves reformulations and, at times, multiple accounts (Shibutani 1966). Thus, receivers of a rumor can find it hard to coordinate their behavior vis-à-vis the transgressor. Unless nonaction is immediately consequential, as in emergencies and disasters, rumor and gossip are not likely to be acted upon when dealing with the transgression would be costly or risky, or when attitudes toward it are either discrepant or unclear. In contrast, publicity, as I define it, almost imposes the transgression on the audience and makes it costly for those who would otherwise ignore the transgression to do so.³

³ Common knowledge seems to have been insufficient to occasion a scandal among the natives of the Trobriand Islands as well. "I have found that the breach of exogamy—as regards intercourse and not marriage—is by no means a rare occurrence, and public opinion is lenient, though decidedly hypocritical. If the affair is carried on *sub rosa*

A transgression may become public unintentionally. An accident, like the botched Watergate burglary, or a catastrophe, like the Enron bankruptcy, which either clearly involves a transgression or urges the public to hunt for one, can start a scandal. But more often, scandals are occasioned by a communicative act, like a public denunciation (Garfinkel 1956) or a revelation of a transgression, as in a news story. Finally, the transgression may be publicized by its deliberate, usually provocative, execution in front of the norm audience, as is often the case in art scandals.

Obviously, not all publicized transgressions occasion scandals. At first blush, it may seem that the cultural offensiveness, disruptiveness, or social costs of a transgression will determine whether it will be seen as scandalous by a given norm audience. The status of the offender is, however, usually a much more important factor, since public reaction is naturally contingent on public attention. This is partly because many high-status people are also well known, their transgressions are readily salient when publicized. While the most atrocious acts by ciphers can go unnoticed, the mere fame of someone who has purportedly perpetrated a peccadillo will often be sufficient to spur massive publicity. But prior renown is not obligatory, with or without fame, high status draws forth an unfixed farrago of fascination, identification, and resentment from others.

In itself, the high status of the offender is, nevertheless, often inadequate to generate a full-fledged scandal that incites more than fleeting curiosity. Most celebrity scandals are ludic. For a transgression to give rise to a genuine scandal, on the other hand, its publicity has to generate negative and disruptive effects on parties other than the offender or immediate victim of the transgression—parties that may include audiences, authorities, and the associates of the offender. Scandal is the lived experience of these effects and, as such, warrants phenomenological analysis. The disruptive effects of the publicity of a transgression shape, as well as elicit, perceptions and reactions from those who come into contact with them.

Hence, my definition: scandal is the disruptive publicity of transgression.⁴ This publicity consists essentially of two kinds of externalities, which can be real or semiotic. In a scandal, the publicity of a transgression contaminates and/or provokes various third parties in a difficult-to-ignore

with a certain amount of decorum, and if no one in particular stirs up trouble—‘public opinion’ will gossip, but not demand any harsh punishment. If, on the contrary, scandal breaks out—every one turns against the guilty pair and by ostracism and insults one or the other may be driven to suicide” (Malinowski 1926, p. 80).

⁴ To be sure, scandals can also involve the apparent violations of nonmoral competency norms as long as their publicity disgraces high-status actors. A recent example is the public allegations of official incompetence in processing intelligence on Al Qaeda before September 11, 2001. But most scandals will involve transgressions proper. And even in other cases, the publicity of the violation will usually lead to moral condemnations of the incompetents and their enablers.

and possibly consequential way. The high status of the offender tends to transform transgressions into scandals mostly inasmuch as it multiplies these effects.

Contaminations—When the publicity of an apparent transgression causes a scandal, it usually does not only taint the offender. Individuals and institutions associated with him or her are also contaminated. The publicity of Clinton's adultery stained the Democrats, the Democratic Party, and the presidency. The recent pedophilia allegations implicating some clergymen smeared their families, as well as the Roman Catholic Church. The Enron bankruptcy slashed the standing of many actors and institutions of American capitalism.

For such externalities to occur, the offender should usually be of high status, or the offense should somehow implicate a high-status actor or institution. Contaminations, and hence the size of scandal, are an increasing function of the social stature of those who are compromised by the publicity of a transgression.⁵ This is because elites represent groups, institutions, and values. This semiotic association will be particularly robust if the high status of an elite is the consequence or condition of trust vested in his or her person. Even when high status does not officially entail exigent ethical standards, elites are often regarded as role models and may be held accountable for the conduct of many others on whom they (are thought to) exert influence or power.⁶

Scandals contaminate only because they operate according to a collectivistic logic and entail the exercise of popular justice—as opposed to legal justice, which is individualistic and demands exacting criteria of proof. These two characteristics of scandals explain the strenuous efforts expended by groups and organizations to resolve their issues and discipline their members internally with as little publicity as possible. Furthermore, as will be manifest in the Wilde affair, scandals often turn into dramas of disclosure with no natural limits to what can be made public about the associates of those snarled in them. They can thus end up airing the dirty linen of whole collectivities. Contaminations of third parties can also spawn systemic crises. In financial scandals, for instance, contaminations

⁵ Status is relative to audience. The publicized transgression of a local official can cause a local scandal, but usually not a national scandal, since he or she holds high status and visibility in that locality, but not necessarily at the national level. Low-status offenders usually get no public attention unless their transgression is in some way exceptional or successfully presented as exemplary or symptomatic by opinion leaders, usually in the form of human interest stories.

⁶ For instance, the Monica Lewinsky scandal brought home the fact that the American president is saddled with exemplary duties in addition to his or her executive responsibilities—but also that the weight of the former might be declining (Posner 1999, pp. 153–59).

generalize distrust through a self-fulfilling prophecy and make everybody (including audiences who are neither connected to the offender nor had been originally hurt by the transgression itself) worse off

The contaminations of third parties are frequently moral in nature. Scandals discredit or disgrace by undermining the reputation and social standing of the ones they afflict. But it is crucial to stress that the logic of contamination derives largely from that of shame. Hence, contamination does not *ipso facto* imply moral deficiency and may often contradict rationality. When publicized, the sins of the father will often defile the son. What is more, the scandalous publicity of a transgression can also contaminate audiences along with its denouncers.⁷ Transgressions pertaining to taboo objects and bodily functions are almost universally contaminating in this sense, even though there are empirical variations from one culture to another in the puissance of such pollutions. In many societies, things sexual and a fortiori sexual transgressions tend to have a polluting “viscosity” (Douglas 1966, p. 38, Sartre 1943, p. 696), which is magnified when they are made public. This is why we find sex at the center of so many otherwise very different scandals—and not only because sex is intrinsically titillating.

The high status of the offender and the taboo properties of the transgression tend to compound contaminations. Here are some other factors affecting contamination intensity. If the audiences experience a steep information asymmetry with the offender’s group, and if they are particularly dependent on it, there will be a rational inclination to generalize the guilt to the whole entity to reduce risks. Such contaminations are exacerbated when the publicized transgression betrays a deficiency of internal control within the offender’s group. Contaminations suffuse more swiftly in collectivities that conceive of themselves through familial metaphors, in honor cultures where collective responsibility is the norm, and in puritanical societies where the publicity of certain transgressions is considered as odious as the transgressions themselves.

Provocations—A scandal does not only contaminate third parties. It can also transform a transgression into a challenge of audiences and authorities. This second kind of externality, which we can call provocations, is engendered especially when it is the offender who makes the transgression public by committing it in front of others—as in public heresy, art scandals, or civil disobedience. The violator not only breaks the norm but also offends the norm audience by flaunting his or her transgression.

⁷ This logic is also operative in “scenes.” The scene is in effect the miniature scandal, and the contagion of embarrassment that scenes and other kinds of interactional contretemps generate (Goffman 1967) is isomorphic with the contaminations created in scandals.

This is why in all societies the public transgression of a norm is a far graver, more scandalous matter than the violation of the same norm in private (Ball 1975, Elster 1989, p. 109). Tartuffe was only half hypocritical when he said, "And there is no evil till the act is known / It's scandal, Madam, which makes it an offense / And it's no sin to sin in confidence" (Molière 1993, p. 289). This position is cherished not only by cynical offenders, but also frequently by audiences and authorities, albeit in an unacknowledged way. Ruthless repression of publicly enacted deviance can go hand in hand with an extensive lenience of the same transgression in private, alcohol consumption during Prohibition is an example. Publicity can multiply or even create the offense. It should be obvious, however, that the provocative externalities of a publicized transgression are proportionate to the status of the offender. Elites will find it easier to provoke since their high status will impart salience and significance to their offense in the eyes of others.

Public transgressions are potentially disruptive because the offender, by making others spectators to his transgression, urges imitation—or, at any rate, can be viewed as urging imitation. The resulting scandal also can normalize the transgression and tempt those who are (thought to be) morally more susceptible. It may, at times, inform some members of the norm audience of the very existence of the transgression. If the legitimacy of the norm is shaky, and if adherence to it stems at least partially from preference falsification, well-publicized acts of violation can set off motivational cascades and inspire others to breach (Kuran 1995, Warriner 1958). Visible transgressions can publicize incongruities in private sentiments and embolden some in the audience, even among the authorities, to flout the norm. A publicized transgression can hence transmute into the litmus test of the vigor of the violated norm—a discomfiting and even dangerous ordeal for the authorities.

THE SCANDAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND

Let us operationalize our conceptualization of scandal as the disruptive publicity of transgression to the Victorian case. Homosexuality norms were underenforced by the 19th-century English law and society, even when transgressions were well known, to prevent scandals. Homosexuality went unsanctioned because its publicity, which would be concomitant to the sanctioning process, would significantly contaminate and provoke a wide array of third parties.

Reticence, as the prime requisite of respectability, was the paramount principle of the 19th-century English public sphere. For the Victorians, any open discussion of sexuality debased the public sphere and defiled

its participants, the members of the middle and upper classes.⁸ In 1885, many newspapers castigated William Thomas Stead's *Pall Mall Gazette* and its crusade against prostitution as shameless on behalf of dignified citizens (Terrot 1979). The publicity of homosexuality, regarded as considerably more egregious than most other sexual sins, was naturally even more disruptive. It contaminated not only audiences, but also those who named it in public even in a denunciatory mode. Thus, in journalistic and legal discourse, sodomy was an "unmentionable" or "nameless" crime. On buggery, the illustrious legal scholar Sir William Blackstone wrote in his *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, "I will not act so disagreeable a part, to my readers as well as to myself, as to dwell longer upon a subject the very mention of which is a disgrace to the human nature. It will be more eligible to imitate the delicacy of our English law, which treats it in its very indictments as a crime not fit to be named" ([1769] 1962, p. 242). When the home secretary recommended the closing of parks to halt their use by homosexuals in 1808, he requested that these measures be taken "without divulging to the Public the disgraceful occasion of them" (quoted in Harvey 1978, p. 942).

The publicity of homosexuality was also thought to corrupt or tempt young and female audiences. At a homosexuality trial in Lancaster, the judge expressed grief that "the untaught and unsuspecting minds of youth should be liable to be tainted by hearing such horrid facts" and prohibited note taking and the presence of young people in the courtroom (quoted in Harvey 1978, p. 942). Lesbianism was never criminalized in England, lest young women, who were seen as more susceptible than men, be unintentionally recruited to the sexual practice. This is how Lord Desart successfully countered a proposed provision against female homosexuality in 1921: "You are going to tell the whole world that there is such an

⁸ Michel Foucault and others deploying his constructivist perspective on sex have contended that the 19th century was marked not by repression but rather by a proliferation of discourses on sexuality (Foucault 1980, Weeks 1989). This claim, at least in the English context, does not hold for homosexuality and downplays the fact that sexuality could only become public in this period through the sanitized language of technocratic public policy. What is more, the latter problematized the sexuality of social categories and focused on the lower classes by addressing overpopulation, poverty, and public health issues. The publicity of the sexuality of particular individuals was anathema. It is true that after the Divorce Act of 1857, divorce cases by upper-class couples, often involving adultery, were narrated in the pages of the *Divorce Court Reporter* and the *Illustrated Police Reporter*. But these newspapers targeted lower-class audiences; middle- and upper-class Victorians were very uncomfortable with such publicity (Leckie 1999, pp. 62–111). In any case, neither the scientific and medical discourse on sex nor the publicized divorce cases concerned homosexuality. Havelock Ellis was prosecuted in 1898 for the first volume of his book *Studies in Psychology of Sex*, which substantively studied homosexuality; the subsequent volumes had to be published in the United States.

offence, to bring it to the notice of women who have never heard of it, never thought of it, never dreamt of it I think this is a very great mischief" (quoted in Hyde 1970, p. 181)

The publicity of homosexuality, and not homosexuality itself, was then the principal preoccupation of the authorities. The director of public prosecutions commanded in 1889 that no "unnecessary publicity" be given to cases of gross indecency (quoted in Weeks 1989, p. 103).⁹ In agreement with the same logic, public homosexuality, in the form of public indecency, was not countenanced and often implacably punished because it challenged the audiences and authorities. Restraint with regard to enforcing the homosexuality laws was particularly patent in the case of elite offenders. Prosecutions would make for sensational trials, endowing the transgression with inordinate salience. Trials risked traducing the good names of reputable families. They would provide for public consumption the sordid spectacle of the internecine hostilities within the English upper crust. The homogeneity and insularity of the upper classes closely connected by tight-knit networks would allow individual scandals to disgrace the whole elite. Hence, many instances of homosexuality within the high

⁹ The eleventh amendment of the 1885 Criminal Law Amendment Act created the new offense of gross indecency between male persons in England. This offense, for which Wilde would be convicted, covered homosexual acts not involving anal intercourse and was punishable by a maximum of two years' imprisonment with hard labor. This legislation, passed 10 years before Wilde's conviction, has led many to perceive the dramatist to be the prey of the hardening Victorian puritanism during the last two decades of the 19th century (e.g., Fisher 1995, pp. 135–66, Foldy 1997, Weeks 1989, pp. 96–117). This is incorrect for multifarious reasons. It must be first underlined that the new offense had little effect since it only included acts that were already prosecuted as attempted sodomy. Few prosecutions were brought following the amendment (Greenberg 1988, p. 400). Second, homosexuality was not mentioned in the original text of the act and did not figure in the agitation for it (Smith 1976). The act was passed as a result of the Maiden Tribute campaign headed by the newspaper owner William Thomas Stead. The objective of the moral crusade was "to make further provision for the protection of Women and Girls, the suppression of brothels, and other purposes" (Gorham 1978). Stead opposed the eleventh amendment and was one of the rare Victorian dignitaries who would later display the derring-do to be publicly compassionate to Wilde. He lamented, in the aftermath of the Wilde affair, that preoccupation with male homosexuality only served to obfuscate the ravages of the rampant and much more ruinous female prostitution. Third, the amendment was proposed by the radical-liberal member of parliament Henry Labouchère, who had been very critical of the act itself. The intentions of Labouchère, who was both a Libertarian and Wilde's friend, are nebulous. A contemporaneous journalist argued that he aimed to wreck the act by adding an absurd amendment (Harris 1959, p. 144). Others have hypothesized that the law attempted to extend the protection that adolescent girls enjoyed to male minors (Hall 2000, pp. 38–39). In effect, Labouchère later claimed to have calqued his proposal on the French law on the protection of minors of both sexes from seduction. Unlike the French counterpart, however, there were no age limits in his amendment. The House of Commons passed the poorly drafted clause with scarcely any debate in a sparsely attended session late at night.

echelons of English society, while often open secrets, were hushed up. In 1889, a male brothel, whose clientele included several aristocrats, was fortuitously discovered on Cleveland Street (Chester, Leitch, and Simpson 1976, Dockray 1996, Hyde 1976). For fear of the contaminating publicity, the lord chancellor advised inaction in a memorandum he wrote to the treasury solicitor: "The social position of some of the parties will make a great sensation and this will give very wide publicity and consequently will spread very extensively the matter of which I am satisfied will produce enormous evil" (quoted in Hyde 1976, p. 84). Only two minor figures were apprehended, they later got off with light sentences.

The society was also disinclined to sanction homosexuals, again in view of the externalities of the publicity of the deviance. Discretion was exercised above all to incidents in prestigious single-sex public schools, which mushroomed during the second third of the 19th century (Gawthorne-Hardy 1979). Potential scandals would not only be very embarrassing for the elite of the nation, the publicized to-dos, by bestowing visibility to homosexuality, could also unintentionally normalize and multiply the deviance in such propitious settings. Hence, when William Johnson and Oscar Browning, both masters at Eton, were shown the door after allegations of homosexual deportment in the 1870s, the real reason for their departures was never made public (Croft-Cooke 1967, pp. 95–118). Browning was actually made a Cambridge don and could carry on with his notorious debaucheries.¹⁰ Parents who believed their sons to have been initiated into homosexuality by older men were also dissuaded from taking legal action because of reputational imperatives.

There were further disincentives to making charges. The English common law, the product of a society heavy with aristocratic heritage where family name is one's foremost asset, has a stringent libel tort. It is sufficient for the libel to be communicated in print form to the person libeled for the crime to be constituted; publication to a third person is not necessary. To be acquitted, the defendant must both prove the assertion and that the publication of the libel is in the public interest.¹¹ The *North London*

¹⁰ Victorians grandees like Edward Fitzgerald, John Addington Symonds, Frederic Lord Leighton, and Walter Pater, who were well-known homosexuals, all evaded social scorn (Hyde 1970, pp. 90–133). Grosskurth recounts the unfettered professional ascent of such a figure, Reverend Charles John Vaughan, who held the exalted titles of the headmaster at Harrow School, the bishop of Rochester, the vicar of Doncaster, master of the temple, and the dean of Llandaff (1964, pp. 33–40).

¹¹ For a history of the development of English defamation laws, see Veeder (1903). That English defamation laws originated to forestall scandals as much as possible is suggested by historical semantics; in early modern English, the words "scandal" and "slander" were synonymous, referring to "malicious or defamatory gossip" or "general comment injurious to reputation" (*OED* 1989, p. 573).

Press, on November 16, 1889, named Lord Euston as a habitué of the Cleveland Street brothel. Lord Euston sued the newspaper for libel and won, as the judge did not consider the prostitute witnesses against the lord credible. The reporter who wrote for the article was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment.

There were a few high-profile homosexuality prosecutions during the late Victorian era. Suspects in these cases were mostly, however, either those caught in flagrante delicto in public places,¹² or political actors who were pursued only after their professional competitors chided the government with cover-up charges.¹³ In any case, suspects were allowed to leave the country. And even when cases went to trial, convictions were often undesirable on the score of their disruptive externalities. Criminal statistics of 1856 show that only 28% of those tried for sodomy were convicted as opposed to 77% for all offenses (Radzinowicz 1968, pp. 330–31). A good example of the Victorian disinclination is the Boulton and Park trial of 1871 (Roughead 1931, pp. 149–83). Two transvestite homosexuals were detained when they were spotted in feminine garb in front of the Strand Theater. These two were the sons of prominent Londoners. Love letters turned up in their lodgings pointing to carnal relations with the member of parliament Lord Arthur Clinton, the son of the Duke of Newcastle. The defense averred meagerly that Boulton and Park, who occasionally took female parts in amateur theatricals, were also given to playacting in public. They were absolved. Even though few entertained doubts about the sexuality of those embroiled in the scandal, not only the authorities but also the opinion leaders thought it better not to convict. The *Times* of May 16, 1871, wrote approvingly of the acquittal and adduced that a guilty verdict “would have been felt at home, and received abroad, as a reflection of our national morals.”

¹² William J. Bankes, a member of parliament, was prosecuted twice, first in 1833 after being caught in a public lavatory with another man and then in 1841 for indecent exposure. Acquitted in his first trial, he was allowed to scurry abroad during his second (Hyde 1970, p. 94). The painter Simeon Solomon was convicted of an indecent offense in a public lavatory in 1873 but only served six weeks (Croft-Cooke 1967, p. 56).

¹³ In other words, homosexuality was denounced in public only when the act was expected to net significant profits to the denouncers that outweighed whatever costs they would incur from doing so. The only political homosexuality scandal of the period that culminated in some legal sanctions was the Dublin Castle scandal of 1884, which was occasioned by the home rule supporters' attack on the British administration in Ireland. The scandal led to a lawsuit. All the compromised officers were exculpated, however, with the exception of the country police inspector.

VICTORIANS AND OSCAR WILDE BEFORE HIS TRIALS

Victorians were thus reluctant to sanction homosexuals, especially when the latter had high status. Oscar Wilde's case was no exception. Wilde's homosexuality was well known long before his trials. His effeminate public persona fit fully the Victorian stereotype of the homosexual. From the late 1870s to the mid-1880s, Wilde sported a flamboyant look with flowing locks, colossal flopping collars encircled by colorful scarves, velvet frock coats, and knee-length stockings. He was regularly caricatured by George du Maurier in *Punch*, the bastion of middle-class morality. Maurier mocked Wilde's preciosity, epicene poses, and blue china.¹⁴ The magazine's editorialists called him a "Mary-Ann." Gilbert and Sullivan's comic opera of 1881, *Patience*, a pungent portrait of Wilde as a sham aesthete, ventured vague sexual adumbrations: "A sentimental passion of a vegetable fashion must excite your languid spleen, an attachment *à la* Plato for a bashful young potato or a not-too-French French bean" (Gilbert 1910, p. 103).

In the early 1880s, Wilde, the quintessential poseur, put his audiences in a state of uncertainty about his sexuality. His homosexuality was mostly a matter of conjecture in London except in circles proximate to the author. Wilde married in 1884 and took up the traditional dandy garb. He got a haircut. The widespread scuttlebutt about his sexuality subsided for a while after the birth of his two children. Some thought that his effete ways were merely part of his ostentatious aestheticism. Their sexual suggestions notwithstanding, the public satires of Wilde, especially those in *Punch*, were equivocal.¹⁵ One could always pretend that they merely spoofed Wilde's effeminacy.

But by the end of the decade, Wilde was already going around in public with a green carnation boutonnière—the badge of French homosexuals. His short story *The Portrait of Mr. W. H.* queried the sex of the addressee of Shakespeare's sonnets. Homoerotic tension was palpable in *The Picture of Dorian Gray*. Although Wilde never unambiguously paraded his ho-

¹⁴ For the English identification of effeminacy with homosexuality in the 18th and 19th centuries, see Trumbach (1977) and Symonds (1896).

¹⁵ While these parodies created suspicions, they also turned Wilde into a curiosity. Wilde astutely exploited the liminal public image fashioned, almost collusively, together by the press and himself. His minor provocations and extravagances were calculated to render him salient in London society and the press well before he had written anything noteworthy. But Wilde could afford to shock only so much. Hence, he staved off the talk about his homosexuality with his marriage. Mixing respectability and eccentricity, Wilde had his audiences keep guessing. The name recognition that he acquired this way served him well when he produced his literary works. Wilde's art, and especially his plays, reproduced his public persona. Many deemed his dandy *dramatis personae* with dubious desires indistinguishable from the dramatist himself.

homosexuality, he was becoming indiscrete about his goings-on. He prated imprudently in London society on the delights of male beauty. He surrounded himself with fetching young men in fashionable restaurants and lectured them about Socratic love. He partied with prostitutes in posh hotels and rented houses with upper-class paramours.

Consequently, Wilde's homosexuality became common knowledge in many quarters. The press reported his vacations with male companions. His romantic relationship with Lord Alfred Douglas, a student at Oxford and the third son of the Marquess of Queensberry, was a society item even though its veritable nature was of course never named. The *Pall Mall Gazette* reported that Lord Douglas followed Wilde like his shadow (Wilde [1948] 1966, p. 893). People in literary, dramatic, aristocratic, political, and intellectual milieus talked (e.g., Croft-Cooke 1972, p. 164, Ellmann 1988, p. 409, Harris 1916, p. 104, Marjoribanks 1932, p. 88). Some gossip was apocryphal but most of it was accurate. It seems that law enforcement knew, too. Sir Edward Hamilton, the confidant of the prime minister, noted in his diary during the trials that the word in London was that the police were long cognizant of Wilde's dalliances (Hamilton 1986, p. 236). "The wonder is not that the gossip should have reached Lord Queensberry's ears, but that after it was known, this man Wilde should have been tolerated in society in London for the length of time he has," would later remark Queensberry's lawyer in the libel trial, as much in incredulity as in indignation (Wilde [1911] 1928, p. 121).

Wilde's wife worried about their reputation after the publication of *Dorian Gray*. Constance Wilde, however, remained a high-flying socialite active in the Women's Liberal Foundation. *Pall Mall Gazette* wrote that she was on her way to becoming "one of the most popular among 'platform ladies'" (Ellmann 1988, p. 284). The Prince of Wales commended Wilde lavishly and publicly in the premiere of *Lady Windermere's Fan* in 1891. Prior to his legal travails, Wilde was an indispensable fixture in the country abodes of the Victorian beau monde and hobnobbed with political nabobs like William Gladstone, Herbert Henry Asquith, and Charles Parnell.

Wilde's well-known homosexuality did not cause a scandal until his trials simply because it was not publicly denounced. People prattled—much and maliciously, but always in private. The polluting publicity of the transgression, strict libel laws, and the high status of Wilde all educed reticence from the Victorian elite public. Those who considered themselves to be victims and who would have had legally superior evidence about Wilde's homosexuality (for instance, the families of his lovers) had reputational disincentives to take on the dramatist. They would themselves be contaminated by the resultant scandal. Private shunning of Wilde was also costly. One would be deprived of the company of a charming, witty,

talented, and very famous man connected to everybody who mattered in London. Moreover, a private crusade against Wilde could also eventuate in a public contestation—a chancy proposition in the light of the tough libel laws. Finally, while Wilde was the subject of gossip within various subpublics, without a public denunciation it would be difficult to coordinate attitudes vis-à-vis the deviant dramatist within the larger Victorian public. While those with low tolerance of homosexuality would find it costly to sanction Wilde, those with higher tolerance (for instance those in the cultured milieus) would not have to at all.

The middle-class audiences also partook in this conspiracy of tolerance. Even though he would posthumously be hailed as the hapless victim of hidebound Victorian morality, Wilde actually weathered ethical onslaughts after his homosexuality became an open secret in London, not from straitlaced pundits but from artistic competitors with unconventional lifestyles akin to his own. André Raffalovich's *A Willing Exile* (1890) and Henry James's *The Tragic Muse* ([1890] 1989) lampooned Wilde and his coterie with thinly disguised innuendos, even though they did not name names. A mordant roman à clef by Robert Hichins entitled *The Green Carnation* ([1894] 1970) was based recognizably on Wilde's affair with Lord Douglas. Such parodies were in effect more overt than *Punch's* allusions of the former decade. Ironically, it was thanks to their outsider status that these authors could afford to be less mindful of Victorian modesty norms and publicly insinuate Wilde's homosexuality in the 1890s. On the one hand, the literary representations furnished fodder for gossip. Their deliberate obliqueness, on the other hand, provided everybody the possibility to pretend as if they did not mean what they meant. As long as Wilde did not respond—and the studied equivocalness of the literary insinuations permitted him this option—his well-known homosexuality would not become an unavoidably public matter. What is more, the intimations were not picked up by the mainstream press for the already-cited reasons. The position of *Punch* toward Wilde in the 1890s was indeed complimentary, in part because his plays were now all the rage across the board in Victorian society (Gillespie 1996, Rowell 1978, p. 104).¹⁶

The Impending Scandal

Given the individual and collective costs that well-mannered Victorians faced in denouncing homosexuality, it was ineluctable that the nemesis

¹⁶ A critic called Wilde “perhaps the most popular middle-class wit at present before the public” (Gagnier 1986, p. 81). A few reviewers did pan *Dorian Gray*, the only work of Wilde's to be ever impugned for immorality, but only because of its aristocratic settings and not because of its decadent themes, since many of his other writings harbored similar motifs (Gagnier 1986, pp. 56–67).

of the eccentric dramatist could only be another eccentric, the Marquess of Queensberry Refusing to take the religious oath of allegiance to the queen, which he dubbed as "Christian tomfoolery," the marquess had forfeited his seat in the House of Lords for his aggressive atheism A former prizefighter, Queensberry was a pugnacious spirit with a penchant for attacking prominent people in public or through litigation Universally disliked, the marquess had no reputation no lose Being a divorcé on very bad terms with his children, he cared even less for his family name

Sometime after he heard about Lord Douglas's affair with Wilde, Queensberry ordered his son to cease all contact with the dramatist Lord Douglas was contemptuous of such meddling in his life, he continued his relationship with redoubled recklessness The marquess menaced his son in a missive in 1894 "If I catch you again with that man, I will make a public scandal in a way you little dream of" (Wilde 1928, p 95) Assisted by his band of bruisers, the peer was soon hounding Wilde in fancy restaurants He arrived at the opening of *The Importance of Being Earnest* on February 14, 1895, with the purpose of perturbing the performance The police, instructed by Wilde to guard the theater, did not let him on the premises Queensberry nevertheless deposited a bouquet of vegetables at the entrance of the theatre to declare his disdain for the dramatist

On February 18, 1895, Queensberry showed up at the Albermarle Club to which Wilde belonged Not finding him, he left a calling card with an insulting, in part illegible, and misspelled message When Wilde picked it up 10 days later, he read the note as, "To Oscar Wilde, ponce and sondomite " Queensberry would later maintain that he had scribbled, "To Oscar Wilde posing as a Somdomite," a phrase easier to justify in a libel case Surmising that there was nothing that he could do to eschew the looming scandal, Wilde set out to preempt Queensberry by suing him ¹⁷ He seems to have reckoned that he would fare better in court than in a public fracas given the high standard of evidence required in libel cases Wilde understandably did not foresee that Queensberry could deliver any witnesses, they were all partners in crime In any case, the judge would not consider them credible, most of them were prostitutes Under these circumstances, the trial would surely degenerate into a popularity contest between the beloved of London society and the black sheep of the English peerage, abhorred even by his own family

¹⁷ This is how Wilde would later describe his dilemma in *De Profundis*, the doleful diatribe against Lord Douglas that he penned in prison "So the next time he [Queensberry] attacks me, no longer in a private letter and as your private friend but in public as a public man I have to expel him from my house He goes from restaurant to restaurant looking for me, in order to insult me before the whole world, and in such a manner that if I retaliated I would be ruined, and if I did not retaliate I would be ruined also" (Wilde 1966, p 894)

THE DYNAMICS OF THE OSCAR WILDE AFFAIR

Once a scandal-generating transgression is effectively publicized, it contaminates and/or provokes third parties. These externalities, in turn, will pique reactions from those who are affected as well as from those who hope to profit from them.¹⁸ An episodic process of strategic interaction in public ensues where parties attempt to manipulate and manage the effects of the publicized transgression. This is how scandal assumes a temporal reality—a thing that erupts, grows, and ends.

The dynamics of the scandal process reveal that the public sphere is the domain not only of collective deliberation and action, but also, and more important, of appearances. It is the way that apparent transgressions appear in public that endow them with disruptive externalities, and it is the impressions that offenders, denouncers, authorities, and even members of the norm audience foster to each other in public that govern their interaction in the scandal process. The implicit logic of the public sphere, which equates being with appearance (Arendt 1958, 1982, Goffman 1959), is fully actualized in scandals. The publicity of an apparent offense will make it arduous for an actor to stabilize the signification of his or her act to others, especially when the act gives rise to uncontrollable externalities for which he or she will be held liable, and especially if the others can link the publicity of the act to his or her indiscretion or recklessness.¹⁹ The intentionality of the publicity of transgression is important in calibrating sanctions to transgressions. But one is also expected to ensure that one's transgressions, in the case of norms that can safely be violated in private, would not become public.

Reactions to transgressions are also conditioned by the fact (or to the extent) that they are themselves reactions undertaken in public, in front of others. Authorities or associates of offenders often sanction transgressions that they would otherwise accommodate only because the publicity of the transgression challenges or contaminates them in the eyes of the norm audience, sanctions function more as signals of resolve or rectitude to the norm audience than as reactions to the offender.²⁰ Members of a public can also find themselves in an analogous predicament *vis-à-vis* each other, where not shunning an offender can be interpreted as a sign

¹⁸ The anticipation of such externalities is of course the main motivation for strategically creating scandals in the first place. Once externalities are generated, as in political scandals, they can also furnish fillips for the opponents of those associated with the offenders to intervene for exploitative purposes.

¹⁹ This rebuke was recurrently leveled at Clinton during and after the Lewinsky crisis by those who otherwise did not mind his sexual shenanigans and related evasions.

²⁰ The Republican reactions toward Trent Lott in December 2002 were, for instance, conditioned by the general obloquy heaped on the senator in the wake of his public praise of the late Strom Thurmond.

of moral deficiency. Reactions in scandals are then governed by the way that publicity transforms the meaning and import of apparent transgressions.²¹ These dynamics are readily discernable in the unfolding and denouement of the Wilde affair.

The Libel Trial

The Wilde affair only really took off with the libel trial that opened with immense publicity in the Old Bailey on April 3, 1895, and during which Wilde's homosexuality was finally publicly denounced by Queensberry's lawyer, Edward Carson. In the course of the proceedings, Wilde's chief lawyer, Sir Edward Clarke, dropped the charges against Queensberry even before testimony could be heard against Wilde. This act was, as it might seem, not primarily motivated by Clarke's apprehension of the marquess's witnesses—youthful hustlers who were cowed and compensated to give evidence. Clarke had already perused, before the trial, Queensberry's plea of justification which itemized the occasions on which Wilde had allegedly solicited the prostitutes to commit sodomy. While this evidence struck some of Wilde's friends, who pleaded with him to drop the case, as substantial, the dramatist settled on proceeding. His lawyers, including the veteran Clarke, the former solicitor general who was, at the time, the president of the English Bar, did not demur. Even though in retrospect it turned out to have been a blunder, this was a calculated risk given the tainted and the uncorroborated character of the evidence.

Wilde lost his libel trial because of the externalities that were generated once his homosexuality was publicly alleged. Queensberry's lawyer highlighted the homosexual writings of Wilde as well as those of young men held to be within his orbit in *Chameleon*, an undergraduate magazine

²¹ An implication of this principle is that an individual reaction to a scandal-generating transgression is often conditioned by anticipations about how the others will react, especially when such reactions have immediate repercussions on one's life chances. In the Enron scandal, for instance, the allegations of misconduct by Enron executives contaminated all other similar firms in the eyes of the public who faced steep information costs in gauging whether the publicized transgressions were isolated incidents or not. This contamination affected even the actions of buyers who could distinguish fraudulent firms from upright ones, and who distrusted the stock market only because one could not trust that others would trust it. Hence, discredit was generalized through a self-fulfilling prophecy. Another example, which illustrates that reactions in scandals are largely autonomous of what one privately thinks of transgressions themselves, is Watergate. During much of the scandal, attitudes toward Nixon stayed indexical on political party affiliations long after the incriminating evidence against the president was made public (Lang and Lang 1983). Nixon clearly saw that it was the growing persuasion among the Republican electorate that he would be impeached that led many of his supporters to withdraw their support from him (Nixon 1978, p. 972).

published at Oxford Carson pressured Wilde to abjure these works and to acknowledge his depraved influence over their authors Wilde refused to judge his own or his acolytes' writings by moral standards and said, "I do not believe that any book or work of art ever had any effect whatever on morality" (Wilde 1928, p. 51) Thus, Wilde appeared during his cross-examination not as someone privately indulging in his unnatural tastes but as an elite who was abusing his high status (and the artistic license that such status conferred on him) by corrupting the youth While all the men suspected of improprieties with the dramatist were over the statutory age of consent, Carson underscored throughout the trial the class disparity between Wilde and the male prostitutes and the age difference between him and Lord Douglas

Moreover, Wilde mismanaged and aggravated the externalities of the publicity of his homosexuality and came across as a provocateur defying society through his words and persona even as he denied his transgression To Carson's question, "The majority of persons would come under your definition of Philistines and illiterates?" the illustrious *homme d'esprit* rejoined, "I have found wonderful exceptions" (Wilde 1928, p. 54) When Carson asked him to comment on whether his epigram, "Wickedness is a myth invented by good people to account for the curious attractiveness of others," was true, Wilde dismissively retorted, "I rarely think that anything I say is true" (Wilde 1928, p. 52) Wilde's flippant quips did not help his case, either Upon being interrogated about whether he kissed a servant boy, Wilde snapped back, "Oh dear no He was a peculiarly plain boy He was, unfortunately extremely ugly I pitied him for it" (Wilde 1928, p. 90) The *Star* accused "the aesthete" on April 3, 1895, of giving "characteristically cynical evidence" It was when juxtaposed with such an impervious performance that the witnesses against Wilde became perilous Wilde's lawyers, facing a hostile public opinion, dropped the charges against the marquess

The Prosecution and Conviction of Wilde

The outcome of the libel trial posed a challenge to the authorities Prosecutorial apathy at this point could be read as a want of steadfastness in upholding the homosexuality laws Yet the legal case against Wilde was far from adequate Losing a libel trial involving homosexuality did not inevitably lead to criminal action in Victorian England, either The trials, as we saw, imposed too many costs on third parties, the authorities were averse to act

The libel case of Robert Ross, Wilde's former lover, is a case in point From 1911 to 1914, after he renounced homosexuality, Lord Douglas composed epistles to the prime minister, several judges, and the public

prosecutor accusing Ross of being a sodomite, blackmailer, and pedophile. He even betook himself in person to Scotland Yard with a man who signed a statement confessing to physical relations with Ross. The private crusade was futile, however, the authorities were immovable. But as Douglas's harassment would not cease, Ross finally sued him for libel in 1914. Douglas produced a string of witnesses in court. Like Wilde, Ross entered a plea of *nolle prosequi*, which meant that he had admitted to the charge made in the libel. The authorities, however, disregarded Douglas's plea of justification, Ross was not prosecuted. The contrast between Ross and Wilde is all the more glaring as the evidence against the former was much more devastating than that against the latter. It came from nonprostitutes, and, unlike in the Wilde case, the witnesses testified in court (Murray 2000, pp. 208–11).

It is the different externalities of the scandals of the two men that paved the path to their divergent destinies. Ross, unlike Wilde, was nonconfrontational in court and hence did not come across as a provocateur. His lower status also rendered the outcome of the libel trial less disruptive. But, more important, the pollution produced by the publicity of Ross's homosexuality was relatively contained. The ill-starred Wilde, in contrast, was tried, and truculently so, because the libel trial exposed the dirty linen of the Victorian elite, contaminated the authorities, and thereby drastically increased the costs of not legally sanctioning Wilde.

Queensberry cultivated a long-lasting rancor for the prime minister Lord Rosebery. The marquess's oldest son, Viscount Drumlanrig, was the private secretary of the lord when he was the foreign minister. Queensberry, persuaded that Rosebery had a homosexual entanglement with his son, chased the former with a dog whip in August 1893 at Homburg. The incensed peer could be ejected from the scene and the pandemonium prevented only thanks to the intervention of the Prince of Wales (Ellmann 1988, pp. 404–5). Drumlanrig died shortly after—apparently, in a shooting accident. The marquess believed, along with some others, however, that his son was threatened with exposure over his affair with Lord Rosebery and had killed himself to protect the foreign minister (Queensberry 1949, p. 52).

Queensberry had stated his detestation of Rosebery in numerous letters which were now in the possession of Wilde's counsel. Clarke had already referred to, but not read, these letters in the police court proceedings. The grand jury deliberations were, nonetheless, leaked to the continental press. The English press did not print the prime minister's name, but the news traveled around the country (Marjoribanks 1932, p. 204). In the libel trial, Clarke read the marquess's letters in order to show that Queensberry was an unhinged man whose accusations could not be taken seriously. In one of them, Queensberry called Wilde "damned cur and coward of the Rose-

bery type" and blamed Rosebery for having creating a lifelong enmity between him and his son (Wilde 1928, pp 96–97)

The name of the prime minister, once enunciated in court, spawned insidious suspicions—some of which were pronounced obliquely in public Wild rumors, some founded in truth, others not, sprouted apace during the trials in London about the Queensberry-Rosebery-Wilde link Many were whispering, correctly, that Rosebery was a homosexual There had already been some bad-mouthing of the prime minister in some circles, the Wilde affair now refueled the ignominious bruits and disseminated them to larger publics Many said that Rosebery was pressuring the prosecution to drop charges against Wilde, who was his friend Some falsely suggested that Wilde was blackmailing the government

As we saw, the Victorian authorities were very unwilling to try homosexuality cases involving elites, in part because London society was a very small world connecting anybody with everybody, and scandals could besmirch entire elite networks and reveal their closet skeletons This is, of course, precisely what transpired during the Wilde affair Thoroughly contaminated, the authorities were thereby compelled to pursue Wilde relentlessly, even though they were otherwise indisposed to do so, in order to dampen the rumors about Rosebery and the prosecution²² After the first criminal trial, Carson asked the solicitor general Frank Lockwood if the crown could not let up on Wilde, since he had already suffered so much Lockwood replied ruefully, "I would, but we cannot, we dare not, it would at once be said, both in England and abroad that owing to the names mentioned in Queensberry's letters we were forced to abandon it" (Marjoribanks 1932, p 230) When T M Healy, the Irish home rule member of parliament, beseeched him to spare his compatriot, Lockwood put forth the identical rationale for the prosecutorial intransigence "I would not but for the abominable rumors against [Rosebery]" (Healy 1928, p 416) The Liberals lacked a majority in Parliament, and the chief secretary Arthur Balfour cautioned Lord Rosebery that they could succor Wilde only at the cost of the upcoming elections

Scandals usually give rise to a strategic interaction where the parties involved attempt to manipulate and manage the externalities that are created when transgressions are made public This interaction is conducted through signaling It is usually this interaction, and not the consensus in a society regarding the offensiveness of a transgression, that determines the unfolding of a scandal The Wilde affair generated such

²² Sir Edward Hamilton, the assistant financial secretary, noted in his diary, "A verdict of guilty would remove what appears to be a wide-felt impression that the Judge & Jury were on the last occasion got at, in order to shield others of a higher status in life" (Hamilton 1986, p 27)

a process that aggravated the antagonism toward the dramatist. As Wilde appeared as a public provocateur, the courtroom audience turned against him. The public gallery cheered when Queensberry was acquitted, and the popular reaction was officially endorsed when the judge refrained from silencing the crowd. The press, in turn, was encouraged by this unc customary forbearance and cudged Wilde without clemency.²³ Some newspapers exhorted legal action against him, and *The Importance of Being Earnest* and *An Ideal Husband* were shortly after cancelled at the Haymarket Theater and at the St. James.

The growing public opinion against Wilde made inaction by the authorities seem like lack of resolve. More damningly, however, the press smelled a coverup. In its coverage of the police court hearings, the *Evening News*, on March 9, 1895, questioned the probity of the legal officials. Reporting the private interview that the judge had with Wilde's and Queensberry's counsels after the mentioning of the Queensberry letters, a journalist publicly voiced the doubts of many: "What was the reason for the retirement, was the case to be nipped in the bud in the interest of 'exalted personages'?"

Risking discredit, the authorities resorted to zealous prosecution and adjudication. Sir Justice John Bridge declaimed after the libel trial, "I think there is no worse crime than that which the prisoners are charged" (quoted in Goodman 1989, p. 93). Wilde was thus refused bail. This gratuitous denunciation of Wilde was legally tenuous and the incarceration irregular as he was arraigned not with a felony (sodomy) but only with a misdemeanor (gross indecency), the maximum sentence for which was only two years. In the first criminal trial, the male prostitutes were promised immunity for their word against Wilde. In addition to being uncorroborated accomplices, however, several of these witnesses were self-avowed blackmailers, and one of them perjured himself on the stand. One of two nonprostitute witnesses gainsaid indecencies between him and Wilde. The other one's testimony was muddled. Eyewitnesses from hotels

²³ The *Daily Telegraph* wrote on the morning of April 6, 1895: "The judge did not attempt to silence or reprove the irrepressible cheering in Court which greeted the acquittal of this sorely provoked and cruelly injured father." The *National Observer* expressed gratitude to the marquess in the name of those with "wholesome minds for destroying the High Priest of the Decadents, an obscene impostor whose prominence has been a social outrage ever since he transferred from Trinity Dublin to Oxford his vices, his follies and his vanities." The *Daily Telegraph* berated Wilde for "shameless disavowal of all morality" and for having established "a cult of degeneracy." Wilde was also held responsible for having contaminated the audiences through his own legal action: "We have had enough of Oscar Wilde, who has been the means of inflicting on the public during this recent episode as much moral damage of the most hideous and repulsive kind as no single individual could well cause," declared the same newspaper.

were contradictory and unreliable. The trial terminated with a deadlocked jury.

London was now aflutter with rumors regarding Rosebery's homosexuality and his putative efforts to save Wilde. In addition, some testimony in the trials hinted that some of the young men Wilde had slept with were the relatives of Victorian dignitaries. As a result, the *Morning* suspected illegitimate interference with justice on May 2, 1895: "Society feels that a gross public scandal has not yet been probed to its depths, and that a great mass of loathsome evidence must once more be heard in open court."

Ought the prosecution stop there? That is a very grave question. Whatever may be truth as regards Wilde and Taylor, the evidence given at the Old Bailey seems to affect more reputations than those that have been openly impugned" (quoted in Goodman 1989, pp. 117–18).

The vortex of the scandal, tarnishing more and more prominent names, forced the hands of the authorities to convict Wilde. Simultaneously, however, they wanted to prevent the publicity of his sin as much as possible. When the judge of the libel trial congratulated Carson for his impeccable cross-examination, he also thanked him for sparing the court of "the filth" of Wilde's deeds. The press was urged to censor its coverage.²⁴ And as they would rather not try him, the powers that be implicitly extended Wilde several opportunities to flee the country. Wilde was notified forthwith after the libel trial through informal channels of his immanent arrest. The magistrate who had denied Wilde bail and repudiated him in the most impassioned terms issued his warrant with sufficient delay for him to catch the last train for Dover. Wilde's friends implored him to leave. But he stayed—or rather shilly-shallied. After the first criminal trial, Wilde was accorded another chance to abscond. He spurned this opportunity as well and had to be prosecuted with a vengeance.

The prosecution proffered, albeit without success, to withdraw charges against Wilde's procurer on the condition that he turn state's evidence. In a decision that was particularly detrimental to Wilde, the director of

²⁴ The *Evening Standard* censored Queensberry's libel note as "Oscar Wilde posing as _____" (Cohen 1993, pp. 145–48). Other papers did not even mention the note, calling it "words unfit for publication." A few newspapers debated the pros and cons of the prosecution in terms of the contaminations that the publicity of homosexuality would engender. The editors of the *Pall Mall Gazette* wrote on April 6, 1895: "It is a difficult question to decide whether in such cases absolute reticence or modified publicity is the better in the interests of public morality." After the jury disagreed in Wilde's first trial, some worried that more harm "would be done to the public morals" if the case were renewed (Ellmann 1988, p. 465). While the press almost unanimously supported and in effect clamored for the prosecution of Wilde, it was acknowledged that this had a price: "It is at a terrible cost that society has purged itself of these loathsome importers of exotic vice, but the gain is worth the price," wrote the *News of the World* on May 26, 1895, after Wilde was sentenced (quoted in Goodman 1989, p. 132).

public prosecutions instructed Solicitor General Lockwood to prosecute at the second criminal trial. Lockwood was not only famous for his ferocity but also retained, thanks to his rank, the customary right to make the final address to the jury. This was only the second important case in which he was detailed to exploit this prerogative. Moreover, as the *Star* reported on May 20, 1895, Sir Justice Wills was appointed by special arrangement to preside (Foldy 1997, p. 35). He proved unduly tendentious. Prejudicing the dramatist in the eyes of the jury, he permitted Wilde's trial to follow immediately that of his procurer, against whom the evidence was much more solid. Justice Wills also admitted all the evidence that the judge of the first criminal trial had barred in the absence of independent validation. The testimony of the only nonprostitute witness teemed with so many inconsistencies that the prosecution had to relinquish the complaint regarding him. But in his summation to the jury, the judge presumed Wilde's culpability by playing up his supposedly noxious sway over Lord Douglas manifested in the billets-doux exchanged between the two men.

Over and above reacting to Wilde's homosexuality, the authorities were endeavoring hammer and tongs to ward off the contaminations that the publicity of his sin had engendered. But their asperity unwittingly authorized the press's ire against Wilde, which, in turn, only spurred the authorities to be more fervent. This feverishly self-feeding fury could not but have unfavorable effects on the jury, and Wilde was finally convicted to the severest sentence that law allowed for gross indecency with the uncorroborated testimonies of accomplices—a very rare occurrence in English criminal practice of the time. The witnesses had blackmailing records to boot. Justice Wills scathingly upbraided Wilde and called the sentence—two years in prison with hard labor—“totally inadequate for such a case as this” (Wilde 1928, p. 426). Taking its cues from the official actors, the English press was unstinting in its en masse assault on Wilde. “Open the windows. Let in the fresh air!” cried the London *Evening News* on May 27, 1895, calling Wilde “a social pest.” The *Daily Telegraph* proclaimed on the same day, “The grave of contemptuous oblivion may rest on his foolish ostentation, his empty paradoxes, his insufferable posing, his incurable vanity.”

This reciprocal reinforcement of rage not only contributed in large part to Wilde's conviction, but also obligated the members of the different sections of the Victorian public to signal rectitude to each other horizontally by shunning Wilde after his sentence. The dynamics of the scandal made it progressively dear for those who would rather not punish Wilde to not do so, while minimizing the sanctioning costs faced by those who rather would. If Wilde had been acquitted or if the prosecution had not retried him, he would have suffered much less social ostracism. During

the late Victorian period, many high-status actors who were widely held to be homosexuals but were nevertheless legally absolved, or were not prosecuted in the first place, encountered restricted opprobrium from the public. The aforementioned acquittal of Boulton and Park vindicated them for the press. None of the elites embroiled in the Cleveland scandal, except Lord Somerset, who was allowed to decamp, were seriously affected. Prince Eddy, whom many assumed to be a homosexual, was named Duke of Clarence in May 1890 (Aronson 1994, p. 181). Even though Lord Euston had confessed in his libel trial to having been in the male brothel on Cleveland Street—with the feeble pretext that he had stumbled into it under the impression that it was a regular striptease club—the peer was soon elevated to the rank of the grand master of the Mark Masons and was later nominated an aide-de-camp by King Edward VII.

The contrast between the Wilde and Ross cases is again telling and attests to how, in Victorian England, the societal sanctioning of elite homosexuality required prior legal measures even in instances where the transgression was already common knowledge. After he lost the aforementioned libel trial against Lord Douglas in 1914 and hence acceded to the charge of being a sodomite (as well as a pedophile and a blackmailer), Robert Ross had to resign from his post as “assessor of picture valuations to the Board of Trade.” But, as he was not prosecuted, he survived his scandal, for all intents and purposes, unscathed. After the verdict, 300 members of the Victorian *crème de la crème* issued a testimonial to the good character of Ross. He was made a trustee of the National Gallery two years later (Croft-Cooke 1963, p. 274).

Only because (and only after) Wilde was prosecuted and sentenced, on the other hand, did the Victorian society prove much less obliging to its former favorite. Wilde’s conviction imposed a unity on the different sections of the Victorian public against him, and he abruptly became an untouchable. While Oscar Wilde’s homosexuality was much talked about in various social circles, it had taken his trials to inescapably publicize his transgression to the Victorian society as a whole. The sentence now impelled the Victorian subpublics, especially the higher and cultured ones, to take a stance against Wilde lest they be stained in the eyes of the others. Wilde’s plays were hence banished from the English theater scene, his books pulled from bookstore shelves. Only an obscure pornographer would agree to publish *Ballad of Reading Gaol*, which Wilde wrote in exile. And it was only after the seventh printing of the plaintive poem in June 1899 that the expatriate would dare insert his name in brackets on the title page. Most reviewers overlooked the work. In accordance with the logic of scandal, his high status, which had hitherto shielded Wilde, now exacerbated the societal reactions to him. With his homosexuality public, he was now a synecdoche of the innovative segments of the art

community, who were demonized as a corrupt influence in English society. The Wilde scandal also offered opportunities to some opinion leaders in the press to vent their class resentment. Wilde was hence represented as the avatar of the degenerate upper classes. The London *Evening News* of May 26, 1895, excoriated Wilde and others of his ilk "[Wilde] was a perfect type of his class, a gross sensualist veneered with the affectation of artistic feeling too delicate for the appreciation of common clay. To him and such as him we owe the spread of moral degeneration amongst men with young men with abilities sufficient to make them a credit to their country."

These contaminations compelled the members of the art community and the cultured elite of the country to signal rectitude to the larger community as well as to each other by shunning Wilde. Unlike its modernist French counterpart (Bourdieu 1992), the English avant-garde had not effectuated a rupture with bourgeois society and was very much reliant on it. Most of his fellow artists who were well privy all along to his sexual habits snubbed Wilde in France after his release—when they did not bluntly convey their contempt (Ellmann 1988, pp. 536–37). His close friend, the painter Edward Coley Burne-Jones, hoped that Wilde would shoot himself and was dismayed when he did not. Few signed a petition drafted by Bernard Shaw to have his sentence reduced. Aubrey Beardsley, who had illustrated *Salomé*, declined to draw for the *Yellow Book*, the chief journal of the Aestheticism movement, as long as Wilde was published there.²⁵ To parry stigma, his wife changed their sons' names and in her will forbade Wilde to ever see them again. Wilde's few remaining years in France were those of solitude and penury.

Scandals are, in part, structurally determined. The cultural attitudes of the Victorians toward the publicity of sex, the fame and high status of Oscar Wilde, and the dense networks within the Victorian elite that connected Queensberry, Wilde, and Rosebery affected the externalities that would be generated when Wilde's sexuality was made public. But scandals also give rise to a strategic interaction where parties respond to and attempt to manipulate such externalities. During such episodes, the parties respond more to others' prior public handling of disgrace than to the transgression underlying the scandal. Hence, the unfolding of scandals cannot be reduced to sociological variables, and the strategic and sequential wielding and warding off of disgrace renders scandals path dependent.²⁶

²⁵ All this was unavailing, however. The Aestheticism movement, tarred in toto by the Wilde scandal, petered out soon after Wilde's conviction (Sturgis 1995).

²⁶ For a cogent critique of the variables approach in sociology and a potent plea for the irreducible temporality of social phenomena, see Abbott (2001).

The piteous fortune of Wilde was particularly path dependent. Wilde would most probably not have been tried if he had not himself initiated the legal process by suing Queensberry—even though the writer would have nevertheless probably been attacked in public by the peer, which would have brought upon the dramatist some social censure. Wilde's homosexuality was already common knowledge in London. But the allegations in the libel trial granted unavoidable publicity to Wilde's homosexuality by imposing it simultaneously onto the audiences and authorities who had until then reasons for ignoring it, and who would have incurred costs for denouncing it. Nevertheless, Wilde could have won his libel trial if he had not appeared as a provocateur during his cross-examination. He would at least have been exempt from the moral blitz of the opinion leaders and thereby would have later elided the repercussions of their collective fury on the judicial process. It was the confluence of Wilde's legal rout with the contamination of the Victorian elite in the libel trial that led to the criminal prosecution of the author. Here, contingency played a part. Many Victorian libel cases bared the seamy doings and dealings of elite families to the general public. Yet it was an evitable vicissitude of the Wilde scandal that the Queensberry letters were read in court. Once Lord Rosebery was fatefully tied to the affair, this specific externality, with an overwhelming thrust, forced the authorities to distance themselves from it through zealous prosecution and adjudication. Finally, had Wilde not been prosecuted or sentenced, or had he left the country during his trials, the reactions he would have had to endure would have been much more temperate. It was, in large part, the legal process that adversely altered the incentives of various Victorian groups and caused their volt-face.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

For the Victorians, the publicity of homosexuality contaminated third parties and the public sphere as a whole and was thought to yield deleterious provocative and normalizing consequences. Sanctioning instances of homosexuality would entail its publicity and thereby create a scandal. Homosexual acts committed in private were thus undersanctioned by authorities and audiences even when such acts were common knowledge. This was especially the case with elite offenders, since high status multiplied the externalities of the publicity of homosexuality. And audiences and authorities were contaminated—as well as provoked—when Wilde's well-known homosexuality was unavoidably made public in the course of his legal ordeals. These externalities gave rise to a process of strategic interaction among those affected. During this process, the authorities were

stirred to signal resolve and rectitude to the general norm audience through extraordinary zeal. The official acts, in turn, welded the already provoked norm audience against the author. Hence, the very factors that undergirded the underenforcement of homosexuality norms in Victorian England bred overenforcement once Wilde's transgression became inescapably public.

This article proposed a phenomenology of scandal as the disruptive publicity of transgression, which revealed that much of norm work and reactions to deviance in society are profoundly molded by the externalities that are generated when transgressions are publicized. In doing so, I showed that publicity is a *sui generis* social force that radically transforms the meanings and effects of transgressions. Through developing these conceptions of scandal and publicity, I also sought to emphasize the dramaturgical nature of the public sphere, which, in the recent literature following Habermas (1989), tends to be seen through normative and rosy lenses as a merely critical and deliberative domain.

My phenomenology goes beyond an account of how scandals affect the actions of those who come into contact with them. It also makes predictions regarding the frequency of scandals in different social systems. We saw that the anticipation of negative externalities augmented the costs of denouncing homosexuals in Victorian England and resulted in underenforcement. The same logic also applies to political scandals and would explain their escalation during the recent decades in the Western countries. To the extent that political institutions possess sacredness in the Durkheimian sense, publicizing damaging information about those who represent them is costly for the public who is hurt or offended by the contamination of the state and the resulting disruptions of the political process. In the face of such externalities, legal and social norms will erect obstacles and costs for scandalmongers who would face disapproval from the norm audience for engaging in ethical aggression against the political elite and thereby sully the august institutions they embody. The threshold of evidence and of the gravity of the transgression necessary to make a successful denunciation of a high-status political actor will be high. The relative inviolability of the political institutions will not only insure substantial immunity for the actors who stand for them, it will also arm public officials with redoubtable resources of riposte and deterrence—resources that may be legitimate as well as illegitimate—against scandalmongers.

Hence, there is reason to think that the upsurge in political scandal activity during the recent decades in the West has required the profanation of political authority as its main enabling condition. The waning prestige of political institutions (a process that started with the Vietnam War in the United States), the declining dependence of the public on the state

(reinforced by the end of the Cold War, the rise of globalization, and the spread of neoliberal economic policies), and the increasing transparency to which politicians and the decision-making process have been subject, have, in empirically variable degrees, profaned political authority. As the profanation has relatively decreased the externalities of political scandals, the public's discretion and tolerance threshold for wrongdoing by political actors have also dropped. The result is that the political actors have been rendered ever more vulnerable to scandal mongering and moral flak by colleagues, media, and legal actors. Once established, the climate of scandal has, in turn, further accelerated the profanation process.²⁷

The Victorian case also illustrates that the very repulsiveness of a transgression for a norm audience can at times cause underenforcement in view of its externalities when publicized. Hence, the softening of sentiments toward an offense, by abating the externalities of its publicity, can give rise to souped-up societal sanctioning. This mechanism applies above all to the case of taboo-like transgressions and offers clues into why contemporary American politics is routinely plagued with sex scandals. Although many see the latter as the expression of some antiquated puritanism in the American psyche, the phenomenon seems, on the contrary, to be partly an unintended upshot of sexual liberalization in a context of degraded political authority. After all, a much more austere America from the late 19th century until the 1960s witnessed almost no sexual scandals involving political actors (Summers 2000).

The relative attenuation of the sexual puritanism of Americans since the early 1960s has made the publicity of sex considerably less contaminating for much of the national audience. One by-product of the radical ease with which contemporary Americans talk about sex in public is that the individual and collective costs of making accusations of sexual misconduct about political actors have dramatically dwindled. Of course, the relaxation of sexual mores means that fewer people are outraged (and somewhat less so) when scandals occur. But this trend has been far outpaced by the rate at which sex talk has been normalized, if not banalized, both for the accusers and the audiences.

Scandals are often brushed aside as ephemeral or epiphenomenal. Yet they can occasionally be very consequential, and it is only if we approach scandal by the externalities caused by the publicity of transgressions that we can then comprehend its socially creative powers. As it is borne out by evidence from the last decades of the French *ancien régime* (Darnton 1995) and post-Watergate United States (Garment 1991), the contaminating effects of a self-reproducing spate of scandals can help whittle

²⁷ For a detailed study of this process in the contemporary French context, see Adut (2004).

away at the prestige of political institutions as a whole. Or, by dint of the provocations and normalizations they bring about, scandals can transform norms and spawn social change. For instance, Luther's public heresy—his defiant burning of a papal bull and a copy of the canon law in 1520—was a founding moment in the history of the Protestant Reformation. Similarly, the provocative exhibition of Manet's *Déjeuner sur l'herbe* in 1863, which was denounced as an affront to decency and good taste by the artistic establishment and bourgeois public, prompted modernism's rise to prominence. Combining disruptiveness with salience, scandals like Watergate or the Dreyfus affair can galvanize popular passions (Posner 1999), become central references in the collective consciousness of societies (Birnbaum 1994, Schudson 1992), and function as "historical events" transforming social structures (Sewell 1995). It is because of the disruptive potential of scandals that sundry actors—from private citizens, to the press, to painters, to prosecutors—routinely resort to them for opportunistic as well as moral purposes. This also explains why, at the same time, individuals and collectivities of all sizes are constantly, if only surreptitiously, regulating themselves and each other to avert scandals.

The general theory of scandal proposed in this article is not only useful because scandal is a common social phenomenon that is at once significant in itself and insofar as it unveils the dramaturgical logic of the public sphere. Scandal is also a protean form governing the dynamics of seemingly very disparate occurrences like religious heresies, publicity stunts, political purges, artistic provocations and controversies, acts of civil disobedience, causes célèbres, electoral campaigns, moral crusades, Goffmanesque interactional disturbances, and whistle-blowing incidents. Much of social conflict, to the extent that it takes place in public, feeds on scandal or takes on its overall features. Theorizing scandal permits us to appreciate the principal role that publicity and transgression play together in social reproduction, conflict, and change.

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Interlocking Directorates and Political Cohesion among Corporate Elites¹

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This study uses data on campaign contributions and methods of network analysis to investigate the significance of interlocking directorates for political cohesion among corporate elites. Using quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) regression, the author shows that social ties formed through common membership on corporate boards contribute more to similarity of political behavior than commonalities of economic interests, such as those associated with operating in the same industry or the same geographic region. Moreover, the politically cohesive effects of directorship ties remain robust even as one moves several links down the chain of indirect ties that connect top corporate officers to one another. The study thus provides empirical support for the thesis that social networks among corporate elites facilitate political cohesion within the business community.

Interlocking directorates among major U.S. corporations have been a focus of political and scholarly interest since the early 20th century. In recent decades, advances in computer technology and methods of network analysis have led to a virtual explosion of empirical studies of interlocking corporate directorates. Despite this extensive body of research, important questions remain as to the meaning and significance of director interlocks. As Mizruchi (1996) notes in his review of the literature, the question "What do interlocks do?" is perhaps the most crucial question confronting interlocks research. Critics of the early studies of director interlocks argued that this research was mostly descriptive and that the social, political, and economic effects of interlocking directorates were more often assumed than empirically demonstrated. Partly in response to this criticism, con-

¹ I wish to thank Bill Domhoff, Ken Hudson, Beth Mintz, Robert O'Brien, Caleb Southworth, and the *AJS* reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. Direct correspondence to Val Burris, Department of Sociology, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon 97403. E-mail: vburris@uoregon.edu

temporary scholars have sought to provide more direct evidence of the consequences that director interlocks have for the functioning of large corporations and the behavior of corporate elites

One consequence that is often imputed to director interlocks is the potential to facilitate political cohesion among corporations and corporate elites.² Disagreement over whether or not interlocking directorates serve this function is linked to a larger debate over how best to understand patterns of political consensus and cleavage within the business community (Mizruchi 1992, pp. 1–32). One view (generally associated with pluralist theory) argues that political consensus, when it occurs, is the contingent outcome of a coincidence of firm-specific or industry-specific interests—interests that are just as likely to divide corporations and corporate elites as they are to produce political unity. A second view (generally associated with elite theory or class cohesion theory) argues that potential divisions rooted in the parochial interests of individual firms or industries are reconciled or overridden by mechanisms of consensus formation that are embedded in social networks, such as those formed through interlocking directorates.

Most researchers now working in this area recognize that one can point to signs of both consensus and cleavage within the business community, and would reject the notion that one must choose between one-sided versions of either of these theories. Rather than debating whether business is essentially divided or essentially unified, the focus of research has turned to questions of specifying more precisely the forces that threaten to divide the business community at any given time, and the mechanisms by and conditions under which (some degree of) business unity is achieved. Whether or not interlocking directorates facilitate political cohesion within the business community is a key issue within this research agenda, and one that only recently has become subject to rigorous empirical study.

By far the most systematic effort to bring empirical evidence to bear on this question is Mizruchi's (1992) important study of interfirm relations and their impact on corporate political action. Mizruchi's findings are mixed but generally support the thesis that director interlocks increase the potential for political cohesion among corporations. Using testimony before Congress as a measure of corporate political action, Mizruchi shows that firms that are connected through interlocking directorates are more likely to express agreement on legislative matters, controlling for other

² Unless explicitly stated otherwise, I use "cohesion" in the *objective* rather than subjective sense of the term. That is to say, "cohesion" refers to the density of observable relations or similarity of observable behavior among actors, without any presumptions regarding the extent to which these are associated with subjective sentiments of solidarity or collective identity (cf. Mizruchi 1992, pp. 34–43).

factors that could be expected to promote consensus. This is true both for “direct” interlocks (firms that are directly linked through a common director) and for “indirect” interlocks (firms that each have a director on the board of a third, intermediary firm). However, when political unity is measured in terms of corporate contributions to political candidates, the findings are ambiguous and slightly puzzling. Mizruchi reports that *indirect* interlocks between firms contribute significantly to similarity of political contributions (net of other factors), but that *direct* interlocks do not. Mizruchi interprets this seemingly anomalous finding as an indication that “structurally equivalent” positions within networks of interlocking directors may be more conducive to political cohesion than direct ties between firms.³ Whatever the merits of this hypothesis, the fact that direct interlocks do not contribute to similarity of campaign contributions is certainly contrary to the usual understanding of how director interlocks are thought to facilitate political cohesion.

Mizruchi’s findings appear less puzzling when it is recognized that his measure of indirect interlocks is limited to one specific type of indirect interlock: the common membership by directors of industrial firms on the boards of leading financial corporations. Research has shown that the boards of large commercial banks and insurance companies provide important meeting grounds for some of the most influential and politically active members of the business community (Zeitlin 1974, 1976, Useem 1984, Mintz and Schwartz 1985, Bearden and Mintz 1987, Soref and Zeitlin 1987, Burris 1992). Hence, it is not surprising that joint participation within these exclusive “inner circles” might have consequences for political cohesion that other corporate interlocks do not. Mizruchi does not present evidence on whether indirect interlocks *in general* are significantly associated with similarity of political behavior.

It is important that Mizruchi’s research be followed up with similar studies using data from other elections and other samples of firms. In this study, however, I wish to advance a different line of analysis—one that complements, rather than replicates, Mizruchi’s research on the relationship between director interlocks and political cohesion. One of the early and most important findings of the research on interlocking directorates is the fact that “broken ties” (situations in which an interlock between firms is severed by the death or retirement of a director) are not typically restored through the exchange of a new director (Koenig, Gogel, and Sonquist 1979, Ornstein 1980, Palmer 1983). This finding has led many to the conclusion that the significance of director interlocks for firms

³ In the language of social network analysis, “structurally equivalent” actors are ones who share a common pattern of ties to the larger network, even though they may not be directly tied to one another.

cannot, in most cases, be located at the level of the specific interfirm dyad, but must be interpreted as a *general* resource that facilitates (through any of a number of equivalent channels) the flow of communication, monitoring of events, or projection of influence across the larger corporate network (Useem 1984, Mintz and Schwartz 1985, Stearns and Mizruchi 1986)

Research on interlocking directorates has been greatly enriched by studies that shift the focus of attention from dyads of interconnected firms to the structural position of firms within the overall interlock network. It is worth recalling, however, that the theoretical conclusions drawn by the authors of the original broken-tie studies pointed toward an even more radical reorientation of research on interlocking directorates. For Koenig et al. (1979), Ornstein (1980), and Palmer (1983), the fact that accidentally broken ties were not typically reconstituted with new ties to the same firm was taken as evidence that interlocks were not primarily *inter-organizational* phenomena and might be better conceptualized as *intra-class* phenomena—that is, as social ties among corporate elites and other members of the capitalist class.⁴ This implied that the answer to the question “What do interlocks do?” ought to be pursued by studying the behavioral implications for corporate directors of their ties to other directors through common board memberships, rather than focusing exclusively on the behavioral implications for firms of their links to other firms through shared directors.

The thesis that interlocking directorates facilitate political cohesion among corporate elites is common within the literature (Mills 1956, Domhoff 1967, Zeitlin 1974, Useem 1984), but hard evidence for this thesis is surprisingly limited. Research does show that corporate elites who are instrumental in the formation of interlocking directorates (i.e., multiple directors) are distinctive in terms of their political affiliations and behavior (Useem 1984, Burris 1991, Broyles 1993). However, systematic research using modern methods of network analysis to study the structure and/or behavioral consequences of interlock networks for individual directors is almost entirely lacking (see Bearden and Mintz [1987] and Johnsen and Mintz [1989] for notable exceptions). Overwhelmingly, the empirical research on interlocking directorates has taken the links among firms as the focus of analysis, ignoring the complementary network of links among

⁴ The distinction between interorganizational and intraclass perspectives on interlocking directorates is fruitfully employed in a number of later studies (Palmer, Friedland, and Singh 1986, Palmer and Friedland 1987, Johnsen and Mintz 1989, Kono et al. 1998, Palmer and Barber 2001). See Mintz (2002) for a comprehensive discussion of the theoretical and empirical questions raised by this distinction.

individual directors created by their common membership on corporate boards

The present study seeks to broaden the research on interlocking directorates by investigating ties among individual directors and the significance of those ties for the political behavior of individual directors. The case for extending the research on interlocking directorates in this direction is reinforced by two important facts. First, in the terminology of social network analysis, the network of firms linked through directors and the network of directors linked through firms are known as “duals” of one another. It is well established that there is no simple correspondence between the structural properties of a network and its dual (Breiger 1974). This makes any inferences about patterns or processes of cohesion from one network to the other fraught with danger. For example, Bearden and Mintz (1987) show that although banks play a central role in unifying the network of corporations linked through shared directors, bankers themselves do not play a corresponding role in unifying the network of directors linked through corporations.

Second, as Burris (2001) shows with respect to campaign contributions, research based on the political behavior of firms cannot be extrapolated to predict or explain the political behavior of corporate elites associated with those firms, and vice versa. The political action of individuals follows a different logic from the political action of firms as a result of the different legal, institutional, and strategic contexts in which it occurs. For example, as political contributors, firms are generally more interested in buying access for purposes of lobbying, whereas individual corporate elites are more interested in bolstering the election prospects of favored parties and candidates. Hence, research on campaign spending by individual corporate elites, by providing a more direct measure of true partisan preferences, may clarify theoretical questions that remain unresolved in the research based on corporate contributions. For both of these reasons, investigation of the political implications of interlocking directorates should not be limited to the analysis of firms, but should include research on the ties among individual corporate elites and the consequences of those ties for political action.

This study uses data on campaign contributions and methods of network analysis to investigate the consequences of interlocking directorates for the political behavior of individual corporate elites. Using quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) regression, I show that social ties formed through common membership on corporate boards contribute more to political cohesion than presumed commonalities of economic interests—such as those associated with operating in the same industry or the same geographic region—that are widely cited in the literature as important influences on the politics of corporations and corporate elites. The study

thus highlights the significance of interlocking directorates, relative to other factors, as potentially important mechanisms of political cohesion within the business community

DATA AND METHODS

For this analysis, I constructed a set of similarly ordered matrices representing links through boards of directors and measures of political cohesion among 761 corporate elites. To assemble the sample, I began with the top officers of 1,050 of the largest U.S. corporations in 1980. These included the 500 largest publicly traded industrial firms, the 100 largest service firms, the 50 largest commercial banks, the 50 largest investment banks, the 50 largest insurance firms, the 50 largest diversified finance companies, the 50 largest retailers, the 50 largest transportation firms, the 50 largest utilities, and the 100 largest privately held companies. Individual corporate elites were eligible for inclusion in the sample if they held positions of chairman, CEO, president, or (in the case of investment banks) partner of any of these 1,050 corporations (a total of 1,879 persons).

Following Mizruchi (1992), I operationalized political behavior in terms of contributions to political candidates. Through a careful examination of the Federal Election Commission's list of individual campaign contributors, I identified 1,088 of those top corporate executives who contributed to political candidates or committees in the 1980 election (the same election studied by Mizruchi). Of these 1,088 contributors, 761 made at least one contribution to a candidate for president. These 761 presidential contributors were taken as the sample for the study.⁵

The pattern of political contributions by individual corporate elites differs in several ways from that of the corporate political action committees (PACs) that have been the focus of most recent research on business involvement in campaign finance. For legal and other reasons, aggregate corporate contributions are usually larger than those made by

⁵ Presidential contributors are not a perfectly random cross-section of the larger sample of 1,879 top corporate officers, although the differences are modest. On average, presidential contributors tend to be associated with slightly larger firms, and they hold slightly more outside directorships. Top executives of firms with high levels of defense contracts are especially likely to be presidential contributors, but otherwise, there are few significant industry differences in the propensity to contribute. Neither are there any pronounced regional differences between contributors and noncontributors. As a precaution, I applied a correction for selection bias to control for any effects associated with nonrandomness, but, as I explain in more detail below, the results of the study remain the same with or without such a correction.

individuals⁶ In 1980, for example, the average total contribution of 489 PACs operated by the largest U S firms was about \$29,000 (Mizruchi and Koenig 1986, p 483) By comparison, the average total contribution of the 761 corporate directors in this sample was about \$5,000⁷ Corporate PAC contributions are also spread across a larger number of candidates and are directed mainly toward congressional races Individual corporate elites rarely contribute to more than a handful of congressional candidates and direct a larger share of their contributions to presidential candidates and to both party and nonparty committees⁸ Finally, although corporations are known to contribute to competing candidates in the same race, this is relatively rare In the case of presidential primaries, however, it is not uncommon for individual corporate elites to contribute to more than one candidate for the same office⁹ Of the directors in the sample, 38% contributed to two or more presidential candidates, and 18% contributed to three or more This difference is largely a reflection of the distinctive character of presidential primaries as compared with the congressional races that receive the bulk of corporate PAC money The logic of presidential primaries encourages contributors to hedge their bets by supporting multiple candidates who represent a similar political viewpoint, by switching support from one candidate to another depending upon the

⁶ Legally, individuals were limited to \$50,000 in total contributions in the 1980 election Corporate PACs were restricted to \$10,000 per candidate (primary and general election combined) but had no limit on total contributions

⁷ This might make it appear that contributions by individual corporate elites are politically less important than those made by corporations, but it should be remembered that there are many times more corporate elites who contribute to political campaigns than there are corporations Overall, contributions by business elites and other wealthy individuals are the single largest source of money for political campaigns This is especially true for presidential primary campaigns, where PACs play a negligible role, and 70%–90% of the money raised by candidates comes from large individual contributions (Brown, Powell, and Wilcox 1995, p 8) In congressional races, large individual contributions account for roughly 35%–40% of the money raised, compared with 6%–10% raised from corporate PACs (Federal Election Commission 2001) I cannot say for certain what share of these large contributions comes from corporate elites, although the fact that 46% of those making contributions of \$200 or more report annual incomes in excess of \$250,000 suggests that high-ranking corporate officers are well represented among this group (Green et al 1998)

⁸ By nonparty committees, I refer here specifically to ideological PACs of the kind that clearly aligned with one or the other of the two major parties Corporate elites also make contributions to their own company or industry PACs, but these are excluded from this analysis because of the difficulty in assigning them any clear partisan meaning

⁹ Since 1976, presidential candidates who accept public funding in the general election are precluded from taking further private donations after they have received their party's nomination Hence, it is during the prenomination primary campaign that individual corporate elites make their contributions to presidential candidates

shifting fortunes of candidates over the long primary campaign, or by seeking to minimize the potential stakes of the general election by contributing to their preferred candidate(s) in each of the two major parties

For each of the 289,180 dyads in the study, I constructed three measures of similarity of political behavior. The first measures the similarity between corporate directors in terms of the percentage of their total political contributions going to each of the two major parties. The similarity of party support between directors i and j (denoted by P_{ij}) is given by the expression

$$P_{ij} = 1 - |r_i - r_j|, \quad (1)$$

where r_i is the proportion of director i 's total contributions that went to Republican Party candidates or committees, and r_j is the proportion of director j 's total contributions that went to Republican Party candidates or committees. This measure ranges from zero (least similar) to one (most similar).

The second and third measures focus exclusively on contributions to presidential primary candidates. The presidential contest receives by far the most donations by individual corporate elites and is the only race in which a sufficient number of individuals contribute to allow for a detailed analysis of patterns of support for identical or opposing candidates. Compared with other presidential elections, the 1980 election is particularly well suited for revealing political differences among corporate elites. The fact that there was neither an incumbent nor a clear front-runner among Republican presidential hopefuls, combined with the vulnerability of the Democratic incumbent (Jimmy Carter), encouraged a large and ideologically diverse field of Republican candidates to compete for financial support from the business community (John Anderson,¹⁰ Howard Baker, George Bush, John Connally, Philip Crane, Robert Dole, Benjamin Fernandez, and Ronald Reagan). Having a Democratic president up for reelection also served to separate the hard-core Republican supporters from the more pragmatic ones who, despite their Republican sympathies, were not averse to contributing some money to Democratic candidates, especially if they were incumbents. Finally, Carter's vulnerability within his own party brought two popular Democratic challengers into the race.

¹⁰ Better remembered for his third-party candidacy in the 1980 general election, John Anderson was initially a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination.

(Jerry Brown and Ted Kennedy), creating additional choices for the minority of corporate elites who traditionally supported Democrats ¹¹

The similarity in corporate directors' contributions to presidential candidates was measured in two ways. The first measure counts the number of instances in which directors contributed to the same presidential candidate, controlling for variation in the total number of presidential candidates supported by each dyad of directors. The number of standardized matches in presidential contributions (denoted by S_{ij}) is given by the expression

$$S_{ij} = x_{ij} / \sqrt{x_i x_j}, \quad (2)$$

where x_{ij} is the number of presidential candidates supported jointly by directors i and j , x_i is the total number of presidential candidates supported by director i , and x_j is the total number of presidential candidates supported by director j . This measure ranges from zero (no matches in the candidates supported) to one (only matching candidates supported) ¹². The second measure is the Pearson correlation for each dyad of directors between the 1×11 vectors representing the amount of their contributions to each of 11 presidential candidates (Anderson, Baker, Brown, Bush, Carter, Connally, Crane, Dole, Fernandez, Kennedy, and Reagan). There

¹¹ It goes without saying that, in order to identify sources or mechanisms of political cohesion within the business community, we require data on a type of political behavior for which there is not *too much* unity, since it is only through the variance in patterns of behavior that the causes or correlates of cohesion can be identified. In this respect, presidential primary contributions are particularly well suited for exploring political cohesion within the business community, since they accentuate modest differences in political preferences, even when a substantial majority of corporate elites are relatively unified in their support for Republican over Democratic candidates.

¹² The number of matches is standardized to ensure that similarity is measured independently of variation in the number of candidates supported—that is, to make sure that two directors who contribute to multiple candidates will not appear more similar simply because of an increase in the random likelihood of matching candidates as the total number of supported candidates increases. This index is identical to the measure used by Mizuruchi (1992) to measure the similarity of candidates supported by corporate PACs, and is also similar to one employed by Mariolis (1975) to measure the degree of overlap among corporate boards of different sizes. As a practical matter, the variation in the number of presidential candidates supported by individual corporate elites is smaller than the variation in the number of candidates supported by corporate PACs, so the effects of standardization are modest in this study. A simple count of the number of matches in the candidates supported does not yield significantly different results from the standardized measure employed here.

are different strengths and weaknesses to each of these measures, although empirically they are highly correlated and yield similar results¹³

Standard and Poor's *Register of Corporations, Directors and Executives* (1980) and Marquis' *Who's Who in Finance and Industry* (1979–80) were used to identify the corporate directorships held by each of the 761 individuals in the sample. With these data, I computed direct and indirect board ties among the 289,180 dyads formed by these 761 individuals. Approximately 62% of the corporate elites in the study had a direct tie to at least one top executive of another firm through their joint membership on a corporate board. Of the 289,180 dyads, roughly half of 1% of the total were linked through a direct board tie.¹⁴ Another 2.7% of the dyads were linked indirectly through a third party to whom both individuals were directly tied.

As control variables, and also to provide benchmarks against which to assess the strength of any political effects associated with directorship ties, I constructed three additional independent variables for each dyad of directors: shared firm, common industry, and geographic proximity. Shared firm is a dichotomous variable which is coded one when two directors' primary executive position is with the same firm, and zero otherwise. There is general agreement that ties of this kind should be conducive to similarity of political behavior. Hence, they provide a yardstick against which to measure the effects of directorship ties to executives of other firms. Common industry is a dichotomous variable that is coded one if both directors' main executive position is with firms that operate in the same primary industry, and zero otherwise. Here, I used *Moody's Manuals* (Moody's Investors Service 1980) and *Ward's Directory of 55,000 Largest U.S. Corporations* (Ward Publications 1981) to assign firms to 33 industries, roughly equivalent to two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) categories. Geographic proximity is a dichotomous variable

¹³ The measure of standardized matches in the candidates supported has the advantage of not treating noncontributions as instances of similar behavior, but it has the disadvantage of ignoring variation in the relative size of contributions. The Pearson correlation measure gives due weight to variation in the relative size of contributions, but treats matching contributions of \$0 (i.e., noncontributions) as indicators of similar behavior. The correlation between the two measures is 0.93 ($P < .001$). As one would expect, both measures of similar presidential contributions are also positively associated with similarity of party support, although the correlation here is more modest ($r = .29$, $P < .001$). This is because most of the variation in corporate directors' contributions to presidential candidates occurs among candidates of the same party (namely, Republicans) rather than between parties.

¹⁴ Here I refer only to directorship ties that link officers of two different firms, rather than two officers of the same firm. There is a slight undercounting of directorship ties because interlocks were counted only if they were created through the boards of any of the largest 1,050 U.S. corporations. To limit the data collection to a manageable scale, ties created through the boards of smaller firms were not counted.

that is coded one if both directors' main executive position is with a firm headquartered in the same state, and zero otherwise ¹⁵

Industry and region are routinely cited by pluralist theorists as important axes of interest group formation and competition within the business community (Truman 1951, Dahl 1961, Berle 1963, Rose 1967, Epstein 1969, Vogel 1989, Smith 2000). According to this view, for example, protectionist tariffs are likely to be favored by threatened manufacturing industries but opposed by other business sectors that would be forced to pay higher prices for imported goods or fear retaliation that would limit their access to foreign markets. Similarly, increased military spending might be favored by defense contractors but produce fiscal consequences that would be costly to other industries. Regional political alignments are understood in a similar fashion. State and regional business coalitions are seen as pitted against one another in competition for federal programs or expenditures that would tend to strengthen the local economies in which they operate. State and local variations in tax, labor, and regulatory laws also mean that many kinds of federal legislation will have differential impact on (and may receive differential support from) firms operating in different geographic locales.

Pluralists are not alone in viewing industry and region as important bases of political alignment within the business community. Industry and region are also central to those variants of elite and class cohesion theory that acknowledge political competition between "capitalist class segments" (Sale 1975, Dye 1976, Zeitlin, Neuman, and Ratchliff 1976, Davis 1981, Ferguson and Rogers 1986, Domhoff 1987, Ferguson 1995). For example, distinctive politics are often identified with financial and industrial capital or with "Yankee" (northern) and "cowboy" (southern and western) business interests. Research on campaign contributions by individual corporate elites reveals significant differences in political partisanship by industry and region (Overacker 1933, 1937, 1941, 1945, Heard 1960, Domhoff 1972, Allen and Broyles 1989, Ferguson 1995, Webber 2000, Burris 2001). Additional research shows that regional variation in presidential primary contributions is accentuated by the reliance of many presidential candidates on contributions from longtime supporters in their home states (Brown et al. 1995). Hence, the consensus of both the theoretical and empirical literature is that common industry and geographic proximity

¹⁵ In all but a few cases, corporate officers reside in the same state in which the firm with which they are affiliated has its headquarters. The choice between their state of residence and the state in which their firm is headquartered has negligible effects on the analysis.

ought to be associated with similarity of political contributions among corporate elites¹⁶

Finally, to broaden the analysis of directorship ties and to provide an additional benchmark against which to assess the political effects of ties formed through corporate boards, I included one measure of ties among corporate elites that are created through their common membership on *noncorporate* boards of directors. In addition to their corporate directorships, high-ranking executives often serve as directors of noncorporate organizations, including foundations, think tanks, business lobbies, trade associations, universities, charities, and civic associations. Like interlocking corporate directorates, these noncorporate boards provide the institutional basis for an extensive network of social ties among corporate elites—ties that could be instrumental in facilitating political cohesion. Of the myriad types of noncorporate boards of directors, arguably the most important from a political standpoint are those of leading policy-planning organizations like the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution, and the Council on Foreign Relations. Whereas the skeptic might argue that corporate boards tend to be narrowly concerned with economic performance and are, therefore, unlikely to facilitate political consensus, it is less plausible to argue that common membership on the boards of policy-planning organizations (whose *raison d'être* is the promotion of elite consensus on policy issues) is inconsequential for political cohesion (Domhoff 1970, Burch 1983, Peschek 1987, Smith 1991, Burriss 1992, Dye 2001). Hence, ties formed through policy-planning boards—where the *prima facie* case for political cohesion is compelling—provide another benchmark for assessing the significance of any political effects associated with corporate board ties. To measure the presence of these ties, I constructed a dichotomous variable that indicates whether each

¹⁶ In this study, I treat geographic proximity and common industry as shared characteristics that are likely to be associated with a coincidence of economic interests. However, such variables could also be construed as weak proxies for social network ties, since corporate elites within the same state or industry are more likely to have social ties to one another than they are to corporate elites in other states or industries (Palmer et al. 1986, Palmer and Friedland 1987). Past research shows that interlocking corporate directorates are, themselves, partly organized on a regional basis (Allen 1974, 1978, Koenig and Sonquist 1977, Mizruchi 1982, Mintz and Schwartz 1985, Bearden and Mintz 1985, 1987, Johnsen and Mintz 1989, Kono et al. 1998). Consistent with this research, using the method of QAP correlation (explained below), I found that corporate directorship ties among individual corporate elites are modestly, but significantly, associated with geographic proximity ($r = .09$, $P < .001$).

dyad of directors is linked through their joint membership on the boards of any of 20 leading policy-planning organizations¹⁷

Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the dependent and independent variables employed in the study. Note that all of the independent variables are dichotomous, and all of the dependent variables are continuously distributed and roughly interval scaled. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is an appropriate method with these kinds of data.¹⁸ However, the fact that the 289,180 dyads are created by multiple relations among only 761 corporate elites means that the observations are not statistically independent. This creates potential problems of autocorrelation in the regression results that are not easily handled by conventional regression techniques.

This study uses QAP regression to overcome these problems associated with autocorrelation (Krackhardt 1987, 1988). The method was implemented using the UCINET network analysis program (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 1999). QAP regression begins by calculating, in the usual fashion, OLS coefficients for all the independent variables in the regression, but then it uses a nonparametric technique to estimate the probabilities of these coefficients. This is done by randomly permuting (i.e., reordering) all the rows and columns of the dependent variable matrix and then recalculating the regression coefficients. In effect, this may be understood as a simulation that retains the structure of dyadic relations among the actors but rearranges the individuals assigned to each set of values. The process is repeated a large number of times (in this study

¹⁷ The 20 organizations are the American Enterprise Institute, the Aspen Institute, the Brookings Institution, the Business Council, the Business Roundtable, the Cato Institute, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the Conference Board, the Committee for Economic Development, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institution, the Hudson Institute, the Institute for Contemporary Studies, the Manhattan Institute, the National Association of Manufacturers, the RAND Corporation, the Rockford Institute, the Trilateral Commission, and the Urban Institute. In 94% of the cases where corporate elites shared a policy board directorship, they had only one such tie, 5% of the time, they shared two such ties, and 1% of the time, they shared three such ties. A continuous measure based on the total number of shared policy board directorships does not yield significantly different results from a simple dichotomous measure.

¹⁸ Note also that the first two dependent variables are bounded by 0 and 1, and the third by -1 and 1. In such situations, it is customary for purposes of regression to apply a logit transformation to the dependent variable to ensure that the predicted values do not fall outside the bounds of the valid range of the dependent variable. With the regression method used in this study (described in the next paragraph), this is less of a problem because the probabilities of the regression coefficients are estimated in a nonparametric fashion. Moreover, in the regressions that follow, none of the predicted values of any dependent variable fall outside these bounds. Because of the difficulties in interpreting regression coefficients associated with logit-transformed data, I decided to leave the dependent variables in their raw form.

TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Variable	Min	Max	Mean	SD
Dependent variables				
Similarity in percent of contributions to parties	00	1 00	658	349
Standardized matches in presidential contributions	00	1 00	294	364
Correlation between presidential contributions	— 54	1 00	183	423
Independent variables				
Shared firm	00	1 00	001	025
Common industry	00	1 00	040	196
Geographic proximity	00	1 00	075	264
Policy-planning board interlock	00	1 00	003	057
Direct corporate board interlock	00	1 00	004	066
Indirect corporate board interlock	00	1 00	027	163

NOTE — $N = 289,180$ dyads among 761 corporate directors

2,000 times) to provide an estimate of the distribution of all possible coefficients that are consistent with the structure of the data. This distribution is then used to estimate the probability that each coefficient could have achieved a value as extreme as the observed value simply by chance. For example, if only 100 out of 2,000 permutations of the matrix yield regression coefficients as large as the observed value, then this indicates that the probability that the actual coefficient could be the result of random sampling error is about 0.05. Simulation studies indicate that, regardless of the degree of autocorrelation, QAP regression yields unbiased parameter estimates that can be interpreted in the same manner as those of a standard regression (Krackhardt 1988).¹⁹

FINDINGS

Table 2 reports the coefficients for three regression models that estimate the effects of shared firm, common industry, geographic proximity, and directorship ties on each of three measures of similar political behavior.

¹⁹ Other approaches to regression with autocorrelated network data are also possible, mainly borrowed from the techniques used in time-series analysis or with spatially autocorrelated data. See Krackhardt (1988) and Mizuchi (1992, pp. 111–16) for a discussion of the advantages of QAP over alternative methods. Among the chief advantages of QAP are its computational feasibility with very large networks and the fact that it solves the problem of potentially biased parameter estimates in a manner that retains the row/column interdependence that is an essential property of network data.

Interlocking Corporate Directorates

TABLE 2
REGRESSION OF POLITICAL COHESION ON MEASURES OF SHARED TRAITS AND
DIRECTORSHIP TIES UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	DEPENDENT VARIABLE		
	Party Contribution Similarity	Presidential Contribution Matches	Presidential Contribution Correlation
Shared firm	104 (.000)	186 (.000)	250 (.000)
Common industry	.005 (.201)	.014 (.005)	.016 (.004)
Geographic proximity	.004 (.297)	.017 (.019)	.017 (.021)
Policy-planning board tie	.063 (.066)	.105 (.001)	.105 (.002)
Direct corporate board tie	.101 (.000)	.099 (.000)	.119 (.000)
Indirect corporate board tie	.102 (.000)	.098 (.000)	.113 (.000)
Intercept	.654	.288	.177
R^2	.003	.003	.003

NOTE — QAP probabilities in parentheses $N = 289,180$ dyads among 761 corporate directors

Shown here are the unstandardized OLS coefficients with QAP probabilities in parentheses. Before I discuss the substantive significance of these results, it is worth saying a few words about what should *not* be given undue importance in the figures shown in table 2. First, the fact that the R^2 for each of the regressions is quite small should neither come as a surprise nor be a matter of concern. The fact that the directorship ties that are the main focus of interest are present only in a tiny percent of the 289,180 dyads in the sample guarantees that the explained variance associated with these ties will be small, simply as a result of the radically different distributions of the dependent and independent variables. For example, even if *all* of the dyads of corporate elites who are linked by a direct board interlock contributed *identical* amounts to *identical* presidential candidates, direct interlocks would still explain less than 2% of the variance in either measure of similar presidential contributions.²⁰ Compared against this yardstick, the fact that the actual regression results

²⁰ This simulation is done by substituting a maximum possible similarity score of 1.0 on the dependent variable for each dyad of interlocked directors, leaving the similarity scores on the other dyads unchanged and reestimating the regression model. The maximum possible explained variance on the similarity of party contributions is comparable in magnitude.

explain roughly a third of a percent of the variance in the dependent variables does not appear unduly small

Second, too much importance should not be given to the mere fact that the coefficient associated with a particular independent variable achieves a high level of statistical significance. With a sample this large, small effects can still achieve a high level of statistical significance. The important point is not whether one independent variable is statistically significant while another is not, but the *relative size* of the unstandardized coefficients associated with these variables.²¹ Because all of the independent variables are measured in an identical (dichotomous) fashion, denoting the presence or absence of a specific type of shared trait or social tie, the unstandardized regression coefficients provide a straightforward way of comparing the average impact of each kind of shared trait or social tie on each measure of political cohesion.

In terms of the issues that are the focus of this study, the most impressive finding shown in table 2 is the relatively large magnitude of the coefficients associated with directorship ties. The cohesive effects of directorship ties between executives of different firms compare favorably with the effects of holding high executive office within the same firm. The coefficients associated with shared firm ties are consistently larger, but not dramatically so. For similarity of party contributions, they are only a few percentage points larger than the coefficients associated with directorship ties outside the home firm. For the measures of similar presidential contributions, they are roughly twice as large.

Importantly, the cohesive effects of directorship ties far exceed any effects associated with common industry or geographic proximity. Measuring political behavior in terms of party contributions, the fact that two corporate elites are tied, either directly or indirectly, through a corporate board interlock has, on average, roughly 20–25 times the impact on their similarity of political behavior as either common industry or geographic proximity. To put this in more concrete terms: if we were to choose two corporate elites at random, the expected difference in their percentage of contributions to Republicans or Democrats would be roughly 34 percentage points. Randomly selecting pairs of corporate elites from the same state or whose primary affiliation is with firms in the same industry, we

²¹ There is another reason for not placing excessive importance on tests of significance. The data employed in this study are not based on a random sample. Rather, they are more appropriately viewed as a *population* of dyads among *all* the top officers of the largest 1,050 firms who contributed to presidential candidates in 1980. With data of this sort, significance tests remain useful as a heuristic device for interpreting the strength of relations among variables, but they do not have the usual meaning of providing an estimate of the probability that the results could be caused by random sampling error.

would not expect this gap to close by more than half a percentage point. However, randomly selecting pairs of corporate elites who are tied through a corporate board interlock, we would expect this gap to close from 34 to about 24 percentage points.

Similar results are shown for the two measures of similarity of presidential contributions. For these measures, directorship ties have, on average, five to eight times the impact on similarity of political behavior as either common industry or geographic proximity. In more concrete terms for two directors chosen at random, the mean likelihood that a presidential candidate supported by one director will also be supported by the other is approximately 0.29.²² Randomly selecting pairs of directors from the same state or whose primary affiliation is with firms in the same industry would increase this likelihood to between 0.30 and 0.31. Randomly selecting pairs of directors who are tied through a corporate board interlock would increase this likelihood from 0.29 to 0.39.

To test the robustness of these results, I examined a number of alternative measures of common industry and geographic proximity. For example, I constructed a measure of common industry based on less highly aggregated industries (equivalent to three-digit SIC categories). I constructed measures of geographic proximity based on both smaller (metropolitan) and larger (regional) geographic units. The substitution of these alternative measures yields small changes in the magnitudes of some regression coefficients, but in no case does it significantly diminish the disparity between the relatively strong effects of directorship ties and the comparatively weak effects of common industry and geographic proximity.

Additional control variables were also added to see what effects, if any, these might have on the results. Previous research indicates that status characteristics, such as ethnicity (Jewish/non-Jewish), elite educational background, and listing in the *Social Register*, influence the political partisanship of individual corporate elites (Domhoff 1972, Allen and Broyles 1989, Burris 2001). It is therefore possible that similarity in terms of such status characteristics might contribute to similarity of political behavior. To maintain comparability with Mizuchi's study, I refrained from introducing variables of this type into the models shown in table 2. Such variables have meaning only at the individual level and not at the level of the firm. In parallel analyses, however, controls for shared ethnicity, common attendance at elite colleges and universities, and joint listing in the *Social Register* were added. More often than not, these variables do

²² Here I refer to the *geometric* mean of the probability that any candidate supported by director *i* will also be supported by director *j*, and the probability that any candidate supported by director *j* will also be supported by director *i*.

have significant effects on similarity of political behavior, but they are sufficiently orthogonal to the other independent variables that their inclusion has only a modest impact on the coefficients associated with those variables and does not alter the main results shown in table 2. Including these controls in the estimation of similarity of party contributions, the coefficients associated with corporate directorship ties remain 15–25 times as large as those associated with common industry or geographic proximity. Including them in the estimation of similarity of presidential contributions, the coefficients for corporate directorship ties remain six to eight times as large as those associated with common industry or geographic proximity.²³

Further, as a check against the possibility that these results are partly an artifact of sample selection, I reestimated the three regression equations in table 2 with a correction for sample selection bias. The usual practice in the research that uses data on campaign contributions to measure political partisanship is to construe the population under study as restricted to those large corporations (or officers of large corporations) who contribute to political parties or candidates (Mizruchi 1992, p. 112). The foregoing discussion is based on this assumption, hence, I would not want to claim that these findings are generalizable to other (latent or unmeasured) types of political partisanship by corporate elites outside of this population. Nevertheless, our confidence in these results can still be enhanced by exploring the question of how they might differ were we to construe the population of 289,180 dyads among 761 presidential contributors as a *nonrandom* sample of the larger population of 1,764,381 dyads among all 1,879 top officers of the largest 1,050 firms. From this perspective, similarity with respect to political contributions can be viewed as a joint outcome of (1) the decision of whether or not to contribute, and (2) among those who contribute, the decision of which parties or candidates to support. In the nomenclature used to discuss sample selection, the first process is said to be estimated in terms of a “selection model,” and the second is estimated in terms of a “substantive model.”

To reestimate the regression coefficients under these assumptions, I computed a full maximum likelihood estimation of the Heckman selection model (Heckman 1979, Breen 1996, Greene 2000). The independent variables in the substantive regression models are the same as in table 2. The selection model includes all three types of directorship ties plus two additional variables known to increase the likelihood of making a political contribution: firm size (measured as the geometric mean of the sales of the two firms that serve as the primary employer of the directors in each

²³ Detailed results of the revised regression models that include controls for similar status characteristics are available from the author upon request.

dyad) and defense contracts (measured in an analogous manner) Consistent with previous research (Useem 1984), multiple directors are more likely than single directors to be political contributors The coefficients associated with directorship ties are therefore positive in the selection model Thus, if we interpret positive matches on the decision to contribute as a measure of similar political behavior, then director interlocks can be viewed as increasing the likelihood of similarity in this sense

In the reestimation of the substantive regression models for the three original measures of political cohesion, the coefficients associated with direct and indirect corporate interlocks decline by approximately one-quarter The coefficients associated with common industry and geographic proximity decline by roughly the same proportion Consequently, the main findings revealed by the regression estimates shown in table 2 remain essentially unchanged On the measure of similarity of party contributions, directorship ties have 20–30 times the effect on political cohesion as either common industry or geographic proximity On the measures of similarity of presidential contributions, directorship ties have five to seven times the effect on political cohesion as either common industry or geographic proximity Hence, the disparity between the relatively strong effects of directorship ties and the comparatively weak effects of common industry and geographic proximity does not appear to be attributable to sample selection bias²⁴

Apart from this basic finding, several other patterns shown in table 2 deserve comment First, in contrast to Mizruchi's (1992) finding that similarity of political contributions among corporations is mainly associated with *indirect* interlocks, this study shows that both direct and indirect ties are highly significant and roughly comparable in the magnitude of their effects on political cohesion among individual corporate elites The implications of this finding will be examined in greater detail in the following section of the article

Second, for all three measures of political cohesion, the political effects

²⁴ These results should be viewed with a degree of caution As is amply demonstrated in the literature, neither the widely used Heckman model nor any other technique guarantees rescue from potential problems of selection bias (Berk 1983, Berk and Ray 1982, Hartman 1991, Nelson 1984, Stolzenberg and Relles 1990, 1997, Winship and Mare 1992) Almost any population can always be reconceptualized as a nonrandom sample of an even larger population The precision of the Heckman estimator is sensitive to the specific variables chosen for the selection equation and, thus, on the adequacy of our implicit theory of the selection process Under a variety of common (but not easily specified) circumstances, correction for selection bias can worsen rather than improve estimates Moreover, the literature provides little if any guidance or practical experience in attempting to apply a correction for selection bias to dyadic data Detailed results of the Heckman estimation are available from the author upon request

of corporate board ties are roughly as great as those of ties created through the boards of leading policy-planning organizations²⁵ This is an impressive finding, considering the important role that such policy-planning organizations are believed to play in forging elite political consensus (Domhoff 1970, Burch 1983, Peschek 1987, Smith 1991, Burris 1992, Dye 2001)

Finally, whereas the corporate interlock measures are quite robust in their effects across all three measures of political cohesion, the same is not true for the measures of common industry and geographic proximity As expected, these two variables are positively associated with similarity of presidential contributions Contrary to expectations, however, when similarity of political behavior is measured in terms of the percentage of contributions to each of the two major parties, neither common industry nor geographic proximity has a marked effect on political cohesion Although the coefficients are in the expected direction, their magnitude is so small as to be statistically insignificant even in this very large sample²⁶ This finding, too, stands in contrast to the results of Mizruchi's (1992) study of corporate campaign spending, which shows that geographic proximity (although not common industry) has a significant positive effect on similarity of party support among corporations

INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES AS EXTENDED CHAINS OF INDIRECT TIES

To this point in the analysis, I have focused mainly on the effects of direct board ties or, at most, indirect ties of a distance of two This has been necessary to isolate the specific relations through which interlocking directorates are created and to assess the political effects of those relations at their point of origin It should be emphasized, however, that the purported significance of interlocking directorates is not simply their potential to create a tie between director *i* and director *j* that may have consequences for the political behavior of those two individuals As understood by elite and class cohesion theorists, interlocking directorates are significant because they form an extended chain or network of ties that increases the potential for political cohesion across an entire class of individuals,

²⁵ In the regression shown in table 2, the effect of policy-planning board ties on similarity of political party contributions is somewhat weaker than the effects of either direct or indirect corporate board ties However, at the zero-order level, the effects of these three kinds of directorship ties are more closely comparable in magnitude, and all three are statistically significant There is a modest correlation between policy board ties and both direct corporate interlocks ($r = .05$, $P < .001$) and indirect corporate interlocks ($r = .08$, $P < .001$), so that the variance explained by the former declines once the latter two are included in the regression

²⁶ This is true not only in the multivariate model, but also at the zero-order level

not all of whom are directly linked to one another. Showing that directorship ties are associated with similarities of political behavior for individual dyads of corporate elites enhances the plausibility of this argument, but it is not sufficient of itself. It must also be shown that the extended chain or network of directorship ties is sufficiently dense and far reaching to encompass a substantial portion of the leadership group of the business community, and it must be shown that the cohesive effects of directorship ties remain robust even as one moves several links down this chain.

By examining the effects of indirect ties on similarity of political behavior, I have already taken a first step toward addressing these larger issues. The fact that direct and indirect ties are shown to have substantially equivalent effects on similarity of political behavior demonstrates that the mechanisms by which directorship ties facilitate political cohesion remain operative at a distance of at least two links down the chain of person-to-person relations. Thus, if director *i* and director *j* are members of the same corporate board, not only are they likely to exhibit similarities of political behavior with one another, but each is likely to exhibit similarities of political behavior with any third corporate elite with whom the other shares a board membership. This raises the interesting and important question of whether or not similarities of political behavior can also be traced at even greater distances along the extended chain of directorship ties.

To examine this question, I created a series of dummy variables representing the minimum number of links required to connect each dyad of directors in the sample. Just how far do such chains of indirect ties extend across this group of politically active top executives of large corporations? As noted earlier, roughly half of 1% of the 289,180 dyads in the sample are directly linked through a common board membership, adding indirect ties (i.e., ties with a distance of two links) increases the number of linked dyads to roughly 3% of the sample. Approximately 12% of the dyads are linked at a distance of three or less, 26% are linked at a distance of four or less, 37% are linked at a distance of five or less, and 42% are linked at a distance of six or less. Hence, even though direct board ties among top corporate officers comprise only a tiny percentage of the dyads in the sample, a substantial plurality of the directors in the sample are connected to one another when indirect ties of four or more links are counted.²⁷

²⁷ These results should come as no surprise, given the extensive research demonstrating the high likelihood of being able to connect any two members of most relatively sparse, naturally occurring social networks through chains of six or fewer links (Watts 1999). Note, however, that these figures underestimate the full extent of indirect ties within

Table 3 shows the results of three regression models that estimate the effects of these increasingly distant indirect ties on each of three measures of similar political behavior, again controlling for shared firm, common industry, geographic proximity, and policy board ties. Of course, if direct ties are associated with similar political behavior, then indirect ties will necessarily share in that association. If director *i* is similar to director *j*, and director *j* is similar to director *k*, then directors *i* and *k* will also share a degree of similarity. But the strength of the latter association should drop off exponentially if it is nothing more than a chance artifact of the underlying direct ties. As can be seen from table 3, this is not the case. For all three measures of similarity of political behavior, there is a gradual decline in political cohesion as one moves from proximate to more distant ties. Nevertheless, in each case, indirect ties up to a distance of four or five links have substantial effects on political cohesion, and the effects of even the most distant ties far exceed those associated with common industry or geographic proximity.²⁸

To present this in more concrete terms, we may compare the expected degree of political similarity between randomly selected pairs of directors at varying distances from one another. As noted earlier, if we were to select randomly pairs of directors who are connected through ties of one or two links, the expected difference in their percentage of contributions to Republicans or Democrats would be 24 percentage points. Randomly selecting pairs of directors whose most direct connection is through ties of three or four links, the expected difference in their percentage of contributions to Republicans or Democrats would be 27 percentage points. At a distance of five links the expected difference would be 29 percentage points, at six links it would be 34 percentage points, and at greater than six links it would be 39 percentage points.

A similar pattern exists for presidential contributions. If we were to select randomly pairs of directors who are connected through ties of one

the director interlock network because we are dealing here not with the entire network, but with a subset of top executives. The indirect ties between the directors in our sample would undoubtedly have been shorter and more numerous had we been able to calculate them on the basis of the entire boards of the largest 1,050 U.S. firms. However, this would have required dealing with a matrix of roughly 300 million dyads—a task that poses near-insuperable obstacles in terms of both data collection and computational ability.

²⁸ As I did for the regression models in table 2, I also reestimated the three regression models in table 3, applying Heckman's (1979) correction for sample selection bias. Again, the results remain essentially unchanged. There is no substantial decline in the coefficients associated with corporate directorship ties. The size of these coefficients declines monotonically as one moves from more proximate to more distant ties. And the effects associated with even the most distant directorship ties far exceed those associated with common industry or geographic proximity.

Interlocking Corporate Directorates

TABLE 3
REGRESSION OF POLITICAL COHESION ON MEASURES OF SHARED TRAITS AND
DIRECTORSHIP TIES OF INCREASING DISTANCE UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION
COEFFICIENTS

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	DEPENDENT VARIABLE		
	Party Contribution Similarity	Presidential Contribution Matches	Presidential Contribution Correlation
Shared firm	144 (.000)	212 (.000)	280 (.000)
Common industry	003 (.261)	013 (.010)	015 (.006)
Geographic proximity	006 (.278)	017 (.015)	017 (.030)
Policy-planning board tie	022 (.276)	072 (.007)	069 (.020)
Direct corporate board tie	143 (.000)	125 (.000)	150 (.000)
Indirect board tie (distance = 2)	143 (.000)	124 (.000)	144 (.000)
Indirect board tie (distance = 3)	118 (.000)	096 (.000)	107 (.000)
Indirect board tie (distance = 4)	111 (.000)	067 (.000)	074 (.000)
Indirect board tie (distance = 5)	100 (.000)	041 (.000)	052 (.000)
Indirect board tie (distance = 6)	048 (.005)	036 (.004)	053 (.000)
Intercept	614	263	147
R ²	024	011	011

NOTE — QAP probabilities in parentheses $N = 289,180$ dyads among 761 corporate directors

or two links, the mean likelihood that a presidential candidate supported by one director will also be supported by the other is approximately 0.39. Randomly selecting pairs of directors whose most direct connection is through ties of three or four links, the mean likelihood of common presidential contributions would be 0.34. At a distance of five or six links it would be 0.31, and at greater than six links it would be 0.26. Hence, whether measured by party support or by contributions to presidential candidates, the propensity toward political cohesion is not distributed randomly across the network, but varies systematically by the degree of proximity among directors along the extended chains of direct and indirect ties that constitute the network.

This pattern is thrown into sharper relief if we trace the chains of directorship ties that emanate from what one can plausibly assume to be centers of economic and political influence within the business community.

Numerous researchers have identified large commercial banks as uniquely powerful institutions within the U S economy and the boards of these banks as providing important arenas for mediating the potentially conflicting interests of different economic sectors and forging a common strategy for corporate capital (Zeitlin 1974, 1976, Useem 1984, Mintz and Schwartz 1985, Bearden and Mintz 1987, Soref and Zeitlin 1987, Burris 1992) The largest U S commercial bank in 1980 was Citicorp, and its chairman, Walter B Wriston, was an early supporter of John Connally for president As co-chairman of the Business Roundtable and chairman-elect of the Business Council, Wriston was a person of considerable influence within the business world, but the same could also be said of many of the other members of the Citicorp board These included the chairmen or CEOs of eight *Fortune* 500 firms (Exxon, United Technologies, Xerox, Monsanto, W R Grace, Continental Group, Corning Glass, and Paccar) plus the oil field services and construction giant, Halliburton, and the country's largest privately owned textile firm, Milliken and Company Wriston had worked with Connally on President Nixon's Productivity Commission when Connally was secretary of treasury Connally had also served as a director of Halliburton and presumably had ties to some of the other Citicorp directors Whatever the reason, Connally was the consensus candidate of the Citicorp board Both Wriston and Citicorp president, William Spencer, contributed to Connally's campaign for a total of \$4,000 Of the 10 outside directors from the companies listed above, eight contributed to Connally for a total of \$16,000²⁹ These Citicorp directors sat on other corporate boards, where they established links with 62 other top executives These indirectly tied directors also leaned toward Connally, but not quite so strongly Thirty-seven (64%) contributed to Connally for a total of \$40,200 These directors, in turn, were tied to another 161 top executives on yet other boards Ninety of these (56%) contributed to Connally for a total of \$78,070 These, in turn, were tied to another 130 top executives, 48 of whom (37%) contributed to Connally for a total of \$46,050 At this point—four links removed from the top management of Citicorp—support for Connally was only slightly above the average (34%) of the remaining sample Similar patterns of radiating influence can be traced from the boards of other major banks, although most do not exhibit quite the level of consensus reflected on the Citicorp board, nor was Connally always their top choice

²⁹ Five members of the Citicorp board also contributed to Reagan (\$5,750 total), and five contributed to Bush (\$4,250 total) However, most of these contributions were made later in the primary campaign after Connally had withdrawn from the race

DISCUSSION

The chief finding of this study is the significant association that it reveals between corporate directorship ties and similarity of political behavior among corporate elites. This bolsters and extends Mizruchi's (1992) conclusions regarding the role of interlocking directorates in facilitating political cohesion within the business community. Not only are firms that are linked through common directors more likely to engage in cohesive political action, but the directors who create those interlocks among firms are also, as individuals, likely to exhibit similarities of political behavior. The microlevel mechanisms that might produce such political similarities are not difficult to imagine. Presumably, they include processes of information exchange, persuasion, deference, and conformity with group norms of the sort that have been extensively studied in the structurally oriented literature on political behavior and opinion formation (see Knoke [1990] for a review).³⁰ Such an interpretation is consistent with the findings of interview studies with corporate multiple directors, who speak of their directorship ties to high-ranking executives of other firms as valuable sources of information and guidance on political as well as economic matters (Useem 1984, pp. 55–58).

At the same time, comparing the findings of this study with those of Mizruchi (1992) points toward differences in the processes that produce political cohesion among corporations and those that facilitate cohesion among individual corporate elites—at least insofar as campaign contributions are concerned. The main difference is that, for individual directors, both direct and indirect ties are significantly associated with similarity of political contributions. For the corporations in Mizruchi's study, only one specific type of indirect interlock is significantly associated with similarity of political contributions, direct interlocks between firms are not. This means that immediate proximity within networks of interlocking

³⁰ Similar mechanisms are invoked to explain the impact of directorship ties on the interorganizational diffusion of managerial practices (Davis 1991, Haunschild 1993, Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou 1993, Davis and Greve 1997). An alternative interpretation, of course, is that the association between directorship ties and similarity of political behavior indicates that corporate directors are selected on the basis of political affinity. There are several reasons why this is unlikely to explain the patterns revealed in this study. First, the membership of corporate boards tends to be relatively stable over an extended number of years, whereas candidates and issues vary from one election to the next. Thus, in the vast majority of cases, the creation of directorship ties among corporate elites preceded their decisions about which candidates to support in 1980 by a substantial period of time. Second, much of the variation in political behavior measured in this study, especially on the two presidential contribution variables, concerns relatively nuanced choices among broadly similar candidates (e.g., the choice to support John Connally over Ronald Reagan or vice versa) rather than sharp ideological differences of the sort that might plausibly lessen one's chances for board nomination.

directorates is more conducive to similarity of political behavior among individual corporate elites than it is among corporations

We cannot rule out the possibility that these divergent findings are partly the result of differences in sampling and measurement, although this appears unlikely. Mizruchi's sample is restricted to industrial firms, whereas this study includes large firms from all branches of the economy. However, a replication of this study using a reduced sample of 374 corporate elites whose primary executive position is with industrial firms also reveals strong effects of both direct and indirect ties on all three measures of political cohesion. Mizruchi also controls for the effects of several industry-level variables (e.g., measures of market constraint based on industry-level concentration ratios and input-output tables) that are meaningful or available only for industrial firms and, therefore, not used in this study. However, the effects of these variables in Mizruchi's study are generally modest, and a reanalysis of Mizruchi's data that omits these controls does not alter his findings with respect to the director interlock variables. Finally, this study gives greater attention to contributions to candidates for president, because this is the only race that attracts sufficient contributions by individual corporate elites to allow for detailed measures of support for identical or competing candidates. Mizruchi necessarily gives greater attention to congressional races, since these receive the bulk of corporate PAC contributions. However, both Mizruchi and I employ an identical measure of the share of contributions going to each of the two major parties, and the results on this dependent variable are no less divergent than on the candidate-specific measures.

Moreover, there are sound reasons for believing that direct, person-to-person ties between corporate elites should have greater salience for their individual decisions regarding political contributions than direct interlocks among firms are likely to have for the political spending of corporations. Individuals and firms are different types of social actors. Individuals are arguably more profoundly influenced by other people, whereas firms tend to have less permeable barriers to their environment. This, indeed, is how they preserve the goals and internal arrangements of the organization. Individuals have the discretion to choose which candidates or parties they will support without having to seek the formal approval of others. In the case of firms, the sharing of a director between corporations merely creates a channel of information or influence that is then filtered through the larger bureaucratic process by which campaign contributions are decided. Important in this regard is the fact that corporate decisions about campaign spending are typically constrained by pragmatic considerations related to their role as an adjunct to corporate lobbying (Handler and Mulkern 1982, Sabato 1984, Clawson, Neustadt, and Weller 1998). Individual contributors are less constrained by such

pragmatic concerns and freer to follow their personal preferences in deciding which candidates or parties to support. Finally, a substantial part of campaign fundraising targeted at individual large donors is organized by well-connected political entrepreneurs who skillfully exploit networks of social and business ties among corporate elites as avenues for soliciting campaign contributions (Brown et al. 1995). Direct solicitation of political contributions among interconnected firms is not uncommon (Clawson et al. 1998), but it is not the usual way in which corporate decisions regarding campaign contributions are initiated.

While direct ties among corporate board members are significantly associated with similarities of political behavior, it is also evident from this study that *indirect* ties—that is, ties that do not entail a person-to-person connection but are established through one or more intermediaries—also contribute to political cohesion. Generally speaking, the closer the proximity of dyads of directors within the network of interlocking directorates, the greater their similarity of political behavior. Proximity is therefore important. However, even at a distance of four or five links, indirect ties remain significantly associated with similarity of political behavior. Hence, much of the political importance of interlocking directorships is likely to be missed if we remain narrowly focused on direct interlocks.

These findings point to the need to move beyond the level of individual dyads toward a more *structural* understanding of interlocking directorates. From the standpoint of the individual dyads that make up the interlock network, indirect ties represent situations in which one director gives and receives influence vis-à-vis another director (through the exchange of information, persuasion, deference, etc.), who, in turn, gives and receives influence with another director, who gives and receives influence with another director, and so forth down the line. Directors who are closely tied to one another give and receive the full weight of such influence, while those who are several intermediaries removed presumably receive a weaker dose relative to other influences that are impinging upon them. At some point, however, we are forced to recognize that all of these extended chains of communication and influence are cross-cutting and overlapping, so that what we are actually witnessing is more like a multidimensional field of force in which individual directors are positioned or “embedded” (Granovetter 1985) within the network at varying distances to one another and, thus, simultaneously subject to reinforcing (and/or competing) influences of varying magnitudes. This notion is nicely captured by Useem (1984, p. 56) who describes the interlocking directorate as a “transcendent network” in which each localized tie assimilates and transmits the influence of innumerable other ties, both proximate and remote. On this point, our findings converge with the more general conclusions of Mizuchi’s (1992) study of interfirm interlocks. As with cor-

porate actors, the political behavior of individual directors is influenced not only by those other directors with whom they share a direct tie, but also by their location within the larger *structure* of multiple and overlapping ties that comprise the interlock network

Judging from the findings of previous research, it can also be argued that the network of directorship ties is, itself, embedded within other networks of formal and informal ties among corporate elites. The decision to invite an executive of one firm to join the board of another typically presupposes some prior contact or association through which the board candidate became recognized as a person worthy of trust and able to provide useful advice and information. Previous research suggests that informal social interaction within exclusive metropolitan upper-class clubs plays an important role in the selection of outside corporate directors (Johnsen and Mintz 1989, Kono et al. 1998, Useem 1984, Bonacich and Domhoff 1981, Soreff 1976, 1980, Soreff and Zeitlin 1987). Interpersonal ties created through membership on noncorporate boards of directors, kinship relations, or attendance at elite boarding schools and universities may also be important (Domhoff 1970, 1974, Useem 1984). The network of corporate directorship ties can thus be viewed as one thread in the larger fabric of social ties connecting corporate elites. It is therefore possible that the politically cohesive effects of interlocking corporate directorships are both reinforced and complemented by the other social networks with which they are intertwined. More systematic empirical research on the political consequences of these associated networks would be valuable for assessing the arguments advanced by elite and class cohesion theories of corporate power.

One of the unexpected results of this study is the fact that neither common industry nor geographic proximity has pronounced effects on similarity of party support among individual corporate elites. As noted earlier, geographic proximity has been shown to promote similarity of party support among firms (Mizruchi 1992). I can only speculate as to why geographic proximity should have more pronounced effects on similarity of party support among corporations than among individual corporate elites. It is possible that other ways of measuring geographic proximity might yield different results, although a number of alternative measures were examined without yielding any change in these findings.³¹

³¹ Measures of geographic proximity constructed at the metropolitan level show weaker effects on similarity of political behavior than the measure used here, which (like the one used by Mizruchi) is constructed at the state level. Some measures of geographic proximity constructed at the level of multistate regions yield slightly stronger effects on similarity of party contributions, but these effects still fall below the threshold of significance. Moreover, measures of geographic proximity based on regions rather than states have *dramatically* weaker effects on similarity of presidential contributions.

The most plausible explanation for this difference is one suggested by Mizruchi (1992, p. 140), which is simply that firms, because of the benefits they derive from maintaining cordial relations with potentially sympathetic members of Congress, are likely to contribute disproportionately to congressional incumbents in their own state or region. Incumbents are virtually certain of reelection in most congressional races, and, regardless of party or ideology, members of Congress can be expected to demonstrate special sensitivity to the concerns of their regional constituents. Because Democratic incumbents tend to be concentrated in some regions and Republican incumbents in others, corporate PAC contributions will tend to mirror, at least in part, these regional differences in party strength. Of course, individual corporate elites also contribute to congressional incumbents from their own region for many of the same reasons that firms do. But buying access with incumbents is a much lower priority for individual contributors compared with seeking to influence the outcome of the election. Consequently, individual corporate elites donate a much larger share of their money to *national* party committees, presidential campaigns, and high-profile or closely contested Senate races, regardless of where they occur. Partisan preferences of individual corporate elites are therefore less likely to converge toward some regional norm purely as a result of their pragmatic interest in staying on good terms with local incumbents.³²

CONCLUSION

This study provides evidence for the thesis that interlocking directorates increase the potential for political cohesion among corporate elites. Although this is by no means a novel thesis within the corporate power structure literature, it is one that has frequently been disputed and whose

³² It is also instructive to compare the results of this study with the findings of Burris (2001). Using individuals rather than dyads as the unit of analysis, the earlier study found that geographic region was a significant predictor of party support among corporate elites. From this, one might infer that geographic proximity should be associated with *similarity* of party support. Upon reflection, however, it should be evident that these two are not equivalent. If the norm for corporate elites is to favor Republicans, but a disproportionate number of corporate elites in certain states support Democrats to a degree that exceeds the norm, then dummy variables for residence in those states will be associated with party preference. At the same time, *dyads* of corporate elites from those same states will tend to be *less* politically cohesive than average because a larger number of them deviate from the Republican norm. Dyads of corporate elites from other states where conformity with the Republican norm is accentuated will tend to be *more* politically cohesive than average. Hence, there may be no consistent association between geographic proximity and similarity of party support. This illustrates the pitfalls of attempting to infer sources of political cohesion from research that is not based explicitly on dyadic data.

credibility has been defended, heretofore, mainly in terms of its surface plausibility rather than through empirical demonstration. The fact that corporate elites who are linked through common board memberships show evidence of similar political behavior will not come as a surprise to most defenders of elite or class cohesion theories of corporate power. More impressive is the fact that the effects of such directorship ties on political cohesion are stronger by several magnitudes than the effects of shared characteristics, like common industry or geographic proximity, that adherents of virtually all competing theoretical perspectives agree are conducive to political cohesion. Indeed, pairs of top officers of the *same* firm are only moderately more likely to engage in similar political behavior than two officers of *different* firms who are tied through interlocking directorships. The evidence presented in this study should therefore be convincing even to those scholars who traditionally have been most skeptical of the political importance of interlocking directorates. When we consider that, on average, the top officers of large corporations are linked to roughly a third of all other top officers of large corporations through chains of interlocking directorships of no more than four or five links, and that linkages of this distance are significantly associated with similarity of political behavior, then the thesis that interlocking directorships enhance the potential for political cohesion across the entire big business community becomes more persuasive. Remember also that this includes only links that are created through corporate boards, ignoring the numerous ties created through noncorporate boards, not to mention social ties of various kinds.

This study also lends support to the thesis that political action by individual corporate elites follows a different logic from political action by corporations.³³ In numerous areas—of which the study of interlocking directorates is a particularly good example—we know much more about the social organization and political behavior of firms than we do about individual members of the corporate elite. Correspondingly, there has been a temptation to speak of the “politics of business,” as if this were reducible to the politics of corporations. Mintz (2002) calls attention to this in her recent review of the literature and emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between elite unity and intercorporate unity. As this study shows, there are similarities in the conditions and mechanisms that facilitate

³³ See Burris (2001) for an elaboration of this thesis and supporting evidence from a study that compares political contributions made by corporations with those of corporate elites. Among the limitations of this earlier study was its inability to address one of the chief concerns of the literature—namely, the issue of business *unity*. The present study, by conceptualizing and measuring political cohesion at the dyadic level, is able to address this issue directly and to show that the conditions that facilitate or inhibit business unity also operate differently at the individual and the firm level.

political unity among corporations and among corporate elites, but there are also important differences. With respect to campaign contributions, firms tend to be more constrained by pragmatic concerns, whereas individual corporate elites are freer to follow their partisan sympathies or personal preferences. This encourages certain forms of political unity among corporations (such as the propensity to coalesce in support of congressional incumbents from their region) that are not as evident among individual corporate elites. Conversely, other forms of political cohesion (such as the propensity to align politically with those to whom one is directly tied within the interlock network) are more evident among individual corporate elites than among firms. Such findings should serve as a caution against the temptation to conflate these two forms of political action. Both types of political action impact the system in important ways, and evidence on both is necessary for a balanced account of the manner in which political influence is mobilized within the business community.

With respect to its broader implications, this study adds to an accumulating body of empirical support for the general proposition that political action should be studied in terms of its *embeddedness* within social networks (Knoke 1990). The more common view—exemplified by pluralist interest-group theory, but also common to a variety of other theoretical perspectives—locates the sources of political action in individually calculated interests and the potential for political unity (or disunity) in the coincidence (or conflict) of such interests. This view is typically associated with a methodology that takes attributes attached to individual actors, rather than concrete and ongoing social *relations* among actors, as the focus of analysis. As this study shows, social ties among actors have significant consequences for political action that go beyond anything that can be explained in terms of attributes measured at the level of the individual actor. The study thus speaks to the merits of a structural perspective on political behavior and the importance of gathering and analyzing data not just on individual actors, but on the network of social ties among those actors.

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Review Essay

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Max Weber's Methodologies Interpretation and Critique By Sven Eliaeson Cambridge Polity Press, 2002 Pp x+230 \$72 95 (cloth), \$33 95 (paper)

Sociology as Political Education By Karl Mannheim Translated and edited by David Kettler and Colin Loader New Brunswick, N J Transaction Publishers, 2001 xvi+207 \$44 95

Karl Mannheim's Sociology as Political Education By Colin Loader and David Kettler New Brunswick, N J Transaction Publishers, 2002 Pp x+233 \$49 95

CONTEXTUALISM, LITE AND SUPERSIZED

Nearly 30 years ago, this journal published an article ("On Understanding a Sociological Classic" [*American Journal of Sociology* 83 (September 1977) 279–319]) in which Robert Alun Jones put "contextualism" square on the map of sociologists who study the ideas of social thinkers from the past. Building on the arguments of Quentin Skinner and other intellectual historians, Jones warned sociologists of their tendency to read works from the past in an anachronistic, or "presentist," manner (as if those works belonged to current academic debates) and urged the importance of also seeking to understand such works *historically*, that is, by carefully reconstructing the intellectual contexts in which they were written.

In the years since, the fortunes of contextualism within sociology have wavered as the program has attracted dedicated adherents, who have applied contextualist methods to the study of various past social thinkers, and equally ardent critics, who have been doubtful of the sociological value of such research. This polarized situation has long left contextualism's status uncertain. The marked contrasts between the recent books by Sven Eliaeson and by David Kettler and Colin Loader, all of whom

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0002-9602/2005/11101-0007\$10.00

align themselves with contextualism, speak to the issue by exhibiting the very different directions in which the approach has run

The books differ greatly in focus and ambition. Eliaeson's subject is a large one. Max Weber's "methodology," as articulated in Weber's sprawling and often polemical writings on the nature, purpose, and subject matter of the historical and cultural sciences and on the mode of concept formation appropriate for these sciences. Some of these writings hold a permanent place in the sociological canon, sociologists have read and reread them and produced around them a secondary literature consisting of hundreds of items. Yet, in Eliaeson's view, "Weber's methodological writings are rarely taken seriously as a whole" (p. 163, n. 18). To fill this gap, Eliaeson elaborately proposes to offer "a contextual reconstruction" that will "recapture Weber's original context" and thereby furnish "a more reliable and less biased interpretation of his methodology, drawing on hitherto little noticed essays as well as neglected parts of his correspondence" (pp. 1–2).

Kettler and Loader's project is more modest. In the summer of 1930, Karl Mannheim, newly appointed professor of sociology at the University of Frankfurt, delivered an inaugural lecture course, *General Sociology*. Of the exact content of this course, Mannheim scholars were long in the dark until a transcript of Mannheim's lectures came to light in the papers of his former assistant, Hans Gerth, following Gerth's death in 1978. Seeking to make this esoteric document more widely accessible, Kettler and Loader set about to translate it from German and to provide an introduction. Eventually, however, as their introduction grew in length, their publisher decided to split the results into two volumes. The first of these, *Karl Mannheim's Sociology as Political Education*, is the expanded introduction, Loader and Kettler's effort to situate Mannheim's 1930 lectures and related writings in their intellectual-historical context. The companion volume, *Sociology as Political Education*, contains the translated transcription of Mannheim's course, plus translations of nine shorter items that Mannheim wrote around the years 1921–33. Among these are three newspaper articles, several letters, and an excerpt from his book on the sociological curriculum. While most of these additional items are fairly slight—translations of Mannheim's more substantial writings from these years have already been published—his youthful letters from Heidelberg provide a sharp eyewitness account of the city and its university during a period that was formative not only in Mannheim's intellectual development, but also in the careers of such Heidelberg contemporaries as Erich Fromm, Hans Speier, Hans Gerth, Hannah Arendt, Norbert Elias, and Talcott Parsons.

In execution, Eliaeson's book and Kettler and Loader's paired volumes differ still further. According to Eliaeson, understanding Weber's meth-

odology requires an examination of multiple contexts—neo-Kantianism, marginalism, the *Methodenstreit*, the *Werturteilsstreit*, the demarcation controversy, and “the theodicy crisis” (p. 4)—and the point is unobjectionable. But, after setting up such an ambitious prospectus, his book continually disappoints. Having named these several complex (and allegedly understudied) contexts and trumpeting the benefits of contextualizing, Eliaeson brusquely dispatches the contexts of Weber’s methodological oeuvre in a mere 11 pages that are almost wholly reliant on a few standard sources in the secondary literature. Later in the book, a handful of references to the work of thinkers who were part of Weber’s milieu and a few gestures toward Weber’s correspondence and lesser-known writings punctuate Eliaeson’s pages, but that is as close as he comes to delivering the promised historical reconstruction of Weber’s methodology. What is more, Eliaeson puts the points that he does make about Weber’s context so opaquely that these will likely be lost on anyone not already well informed about the subject. In Eliaeson’s hands, Weber’s context blurs into a torrent of undefined -isms—idealism, romanticism, historicism, positivism, Enlightenment polytheism, liberalism, conservatism, nominalism, essentialism, realism, intuitionism, value-relativism, and perspectivism—that rain down on the reader, after which Eliaeson’s effort to contextualize ends.

For its remainder, his book drifts, as Eliaeson offers disjointed and, at times, inaccurate summaries of Weber’s methodological ideas (on the usual topics: objectivity, ideal-types, etc.), shifts next to an extended analysis of the contrasting ways in which Parsons, Alfred Schulz, and Paul Lazarsfeld and Anthony Oberschall later appropriated Weber’s writings, and then opines about the “continuing significance” of Weber’s work for mediating the “tension between history and theory [that] appears to be the perennial main paradigmatic divide in social science” (p. 104). As he veers in this direction, Eliaeson loses his contextualist footing altogether, suddenly adjuring efforts to recover Weber’s context (“Why should we bother?” he asks) and embracing a “selective presentism” (pp. 63, 102). It does not occur to Eliaeson that his inability to build a persuasive case for “Weber as mediator” on contextualist grounds may be the result of the extreme thinness of his own historical reconstruction of Weber’s methodological work. Eliaeson’s book does, however, include ample end matter: an appendix that speculates on whether Weber influenced Gunnar Myrdal, some 150 short biographies (e.g., “Durkheim, Émile, French educator and sociologist, known for, among other things, the concept of ‘social fact’”), Inspired Parsons’s interpretation of Weber” (p. 171), and a conceptual glossary, with instructive entries such as “Causality, the idea that a phenomenon (event or change) has a cause and a cause has an effect, that

an event could be explained by a factor, like the apple falling to the ground because of gravity” (p. 186)

Of much greater substance are the Kettler and Loader volumes, which, with no elaborate fanfare about contextualist research, nonetheless reconstruct the intellectual-historical context of Mannheim’s 1930 lecture course with a thoroughness and meticulousness that sociologists who study thinkers from the past have rarely equaled. That Kettler and Loader devote more than 200 pages to contextualizing lectures that run less than 80 pages is indicative of the contrast with Eliaeson.

Kettler and Loader invite those interested in Karl Mannheim to look beyond the pages of *Ideology and Utopia* (originally published in 1929) to the milieu in which Mannheim was embedded in the 1920s and, by so doing, to appreciate—to an extent not possible before the discovery of the 1930 lectures—that his work was part and parcel of his overriding “educational mission” (p. 17, n. 9). The turbulent Weimar era, as Kettler and Loader explain, was the scene of a massive crisis in German higher education, a crisis that pitted defenders of classical and romantic conceptions of education as aristocratic cultivation against modernist critics who favored a democratic overhaul of the universities and ways of keeping schooling in step with the growth of specialized scientific knowledge and the demands of the market for educated labor. Faced with these alternatives, Mannheim, according to Kettler and Loader, sought to recast and “to revitalize the ideal of cultivation through the infusion of modern elements through sociology” (p. 15). Seen in this light, Mannheim’s determined effort to construct the sociology of knowledge—understood as a field that would facilitate a synthesis of divergent contemporary ideological perspectives—was simultaneously a program of political education, a way to develop in academic and lay audiences the enlarged social awareness and sense of public responsibility required by modern industrial democracies.

To build this original and convincing interpretation, Kettler and Loader proceed in steps. First, they trace German notions about education as cultivation back to Kant and Humboldt. They then examine how Weimar state officials planned to modernize traditional ideas about cultivation using the discipline of sociology, and how their plans provoked widespread critical reaction. Finally, Kettler and Loader analyze competing conceptions of sociology presented to Mannheim by other thinkers from the period, including Max and Alfred Weber, the apolitical sociologist Leopold von Wiese, the fascist theoreticians Hans Freyer and Carl Schmitt, and various figures in different branches of the Marxist tradition, among them Georg Lukacs, Max Adler, Emil Lederer, and the members of the Frankfurt School. Kettler and Loader carefully consider Mannheim’s links to all of these thinkers and quote extensively from their writings.

Sometimes this analysis can feel almost like too much contextualization. When, for example, Kettler and Loader comment that “to understand why Mannheim comes to treat the antithesis between fascist social thought and his own reflexive sociology as the prime constituent of the ‘dialectics’ he puts forward, it is necessary to review Heidegger, Schmitt, and Freyer in some detail” (p. 114), and when the authors then plow ahead on this course for some 15 additional pages, I thought I was being offered far more than I would ever need to know to understand this particular wrinkle in Mannheim’s thought. Still, while *Karl Mannheim’s Sociology as Political Education* is overwritten in a few spots (and clumsily written in more than a few spots), the yield from Kettler and Loader’s massive excavation is impressive. Before taking up their book, I read the Mannheim text that it is designed to introduce, barely catching the gist of Mannheim’s statements, but my confusion was gone when I returned to Mannheim after reading Kettler and Loader. Indeed, not only does their account substantially clarify the specific argument of Mannheim’s General Sociology course and the companion items, but Kettler and Loader’s analysis also lays the groundwork for a rethinking of Mannheim’s work as a whole. Further, while Mannheim is the focal subject, Kettler and Loader’s study, because it does range so broadly across the academic context of the Weimar era, is a work of more general import, offering a well-positioned window into the field of German social science during a critical period in the historical development of social scientific thought.

Nor are the Kettler and Loader volumes of “mere historical” interest. Kettler and Loader’s contextual reconstruction of Mannheim’s program for sociology points up (as they observe) parallels between the situation that confronted Mannheim and current-day controversies about higher education and speaks as well to recurrent debates about the political uses and public role of sociology. But Kettler and Loader stop short of drawing out the contemporary implications of their research for the subfield that, ironically, is most associated with Mannheim’s own name: the sociology of knowledge. Their nuanced analysis of Mannheim’s efforts to configure sociology in response to the educational agenda of Weimar officials and, at the same time, to differentiate his conception of the discipline from the contending views of social thinkers on the right and the left implicitly provides a rich case study of the social dynamics of an intellectual field—a case study that calls out for theorization in light of recent work on this topic by those such as Andrew Abbott, Pierre Bourdieu, and Randall Collins (to go no further than the ABCs of the literature). Yet, Kettler and Loader neglect this work (as does Eliaeson, in a telling instance of correspondence among these different authors), missing the chance to turn their contextualization of Mannheim into an explicit contribution to the

sociology of knowledge. That such a turn might further enrich contextualist research, while demonstrating to critics the sociological significance of contextualism, is a possibility that scholars in the area may hereafter wish to consider.

Book Reviews

Geographies of Power Placing Scale Edited by Andrew Herod and Melissa W Wright Malden, Mass Blackwell Publishers, 2002 Pp xii+315

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Since the early 1990s, in close conjunction with debates on globalization, geographically inclined social scientists have devoted increasing attention to the changing scalar organization of capitalism. Rather than conceiving the differentiation among global, national, regional, and local forms of political-economic organization as a fixed, given feature of social life, this new scholarship has argued that scalar orders are the arenas and products of historically specific institutional arrangements, regulatory strategies, and sociopolitical struggles. As such, they may be challenged and, under certain conditions, qualitatively transformed. Initially pioneered by neo-Marxist geographers to grasp the geographical dynamics of capitalist uneven development, theories of the “production” of geographical scale have more recently been mobilized by political economists, state theorists, urbanists, and cultural sociologists concerned to decipher the spatial dimensions of globalization processes. Andrew Herod and Melissa Wright’s edited volume builds upon and advances the new political economy of scale in a variety of creative, innovative ways. The volume is derived from the contributions to a conference held at the University of Georgia in 1999. While all but two of the contributors are geographers, the book will speak to a broad interdisciplinary readership in fields as diverse as critical social theory, political economy, cultural studies, urban studies, and social movement studies.

Unlike many conference volumes, which frequently contain assortments of papers that have little discernable connection to one another, Herod and Wright’s book is well organized and coherent. Despite considerable methodological and thematic heterogeneity among its chapters, the book’s three sections advance research on at least three overarching questions—How do we conceptualize geographical scale and contemporary rescaling processes? (pt. 1) What is the role of discourse (academic, political, and popular) in the social construction of geographical scale? (pt. 2) In what ways, and with what consequences, are contemporary social movements attempting to reorganize inherited scalar configurations? (pt. 3) Each of these sections is preceded by brief introductory essays by Herod and Wright that situate the chapters in relation to contemporary debates on globalization, localization, and critical sociospatial theory. In addition,

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Herod and Wright's introduction to the volume provides a useful overview of some of the key aspects of the contemporary "scale question" (p 5)

The contributions to part 1 of the book problematize binary understandings of the global and the local. Rather than viewing the global as universal, homogenizing, and all encompassing and the local as particularistic, place bound, and powerless, the authors suggest a variety of alternative conceptualizations. J. K. Gibson-Graham contends that the global-local binarism is intellectually misleading and politically disempowering, arguing instead for a more sustained consideration of the transformative potential of localized, noncapitalist identities and practices. Eugene J. McCann challenges the dominant understandings of scale within critical urban political economy and proposes an approach that is attuned to the particularity and interconnectedness of places. Kevin Cox deconstructs regulationist-inspired understandings of scale and develops a sophisticated framework for investigating the diverse territorial and scalar expressions of uneven development under contemporary capitalism. Finally, in an innovative chapter, Alan Latham develops a topological conceptualization of scale grounded upon actor-network theory, which he further elaborates through a case study of a restaurant district in Auckland, New Zealand.

Parts 2 and 3 of the book mobilize these and other strands of sociospatial theory in order to explore the specific social, political, and discursive projects through which scalar orders are constructed, destabilized, and reworked. Contributors to part 2 examine the role of diverse rhetorical and discursive strategies in constructing or challenging dominant understandings of scale. This theme is developed in chapters examining the scalar dimensions of identity construction within an educational and media campaign known as the Virtual Trade Mission (Ken Hillis, Michael Petit, and Altha Cravey) and in a study of the policing practices of the U.S. border patrol along the U.S.-Mexico border (Susan Mains). Andrew Kirby's thoughtful essay explores the apparent disjuncture between academic theorizations of scale and the assumptions about scalar organization that pervade contemporary U.S. popular culture. Contributors to part 3, meanwhile, explore the ways in which social actors and political organizations attempt, in pursuing their variegated goals, to modify the scale(s) at which sociopolitical contestation is organized. The chapters in this final section of the book are particularly powerful, as they build upon innovative theoretical arguments and detailed, nuanced empirical examples derived from a broad range of spatiotemporal contexts. Thus, whereas Jeff Crump investigates the deeply contested scalar politics of union organizing in the farm implements industry during the mid-20th century, Hilda Kurtz explores the role of struggles over scalar organization in contemporary protests against environmental racism in an industrial corridor of Louisiana. The final chapter, by Helga Leitner, Claire Pavlik, and Eric Sheppard, unpacks the scalar dimensions of emergent, trans-

national interurban networks in the European Union. As they argue, scales and networks are not distinct forms of sociospatial organization, but must be viewed, rather, as closely intertwined dimensions of contemporary urban governance, both in the EU and beyond.

In sum, this book provides a useful overview of the new conceptualizations of geographical scale that are being developed by radical geographers. At the same time, it demonstrates how such conceptualizations are being applied to inform diverse strands of empirical research both within and beyond the discipline of geography. The book is particularly strong in grappling with the cultural and discursive dimensions of the new politics of scale, which have been neglected in many political-economic accounts. Just as important, the case studies included in part 3 of the book are particularly clear, elegant, and accessible demonstrations of the now-standard proposition that geographical scales are socially produced and politically contested.

At a more general level, *Geographies of Power* contributes to the recent wave of scholarship concerned to criticize interpretations of contemporary globalization as a process of "deterritorialization" heralding the emergence of a "borderless world." In contrast to this neoliberal vision, Herod and Wright's volume illuminates the complex transformations of space, place, and scale that have underpinned the contemporary round of global restructuring.

The World in a City. Edited by Paul Anisef and Michael Lanphier. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Pp. viii+543.

Eric Fong
University of Toronto

The World in a City is about immigration in Canada's largest city, Toronto. According to the 2001 Canadian census, about 44% of Toronto's residents are immigrants. To put this percentage in context, about 24% of the residents of New York are immigrants, while Los Angeles is 31% immigrant, and Miami is 40%. Despite the visible presence of immigrants in Toronto, there have been few books published that are devoted to understanding immigration issues in the city, so this publication is a welcome addition.

As suggested by the editors, this book is intended to provide a general overview of the integration process of immigrants, specifically the aspects of inclusion and exclusion of immigrants in the host society. It does so by addressing immigrant integration in five areas: housing and neighborhoods, economy, education, health, and community.

The book begins with a historical account of immigration in Toronto, with an emphasis on the period before the 1970s. In chapter 1, Harold Troper traces how changes in legislation have shaped the immigrant pop-

ulation and its socioeconomic composition. In the next chapter, Clifford Jansen and Lawrence Lam focus on the recent picture of immigration in Toronto. Using the 1996 Canadian census, they highlight the socioeconomic backgrounds of immigrants. The results show the diversity of socioeconomic resources among immigrant groups. After presenting a general picture of immigration in Toronto, chapter 3 begins to explore one of the five areas of immigrant integration: housing and neighborhood. Robert A. Murdie and Carlos Teixeira discuss the settlement patterns of various ethnic groups in Toronto over the years. They explain that immigrant neighborhoods are no longer found only in the central city but in suburban areas as well. They then highlight differences in housing conditions among various immigrant groups and home ownership rates according to period of immigration and ethnicity. In chapter 4, Valerie Preston, Lucia Lo, and Shuguang Wang turn to the second aspect of immigrant integration: economic integration. The authors explore the economic contribution of immigrant groups based on the Immigration Data Base. They have found that the economic contribution of immigrants varies by level of education, year of landing, and place of last permanent residence. They also show differences in self-employment level and income according to immigrant country of origin. In chapter 5, Carl E. James and Barbara Burnaby discuss the third aspect of immigrant integration: educational integration. They have reviewed previous findings of the educational achievements of young immigrants in Toronto and discussed the educational policies in relation to immigration. In chapter 6, Samuel Noh and Violet Kaspar explore immigrant health, the fourth aspect of immigrant integration. Their discussion, not limited to the Toronto context, suggests that immigrants have better health than native-born Canadians. However, immigrant health becomes more similar to that of the Canadian-born population as they remain in the country longer. In chapter 7, Gabriele Scardellato provides a vivid understanding of immigrant integration in Toronto, using a set of pictures and an essay to describe the lives of immigrants in various time periods. In chapter 8, Myer Siemiatycki, Tim Rees, Roxanan Ng, and Khan Rahi discuss community and immigration. They describe how immigrant communities mobilize to address various issues confronting them. In the final chapter, Michael Burstein and Howard Duncan suggest some policy implications of the immigration issues.

The most obvious strength of this edited volume is the richness of information. Numerous tables about different aspects of various racial and ethnic groups in Toronto are provided. For example, chapter 2 provides rich information about more than 25 racial and ethnic groups in Toronto, and 15 tables are presented in this chapter. My concern is that a general picture can become blurred with such detailed information. In addition, I would have appreciated a consistent list of racial and ethnic groups included in the analyses of each chapter; this would have strength-

ened the coherence of the discussion and allowed comparison of results among chapters

Europe without Borders Remapping Territory, Citizenship, and Identity in a Transnational Age Edited by Mabel Berezin and Martin Schain
Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004 Pp xii+319

Paul Statham
University of Leeds

Europe without Borders is an edited volume that contributes to the growing attention given by sociologists to contemporary changes in the European region, through which nation-states are being transformed by processes of globalization. Historically, the process of internal integration that resulted in the nation-state goes to the very core of classical sociological inquiry. There is subsequently much to debate sociologically at a time when nation-states are being transformed by processes of globalization. Heated debates about the direction, substance, and consequences of such purported changes have been fought in recent years, notably over issues of postnational citizenship, cosmopolitanism, and transnationalism. Two key battlefields for informing these debates have been immigration studies and the position of migrants in their Western societies of settlement, and European studies and the integration of countries that has led to the European Union. It is laudable that a volume sets itself an agenda for addressing these topics, especially since studies about European integration have thus far tended to be dominated mostly by political science. However, one of the difficulties of dealing with such a broad but fundamental research question is that it requires considerable intellectual steering and leadership to bring forth a coherent statement, especially when the chosen format is an edited volume. *Europe without Borders* really could have done with a few more borders laid out to define how the different parts make sense as a whole. True, this is the eternal dilemma of an edited volume with conference origins, but nonetheless, one is left here with the impression that the whole is less than the sum total of some of the parts and that some of the parts do not really fit, at least to the billing to which they have been attributed.

The lack of coherence in the volume stems from the inability of the preface and introduction to set a clear intellectual agenda, both generally for the field and specifically for the volume. Mabel Berezin's introduction is a patchwork of asserted platitudes that are not sufficiently developed or unpacked by argument to communicate effectively to the reader. Her basic claim for innovation is in the conceptual use of "territory," but the text elides meaning in a way that makes it difficult to see the analytic utility of the concept. By page 7 we are told for the third time that "territory is *social* because, independent of scale, persons inhabit it col-

lectively, *political* because groups fight to preserve as well as enlarge their space, and cultural because it contains the collective memories of its inhabitants. Territory is *cognitive* as well as physical, and its capacity to subjectify social, political, and cultural boundaries makes it the core of public and private identity projects. Emotion is a constitutive dimension of territory. The feeling 'mine, not yours, ours, not theirs' colors social and political space. These claims are then left to stand as if they are self-evident truths without further explanation. Territory is stretched to mean everything and substantially nothing. Sadly, the introduction is characterized by the looseness of thought and writing that has become commonplace in much supposed theorizing about processes of globalization. Neither is the hodgepodge of selective examples chosen to make the case particularly illuminating, nor, in some cases, accurate. Thus we are told with regard to the "democratic deficit" of the EU (p. 15) that "the deficit becomes real when something like mad cow disease infects European cattle, stops the consumption of beef, and forces individuals to change their daily dietary habits." I fail to see how the impact of a cattle disease on consumers can be traced directly to a deficit in the EU's political communication with its citizens.

Despite this lack of coherence, there are still individual pieces that deserve attention and that bring clarity to these conceptually tricky waters. Krishan Kumar uses the full depth of historical sociology to map out sensitively and meaningfully the field and contested positions over the idea of Europe and the nation-state. Craig Calhoun writes an important and thought-provoking piece on the concept of the public sphere with respect to European integration. As for the more empirical pieces, Juan Diez-Medrano provides an interesting and innovative cross-national study of people's perceptions of European integration, comparing Germany, Britain, and Spain. The presence of some other contributions makes the book appear unbalanced in content. An article entitled "Territoriality and Political Identity in Europe" by John Agnew turns out to be a case study of the Northern League in Italy; this is an interesting case but hardly generalizable for Europe. Riva Kastoryano makes her usual extremely benevolent interpretation of the EU and the potential for transnational activism by migrants. Other authors are J. Nicholas Entrikin, Roy J. Eidelson and Ian S. Lustick, Roland Axtmann, Neil Brenner, and Levent Soysal. In sum, this book is good in a few parts, but the pieces contained may have been better dispersed through relevant journals instead of being brought together.

Global Civil Society An Answer to War By Mary Kaldor Cambridge Polity Press, 2003 Pp ix+189 \$56 95 (cloth), \$22 95 (paper)

Mayer N Zald
University of Michigan

This small book, *Global Civil Society*, contains big ideas. The author, a longtime student of the transformation of the political economy of war and an activist in peace and human rights movements, argues that a global civil society has been emerging. If it develops further, she believes that the institutions and practices of global civil society may present an alternative to collective violence, both between and within states.

The book is divided into six chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 present five major conceptions of civil society and discourses about them that have been used since it was developed in the 18th century. The oldest, *societas civilis* (contrasted with an anarchical state of nature), undergirds the later ones, which are labeled "bourgeois society," "the activist version," "the neoliberal version," and the "postmodern" version. According to Kaldor, the changing definitions and discourse reveal three main tensions: (1) the kinds of institutions and processes that should be seen as constituting civil society, (2) the extent to which the discourse emphasizes *what is* as contrasted with *what could be*, and (3) the amount of emphasis upon and definition of public and private, communal and individual aspects of civil society. All definitions of civil society assume a monopoly of the means of violence by a political authority, conversely, since there is or was no authority that had a monopoly of violence in interstate relations, civil society did not exist there. However, Kaldor argues that even without an international political authority with a monopoly of the means of violence, the growth of international institutions and agreements and the development of transnational publics represents the partial institutionalization of a global civil society.

Kaldor's passion for the topic emerges in chapter 3, "The Ideas of 1989: The Origins of the Concept of Global Civil Society." It zooms in on the social and political situation in Western Europe and Eastern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s and describes the political context of the peace and human rights movement and the views of prominent spokespersons. These two movements have little to do with each other early on, indeed, they reified the "Great Divide" between the European core and the authoritarian, totalitarian, and anarchic others, since peace movements focused upon interstate relationships and the threat of war, while the human rights movement focused upon conditions within a state. "It was the breakdown of the separation between peace and human rights—first from above, in the 1975 Helsinki Accord, and then from below as opposition groups in East and West embraced each other's causes—which contributed in important ways to the 1989 revolutions and the end of the Cold War" (p. 53). Both the peace movement and the human rights movement developed

as transnational movements. Both movements sought a change in regime policy. Equally important, they moved the action downward. The new social movements wanted rights to be not only formal and institutional, but local and participatory.

For Kaldor, the revolutions of 1989 created the conditions and the language for a new, enlarged concept of global civil society that fostered individual and group autonomy and participation and the right to self-organize in local, national, and global arenas. The ideas of civil society in the enlarged and emancipatory model took hold in Latin America and elsewhere almost as simultaneous inventions. But, of course, I would argue that the emergence of the emancipatory model grew out of the widespread critique of socialism, the failure of bureaucratic states to incorporate adequately weak and marginal groups, and the limits of the neoliberal approach to civil society.

Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the principal actors of global civil society, “old” social movements, new social movements, NGOs, transnational civic networks, new nationalist and fundamentalist movements, and new anticapitalist movements. The author presents a “typology” of the actors of global civil society (pp. 80–81) and key aspects of their modes of organization and modes of operating. She assesses their interaction with each other and with global politics. For instance, she sees the NGOs as representing the taming of the new social movements. And she sees NGOs as one of the components of transnational civic networks.

This chapter confused me. Kaldor’s typology presented actors in global society, not global *civil* society. I would have thought, for instance, that nationalist movements and fundamentalist movements tended to work against the development of global civil society. The chapter mixes kinds of global actors with the time frame in which these actors emerged.

In chapter 5 Kaldor considers the question of how the transformation of global society—the spread of capitalism, the growth of interconnectedness, the growing consciousness of a global society (in her words, “a common consciousness of human society on a world scale” [p. 112]) intersects with the changing nature of political authority and warfare. After a very interesting discussion of how the amount and kinds of global interconnectedness changed over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries and how that interconnectedness related to kinds of political and military rule, Kaldor turns to a discussion of contemporary forms of warfare. If the kinds of wars we have are changing, since old-fashioned wars between nations are less likely at least among core nations, and if the nature of political authority is changing, since many nation-states opt for a multilateral approach to international problems, what is the nature of the new global order and the possibility of a global, humanitarian civil society? In this discussion, the United States is treated as a sport or throwback, as “the last nation-state” or as the only “global unilateralist.”

In the concluding chapter, Kaldor turns to a summary of her arguments about the emergence of global civil society and the consequences of 9/11.

for its continued growth. In many ways the decade following 1989 was a hopeful one for activists interested in a humane global society. The growth of multilateral agreements and institutions, the decline in the threat of massive wars, the growth of international NGOs, and the connections between social movements aimed at justice seemed to presage a more humane world. Of course, small local wars developed and some states began to dissolve. Kaldor recognizes that humanitarian attempts to end local wars were not successful without the support of major military powers. The events of 9/11 and their aftermath interrupted any optimistic scenario for the expansion of global civil society. The actors of global civil society were powerless to prevent 9/11 or to play a meaningful role in resolving the conflicts and issues that generated it. Moreover, the response of the Bush administration did little to support global civil society or a multilateral pursuit of change. So, by the end of the book Kaldor is much less optimistic than she was following 1989 (and the time she completed earlier chapters). She offers a good list of possible ways to strengthen global civil society and multilateral international institutions, but she is not optimistic about their feasibility.

This is an interesting book on a very important set of topics. It is also a frustrating book. Several times Kaldor moves too quickly between topics or offers a statement that is not well grounded analytically or put in its historical context. Sometimes the mixture of activist desire and empirical reality get confounded. But, still, the play of ideas is rich.

There are two issues that need elaboration. First, Kaldor does not elaborate on the interconnectedness of the various kinds of civil society. For instance, sometimes the expansion of practices and institutions that are consonant with the neoliberal version of civil society may limit the expansion of the kinds of action associated with the humanitarian version. Second, in her focus upon a global political and social order she also needs to address the politics and powers of different kinds of states and how they relate to the international order. As long as there is not an overarching international political authority, the role of states and of nonstate actors in promoting or limiting the growth of a global civil society cannot be ignored.

Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000 By Charles Tilly. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp. xiv+305. \$60.00 (cloth), \$22.00 (paper).

John Hall
McGill University

Charles Tilly resembles the best claret: superb early promise has led to ever greater depth and richness in maturity. But the analogy does not hold, for late career Tilly is phenomenally productive—producing, so to

peak, increased quantities of wine. There has been great range to his recent work, but this book represents a summation of its central thrust, namely a concern with contention and democracy understood from the background of his previous well-known work on the roles played by coercion and capital in state building. The present volume will become an instant classic, taking its place at the forefront of current debates.

An attractive feature of the book is the presence of a general theoretical frame, at once subtle and complex and hard to summarize. Negatively, Tilly insists that no trend in social evolution exists such that the triumph of democracy is predestined; to the contrary, he properly makes a great deal of dedemocratization processes. Positively, he follows an analysis of regimes made distinctive by varied combinations of capital and coercion with emphasis on the way in which state capacity and protected consultation—that is, loosely, softness of political life—allow for democratization. As one would expect, he argues that increasing state capacity is likely to breed resistance: differently put, civil society reacts once demands are placed upon it.

If this is one route to democracy, albeit one occasionally interrupted by authoritarianism, a second route is one in which liberties of all sorts are maintained into the modern world. This low-intensity route is generally judged to be less propitious for democratization because liberties can all too often be exclusive—thereby allowing social self-organization to perpetuate cages rather than to encourage the civility and interaction upon which democracy in the full sense clearly rests. Three variables—trust, status equality, and the publicness of political life—will explain democratization (with their absence or removal explaining authoritarianism or dedemocratization). He theorizes further the effects of revolution, conquest, confrontation, and colonization, and he insists that democratization depends at all stages upon contention. If this marvelous scheme is well used, it is as important to stress that it does not determine results. To the contrary, thinking through national histories leads Tilly to add three further considerations: democratization will suffer from a powerful military and from status gaps created by the presence of different religious communities, while external interventions of varied sorts can positively influence the life chances of democracy.

With this in the background, Tilly turns to case studies. He writes with enormous authority about France and Great Britain, both countries in which considerable state capacity led to democratizing processes from below. His arguments are novel: he restores the role of bourgeois elements to the French Revolution and casts particularly striking light on Britain by considering everything from the perspective of Ireland. He then turns to Switzerland as an exemplar of democratization of the low-intensity variety. His judgments here are mixed: on the one hand, democratization in fact rested on a military victory, while on the other the homogenization of life within cantons did much thereafter to limit the realities of democratic life. Two final chapters conclude the book. One looks at European

development as a whole. Particularly interesting points are made about postcommunist societies, with Tilly being both consistent and convincing when arguing that reactions to Putin's effective increase in Russian state capacity are more likely to lead to democracy than the prior breakdown into clientelistic and corrupt satrapies of one sort or another. The other chapter asks whether advice for others can be gleaned from European experience. Here he is controversial but again convincing—albeit, much too incisive given the importance of the issue. Crucially, we must learn to understand local dynamics and certainly not be so stupid as to imagine that the imposition of elegant constitutions will change a thing. Roughly speaking, he favors careful ways in which political contention can be encouraged, so that others can manage what we cannot possibly impose from the outside.

Whilse I can only urge people to read the book, they might at least bear three criticisms in mind. First, Tilly never really confronts dynamics within elites. This may be mistaken: much of the erstwhile socialist bloc fell less from the efforts of civil society than from the pressures imposed by Gorbachov, whilse the move to democracy in South Africa had a great deal to do with accommodation within the elite. Second, insufficient attention is given to history. A particular mood dominated Europe between 1870 and 1945: a concern for geopolitical autonomy made imperialism seem rational and ethnic cleansing just about necessary. Historical time has changed, and not just in Europe. Finally, there is a mild tendency to reify the units of analysis—which makes no sense given the endless changes in boundaries and peoples. But these are cavils: this is a superb book.

Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe. By Frank N. Pieke, Pál Nyíri, Mette Thunø, and Antonella Oecagno. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Pp. xi+252.

Zai Liang
SUNY Albany

China's Fujian Province, located in the southeast corner of the coastal region, is historically one of the important provinces for emigration, especially immigration to Southeast Asian countries. This historical legacy began to revive in the mid- or late 1980s with China's transition to a market-oriented economy. This new wave of immigration from China seems to have had more impact on destination countries than on China. In fact, the Fujianese immigrants have captivated media attention since the early 1990s. One frequently reads reports about Fujianese immigrants in the *New York Times*, *Business Week*, and the *Economist*, to name but a few publications. However, systematic scholarly studies are lacking. The book *Transnational Chinese*, by China scholar and anthropologist Frank

Pieke and his colleagues, represents one of the first systematic scholarly efforts to study this Chinese immigration in the 21st century. Moreover, it adds a much-needed comparative perspective, since much of the earlier work was on Fujianese immigrants to the United States. This book makes important theoretical and methodological contributions to the study of immigration in comparative perspective. Theoretically, the book's argument gives us fresh ideas for understanding globalization and Chinese immigration. To my knowledge, this is the first time that the multisite ethnographic approach has been used to study Chinese immigrants, and it is likely to be followed by future scholarly efforts.

The book's main arguments are laid out in the theoretical chapters (chaps. 1, 5, 6). Unlike many recent studies of Chinese immigrants, which tend to focus on destination countries, this book stresses the transnational nature of Chinese (Fujianese) immigrants in the age of globalization. The important players in this process are Fujianese immigrants and leaders of Fujianese immigrant organizations who have the ability to move from China to Europe, to move within European countries, and to make transnational connections between China and other countries. Perhaps the most provocative argument the authors make concerns their thesis about Fujianese migrants and Chinese globalization. Globalization is a buzzword these days. As the authors state, "Globalization theory carries over from its predecessor, center-periphery theory, a spatial projection of differences of power and wealth" (p. 198). The authors challenge this dominant view by stressing the importance of the periphery as a migrant destination. Their evidence is the centrality of the eastern and southern European frontier in the Fujianese migrant flows in Europe. While I think this is an important addition to our understanding of migration and globalization, we should not lose sight of the fact that that Fujian-to-U.S. migration (esp. to New York City) continues its dominance. The second layer of the book's theoretical argument is that the global flow of Chinese immigrants makes the world more Chinese (as reflected in Chinese goods, capital, and culture), and gaining control of Chinese migrants is "one of the ways to control other aspects of Chinese globalization" (p. 199).

The book's empirical chapters rely on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in the United Kingdom, Hungary, Italy, and sending areas in the Fujian Province. This is possible in part because the research team members are from these countries. In chapter 2, which is on old and new transnational villages in Fujian, the authors provide a vivid account of emigration from two villages: one located in Fuqin County (now a city) and the other in Sanming Prefecture. There are idiosyncratic characteristics in geography and economic opportunities between the first village and the second village, but perhaps the most important one is the strong and active role played by the agents of state in promoting and facilitating emigration in Sanming Prefecture in northern Fujian Province. Thus globalization in this case shows the increasing role of the state, contrary to what is predicted by most theories of globalization.

In explaining the recent surge of Fujianese immigration to Europe, the book outlines three main factors. First, China's economic reform program proves to be critical in this process. In the context of Fujian province, increasing investment (especially from Taiwan) and trade and increasing connections between overseas Chinese and emigrant-sending areas created a much mobile local population. Second, from the perspective of destinations, the integration and expansion of the European Union make it possible for immigrants to explore opportunities in different European countries. Third, the fall of the Soviet bloc opened up a frontier region quickly explored by Chinese immigrants, although I think this third factor is probably less important in orchestrating Fujianese immigration to Europe than the first two.

Overall, this is a carefully crafted book on Chinese immigration and globalization. The book's new arguments are thoughtful and well articulated. The book's multisite ethnographic method has a lot of potential for the study of other immigrant groups in different parts of the world. For United States-based scholars whose research focus is only in the United States, this is also an eye-opening study. Finally, the book sets an example of a new type of scholarship in that it makes crucial research materials (case files, interview notes, and field notes) publicly available, a practice that ought to be followed by other researchers.

Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Venturing Abroad in the Age of Globalization
Edited by Robert Kloosterman and Jan Rath. Oxford: Berg, 2003. Pp
xix+331.

Jeffrey G. Reitz
University of Toronto

Immigrant Entrepreneurs surveys immigrant entrepreneurship in 11 countries, with an introduction by the editors and a chapter on each country written by local experts. The countries include three traditional immigration countries (United States, Canada, Australia), seven European countries (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, France, Belgium, Austria, Germany), and South Africa. The collection had its origins in a "thematic network," through a conference called "Working on the Fringes: Immigrant Businesses, Economic Integration and Informal Practices," sponsored by several international groups. The collection is interdisciplinary to some extent, with most contributors being sociologists or geographers.

One of the editors' goals, an "up-to-date reference on immigrant entrepreneurship in advanced economies" (p. xviii), is largely achieved. The country chapters cover a roughly standardized list of topics—recent immigration patterns, the extent and causes of immigrant self-employment, the impact of relevant government policies—with less attention to con-

sequences of immigrant self-employment on economic mobility or integration (an exception being the discussion of "breaking out," the expansion of ethnic businesses into mainstream markets) Based on those countries with which I am most familiar, I can attest to the contributors' good reputations and solid work

The chapters demonstrate that, as with most subjects related to immigration, research on immigrant entrepreneurship is more advanced in the United States, with Canada and Australia following European research is more recent, less developed, and pursues a somewhat different agenda

One theme common to most countries is that immigrant entrepreneurship is increasingly significant, often simply because immigration itself is now more significant There is also a common emphasis on immigrant entrepreneurship as a response to disadvantage or "blocked mobility" in mainstream labor markets and on what American researchers call "social capital" and the ethnic and class resources of immigrants In the United States, there has been a major focus on variations in entrepreneurship among specific origins group, with high rates among certain groups, including Koreans, and lower rates among others, including Mexicans or Caribbean blacks There is awareness of the impact of the social and economic context, and here Europeans have shown much more interest, perhaps because of the implications of the differing economic and policy contexts among European countries

This European focus on context feeds the editors' second objective, which is to highlight features of host societies that shape immigrant employment macroeconomic conditions, regulatory structures, and welfare systems The editors' introduction outlines several emerging theories, and they hope that the chapters will advance understanding of context through comparative analysis They explicitly offer their book as a "successor" to the 1990 book by Roger Waldinger, Howard Aldrich, and Robin Ward (*Ethnic Entrepreneurs Immigrant Business in Industrial Societies* [Sage]), which included contextual factors ("opportunity structure") as well as individual and group characteristics as determinants of ethnic entrepreneurship The editors emphasize a broader range of contextual factors, such as processes linked to globalization and increasing neoliberalism

Although many chapters raise these matters, they do not entirely realize the editors' aspirations, as none is comparative It is an old story assembled case studies are a useful first step toward comparative analysis, but they do not complete the job It would have been helpful to have provided a concluding chapter thoroughly addressing comparative implications

For example, it is suggested (in the introduction and elsewhere) that the role of government, regulatory policies, and the welfare state loom larger in Europe, potentially reducing immigrant self-employment rates compared to the United States This view is not confirmed by a general reading of the country chapters First, immigrant self-employment rates currently do not seem consistently lower in Europe Comparative data

on this question are not good, as the editors point out, but data in the various chapters show rates in the same general range across a number of countries. Although self-employment rates are higher for immigrants than for native-born persons in the United States, the difference is not large, and the same is true in several European countries. Second, it is not clear that immigrant self-employment rates are reduced by interventionist government. While true in some cases (in France, particularly in the past), in others (including the United States) regulation is described as creating opportunities for immigrant self-employment. In still others, policies intended to affect immigrant self-employment seem to have no effect at all.

Another unresolved issue for comparative analysis is the pattern of between-group differences, which is not the same in every country. The Chinese have high rates of self-employment in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands but lower rates in the United States, Canada, and Australia. Turks are highly entrepreneurial in the Netherlands but not in Australia. Such differences point to the interaction between group characteristics and settings.

Overall, the significance and complexity of the comparative agenda is one of the volume's strongest statements. I recommend it for researchers who want to design studies on immigrant economic integration addressing the broadest possible set of issues, relevant to the widest audience.

Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador By Elisabeth Jean Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp xvii + 308.

Jocelyn S. Viterna
Tulane University

Why do poor peasants, most of whom have quietly endured poverty and oppression for generations, sometimes join together and accept mortal risks in order to fight for a more just society? This question, which guides Elisabeth Wood's analysis of insurgent collective action in El Salvador, is certainly not new. Her answer, however, is. After first demonstrating how conventional explanations of high-risk activism (class struggle, material incentives, political opportunities, repression, and mobilizing networks) are inadequate to explain her case, Wood develops an alternative model that includes emotional and moral motives. The result is an important addition to our understanding of the human element of social protest and a compelling model of high-risk activism that will have applications far beyond the case of El Salvador.

For 12 years (1980–92), the FMLN guerrilla army waged a highly effective insurgency against the better-trained, better-funded armed forces of the Salvadoran government. The success of their insurgency is typically

attributed to the political support voluntarily provided by the many *campesino* civilians who occupied land, furnished supplies, provided logistical support, and generally consolidated the FMLN's claim to sovereignty in the war zones (Wood's use of the word "campesino" instead of "peasant" is deliberate and includes all poor agricultural workers, both wage laborers and small landholders)

Why did these insurgent campesinos place themselves and their families in mortal danger even when they had no real expectations of material gain? Wood suggests that two path-dependent processes—patterns of past state violence and the proximity of militant insurgent forces—created the necessary conditions for mobilization in rural El Salvador. However, mobilization itself only occurred when campesinos also developed emotional and moral commitments to the cause. Specifically, participants differed from nonparticipants because they valued participation as a way of honoring their moral commitments to social justice, they sought to defy government authority as a way of expressing moral outrage, even when they had few or no expectations of success, and they derived deep pleasure in asserting their autonomy, especially given their long history of quiescence. Emotional and moral commitments were not only necessary for initiating activism, they also evolved and strengthened throughout the course of participation.

Wood developed her model by analyzing data from 200 interviews conducted with campesinos, both activists and nonactivists, during the waning years of the Salvadoran Civil War. Interviews with military leaders on both sides of the conflict, international aid workers, and government officials, as well as an exhaustive review of archival evidence and human rights reports, provide critical corroborating information. Finally, Wood asked members of local land-owning cooperatives to draw "before and after" maps of land ownership in their communities. These map-making workshops not only demonstrated physically how the end of the civil war brought about new patterns of land tenure, land use, and social organization, they also provided rich ethnographic detail of the new political culture of resistance that had emerged.

By giving emotions a central location in models of high-risk collective action, Wood complements rational choice theories and expands a relatively new area of research on affective motivations for movement participation. Her model may allow researchers to explain quiescence as well as activism. Her review of the literature is thorough and enlightening, her data are remarkable, and her sections on collecting and analyzing narrative data should be required reading for any class on qualitative methods. My only critique, if it can be called such, is that she is perhaps a bit too careful about not theorizing beyond her data. Specifically, she offers little speculation as to why some people become more emotionally committed to the movement than others, even when living in similar contexts.

As a scholar, I found Wood's theoretical model of mobilization highly

compelling. Moreover, as a person, I was deeply touched by the beautiful and important written history embedded in her academic analysis. In a country where most grassroots revolutionaries were illiterate or only slightly literate, and where the few written documents that existed seldom survived the ransacking of the war, this book brilliantly pieces together both the events and the emotions of chaotic times. Wood conducted many of her interviews during the war itself, and her descriptions of the process of data collection—for example, the proudly defiant manner in which her respondents stated their names for her written record despite the risks involved, or how one of her designated map makers, an elderly gentleman who had never learned to hold a pencil, traced the imaginary lines of the changing countryside on a piece of paper with his finger while his grandson followed behind with a marker—give the reader a sense of the spirit of the movement as well as its structure. In addition to providing a rich analysis of revolutionary mobilization, this book captures an important piece of history for the people of El Salvador.

Solidarity and Contention: Networks of Polish Opposition. By Maryjane Osa. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003. Pp. xiii+240. \$21.95.

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Maryjane Osa has produced a significant addition to the literature on postwar social movements in Poland. She poses two questions: How does social mobilization occur in authoritarian states? and Why are some efforts at mobilization more successful than others?

Postwar Poland offers a unique laboratory for exploring these issues. The years 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and 1980–81 witnessed a series of popular movements unmatched in Eastern Europe—or, indeed, elsewhere. Identifying three “protest waves,” Osa asks why those of 1956 and 1968–70 failed to generate a broad-based social movement, while the 1980–81 wave famously did so, in the shape of Solidarity. (Regrettably, she does not take her story on to the imposition of martial law in December 1981 or to the developments in the 1980s that eventually produced Poland’s first elected parliament in 1989.)

Osa focuses on the networks of oppositional organizations that developed before and during the protest peaks and then subsided in the interim periods. Her data on network sizes and linkages convincingly reveal in 1980 a far more dense and numerous oppositional network than in any of the previous periods. It is not a matter, she argues, of one specific organization playing a crucial role (as has been argued, e.g., for KOR or the workers’ movement). Rather, a whole set of both overlapping and competing bodies discovered and elaborated a cooperative framework

This she sees as lying behind the extraordinary success of Solidarity in summer and autumn 1980

One of Osa's most interesting and original chapters concerns the development of relations between the Catholic Church and the Polish regime in the 1960s. After 1956, Polish Catholicism gained for itself a degree of (contested) space for self-development. As well as winning license for Catholic intellectual clubs and journals, Cardinal Wyszyński initiated a populist program of religious revivalism that celebrated linkages between the Polish nation and the Catholic Church. Right wing and linked to landlord interests in the interwar years, Polish Catholicism worked to remake itself as a national, people's church. It developed a program of pastoral mobilization, focused around mass pilgrimages and the ceremonial carrying from parish to parish of a painting of the Black Madonna. The Polish state interfered with these religious ceremonies, generating large numbers of confrontations between believers and the authorities in cities, towns, and villages. Blocked religious processions, defense of crosses, church decoration, and mass singing of forbidden songs were the forms of this drawn-out protest, marked on the one hand by political ambiguity but on the other by a growing identification of the church with "us" and the authorities with "them." As Osa notes, a whole generation gained on-site experience of self-organized resistance. The church also relocated itself as a potential ally of secular opposition.

Not until the 1970s was this potential actualized. The period 1968–71 was marked by what Osa terms a "pseudo-wave" of protest movements, involving first students and members of the intelligentsia, and then workers. Movements were characterized by their isolation from each other and from the church. For example, Roman Laba's study of Polish coastal workers' movements in 1970–71 records an absence of religious discourse and imagery in their demonstrations and demands—though a leading member of the Szczecin interfactory strike committee told me that he and his colleagues did use a local church as a safe place for small meetings.

As Osa records, the 1970s saw leading activists making efforts to overcome the previous fragmentation. Adam Michnik, from the "secular left," argued that a changed church could be an important ally. It should be noted that this reorientation was accompanied by a shift in the same secular left's political ambition, away from Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski's overt political revolutionism in the 1960s to a more reformist "civil society" position. The basic outlines of a theory of "self-limiting revolution"—shared by the secular left and Catholic intellectual circles—were formed in this period and played a major part in the evolution of Solidarity's "intellectual advisers" during 1980–81. Osa, who has little to say about the actual development of Solidarity itself during its heroic period, leaves these matters underdeveloped.

Osa is surely correct that the expanded interlinkages between secular and religious opposition networks facilitated and were further strengthened by Solidarity's explosive emergence in August 1980. To that degree,

her carefully crafted network analysis is illuminating. At the same time, however, it can obscure some other issues. Solidarity appears as nothing but one—albeit crucial and central—element in the network of opposition organizations in 1980. Yet the Solidarity movement, itself a large and complex network taking brilliant organizational form through interfactory strike committees, involved a novel kind of breakthrough to a mass social movement that quite transcended the small-scale world of the small organizations whose interlinkages Osa traces. Other analytic instruments are needed to explore that

After the Rescue: Jewish Identity and Community in Contemporary Denmark. By Andrew Buckser. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Pp ix+271.

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What is a Jew? What defines a Jewish community? Can Jewish communities survive in the face of modernization? How do Jews in the diaspora integrate Jewish tradition with local cultural and social settings? Based on 120 in-depth interviews with Danish Jews and summer ethnographic fieldwork between 1996 and 2001, Andrew Buckser addresses these questions by focusing on Jewish identity and community in contemporary Denmark.

Denmark's Jewish presence dates back to the 17th century. In 1628, King Christian IV established a commercial center in Gluckstadt and offered religious privileges to Sephardic Jews—descendants of families who left Spain during the 1492 expulsions—to encourage immigration. Copenhagen's Jewish community began in 1673, when Denmark extended residence permits to wealthy German Jews who wished to settle in the kingdom. The first Jewish immigrants were cigar makers from Hamburg, followed by German-Jewish jewelers and small-scale manufacturers. By 1684 Jewish observance became legal in Copenhagen.

Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, significantly large numbers of poor Jews entered Denmark illegally, many settling in Copenhagen. These illegal immigrants were often persecuted by non-Jews and so turned to the legal and wealthier Jews to act as a patron class on their behalf. Centuries later, even after legal residence was established for all Jews in Denmark, some of these wealthy Jewish families retained an aura of aristocracy within the Jewish community.

The decree of March 29, 1814, conferred citizenship on Danish Jews, gradually shifting religious practice in everyday life. In addition to ethnicity and social class divisions, Jews developed factions along religious lines. As in other diaspora communities following emancipation, some Jews became ardent reformers and others were ritual traditionalist. Some

remained devout believers, others became outspoken atheists, and some knew little about nor cared much about religious worship

The most interesting chapter in Buckser's book details how Denmark's Jews interpret their rescue from Nazi persecution in 1943. When the Nazis occupied Denmark in April 1940, they left the Danish constitution and its electoral system largely intact. The constitution forbade discrimination on the basis of religion, and the Danish government rebuffed German demands to register and restrict Jewish Danes' activities. Indeed, the courts made a point of protecting the rights of Jews and did not distinguish between Jewish citizens and refugees.

In summer 1943, following a series of popular strikes and an escalation in resistance sabotage, this protectorate arrangement collapsed. On August 29, 1943, Nazi Germany imposed a state of emergency, disarmed the Danish army, and declared German martial law. German forces rounded up potential subversives and began planning to ship Jews to Theresienstadt. The plan was leaked to the Danish government several days in advance, resistance leaders and Jewish leaders were informed, and they turned for help to Christian neighbors, friends, and employers. There was overwhelming sympathy for the plight of the Jews, who were then hidden in basements, summer houses, and farms, large numbers found refuge in the main hospital, where doctors checked them into rooms under standard Danish names. Resistance leaders also managed to smuggle Jews on fishing boats to Sweden. Some Jews had family ties there, while others were boarded in refugee camps for the remainder of the war.

Buckser shows how class and social networks played important roles in shaping individual experiences both during and after the rescue. Jews closest to political and economic leaders were warned about the danger earlier, and they also had places to hide, such as with non-Jewish relatives and friends with spare rooms or summer houses at their disposal. These distinctions continued in Sweden—Jews with professional skills and networks had an easier transition. Stories of the return to Denmark in 1945 were also diverse—some found their tables set with china, flowers, and candles, while others, particularly the less affluent, returned to find their belongings vanished and strangers living in their apartments.

Buckser highlights the multiple ways that the rescue is remembered and its role in formulating contemporary Jewish identity in Denmark. He argues that while Jewish experience in Denmark is diverse, and Jews are fractionalized based on religiosity, ethnicity, social class, and their experience and memory of the "rescue," they have a common symbolic base from which to formulate their identities. Supporting Herbert Gans's notion of symbolic ethnicity, this reservoir of ideas, icons, ritual forms, linguistic formulas, and cultural patterns enables Jews to make sense of themselves and each other, and constitutes Jewish identity in Denmark today. These meanings also include being different in a society that strongly values homogeneity.

Hinduism and Modernity By David Smith Oxford Blackwell Publishing, 2003 pp xii+250

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Western scholars have often noted favorably Hinduism's relative pluralism and tolerance, so the rise of a Hindu nationalism, which stigmatizes and persecutes minorities, has been noteworthy Why have such movements become so powerful in many places?

David Smith places this phenomenon in the context of a more fundamental contrast the relationship between modernity and tradition— notions he acknowledges to be abstractions and simplifications He sees "Hinduism [as] the best, or at least largest, single instance of traditional culture" (p 6) In the first chapter he defines modernity and reviews the ideas of key intellectuals from Bacon to Weber in order to trace the "lineage" of what he calls "primary modernity" Appended is a discussion of postmodernism, feminism, and postcolonialism While he is aware of the mutual influence between modernity and traditional societies, his "concern" is to lay bare the basic parameters of modernity and Hinduism" (p 18) "Primary modernism" and the Enlightenment are seen as positive, while late modernism "has in some senses become a monster" (p 19) and is a juggernaut—ironically using a term that originally referred to the famous temple cart at Puri Chapter 3 is a very brief overview of Hinduism, summarizing the sequence and content of the most famous religious texts plus a few paragraphs about women and Dalits (untouchables)

The three chapters of part 2 are perhaps the most innovative and useful They portray how Hinduism has been seen and understood by outsiders A list of the similarities and differences of Islam with Hinduism and an account of the ruling Mogul/Mughal (Muslim) understanding and treatment of Hindus is outlined, including a history of the building of the Babur's mosque in Ayodhya (Contemporary Hindu nationalists claim this was on the birthplace of the Hindu god Rama)

To indicate how various European intellectuals understood Hinduism, he discusses the 17th-century Dutch clergyman, Abraham Roger, and other relatively unknown observers Strangely, he does not mention the well-known and influential work of the French missionary Abbé J A Dubois The writings of Marx, Weber, and Louis Dumont are covered Smith is critical of both Weber and Dumont

Next, 19th- and 20th-century scholars' understandings of Hinduism are presented While acknowledging colonialism's racism and exploitation and admitting that their scholarship is contaminated by the biases of its time, Smith defends the important contribution these scholars made He recognizes the initial usefulness of postmodern deconstructions of the "orientalist" Western views of the East Yet, he believes portraying earlier scholars as tools of colonialism distorts more than it clarifies

Part 3 deals with four aspects of traditional Hinduism: the role and treatment of women, the various forms and incarnations of the female deity, the male gods, and the Hindu image of the self. This provides the most concrete information about Hindus and contrasts their patterns with modern ones. Rather standard information and views are presented, though the selection of topics has no clear rationale.

Part 5, "Hinduism Today," begins with gurus. They demand obedience from disciples in contrast with the modern notion of "reasoning for yourself." Celebrity gurus are the most visible aspect of Hinduism in the West—and an increasingly important phenomenon in modern India. This chapter mainly supplies descriptions of the beliefs, activities, and followers of the best-known modern gurus.

A chapter on nationalism sees it as a mechanism of solidarity, often based on quasi-fictional historical accounts and manufactured commonalities. Key actors in the emergence of Hindu nationalism are described, including the life and thought of its "father," V. D. Sarkar. The emergence of the Rashtriya Swayamsevaka Sangh (RSS), founded in 1925, is traced. Its aim was to "bring cohesion and strength to Hindus" and to propagate a Hindu-dominant culture. Its core is a cadre of celibates who give up regular employment to serve as preachers and missionaries. It combines quasi-military symbols, hierarchical discipline, camaraderie, and militancy. An overview of the network of related organizations follows, including the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The movement transformed the god Rama into the patron deity of modern Hindu nationalism. In part, this is an implicit move toward monotheism meant to create a more unified Hindu dominance of the state. Rama's "promotion" also provided the rationale for the destruction of the mosque in Ayodhya in 1992 and the ensuing conflict between Hindus and Muslims.

Smith describes his book as a portrayal of Hinduism that is part description and part meditation: this is both its strength and weakness. Too often the factual material reads like lecture notes for undergraduates that have been inserted into thoughtful comments about both Hinduism and modernity. What is the relevance of this book for sociologists? I would not recommend it as an introduction to Hinduism. For those who already understand the key features of Hinduism and are interested in the continuing struggle between modernity and tradition, it could be a useful book.

The Promise Keepers: Servants, Soldiers and Godly Men By
John P Bartkowski New Brunswick, NJ Rutgers University Press,
2004 Pp 184

Anna Gavanas
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Ironically, despite the absence of the Promise Keepers from recent popular and academic discourse, it is timely to publish a book about this controversial Christian men's movement now that the debates have cooled off. John Bartkowski sets out to provide a complex, up-to-date portrait of the group, including its growth and decline and its impact on U S religion. Based on ethnographic fieldwork from meetings and interviews with members, he listens to Promise Keeper men and takes them at their word while situating their accounts and practices in a broader cultural context. Conversely, Bartkowski uses the Promise Keepers as a prism to investigate various social processes in the United States: evangelicalism, family, therapeutic culture, sport, and multiculturalism. He seeks to avoid siding with previous one-sided accounts of the Promise Keepers that have tended to be either "apologists" or "detractors"; instead, he focuses on paradoxes, multiplicities, and "messy, complicated perspectives" within the movement.

Bartkowski maps out four competing and contradictory discourses of masculinity within the Promise Keepers and traces their cultural origins and influences: the rational patriarch/traditional discourse, the expressive egalitarian/masculine liberation discourse, the tender warrior/poeticized discourse, and the multicultural man/racialized masculinity discourse. Moreover, Bartkowski identifies two rhetorical devices that Promise Keepers use to manage internal tensions and contradictions: "discursive tacking" and gendered metaphors. Using these strategies, the organization zigzags against the winds of competing cultural discourses and thus makes a diverse mix of ideologies that seem to overlap and complement, rather than contradict, each other. In other words, according to Bartkowski, Promise Keeper leaders and spokesmen simultaneously embrace and distance themselves from the different notions of manhood they promote.

Bartkowski discusses the ways the four Promise Keeper discourses on masculinity engage with the diverse perspectives of other contemporary men's movements, like the mythopoetic men's movement and mobilizations like the Million Man March. He also situates the Promise Keepers among historical men's movements like Muscular Christianity as well as within evangelical traditions. He discusses the ways in which evangelical Protestantism maintains "distinctive engagement" with U S culture and plays into U S ideologies of individualism while simultaneously distinguishing itself from the cultural mainstream. One of Bartkowski's main points about the growth and decline of the Promise Keepers is the movement's capability to mix elements that resonate with a wide and contra-

dictory range of cultural currents in U S religious culture. He concludes the book with an argument about the “sensate mentality” of Promise Keeper events, which are designed to be spectacles akin to the rapidly shifting entertainment industry. He identifies this responsiveness to U S cultural dynamics as crucial to the rise and decline of the group.

One chapter in Bartkowski’s book is dedicated to multicultural evangelism. Here, Bartkowski discusses the paradoxes of simultaneously transgressing and reinforcing racial divisions among men as manifest in the Promise Keepers’ politics of “racial reconciliation.” Bartkowski points out the ways the group’s focus on eradicating social barriers on private and individual levels diverts from a critical analysis of institutionalized racism and racial stratification.

Bartkowski also addresses claims by feminist critics that the Promise Keepers reassert male privilege and reinvigorate patriarchal dominance. He argues that approaches to the movement in terms of “backlash” and “protest” are too reductionistic. Instead, according to Bartkowski, the group’s conferences “mix elements of gender orthodoxy and family traditionalism with progressive visions of godly manhood.” Bartkowski maintains that the Promise Keeper rhetoric of gender difference is not about denigrating women and emphasizes the ways the exclusion of women from men-only small groups facilitates openness among men. Bartkowski also illuminates how these men disentangle intimacy from sexuality as to make “brotherly love” safe from sexual desire (i.e., excluding gay men). In this context, the author asserts that the Promise Keepers organization reinforces hegemonic masculinity through an explicitly stated opposition to homosexuality. Simultaneously, Bartkowski paradoxically maintains that disapproval of homosexuality serves to facilitate gender experimentation as to make men feel safe to do “unmanly” things, like weeping, hugging, and holding hands. Bartkowski does not explore the connections between the gendered and sexualized exclusionary politics of the Promise Keepers, although these are apparent throughout his ethnography and fundamental to understanding Promise Keeper discourses, strategies, and practices. As opposed to focusing on analytical discussion and distancing himself from the people he studies, Bartkowski really does seem to take Promise Keeper men at their word in this context. As a result, it seems that Bartkowski misses an important cornerstone to the masculinities he describes: the centrality of notions of heterosexuality that construct manhood as the opposite of “sissiness,” meaning *both* femininity and gay masculinity. In sum, although its gendered and sexual analysis could be more elaborate, Bartkowski’s book does answer the need for a solid sociological and historical ethnography of the Promise Keepers.

The Character of Credit Personal Debt in English Culture, 1740–1914
By Margot C Finn Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2003 Pp
xii+362

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One of the oldest ideas about social change is that the rise of modern capitalism eroded and subverted “traditional” social relations. The usual suspect in this alleged destruction was the cash economy. Marx wrote stirringly about the effects of the “cash nexus” in Victorian Britain, but according to Margot Finn, not only were the consequences much less simple, deleterious, and unilateral, but it was the “credit nexus” that mattered most. Finn’s historical analysis does not explicitly engage sociological theory, but it offers a wonderfully detailed and empirically grounded exploration of the embeddedness of credit transactions in social relations and cultural norms. Even with their status as formal-legal claims, debts retained a social character well after the development of industrial capitalism.

Finn relies on a wide-ranging body of evidence to support her arguments. Some of it is clearly relevant and has already been mined by others (court records of debt litigation, political pamphlets, parliamentary discussions, etc.). Some of it is less obvious, but Finn’s use of it is sufficiently intelligent and thoroughgoing that most readers will be won over. Unless they were English majors in college, sociologists will want to blow the dust off their copies of the *Norton Anthology* because chapter 1 exploits the fact that English writers were obsessed with debt and credit (p. 25), and the references, characters, and novels go flying by. Chapter 2 plunders diaries and autobiographies to unearth the complexity of how individuals wrestled with credit and its contradictions. The balance of the book is devoted to debtor’s prison and the English legal system.

Credit was essential to commerce, and however much business people preferred to get cash from their customers, they invariably had to offer credit. Individual credit played a critical role in the consumer revolution (p. 15). Thus, almost every business and consumer was caught in a web of credit, borrowing from some and lending to others. Economic survival depended on a careful coordination of assets and liabilities. Access to credit was as reflective of class and gender differences as almost any other social indicator, a fact that is probably still true today. Until various married women’s property acts were passed in the late 19th century, the legal status of married women (coverture) prevented them from independently entering into debt contracts. But by law they could use their husband’s credit to purchase “necessities,” a rule that assumed the social distinction between “necessity” and “luxury.” As Finn indicates, this distinction was highly variable. And the reality of family life was such that

a degree of economic agency for married women was recognized in English courts of law

Credit was very commonly extended to middle- and upper-class customers. One of the big changes was the inclusion of working-class consumers within the credit economy. Wage earners needed credit if they were to reconcile their unstable incomes with less flexible consumption. Retailers increasingly gave credit to persons of modest means, and that change was reflected in who ended up in debtor's prison. Earlier, debtor's prison offered a legal haven to insolvent gentlemen and professionals, incarcerating them in a not entirely uncomfortable situation. But the composition of the prison population shifted, as did the treatment meted out. More lower-status debtors ended up in jail and faced harsher conditions (pp. 174, 186, 189).

One of the most interesting tensions that Finn follows is that between formal law and law in practice. Legally, a debt was a contractual obligation that creditors were eager to enforce. When creditors felt that their claims were not sufficiently protected, they pushed for legal reforms to strengthen their position. Indeed, courts of conscience and county courts were created to deal with the kind of small claims that poor debtors and their creditors trafficked in. The contradictions between a formal-legal apparatus that sanctified contract and actual credit transactions as negotiated by people in social relations with one another got worked out in the courts of conscience. And in the county courts, the enforcement of contracts was often tempered by the application of norms of fairness to the debtor's personal situation, usually at the expense of creditors (pp. 237, 258). New court systems created by Parliament to update England's commercial legal framework and uphold contractual fidelity were used, in practice, to apply equitable standards inherited from the past.

Tradesmen tried to use courts to enforce their claims, but they also organized trade protection societies and, later, credit enquiry departments. These functioned like credit rating agencies and disseminated the names of known swindlers (p. 280). If retailers could not avoid extending credit they would at least try to manage it better. But the heuristics they used to discern the creditworthy (e.g., customer's home address and profession) were undercut by adaptable dishonest credit seekers (who supplied fictitious addresses and posed as ministers, doctors, or other professionals). The problem of credit was never static, and even over almost two centuries the changes were sufficiently complex and uneven as to defy easy classification into status versus contract, traditional versus modern, or pre-capitalist versus capitalist.

Insurance as Governance By Richard V. Ericson, Aaron Doyle, and Dean Barry. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003. Pp. viii+414. \$65.00 (cloth), \$35.00 (paper).

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Whether we like it or not, the emerging global economy has been accompanied by a corresponding downsizing of the state and an increasing influence of private corporations. Based on the cases of the United States and Canada in particular, the authors of *Insurance as Governance* contend that the insurance industry, which shares many common goals with the state, has come to replace part of the state's essential functions through its control of moral risk. Being part of the liberal risk regimes, they argue, insurance governs the population beyond the state by articulating how people should act, demarcating who is protected, allocating blame and responsibility, and applying systems of surveillance and policing.

This book is divided into three parts. Part 1 establishes a theoretical framework, complete with references on the decline of the welfare state, the rise of liberal risk regimes, the problem of moral risk, and the importance of studying insurance. Parts 2 and 3 contain empirical data on insurers' negotiations with political economies, the intertwining interests of the insurance industry and the state, the structural and cultural underpinnings of market misconduct, and insurers' control over their employees and clients.

Readers will be impressed with the empirical depth of this book. Using mainly interviews and industry documents, along with some field observation, the authors collect data from a wide range of informants. The somewhat mythical operation mechanism of insurance as a modern risk management institution is demystified through detailed, factual information about screening, underwriting, reinsurance, investment, and claiming mechanisms. Those who are interested in the issue of trust between organizations and networking capitalism will find the stories about reinsurance dynamics especially fascinating.

Another strength of the book lies in its critical discussion of how insurance as governance perpetuates inequalities by segmenting the population, unpooling risk, and redlining the undesirable. Commercial insurance, after all, speculates on future risks, and future risks can never be precisely calculated despite advanced actuarial practices. This inherent problem, together with an oversaturation of insurers and products, provides a fertile structural basis for market misconduct. Nevertheless, it is the insurance sales agents who are often made scapegoats for manipulating prospects and clients in the market, while the structural problems of the industry are left intact. The authors fail to address fully this issue, however, as they systematically neglect the issue of ideology, except for a brief mention in conclusion. This is a crucial omission, as ideological mecha-

nisms at work in the industry are conspicuous, from individualizing responsibilities to replacing the word “accident” with “crash” in automobile insurance policies

The main drawback of the book is the striking gap between the literature review and the empirical data. After a review of relevant works, the authors make assertions at the outset instead of posing research questions. When it comes to the empirical data, they are surprisingly descriptive and rarely refer back to any of the works cited, failing to link their substantive data to their argument. The conclusion, which is merely a summary of the chapters, is especially disappointing, as readers might expect to see a reconnection between the macroagenda posited in part 1 and the microempirical details in parts 2 and 3.

Furthermore, while I agree with the authors that private insurance ultimately intensifies social inequality, I disagree that discriminatory and unjust practices are the result of limited technical knowledge of risk and a reliance on “situational, intuitive, and subjective assessments” (p. 12). The source of discriminatory policies, in my observation, is the profit-driven nature of commercial insurance. In asserting that the insurance industry and the state share parallel goals and apparatuses, the authors overlook a critical difference between these two parties that might challenge their core argument. While the state, voluntarily or involuntarily, has been commercializing some of its functional bodies and operations, its legitimacy is still in part grounded in its performance in integrating fragmented populations, minimizing crimes, and orchestrating economic stability. The legitimacy of private insurance, on the other hand, comes from its financial strength and the rhetorical discourse about its role in cultural and political economies. Different sources of legitimacy call for different moral obligations and qualitatively different ways of governing.

Finally, despite a long list of references, one text that is most relevant to the theme, James Post’s *Risk and Response* [Lexington Books, 1976] is curiously absent. Post provides an innovative analysis of private insurance, the state, and social change in the United States from an organizational perspective. Nevertheless, *Insurance as Governance* does address the timely issue of corporate governance and the globalization of the market economy. Its comprehensive scope in examining the field of insurance and abundant empirical details constitute a significant contribution to the limited literature on the sociology of insurance. This book should be of interest to those in the fields of economic sociology, political sociology, and public policy.

The Word as Scalpel A History of Medical Sociology By
Samuel W Bloom Oxford Oxford University Press, 2002 Pp 348

Nicholas A Christakis
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While mostly a staid history of institutions and a biography of great men, *The Word as Scalpel* nevertheless engages important issues in the social history of ideas as they have emerged between the hammer and anvil of the social sciences and medicine. Samuel Bloom, a respected sociologist of medicine, describes the ancient predicates and modern emergence of medical sociology. This is the most comprehensive such history of which I am aware, and it sheds light on how many issues currently being engaged in the field have very old roots indeed, whether they pertain to socioeconomic health disparities, ecological or neighborhood effects, or even sociobiologic determinism.

The problem of advocacy versus objectivity, rife in the social sciences, prominent in sociology, and especially poignant in medical sociology (given its focus on illness and death) is extensively treated in this volume. How could any field that not only originated from the concerns of religious individuals, but also emerged from the active engagement of its founders with the problems of poverty, urbanism, child welfare, and mental health do anything but struggle with the difference between advocacy and objectivity? As Bloom points out, the issue engaged by moral crusaders, social reformers, and ultimately by social scientists is how to “reconsider the causes and reassign responsibilities for problems of health and illness” (p. 19). Among other things, this dualism is illuminated by Bloom with his engaging, contrasting biographies of Lawrence J. Henderson and the unknown Bernhard Stern.

This book comprehensively engages the ways in which the notion of medicine *as* a social science—an ancient idea—butts up against the idea of a social science *of* medicine, and the ways in which disparate professions (from medicine to public health to sociology) have struggled with professional identity. Bloom argues that “both medicine and sociology sought to deal with similar problems” (p. 4) and that “the tension between explanations that focused on the biological on the one hand or on the psychosocial on the other hand has always been there. The tendency for interest in social factors to become greater during periods of social and political conflict and change caused such tension only to become deeper. As a result, public health/social medicine has a long history of identification with radical political movements” (p. 104).

Another theme of the book is the way that mental health—and its origins, distribution, and cures—is related to social phenomena, intellectually and institutionally, and hence to medical sociology. Whether the topic is how problems in mental health motivated some of the founders of the field or what funding was available from the National Institute of

Mental Health for many decades to support the training and research of sociologists interested in medicine or because psychiatry and psychiatrists such as Harry Stack Sullivan were so influential, the book does an excellent job of identifying the links between mental health and medical sociology

We also learn much about the coemergence of sociology and medical sociology at the University of Chicago, the University of Wisconsin, Harvard, Yale, Johns Hopkins, Columbia, and other eminent institutions. The reader is offered a detailed history of the development of the section of medical sociology within the American Sociological Association in one chapter and the role of the University of Chicago in another. Everett Hughes, Talcott Parsons, and Robert Merton make appearances as do Renée C. Fox, Eliot Freidson, Howard Becker, and David Mechanic. So many important individuals receive attention that the book struggles hard to avoid being a "great man" history of medical sociology.

The book offers piquant details regarding key figures. We learn, for example, how Lawrence Henderson, also known as "Pink Whiskers," sent his shirts to be laundered in France every other week, we learn about W. I. Thomas's arrest for disorderly conduct in a Chicago hotel room with a married young woman, we learn of the very old links, at least at Harvard, between the study of human beings and the study of insects, personified by the appointment of William Morton Wheeler as one of the first professors of sociology in 1931.

We hear little in this book about any rancor between the quantitative and qualitative aspects of medical sociology. In part, this is because these two methodological approaches reach their apogee in time periods separated by several decades. I suppose this is good. But we also hear little about vibrant aspects of contemporary medical sociology, such as its increasingly epidemiological focus on the social determinants of how and when we die, its attention to how socioeconomic status affects health across the life course, its examination of the role of social networks in health, its exploration of how health care organizations function and evolve, and its engagement of biodemography and sociobiology.

Bloom's final chapter is oriented to the recent history of medical sociology and the ways in which medical sociology, to the intellectual detriment of the field, has become more multidisciplinary, more applied, and more reliant on government and foundation support for specific projects. Bloom tries mightily to suggest that medical sociology is not in decline in the period between 1980 and 2000, but the evidence he musters would seem to suggest that, in his opinion, the golden period is behind us. This tone, I think, is needlessly pensive.

The Sexual Organization of the City Edited by Edward O. Laumann, Stephen Ellingson, Jenna Mahay, Anthony Paik, and Yoosik Youm. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. Pp. xvii+418. \$35.00.

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Research concerned with sexual attitudes and behaviors of adults in the United States has consistently reported variation by gender and race/ethnicity. In an earlier book reporting the results of the National Health and Social Life Survey (*The Social Organization of Sexuality* [University of Chicago Press, 1994]), Edward Laumann and colleagues reported such differences, for example, in the percentage of persons ever married and in number of sexual partners in the preceding 12 months. Several explanations have been offered, including cultural values, religion, and inherited differences in sexual strategies. The thesis of this volume is that these differences can be explained by variation in the sexual market, "the general social/relational structure in which the search for a sexual partner takes place" (p. 8). The character of sexual markets is influenced by (1) social roles and norms governing interaction, (2) local brokers, including family, clubs, and social organizations, and (3) "social and cultural embeddedness," consisting of social networks, space, sexual culture, and social institutions.

Hypotheses derived from this framework are tested using survey data. Data at the individual level were collected via household surveys of five samples, one representative of adults in Cook County, Illinois ($n = 890$), and representative samples of four diverse communities within the county (210–358). Completion rates ranged from 60% to 78%. Interviewers were well trained and usually of the same race/ethnicity as the respondent. The researchers took steps to minimize threats to validity, and the text addresses questions about accuracy of self-report. Data at the community level were collected via interviews with 160 key informants, community leaders in four areas—law, medicine, religion, and social services.

Chapter 1 presents the theoretical perspective, which incorporates ideas from economic conceptions of markets, rational choice theory, sociological analyses of social institutions, and script theory. Chapter 2 describes the rationale and design of the Chicago Health and Social Life Survey (CHSLS) and contains detailed tables illustrating the features of each community. Chapter 3 discusses spatial organization of markets; the four communities studied are described as socially bounded sex markets, channeling and constraining the relationship and sexual behavior choices of community residents. Each community is defined by its spatial location vis-à-vis other communities, mix of local institutions (churches, social services), cultural norms regarding sexuality, and residents' social ties.

Chapters 4–6 use the concepts and data to examine three aspects of sexual expression: the social construction of same-sex markets in the four

neighborhoods (chap 4), how the individual's "value" changes over the life course and how this is related to changes on sexual partnering strategies (chap 5), and links between sex markets and marriage markets—that is, accounting for differences in rates of marriage. Chapter 7 focuses on relationships between marketplace dynamics and relationship commitment, satisfaction, and jealousy. Chapter 8 considers the data on intimate-partner violence and forced sex, and chapter 9 considers the evidence that social networks affect the transmission of STDs. These six chapters vary in the degree to which the analyses are structured around characteristics of the four communities. Characteristics of all four are prominent in the analyses of same-sex markets and marriage and much less prominent in other chapters. In some cases, gender and ethnicity are the key analytic variables. In each chapter, the presentation of statistical analyses are clear, with numerous figures (21) and tables (39) used in presenting results.

The last two chapters of the book discuss the data from key informant interviews. These chapters focus on how religious, civic, and social leaders construct "causal stories" to explain the problems of the populations they serve. The narrative illustrates how these stories determine the way that these leaders and their agencies respond to the community and the interventions they provide. Chapter 10 focuses on three of the communities and is based on interviews with 58 persons involved in medical and social service organizations. Chapter 11 focuses on the attempts of religious organizations to regulate sexuality in three of the communities. These two chapters provide important insights into the influences on how these institutions serve their communities and nicely complement the individual-level analyses. I found these to be the most interesting chapters in the book.

This book makes an important contribution. The conception of sexual markets is original and thoughtfully developed. The core concepts are presented in chapter 1, and the theory is elaborated as it is applied to specific problems. I find the model plausible and insightful. The research design complements the theory, in the collection of data at two levels, in the design of the individual and key informant samples, and in the content of the interviews. The quantitative analyses are well done. The results encourage generalizations about culture and gender differences, but it is important to note there is variation within as well as similarities between communities. One cost of the emphasis on market and community influences in the analyses is the loss of a sense of the individual as agent, at times. This book should be read by anyone interested in social influences on sexual expression.

Beyond the Closet: The Transformation of Gay and Lesbian Life By
Steven Seidman New York: Routledge, 2004 Pp. x+245 \$18.95

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Stephen Seidman's *Beyond the Closet* seeks to gauge the nature and depth of changes that have been occurring over the last quarter century in the lives of gay and lesbian Americans. The term "beyond the closet" refers to the increasing ability of the upstate New Yorkers, interviewed for this study, to live relatively open and integrated lives without having to pass as heterosexual or hide their sexuality. By employing a fairly strict measure of the "closet" derived from the 1950s—when public debates over homosexuality consisted of deciding whether it was a crime, sin, or sickness—the current era now appears to be in many ways "beyond the closet" with the relative integration of lesbians and gay men into civil society and a corresponding (conditional) freedom to live openly in everyday life. All the same, Seidman is careful to distance himself from an end-of-gay thesis that might argue that liberty and equality have already been attained or that distinct sexual identities have been rendered obsolete because sexual orientation has become socially inconsequential. His interviews also reveal enduring difficulties, social exclusion, and subordination in everyday lives when faced with institutional heterosexuality. Interviewees testify to the price exacted for nonheterosexual orientation by workplaces, schools, some families of origin, and media.

Much of the beyond-the-closet status depends on a conditional acceptance where gay equality has been gained on middle-class, heterosexual terms. Rehabilitated postcriminal and postpathological homosexuals have been normalized as long as they are "gender conventional, link sex to love and a marriage-like relationship, defend family values, personify economic individualism, and display national pride" (p. 133). Those who fail to conform to such conventional values continue to languish in the symbolic purgatory that once captured all lesbians and gay men. In a chapter on the last two decades of cinematic depiction, Seidman notes how often the new visibility translates into lesbian and gay characters playing the roles of pets, sidekicks, comic relief, or marginal players to core heterosexual dramas. Seidman chides those who mistake this conditional status with real equality, arguing that lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) people need to be full players in the public sphere and part of the larger evolution of social values and alternatives. Confinement to fitting into what is already given is scarcely enough.

The book takes an even-handed approach to the gay marriage debate, sorting through the symbolic politics that have freighted it with implications far exceeding what legal recognition can offer. Arguing that same-sex marriage is a necessary part of achieving equality, Seidman critiques opponents who see it as a capitulation to patriarchy or a further stig-

matization of those outside coupled relationships, arguing that gay marriage can help further push marriage toward egalitarianism and toward the status of just another option, rather than a privileged choice

What this book does not take up is perhaps a sign of the times as well. Neither "AIDS" nor "queer" even make an appearance in the index of the book, though these were central topics in LGBT studies in the 1990s and Seidman edited the important volume *Queer Theory/Sociology* in 1996. This book hints at, but does not take up, the larger question of the approaching exhaustion of the equality rights strategy and the need for a politic around sexuality and relationships that opens spaces for experimentation and challenges continuing state regulation. The question is whether the demand for equality can ever amount to anything more than conforming to heterosexual conventionality, and what a more radical critique in favor of sexual freedom and relationship innovation should pursue. An interesting question raised by this book, and explored in a preliminary way, is how contemporary gay and lesbian visibility may be shaping heterosexuality into a marked, rather than simply default, identity.

Beyond the Closet presents a well-measured assessment of the current era and is characterized by the lucid prose that readers have come to expect of Seidman's work. Written by the winner of the 2004 Simon-Gagnon award of the Sociology of Sexualities Section for career achievement, this book contributes to contemporary studies of sexuality as well as being easily accessible to undergraduate readers.

Threads: Gender, Labor, and Power in the Global Apparel Industry By Jane L. Collins. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. Pp. xii + 207.

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This is a thoughtful and engaging book on the labor process and labor politics of the global apparel industry. Global sourcing, Jane Collins has found, is not simply a cost-driven corporate decision but is a political economic process shaped by an array of social, political, and international institutions, resulting in varying degrees of corporate localization and deterritorialization. Pursuing a gender-sensitive analysis of globalization, the book emphasizes the importance of women and gender. That is, the social organization and construction of women's skills, interests, and needs contributes to management's control in the workplace and allows mobile capital to avoid investing in the social reproduction of labor.

Using a multisited ethnographic approach to break open the black box of the commodity chain, Collins studies both the headquarters and the subcontracting factories of two apparel corporations. Tultex, a traditional firm with a long history of vertically integrated sweatshirt production in

Virginia, belatedly attempted overseas subcontracting in the 1990s. It eventually went out of business in 1999. On the other hand, Liz Claiborne, a dominant branded marketer that pioneered a system of overseas subcontracting in the 1970s, enjoys a first-mover advantage and has successfully expanded and diversified its production and retail networks. Collins deftly connects the history of these two firms with that of the industry as a whole, showing continuity and change over time in a single industry. For instance, she shows that the search for low-cost labor is not new. The move to the global south in the 1990s has its precedent in American textile firms' exodus to Southern states since the 1930s. Then as now, capital mobility has to do with domestic and international politics that gave rise to the elaborate quota system in the international textile and apparel trade since the 1950s, as well as the rise of big, well-capitalized marketers and retailers in the United States with leverage over manufacturers in technology and pricing.

One of the most fascinating discoveries of the book is the striking similarities in shop-floor labor control practices in the two Mexican factories producing for the two corporations, respectively. One makes low-end basic apparel and the other high-price fashion, yet, workers toil under the same progressive bundle system doing repetitive and methodical work as their 19th-century counterparts, for minimum piece-rate wages. The higher stress level in the factory making high-end fashion for Liz Claiborne comes from an intensified form of Taylorism called "statistical process control," which measures the quality and speed of workers' output throughout the production process. "Quality was achieved not by developing workers' skills, but by intensifying control," Collins writes. In Mexico, given the neoliberal regulatory framework of NAFTA, the lack of state regulation, and the absence of a strong labor movement, the high road to flexible specialization predicated on skilled workers having more leverage in the workplace is ever elusive.

Continuity in shop-floor despotism notwithstanding, today's corporations differ from their counterparts of a century ago. Global firms are deterritorialized entities that make no commitment or investment in the social infrastructure of production sites. Unlike textile workers in Virginia, who at least could appeal to a moral economy of paternalism or to a union contract, Mexican workers today are bereft of durable connections and direct social interaction with their employers and other workers. In addition, women workers' family responsibilities, managerial devaluation of their skills, and the male bias of traditional unions only aggravate their powerlessness. Collins mentions the emergence of community unionisms and transitional labor coalition, but these budding efforts seem weak.

The caveat in this insightful comparative account is its thin ethnography: the ethnographer is conspicuously absent, especially in Mexico, and we do not hear Mexican workers in their own voices. The microlevel, everyday realities of shop-floor dynamics and workers' experience therein are given short shrift, compared to the historical and the political economic

narratives Her depiction of nontraditional modes of labor activism relies on secondary sources and cases outside of her research sites One wonders what accounts for such uneven capacity among women in different locales to engage in activism

Overall, written in accessible prose and integrating the findings of recent scholarly works on the history and organization of the textile and apparel industry, Collins's book makes a timely and critical intervention in the public debate on globalization, outsourcing, and labor rights Without romanticizing workers' capacity to resist, she nevertheless underscores women workers' budding attempt to invent new forms of community unionism and transnational labor coalition As the Multi-fiber Agreement is due to be phased out in 2005 and another round of intensifying global competition in the industry looms large, *Threads* will appeal to a wide audience

Separate Roads to Feminism Black, Chicana, and White Feminist Movements in America's Second Wave By Benita Roth New York Cambridge University Press, 2004 Pp 225

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In *Separate Roads to Feminism*, Benita Roth examines the emergence of the Black, Chicana, and White Feminist movements during the 1960s and 1970s Perhaps Roth's strongest contribution is her argument that these movements were in fact *simultaneous* Roth contends that the second wave of feminism emerged from organizationally distinct movements (specifically the Civil Rights/black liberation movement, the Chicano movement, and the white left) that influenced each other in both collaborative and antagonistic ways By doing so, the author not only challenges the notion that second-wave feminism was monolithically middle class and white, she also critiques the implicit competition among various race- and class-based movements that one is more "feminist" than another She states very clearly that feminism among women of color did not emerge solely as a result of racism in the white movement, an inaccurate history that negates the agency of feminists of color Instead, Roth paints a more complex picture of second-wave feminism as a composite of distinctly organized movements based upon a varied understanding of *feminisms* that is informed by the larger structural racial inequality of the era

Roth begins the book with a macrostructural discussion of inequality and how African-American, Chicana, and white feminists were differentially located in a race and class hierarchy Here, she critiques the theory of relative deprivation as overly simplistic for its individualistic, middle-class, and white-centered approach to collective action Roth writes, "Class inequality together with racial/ethnic inequality affected the potential for

feminist solidarity across racial/ethnic lines because African American and Chicana feminists had white women in mind as their reference group, and thus did not see them as natural allies in the struggle for gender, racial/ethnic, and economic justice" (p. 45). The complexities and difficulties of feminist mobilizations are made clear in this chapter.

The next section comprises three chapters examining white women's liberation, black feminism, and Chicana feminism, respectively. In the first of these chapters, the author outlines the dilemmas experienced by the white women liberationists as they separated from the male-centered New Left. Roth explains that competing loyalties and identities with the Left both facilitated and delayed the emergence of a separate women's liberation movement. In this regard, the emergence of the white women's movement is similar to that of women of color who experienced this competing sense of loyalty, perhaps even more acutely. This is evident in Roth's analysis of black feminism. In this, her strongest chapter, Roth analyzes the political significance of black women calling themselves feminists in the face of competing demands on their loyalties and energies. Roth convincingly argues that black feminism formed as a distinct movement "into a space created by the inability of both Black Liberation and white women's liberation to incorporate Black feminists as activists" (p. 127). And, as a distinct movement, black feminism had a profound impact on feminism as a whole (I would extend this argument to the black liberation movement as well).

In the next chapter, Roth focuses on how Chicana feminism emerged from the Chicano movement, particularly on college campuses. Like black feminists, Chicana feminists experienced competing demands on their racial and gender identities. However, Roth states that there were two significant differences. First, "Chicana feminists were not hampered by the necessity of challenging a government-sponsored attack on their community like the Moynihan report" (p. 132). Second, Spanish-speaking North Americans were isolated on college campuses, where they were vastly outnumbered by whites. Roth contends that these conditions helped to create an organizationally distinct feminism among Chicanas.

In general, the structure of the book follows a rather standard comparative format. Given the repeated reference to the importance of an *intersectional* understanding of these movements, the author could have strengthened the book by organizing it thematically rather than by racial groups. There are hints of what this could look like in Roth's brief discussion of the interpolitical debates about birth control that occurred in the "black movement." The contestation of "birth control as genocide" among emerging black feminists and the black nationalists, the Civil Rights movement, and the Black Panther Party highlights the complicated ideological differences and similarities with race- and gender-based movements as well as the influence of external movements in shaping particular feminist agendas. The story of this contestation in each of the three movements could help to strengthen the second of two main goals set for the

book (1) to document the understanding or articulation of feminisms in these three diverse communities and (2) to explore the connections and cleavages between the different feminist movements. As it stands, the author does a better job of achieving the first goal than the second. Last, certain sections appear a bit too celebratory and lack the appropriate accompanying critical analysis. Overall, Roth has written an impressive book that makes a strong contribution to the growing literature on U S feminism.

Democracy in Action: Community Organizing and Urban Change By Kristina Smock. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.

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Kristina Smock dissects the strengths and weaknesses of five community organizing models in *Democracy in Action*. Her extensive analysis of interviews and participant observation also sheds light on conflicting collective urban interests intertwined with racial and class inequalities.

Power-based organizations are led by paid organizers who groom neighborhood leaders. After identifying specific community issues and demands, they employ aggressive tactics to confront powerholders. Westridge Organization of Neighbors, or WON (most names in the book are pseudonyms), mobilized hundreds of Chicago residents for a meeting with their alderman to present their demands. They placed a picket in front of his house and even made an unannounced visit to his office. WON's pressure gained capital improvements for streets, schools, sewer systems, libraries, and local parks. Power-based organizations develop savvy and dedicated local leaders, recruit hundreds of supporters, and use direct action to secure resources and services. However, in most communities, a small number of leaders and nonresident organizers dominate decision making, sometimes using manipulation, and Smock's approach provides no critique of the structural roots of urban problems.

Smaller and less structured *civic organizations*, including the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy or CAPS, strive to protect property values and promote "social order." CAPS members work with police to identify and monitor criminal activity and pressure landlords to "screen" tenants. Although civic organizations improve access to city services, their lack of formal organizational structure limits their impact. Typically dominated by white, middle-class homeowners, Smock points out that their strategies tend to exclude other groups and perpetuate the status quo.

PACT (Port Angeles Collaborating Together), a *community-building organization* comprising over 80 community institutions, developed a plan to rebuild the social and economic infrastructure in Chicago's Puerto Rican community to challenge white gentrification. While PACT created

affordable housing and brought in a large grocery store to the neighborhood, middle-class professionals dominated the initiative, inhibiting the involvement of low-income residents. As Smock shows, community-building organizations' dependence on government support also makes them vulnerable to manipulation and cooptation, a situation that may promote rather than impede gentrification.

Women-centered organizations bring women, often poor and working-class women of color, together in small, nurturing groups to discuss common problems, to strategize, and to take action. Chicago's PILOT (Parents in Leadership and Organizing Together) organized a community center with adult education classes, free child care, and youth activities. Such groups empower individual women and create collectives that are "able to create important changes in the material conditions and quality of life of residents" (p. 209). However, Smock's study illustrates that women-centered projects tend to be small and limited in scope as well as dependent on local government, consequently, they do not significantly influence the public decision-making process.

The *transformative model* is the only model that views urban problems as "symptoms of broader systemic injustices" (p. 29). Organizations like JAG (Justice Action Group) raise collective consciousness through popular education and work toward radical social change. JAG forged "a framework for development that would prioritize the needs and interests of the community's residents, particularly its low-income residents, over those of outside investors and businessmen" (p. 213). Through community forums and direct action, JAG forced a city alderman to stop the creation of a tax increment financing (TIF) district that would have utilized a portion of local property taxes for private commercial and residential projects. Smock shows how transformative community organizing changes the terms of public debate and lays the foundation for broader change. Because their leftist ideologies challenge hegemonic ideology, transformative organizations face challenges building membership and obtaining funding, problems that work to limit their impact.

Smock limits her study to neighborhood-focused community organizing, excluding communities (queers, feminists) and organizations (immigrant rights, anti-police-brutality groups) that transcend geographical boundaries. Because Smock also dichotomizes "community organizing" and "[social] movement formation" (p. 225), groups like Justice for Janitors or Neighbors for Peace and Justice that organize on the local level and are part of broader movements are not seen as "community organizing." This truncated view ignores the long history of groups such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee or the American Indian Movement that link local and national organizing.

Some might not perceive the campaigns of PACT—boasting over 80 dues-paying institutional members—and CAPS—created by the Daley machine—to be community organizations. But because she includes groups with divergent political ideologies and strategies, Smock reveals

fissures that exist in urban communities and organizations—an important task. She shows for example, how language is used to express class and race interests. A CAPS member declares, “All of us want to see a more middle-class community. Middle-class families don’t want gangs of thugs roaming around and causing social chaos and robbing and stealing and mugging people. That’s not safe for their children” (p. 154). The powerful flipside is clear: many affluent whites believe that poor and working-class families, implicitly families of color, do not care about gangs and crime, but instead cause “social chaos.”

Smock deciphers these code words to flesh out the collective perspectives of CAPS members complaining about “youths” (youths of color, monolithically perceived as gang bangers deserving police harassment) or “loitering” (low-income people congregating in public, purportedly for criminal purposes). White middle-class neighbors are not to be confused with people who should be subjected to “tenant screening.” Smock points out that such language obfuscates racial and class assaults led not only by individuals, but city governments, commercial developers, and financial institutions that dehumanize and displace poor and working-class communities, disproportionately communities of color.

Given the limits I describe above, the case studies do not represent the full spectrum of community organizing. Nonetheless, the disparate visions of democracy they illuminate are important to understand. The conflicts between community and city, and within communities themselves, provide insight into the complex dynamics of urban change.

Uneasy Alchemy: Citizens and Experts in Louisiana's Chemical Corridor Disputes. By Barbara L. Allen. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003. Pp. xiii+209. \$22.00 (paper).

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Environmental justice is a significant social movement and especially interesting in its challenges to science and government. From an initial civil-rights-movement-fed 1980s explosion of anger at unequal environmental hazards exposure, the movement has become a broad perspective on race, political economy, transportation, economic development, and sanitation. Environmental justice has influenced the environmental movement and reshaped how environmental sociologists think about their field.

Most environmental justice activists have not been involved in environmental activism and have little connection to powerful national environmental organizations and scientist allies, so their triumphs are especially salient. Louisiana has been a hotbed of environmental justice struggle, fueled by an excess of chemical and oil facilities in a state full of antiregulatory practices and cushy government deals with corporations.

Struggles such as the defeat of the Shintech polyvinyl chloride plant have become national exemplars. The region has fostered the growth of eminent environmental justice leaders like Wilma Subra and Florence Robinson.

Author Barbara Allen returns to her hometown roots on the Louisiana Gulf Coast to revisit the contradictory fragrances of her childhood—malathion and magnolias—in the “corridor” between New Orleans and Baton Rouge, which has one of the world’s highest concentrations of chemical plants, often termed “cancer alley.” Allen focuses on the struggles over what is knowledge and who should control it. She employs Sandra Harding’s notion of “strong objectivity”—she holds that science must be seen in political and economic context, and that it must start from the perspective of affected people, while she also employs commonly accepted scientific approaches. Allen demonstrates how the official science of government and industry is frequently biased, despite claims to be objective. Much of the book focuses on the claims and counterclaims about science. For example, corporations got the EPA to redefine the safety of deep injection wells, so that it did not matter that wastes migrated in the ground as long as they did not migrate to water supplies. Citizens find their own experts to argue against that position and demand that risk analysis include the synergistic effect of multiple chemical hazards. Activists and their science allies point to flaws in health surveys that undersample blacks, fail to examine rare childhood cancers, and ignore many noncancer cases. Activists argue that risk analysis should not put the chemical plant in the center and draw rings around it to show differential hazards; rather, the community should be the center of the circle, so that analysis could show the cumulative effect of all contamination sources, not just the one under current consideration. Allen notes how easy it is for corporations to support health hazards openly by claiming that economic progress helps everyone and that progress requires risk. Allen also shows how chemical plants fail in their promises of local job opportunity: these plants are highly automated, use a small number of highly skilled workers, and import most labor from far away.

The U.S. government has allowed massive chemical plants to build across the road from homes. Apart from an occasionally supportive regulator or attorney general, the state apparatus has also been particularly devious. For example, when Tulane University’s Environmental Law Clinic provided assistance to activists, the legislature passed a law prohibiting clinics from such activity, clearly a major infringement on civil liberties.

The embodied knowledge of people who live with hazards and disease is central to scientific discovery and knowledge production. Allen interweaves that with narratives of people’s histories on the land. Some of the success stems from Reconstruction land redistribution, whereby many blacks owned property and where unincorporated all-black towns maintained a collective commons that they fought to protect against industry. The state environmental agency tried to deny such communities the right

to oppose polluting, but residents prevented that, winning not just a battle against polluters but a recognition of their century-old town status

In light of the nearly feudal conditions of Louisiana politics, it is a testimony to grassroots resiliency how many times local environmental justice groups have won struggles, even as they have lost others. Allen finds that the most successful activism occurred when there were alliances between local residents and expert activists, between local and national organizations, and across lines of race and class. This finding is important, though it would help to situate the Louisiana cases within the broader environmental justice movement, including the nature of coalitions and alliances.

Allen touches on some theoretical approaches, like New Social Movement theory and feminist science, but she does not effectively demonstrate how these inform her analysis or conclusion. While she supports lay knowledge, she draws a distinction between lay and expert knowledge, often emphasizing "objective" knowledge when she otherwise critiques corporate and governmental claims to objectivity. In this way, Allen stops short of showing how collective challenges to science have created new forms of science and hybrid knowledge. Apart from those shortcomings, this lively book is a solid contribution to the literature on environmental sociology and environmental justice.

Amakudari: The Hidden Fabric of Japan's Economy By
Richard A. Colignon and Chikako Usui. Ithaca, N.Y.: ILR Press, 2003.
Pp. viii+224. \$35.00.

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Richard Colignon and Chikako Usui carefully dissect and explain in detail *amakudari*, one of the less understood foundations of Japan's "iron triangle," or the nexus of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians, bureaucrats, and vested business interests. *Amakudari*, or "descent from heaven," is the process by which Japanese ministry bureaucrats retire into the boards of directors of public and private corporations or into politics. While there is considerable movement between the private sector and government office institutions in the United States, in contrast, *amakudari* is always movement from a career government post to a similarly ranked position in other areas of society, never the other way around.

The authors' exhaustive data, gathered from a variety of sources, and interviews suggest that the placement of ministry officials is systematic—based on vertical status differences both within and among ministries—and institutionalized. There is competition among ministries to maximize their influence through their *amakudari* networks and through hierar-

chical distinctions made in assigning bureaucrats to their postretirement positions

The data suggest that the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and the construction ministries are main *amakudari* paths to the private sector. These ministries are also those that regulate and allocate resources to established key private-sector industries such as banking, finance, insurance, and construction. Indeed, the authors found that the retired officials from the highest-ranking ministries were often placed in large, *keiretsu*-affiliated firms.

The section on public corporations discusses the different types of public corporations, their subclasses, and the process by which retired bureaucrats cycle through them on their way to placement on the board of directors in the private sector. One of the study's more significant contributions is its explanation of how reported *amakudari* placements have declined over time while stable numbers of ex-bureaucrats continue to sit on private-sector boards of directors. Through *yokosuberi*, or retirement into public corporations, a high-ranking bureaucrat can "sit out" the mandatory two-year waiting period before assignment into the private sector of firms previously under his purview. Unlike *amakudari* placements to the private sector however, these placements are not reported to the National Personnel Authority (NPA). Though relatively inconspicuous and less regulated, public corporations employed roughly 750,000 workers (p. 86) and have operating costs that are as high as 22% of Japan's GDP (p. 83). The authors' careful explanation of the background and role of public corporations in Japan's economy will be helpful to readers unfamiliar with Japan's postwar economic development.

The role of *yokosuberi* into public corporations is made clearer in their explanation of *wataridori*, another significant contribution. Simply translated, the term means "migratory birds." However, in this context, *wataridori* captures the wide-reaching influence bureaucrats have across both public and private organizations. A retired official may move to several *amakudari* positions after his retirement, receiving sizable compensation at each corporate entity and exerting influence over a wide area. The authors track the paths of officials who eventually were placed on the board of directors in the private sector. In doing so they found status differences among the ministries as well as within them. Their finding that certain ministries have greater influence over public corporations is significant. The same five ministries (the MOF, MITI, construction, transport, and agriculture) not only lead in *amakudari* postings but also in *wataridori* positions. As the authors note, this suggests that these ministries have a strong institutional base in both the public and private sectors. One can extrapolate that, as a result of these numerous connections, reform of the iron triangle will be difficult.

The question of the value of these connections could have been better explored. Are *amakudari* postings a way to provide deferred compensation to relatively low-paid government officials and to make room for new

graduates from Tokyo University? Or do they provide value to the private sector or government? While Japan is known to be a country where relationships are key to being effective, interviews might have drawn out the types of activities engaged by retired officials valuable to the different ministries and to entities within both the public and private sector

The reader will come away from this book with an understanding of the web of complex links among politicians, bureaucrats, and big business that have been the underpinning of Japan's past economic success. As the authors observe, the structure and institutions are "oriented toward stability and encourages organizational survival and effectiveness, not necessarily efficiency" (p. 185). It is obvious, however, that if Japan is to recover its economic potential, these structures and institutions will need to be altered drastically.

Divorce in Japan: Family, Gender, and the State, 1600–2000 By Harald Fuess. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004. Pp. xiv+226.

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It is well known that the United States currently has the highest rates of divorce in the world, however, the fact that Japan held this distinction at the beginning of the 20th century is not widely known outside the fields of historical demography and Japan studies. In *Divorce in Japan: Family, Gender, and the State, 1600–2000*, Harald Fuess presents a careful and very accessible description of the social and political context of Japan's historically very high rates of divorce, their subsequent decline to very low levels, and their recent return to levels on par with most other industrialized societies. This book is a welcome addition to the very limited English-language literature on divorce in Japan.

The book opens with a chapter that summarizes and evaluates alternative explanations that have been offered for Japan's historically high rates of divorce as well as their decline over the first half of the 20th century. Subsequent chapters appropriately follow a chronological ordering, describing the social and legal context of divorce in (a) the Edo period (1600–1868), (b) the early Meiji period (1868–97), (c) the pre–World War II period, and (d) the post–World War II period. Two of the more innovative aspects of the book are its long historical focus and the author's very effective integration of multiple data sources and multiple disciplinary approaches. While historical demographers have used temple register data (*shūmon-aratamechō*) extensively to study family processes including divorce, Fuess's examination of qualitative data, including court cases, popular plays, and media portrayals of divorce, provides a rich representation of the social, political, and economic context in which standard

demographic measures of divorce should be interpreted. Although more detailed discussion of the data sources would have been welcome, the bibliography of these historical data sources will be of great interest to many Japan scholars. Sociologists will appreciate the careful use of these data to describe and interpret socioeconomic and regional variation in levels and patterns of divorce.

It is unfortunate that many good books full of provocative and stimulating insights are widely read only within the small academic circles to which they are of most immediate relevance. This seems to be particularly true of research whose primary audience consists of "area specialists." I hope this will not be the fate of *Divorce in Japan*. While I do suspect that the book's primary audience will be Japan scholars and family historians, the central themes in this historical overview of divorce in Japan should be of broad interest to all sociologists. For example, this book surely belongs on the long list of studies in which careful examination of historical data challenges widely held assumptions about family behavior in the past. Fuess's focus on the implications of divorce for women, in particular, challenges the too-easy assumption that divorce has been unequivocally detrimental to the well-being of women in Confucian, patriarchal societies such as Japan. In contrast to discussions that focus primarily on Confucian gender hierarchy, this more nuanced analysis, which focuses on regional cultures and practices (e.g., trial marriage, dowry return, remarriage) as well as historical social and economic circumstances, suggests that divorce in Japan was a far more gender-symmetric process than is commonly thought.

Another unifying theme is the importance of historical continuity in interpretations of social change. Just as interpretations of recent family trends in the United States differ depending on whether change is evaluated relative to the 1950s and 1960s or within a longer historical perspective, Fuess argues that interpretations of recent trends in divorce need to pay attention to the continuity of historical circumstances conducive to the high rates of divorce in 19th-century Japan. Readers may, however, find themselves wishing for a more explicit engagement of questions linking current patterns of divorce and elements of Japan's historically high-divorce society that have persisted into the second half of the 20th century. For example, how are features of divorce in the historical past—such as trial marriages, the role of the extended family, the importance of lineage, and the minimal involvement of courts—relevant for understanding the rapid rise in divorce in recent years? More important, how do these factors associated with historically high levels of divorce interact with prevailing theoretical explanations for recent trends in divorce, such as changing economic opportunities for women and changing attitudes toward marriage and spousal relations? Perhaps it is better, however, to view these unanswered questions as a provocative challenge to researchers interested in understanding current trends in divorce rather than as a shortcoming of this historical study of divorce.

Making Race, Making Power North Carolina's Road to Disfranchisement
By Kent Redding Urbana University of Illinois Press, 2003 Pp 180
\$34 95

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Rather than looking at post-Civil War disfranchisement as a fait accompli—accomplished by a solidified Southern elite favoring a racial caste system (as argued by V O Key)—Kent Redding asks “How did the mobilization of elites and nonelites shape the road to disfranchisement in North Carolina?” He portrays the outcome of this long process as far from inevitable His argument revolves around the unintended consequences of social movement mobilization (Populists, Republicans), whose political innovations got hijacked by opponents (Democrats) His premise resonates with state and social movement theories “Because contention for power is always dynamic, power is best understood as a consequence of mobilizing actions” (p 12)

Redding starts with a puzzle Given that Reconstruction ended in 1877, how can we explain that formal disfranchisement efforts did not take off until 20 years later and did not reach their pinnacle until about 1910? Neither race- nor class-based frameworks can explain the timing of mobilization and countermobilization He turns to political scientists and neoinstitutionalists (Elizabeth Clemens, J Morgan Kousser) to explain the specifics of North Carolina's disfranchisement campaign

Redding interweaves quantitative analyses of long-term, state-level voter turnout trends, qualitative analyses of political rhetoric employed by competing elites and nonelites, and in-depth case studies of two counties showing key variation within the state's political economy and race politics Chapter 1 presents a sophisticated analysis of declines in voter turnouts throughout the region from 1880 to 1912 Chapter 2 delves into North Carolina politics, paying special attention to how patron-client relationships and the lack of centralized political power during the immediate post-Reconstruction era strengthened Democratic power through the 1880s His dual-county analysis shows how this practice created locally grounded, vertical power relations

Chapter 3 focuses on party building by Southern Republicans and concurrent mobilization among African-Americans, stressing that their ability to capture key local political positions was hampered by an undemocratic county government system reliant on partisan political appointments Yet, this institutional setting led political challengers to concentrate on state-level politics and appointments Republicans and Populists used this window of opportunity by stressing issues like educational access, equal funding, and land reform, thus constructing new group interests and identities along horizontal relations that transcended local boundaries Redding cites their ability to construct interests and identities around race (African-

Americans) and occupation (farmers), respectively, as key to their electoral success in 1896. His detailed description of two counties illustrates how race and class dynamics plus institutional arrangements shaped mobilization outcomes. Democratic countermobilization and blatant efforts by the Ku Klux Klan helped destroy secondary associations at the core of black mobilization.

Chapter 4 continues this theme, exploring how specific taxation issues led to contestations of political power at the local level. The economic downturn of the mid-1880s, in combination with increasing landholding inequality, brought taxation issues to a head. Contrasting the same two counties from the Piedmont (white-dominated, small farmers, diversified agriculture, Populist stronghold) and the coastal plains (old plantation district, cotton agriculture, Democratic stronghold), Redding illustrates how conflicts over fencing laws and road construction laws pitted white yeoman farmers against landowners. "In short, even as elites were attempting to induce white solidarity by maintaining traditional vertical political relations and authority that cut across divergent economic positions, the increasing presence of the market helped transform economic relations among whites and create hotbeds of conflict throughout the state" (p. 77). Resulting party division and organizational weakness facilitated the rise of the Populists out of the Democratic party. As coalition partners, Populists and Republicans ousted the Democrats (1896), repealed the county system of appointments that had bolstered Democratic control, and replaced it with elected positions at the local level.

Ironically, these changes in institutional arrangements emboldened Democratic countermobilization around race and voting rights. Chapters 5 and 6 outline how internal organizational dynamics and intensifying confrontations with Democrats affected the long-term viability of Fusionists and the process leading to formal disfranchisement. These chapters constitute the most riveting part of the book. They chronicle the unmaking of the Fusionists and the resurgence of Democratic control after 1898. The result is a cautionary tale about coalitions and compromise and the consequences of ostensible movement success. Rather than describing organizational hierarchies as either boon or bane, Redding stresses that the Fusionists foundered because their coalition was based on identifying a common political enemy, and the frames they employed did not reflect actual social relations between sets of constituents. While tactical innovation and frame extension enabled the Fusionists' short-term rise to power, their tactics were easily coopted by opposition Democrats, who then out-resourced Fusionists, regained power, and pursued formal disfranchisement efforts to undermine the institutional reforms Fusionists had initiated.

I recommend assigning this book in advanced undergraduate or graduate seminars. Redding excels at making his mix of methods accessible, creating a role model for how to do historical sociology. I hope it will

stimulate discussion—and future case studies—of whether his challenge to Key's fair accompli argument can apply elsewhere

Race in the Schools Perpetuating White Dominance? By Judith R. Blau (with Elizabeth Stearns and collaborators) Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. Pp. xvii+237.

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In this book, Judith Blau and her collaborators explore how race and racism are related to attitudes, behaviors, structural opportunities and barriers, and achievements during adolescence and early adulthood. The authors consider the implications of modern liberalism, with its emphasis on individual expression and maintenance of social and political institutions that support personal freedoms. A central premise of the book is that liberalism has evolved in recent decades into a fundamentally selfish ideology used by white Americans as a defense to maintain their dominance. One version of the liberal argument, the authors explain, leads to blaming the victim (read "blacks"). From this perspective, deficiencies in blacks' families and communities and bad choices are likely to be identified by whites as causes of undesirable outcomes. Structural barriers and group-based differences in power and resources are likely to be ignored. Spatial separation and attitudes of superiority among whites are deemed justified.

Race in the Schools is a collaborative effort. Blau is the sole author of four chapters. Various combinations of coauthors share credit for five other chapters; Elizabeth Stearns is a coauthor of four of these. After introductory chapters on theory and methods, subsequent sections offer quantitative analyses of racial and ethnic differences in educational aspirations and the importance attached to other future outcomes, integrity and honesty, and delinquency. Further, the authors consider the place of the high school curriculum in race relations and the likelihood that black and white adolescents will pursue formal education beyond high school. The data come from the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS) and a related supplement, the High School Effectiveness Study. These data sources allow the authors to study longitudinally individuals who were in eighth grade in 1988 or tenth grade in 1990 in the United States. Additionally, the authors make good use of merged geocoded data, for example in the calculation of diversity and consolidated inequality neighborhood indicators used within multilevel models (building upon the ideas of Peter Blau and Joseph Schwartz).

Admirably, the book represents a serious attempt to make contributions to both race scholarship and the sociology of education. The authors give deeper consideration to the ways systems of meaning and perceptions are

shaped by race and the conditions of a multiethnic society than do most sociologists of education whose work I have read. In this way, they are potentially making a major contribution to education research. And with their expert knowledge of a database that is primarily about schools and schooling, the authors potentially bring new insights to the sociology of race about the specific context of education during adolescence.

Another strength of this work is the attention paid to situating the NELS cohort within a particular historical and cultural context. The authors repeatedly remind readers that the study subjects were born in the early to mid-1970s (most in 1973 or 1974). Interpretations of the data frequently make reference to federal legislation, economic trends, and residential patterns that defined the context within which these young people were educated and entered adulthood. All too often large-scale data sets are treated as if they reveal statistical associations that are timeless and independent of context; Blau and colleagues do better than that.

Despite the book's strengths, I have some concerns. Certainly, analysts need to invoke generalizations and describe central tendencies of groups in the name of parsimony and rhetorical power. Nonetheless, I found that the book was frequently in danger of depicting blacks in the United States as one homogeneous, monolithic social group and whites in the United States as another. When Blau writes that "whites fail to be reflective about the privileges they enjoy, the power they possess, the entitlements they claim, and the extent to which their institutions dominate other" (p. 6), it seems as if she is asserting that this is true without exception. If there were no exceptions to this claim, Blau as a white person could not have written this particular book.

I also feel that Blau misrepresents the work of James Coleman as she summarizes themes in 20th-century social science. Her treatment of Coleman (she describes him as one who asserted that blacks' cultural values impaired their assimilation) strikes me as wrong; he simply did not write about values as much as Blau implies. Her summary of Coleman is just a brief part of the book, but it is one of several places where I felt overly broad claims were invoked to advance the authors' arguments.

This book did not leave me convinced of all of its interpretations and conclusions. For example, I would demand a more comprehensive "balance sheet" of harms and advantages before I accepted the conclusion that current race relations harm white youths just as surely as they hurt young persons of color. The book, however, will guide readers to think deeply about how ideologies and large-scale economic and social forces condition the ways adolescents view themselves, their prospects and goals, and other people they encounter within schools and the broader society.

Regressive Taxation and the Welfare State Path Dependence and Policy Diffusion By Junko Kato New York Cambridge University Press, 2003
Pp xi+260 \$55 00

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This is not just a book about taxes, *Regressive Taxation and the Welfare State* is about the relationship between taxation and the ability of governments to withstand assaults on their welfare states in the face of rising economic globalization, neoliberalism, and budget deficits. The basic argument of the book is as follows. Countries that relied prior to the early 1970s on regressive taxation—especially the consumption-based value added tax (VAT)—have typically developed strong revenue-raising capacities and used them to pay for large welfare states. Regressive taxes were such effective revenue producers because they were broad based and relatively invisible to taxpayers. When these countries began to incur budget deficits as a result of stagflation in the 1970s, they managed to increase revenues with little political opposition and, thus, resisted successfully the welfare state backlash of the 1980s and 1990s. Why? In part because citizens believed that increased revenues would be repaid to them through public expenditures. Sweden, France, and Britain are examples given. In contrast, countries like Australia, Canada, and Japan, which relied more on progressive taxes—notably income taxes—prior to the early 1970s, developed weaker revenue-raising capacities and smaller welfare states. The greater visibility of these taxes, especially when inflation pushed taxpayers into higher tax brackets, made it more difficult to increase revenues as economies began to stagnate. As budgetary problems emerged in the 1970s, these governments often tried to shift toward more regressive taxes having recognized their revenue-generating potential. However, it was often too late. They ran into public antipathy that this would simply raise taxes in order to solve deficits without bringing additional welfare and social security benefits to citizens. The argument is based on quantitative (pooled time-series) analyses of 18 OECD countries between 1965 and 1992 and on qualitative case studies of the countries already mentioned plus New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States.

The book has implications for two broad literatures. The first is the literature on globalization. A number of convergence theories predict that increasing globalization leads nation-states to adopt similar revenue structures. But Kato shows that although there have been efforts by all countries to increase their reliance on regressive taxes, those that tried to adopt them after stagflation hit have been much less successful than those that adopted them earlier. In other words, it is has been very difficult for countries to overhaul *radically* their tax regimes since the early 1970s. This is because governments inherit tax and welfare regimes, on the one hand, and a set of public expectations, on the other hand, that make it

hard for them to alter their fiscal institutions in fundamental ways (e.g., impose altogether new taxes) rather than in incremental ways (e.g., adjust rates of already existing taxes)

Kato's argument is explicitly about path dependence. "In a high-tax and -welfare country, the politicians can afford to increase taxes by existing means, and the electorate accepts the high tax level expecting compensation based on the past. In a low-tax and -welfare country, the politicians are deprived of an effective revenue-raising means and face hostile opposition toward a tax increase from the public without a prospect for compensation assured by the past" (p. 214). As such, the book makes an important contribution to the ongoing debate about whether globalization transforms nation-states and to the literature on institutions and institutional analysis that takes exception with convergence theory.

The second area of contribution is the literature on welfare states. Much of this literature neglects how welfare states have been shaped and transformed as a result of the revenue systems to which they are attached. This book puts the relationship between revenue extraction and welfare spending into sharp focus. Moreover, it offers a surprising, counterintuitive twist. That is, regressive taxes are actually *good* for the welfare state and help *reduce* social inequality. Not only have regressive-taxation states been associated with larger welfare states, but they are also better equipped to enable policy makers to defend welfare spending when it comes under attack by conservative forces. Furthermore, according to an analysis of comparative inequality data (chap. 5), more regressive forms of taxation are associated with lower levels of economic inequality, presumably because the revenues raised through VAT, Social Security, and other regressive taxes are used to finance extensive and progressively redistributive welfare programs. Sweden is the book's best illustration of how this works.

I wish that the author had taken more time to explore the theoretical implications of the book's arguments for the literatures on path dependence and institutional analysis. I also wish that there had been more discussion of the contemporary policy implications of the analysis. Nevertheless, this book has important lessons even for people who are not particularly interested in taxation *per se*. And its very interesting argument about the relationships between regressive taxation, welfare spending, and inequality is something that ought to catch the eye of scholars as well as policy makers on both the left and right.

When Women Kill Questions of Agency and Subjectivity By
Belinda Morrissey New York Routledge, 2003 Pp 213

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Belinda Morrissey opens *When Women Kill* with a provocative question Why are we so reluctant to believe women can mean to kill? Using a “metanarrative” analysis of legal and media discourse surrounding famous female killers in the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, and Australia, she attempts to lend credence to several novel assertions (1) that women do indeed have agency in their violent activities and are active participants in their crimes of torture, rape, and murder, (2) that the murderess is discursively represented as either a monster/villain, a myth, or a victim, and this, in turn, “confirms that female aggression has no place in our culture” (p 25), and (3) that any denial of such agency in female violence refuses women the full freedom to be human Morrissey is very effective in interrogating the media and legal discourse involving women who kill and showing the aforementioned constructions of such women as well as the dearth of “human agency” representations Where she falls short is in establishing evidence that such female agency and power in women’s violent actions actually exist

Throughout her case studies analysis, Morrissey employs sensational and extreme examples of women who kill, and she suggests alternative subjectivities to the discourse surrounding them In her examination of Aileen Wuornos, who is touted as the first female serial killer in the United States, she maintains that while feminist legal discourse and media depictions of Wuornos ranged from representing her as “a poor, abused, deluded girl to a monstrous thrill killer” (p 63) in the murder of seven of her johns, another interpretation can be found Morrissey suggests that Wuornos’s tale is oppressed under heteropatriarchy, which leaves her “unable to articulate her feminine experience without the filter of her own subordination” (p 41) Is it impossible to view Wuornos as not a villain nor a victim, but rather, a casualty of circumstance, with violence being an occupational hazard of a highway prostitute?

Morrissey’s other examples follow similar lines of dialogue While her chapter on “convicted survivors” is thoughtful and detailed in both legal and criminological arguments, her other examples remain extreme Tracey Wiggington, the lesbian vampire killer, and Karla Homolka and Valmae Beck, two women who committed rape and murder in concert with sadistic male counterparts, hardly represent typical or palatable examples of “agency” in women’s violence The reader is left wondering if the demonization and victimization representations are specific to women and violence or applied more generally to inexplicable accounts, albeit male or female, of murder Greatly strengthening her argument would be more pedestrian examples of female violence, added comparisons to male vi-

olence and its cultural and legal discourses, and data—evidence—that illustrate “agency”

Why are the cultural and legal arenas so reluctant to believe women can mean to kill? Why are feminist theorists equally as loath? It is because these violent acts and the cultural responses to them take place within the confines of patriarchal gender structures—structures that often deny women (especially those highlighted in this book) equal value, equal power, and equal humanity. Morrissey needs to incorporate further critical discussion of gendered social structures if she is going to convince the reader that social constructions and previous academic analyses of female violence are inadequate. Furthermore, she needs to be cognizant of the very language she uses to contradict the subjectivities of which she is critical. Describing Wuornos, convicted “survivor” Pamela Sainsbury, and Tracey Wiggington with language that gives imagery of their violent actions as “forced” measures (p. 30, e.g.), last resorts, concerted crimes with controlling men, and experiences of just “snapping” gainsays the very argument of “agency” and power in their actions. The reader is left to wonder about the role of victimization, mental illness, and subjugation by dominating, violent men.

Notwithstanding these limitations, Morrissey begins an intriguing discussion about women’s violence and forces us to confront our assumptions about femininity and masculinity, male and female violence. I hope future scholars of women’s violence will continue the conversation.

Society under Siege By Zygmunt Bauman. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002. Pp. viii+256. \$59.95 (cloth), \$22.95 (paper).

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Among the familiar names in European “social theory,” Zygmunt Bauman is often mentioned as the theorist of choice. On a sunny day in Café Europa, the latest Bauman will surely be enjoyed as another brisk romp of literary sociology by “one of the most original social thinkers writing today.” Some readers may indeed find his work inspirational: a light-handed sociology of the new that illuminates aspects of a fast-moving, contemporary globe. Like his primary competitors in the bazaar of social theory—Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, John Urry—Bauman shares the same brilliant looseness with sociological sound bites: the tireless invention of new metaphors to seize the modern condition. Here, we learn what was once postmodern is now “liquid,” and how we are all now “living and dying in the planetary frontier land.” The book “attempts to trace this transformation and to assess its consequences for the life conditions of ordinary individuals.” Bauman appeared late as a major theorist, his reputation resting on one book about modernity and the Holocaust. In a

few short years, he has emerged as one of the revered masters of a kind of social theory that mixes a heady brew of structural political economy, continental philosophy, moral observation, and critical theory

The first half of the book traces the impact of globalization on modern society's pretense to organize and control—even define—its own sovereign realm. It argues for the demise of territorial sovereignty alongside all managerial ambitions of the modern state. Many of the ideas are familiar from more substantive research efforts that have actually sought to document some of these phenomena empirically. The theme of permanent flexibility and impermanent managerial practices has been much better captured by Richard Sennett, the idea of there being new methods of conducting wars much better analyzed by Mary Kaldor, the new corporate cultures of soft capitalism much better studied by Nigel Thrift. Bauman's method here is, rather, the tried and tested social theorist technique of "cut and paste" synthesis, offering new jargon for empirical observations that others have made out of systematic research. This is possible because Bauman writes in an unconstrained publishing paradise, free from peer review or the publisher's final cut, writing for a press owned by social theorists (Polity) committed to publishing more of their self-sustaining debates. Far be it for such a sociology to ever have to advance testable hypotheses or to engage in any kind of measurable observations of the past or present (or future) that other scholars might work with. Bauman just writes, and where evidence is needed, a quote or citation from a fellow social theorist will do. In this kind of sociology, you can wrap up the book rhapsodising about modern utopias of speed and acceleration and a world beyond all territorial structure, and yet still be flexible enough to throw in some topical commentary about terrorists and a Donald Rumsfeld speech you just caught on late-night TV. This is an intellectual's utopia indeed.

The second half of the book refers to what Bauman calls "life politics" after Giddens and Beck: how, amidst all this liquidity, actors might piece together a meaningful morality or politics, or achieve happiness socially. If anything, there is even less content here. The real failing is the delusion that Bauman has anything to say about the "life conditions of ordinary individuals" (his words). No attempt is ever made to approach real, live human "subjects," or to ask about the consequences of global transformations from their point of view. Were Bauman actually to talk to someone, he would quickly find that the language of analysis he uses is incomprehensible to such actors, whose own interpretative lifeworlds are thus routinely violated by the all-knowing professor. Bauman also fails to ask the obvious sociological questions about institutions or social practices. Sections discussing recent trends in reality television and political spin-doctoring read like snapshot media reviews from a pretentious style magazine. We learn nothing about how these enterprises are organized, who populates these worlds, what power structures lie behind them, or how they actually come to influence viewers and electorates. This is dis-

graceful scholarship by any standards. The book reaches a nadir of sorts when, in a brief discussion about Japanese *furitas* (the new young aimless generation of Japanese avoiding careers), Bauman briefly “quotes” Yukio, a young Japanese person. On closer inspection, even this turns out to have been borrowed from a French newspaper article.

Bauman’s opening chapter poses the disciplinary question of how sociology lost its imperial mission to understand and organize society in its own image, and hence its inability now to grasp the changes underway in society. Bauman in fact gets this whole story back to front. It was not society changing that rendered sociology useless, or even something deficient with sociology as such. Rather, the credibility of the discipline was destroyed—in Britain, certainly, and in the rest of Europe, to some extent—by the whole generation of prominent social theorists who, like Bauman, got lost down a postmodern cul de sac. Read with anything other than a credulous eye, this veteran theorizer comes across as a humorless version of arch French ironist, Jean Baudrillard, who at least had the wit to acknowledge that so much of what he says about modern society is made up. Bauman’s tone is, in contrast, ponderous and gloomy: a dismal commentary that leads to the apparently inexorable message that a lifetime’s social science only leads to a loss of faith in any kind of scientific method. One thing is for sure: Bauman, if nothing else, is prolific. *Society under Siege* is his fifth or sixth similar book in as many years. The publisher’s sponsorship of flimsy, overwrought, speculative sociocommentary, such as this, apparently is limitless.

The Travels and Adventures of Serendipity: A Study in Sociological Semantics and the Sociology of Science. By Robert K. Merton and Elinor Barber. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004. Pp. xxvii+313. \$29.95.

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From its myth of origin, the word “serendipity” should now be “Sri-Lankaity,” hardly a promising start for Robert Merton–Elinor Barber heavyweights. James L. Shulman’s introduction to *The Travels and Adventures of Serendipity* gives its three components as a datum not expected, surprising, and of strategic importance to further thought (p. xxi). The surprising datum then is one causing a *gestalt* shift, or a paradigm shift, leading in new cognitive directions. The richer the preceding *gestalt* or paradigm, the stronger the surprise and shift, so the stronger the feeling that happy chance caused findings.

The word then has an embedded narrative. Around that narrative of chance cognitive success or progress coagulate all the magical responses to uncertainty of personal agency: talent or genius, luck, the obduracy of

tradition, the ecstasy of sudden illumination, the value of training of the prepared mind, and playfulness as a basis for originality. This gathering of magic produced, before the word existed, a multiplicity of fairy tales of chance discovery, including the original one about Sri Lankan princes that Horace Walpole used in inventing the word, it eventually made lucky talented scientists heroes, making the magic of discovery and scientific progress secular. Weber's *Entzauberung der Welt* (taking the magic out of the world) with flair. How could Merton and Barber resist?

"Gestalt shift" suggests oddness, paradigm shift, portentousness. The most common experience of the oddness form is perhaps when a picture puzzle's pesky piece's color, figure, shape, orientation, and fit all come together. For a century and a half oddness was emphasized, for three-quarters of a century now, portentousness in science driven by genius has dominated, becoming the core of the secular theology of progress. Merton himself had a strong taste for oddness, and he developed a taste for portent by founding the sociology of science. This book is mainly about the oddness, and this was perhaps a source of the authors' reluctance to publish it for about a half century.

The data in the book are occurrences of a rare word. Data are remarkably scarce—three or four inquiries in a bibliophile journal may be used to characterize a quarter of a century. A few features of the occurrences (e.g., author, audience of the journal, mistakes in the text, mention or not of the cognitive shifts) are used to guess at the general features of the context, together with a mass of secondary sources. These sparse data are used to analyze variations over time and among social locations in the meaning and popularity of the word. This is the speculative end of a variable stretching from a historian's deep exploration of the context of an event, about which we usually already knew a lot, up to sociologists' grand sweep of ideas with an occasional illustration.

The text reflects consciousness of the high level of uncertainty of such a method, producing a nuanced running assessment of inferences (e.g., "again we have an inkling", p. 97). I myself would boost these assessments a notch or two upward toward "reckless," but I agree with the relative rankings—I am not sure whether there is a notch between "an inkling" and "irrelevant." Quite often the interpretation relies on trusting unevaluated secondary sources. For example, the linguistic relation between proper names and words in a source by Eric Partridge (p. 89) refers to the samoyed breed of dogs: the *samoyeds* are not a Mongol people as alleged in the source, but speak languages related to Finnish, the word is a Russian name for Siberian peoples who call themselves by names related to *nenets*. The word has the Russian root *saami* (*Sami* is also used for the related Lapps in Norway, and Finns call themselves *Suomi*) rather than the root *samo-* (self-) of *samovar*. In spite of Partridge's understanding, most Mongols are about a thousand miles from the nearest samoyedic-speaking peoples. The text clearly shows that the authors here know

Partridge's definition is a speculation. My own unevaluated secondary source is an old *Britannica*.

The book as a whole makes no attempt to be a coherent, well-documented history, as Barber is famous for, nor a coherent theory, as Merton is famous for. It most closely resembles Horace Walpole's fondness for elegantly expressed clever uses of oddness—which Merton and Barber characterize, when Walpole does it, as aristocratic playfulness. I suppose that Walpole and the two of them qualify for Jefferson's "natural aristocracy among men [and women]," justifying calling the book itself aristocratic playfulness. Read it for amusement or as an interesting sidelight on the biographies of some of our intellectual heroes.

New Jersey Dreaming: Capital, Culture, and the Class of '58 By Sherry B. Ortner. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003.

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University of Chicago

In *New Jersey Dreaming*, the anthropologist Sherry Ortner turns her ethnographic eye on a topic very close to home: her own high school class. Weequahic High School in Newark, New Jersey, was a predominantly middle-class and overwhelmingly Jewish school when the class of 1958 graduated. Ortner uses her class—or the 246 of 304 graduates she was able to locate—as a lens through which to study a number of issues in contemporary American society. Foremost among these is the question of class, which she sees as a pervasive social reality largely repressed from consciousness in contemporary American culture. She obtained survey data from nearly all of the classmates she located and conducted extensive and extremely rich interviews with over 100 of them. These interviews enable her to trace out how class, although almost never spoken of as such, is experienced and interpreted through languages of ethnicity, success, and such seemingly personal attributes as brains, motivation, and "personality."

Ortner's theoretical proclivities are importantly shaped by Bourdieu's practice theory, especially as embodied in *Distinction* (Harvard University Press, 1984), but this book is refreshingly clear and jargon free. One of its most distinctive and agreeable features is that it is pitched simultaneously to an audience of professional social scientists and to Ortner's high school class members—and by extension to graduates of other high schools who will undoubtedly read it with some of the mildly voyeuristic guilty pleasure that is never absent from high school reunions. This accessibility should make it eminently suitable for undergraduate sociology courses.

Although Ortner is an anthropologist, this is in many ways a strongly sociological book, which makes modest but crucial use of quantitative

methods in tracing class origins, college choices, and adult status Weequahic's class of 1958 was by any standard extraordinarily successful. The parents of the class of 1958, especially of the Jewish students who made up 83% of the total, had already experienced considerable upward mobility from their own working-class backgrounds. Over a quarter of the fathers had upper-middle-class business and professional occupations in 1958, while just under half were in small-business and white-collar occupations, and just over a quarter were working class. But by the 1990s, nearly 60% of the class of 1958 were in managerial or professional positions (or were married to a husband in such a position), and only 5% were in the working class. This remarkable experience of upward mobility, and this graduating class's rather obsessive interest in achievement or "success," forms one of the principal axes of this study.

No sociologist will be surprised by Ortner's account of how this success was achieved, although her account is rendered more personal and concrete than most sociological studies of social mobility by her rich interview data. Rates of college attendance and completion were very high, and many of those who failed to start college immediately after high school went on to college later. Many took advanced degrees. Weequahic High School had an apparently well-deserved reputation as an excellent school, and many students from very modest backgrounds felt that its academic rigor had helped them to be more successful later in life. Ortner also shows that most of the parents in the Weequahic neighborhood were themselves pursuing projects of upward mobility and instilled into their children the value of hard work and study. Moreover, as Ortner points out, this was a charmed cohort, which entered the job market during the peak of the postwar boom, and even those who failed to go to college often were able to work their way into comfortable or even lucrative jobs. Finally, some people in the less favored categories, particularly African-Americans and women of all ethnicities, were able to take advantage of the Civil Rights and women's movements of the 1960s and 1970s to further their own occupational advancement. Ortner also documents how class backgrounds affected the possibilities of social advancement, advantaging those of higher class both within the social structures of the high school (for example the tracking system) and in affecting the quality of education they pursued after graduation.

But while Ortner shows herself to be a discerning sociological analyst, the most distinctive features of this book are her sharp anthropological eye and her insistence on presenting the experiences of those studied in their own voices. Because the members of the class of 1958 do not speak of class directly, Ortner lets us listen in on her conversations about such topics as ethnicity, success, race, happiness, gender, and remembered social relations in high school and points out that all of these have strong class-inflected subtexts. For example, what she (borrowing from Bourdieu) calls "high-capital" individuals tended to remember the school as devoid of class distinctions and said they were friends with everyone, whereas those

with lower capital were often acutely conscious of differences in income and cultural capital and found their happiness in relationships with friends of similar social backgrounds. But if Ortner shows how class inflects almost everything without ever being spoken, she is by no means a class reductionist. She argues, for example, that while race, ethnicity, and gender are all strongly inflected by class, they are also autonomous sources of meaning and hence have their own influences on people's understandings and practices. For example, she shows convincingly how women in the class, whatever their class origins, were programmed to stay on the "girl track" and generally did so with conviction—that they were expected to and did get married rather than pursue serious careers, were encouraged far less than boys to pursue higher education, and were sent to less prestigious and less costly colleges when they went at all. It was only in the late 1960s and especially the 1970s, when the gender organization of American society was challenged and gradually transformed, that some women in the class of 1958 became aware retrospectively of this gender programming.

One of the great strengths of the book is its careful effort to correlate the experiences of the class of 1958 with major historical changes in American life. Ortner argues convincingly that the experiences of the graduates were deeply influenced by the social changes and social movements of the era—the beatnik movement that opened alternatives to the conformist and materialist world of Weequahic in the later 1950s, the Civil Rights and black power movements that affected the life chances of black class members by the late 1960s, the women's movement of the 1970s that was a crucial context for female class members, whose high rates of divorce and eventual pursuit of careers and postgraduate degrees ran counter to the previous expectations of both their parents and themselves. She also argues that the very success of this generation of middle-class Jews was the product of an earlier "social movement"—this one carried out mainly by individuals rather than by organized protest. By means of large-scale Jewish success in the professions and in the press, the music industry, and Hollywood, Ortner argues, Jews gained a new self-confident Jewish-American identity and a new level of access to high and lucrative positions in American life. She also shows how the safe, prosperous, self-confident, Jewish-dominated Weequahic neighborhood, which was experienced by the class of 1958 as essentially timeless and "natural," was very much the product of a particular historical moment of postwar prosperity. The parents of the class of 1958 made a determined effort to gain wealth and social standing in a pre- and postwar social world beset by anti-Semitism, it was their successes that enabled them to move into this previously WASP district. But the pervasive anti-Semitism also meant that the WASPs promptly fled, producing the middle-class Jewish utopia that was Weequahic in the 1950s. In the next decade, rising racial tensions, culminating in the devastating Newark riot (or insurrection) of 1967, resulted in a massive flight of Jews to the suburbs, and the

Weequahic neighborhood quickly became nearly 100% black. The remarkably homogeneous neighborhood and school, which served as such an effective launching pad for the successful careers of the class of 1958, was gone by the time of the class celebrated its tenth anniversary.

In these historical arguments, Ortner is careful to point out that such social changes do not merely impinge on passive subjects, but that the larger changes themselves result from the actions of many individuals, including, of course, those who made up the class of 1958 at Weequahic High School. As she says at the end of this study, "the main point of this book has been the simple, yet very complex, idea that history makes people, but people make history." Ortner's engaging ethnography of the class of 1958 lays bare a fascinating slice of recent American life and shows convincingly how it participated in the larger movements of contemporary history.

Errata

Because of a font-substitution problem that went unnoticed before publication, the figures in Kyle Crowder and Scott South's article, "Race, Class, and Changing Patterns of Migration between Poor and Nonpoor Neighborhoods" (vol 110, no 6 [May 2005] 1715–63), were printed incorrectly. We offer the correct images now, along with our apologies for the error.




Fig 1 —Observed and predicted trends in mobility from poor to nonpoor tracts, by race
PSID heads of households, 1970–97




Fig 2 —Observed and predicted trends in mobility from nonpoor to poor tracts, by race PSID heads of households, 1970–97




Fig 3 —Observed trends in mobility from poor to nonpoor tracts, by race and income PSID heads of households, 1970–97




Fig 4—Standardized trends in mobility from poor to nonpoor tracts, by race and income, standardized for microlevel and contextual mobility determinants PSID heads of households, 1970–97




Fig 5 —Observed trends in mobility from nonpoor to poor tracts, by race and income PSID heads of households, 1970–97





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
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
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
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